House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to say a few words on the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey.

When Ireland and Scotland had representative Peers, there were 28 Irish and 16 Scottish representative Peers. Now, I believe there are 22 Irish Peers born in Ireland and 61 Scottish Peers born in Scotland. Recent population figures for Scotland showed a population of about 5.5 million, and for Ireland about 2 million. But as the Irish representative Peers represented the whole of Ireland, overall the Northern Irish are fairly represented in the House of Lords, with 22 Peers against 28 representatives for the whole of Ireland before the Republic came into existence. Perhaps Scotland has too many Peers now, compared with its former representative Peers.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. This is no surprise, as I have my name attached to it. I can think of no more eloquent a way of doing so than commending to noble Lords, and the right honourable Member for Torfaen in the other place, the social media video made by young people in Northern Ireland in response to the Cabinet Office video introducing the Bill. It is regrettable that the Cabinet Office put out that particular video.

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Moved by

[Lord Northbrook]

93A: At end insert—
“(7) The Judicial Committee must seek the advice of and evidence from Garter King of Arms (for England, Wales and Northern Ireland) and the Lord Lyon (for Scotland) when determining peerage claims under this section.”

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, my probing Amendment 93A would safeguard the current process of proving succession to a peerage. According to the College of Arms:

“The Royal Warrant of 2004 requires that a person wishing to be recognised as a Peer prove succession to the relevant dignity, to the satisfaction of the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice. Garter King of Arms provides a ruling to the Crown on whether each claim has been satisfactorily made out”.


For more complex claims, the current process is that

“advice should be sought from an officer of the College of Arms in London, the Court of the Lord Lyon in Edinburgh (for Peerages of Scotland), or a solicitor”.

As my noble friend Lord Wolfson of Tredegar said, claims are currently made

“by submission of a formal Petition to the House of Lords and Statutory Declaration to the Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice via the Crown Office, made on behalf of the claimant by a suitable person”.

According to the Ministry of Justice guidance notes, the current situation is that the Lord Chancellor is charged with keeping a Roll of the Peerage to ensure that, as far as possible, records of successions of peerages are kept in good order. The point of my amendment is to ensure that, when the House of Lords is removed from any role in determining new peerages, the existing roles of the College of Arms and the Lord Lyon are fully taken into account, as well as the procedures for proving succession to a peerage. As the noble Lord, Lord Collins, said, this Bill is about hereditary Peers. My worry is that if the Ministry of Justice is to be in sole charge of approving hereditary peerage claims, further legislation could be brought in to abolish hereditary peerages in their entirety.

Finally, as a non-lawyer, may I ask the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General how contested peerage claims are going to be dealt with in detail? Do they go to the lower courts first and up through that process? Why is the final Court of Appeal going to be the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council? From my layman’s understanding, the committee mainly handles cases from our overseas territories and certain Commonwealth countries. Why is it not to be the Supreme Court? I have read that judgments of the Judicial Committee are not binding on UK courts, having only persuasive authority. Does this not add an unnecessary extra layer of complexity to this issue, and could this not be resolved by just replacing the Judicial Committee with the Supreme Court?

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I really think we are giving these matters a significance they do not deserve. I absolutely do not think that the Privy Council should be made responsible for the adjudication. That might have been the case in 1833 and while we had hereditary Peers dominant in this House, but the truth is that the possession of a hereditary peerage will confer no right to sit in this House of Lords. That being so, what is the purpose of this amendment? There is often dispute between prospective Peers: one says that they are entitled and the other says that they are. Well, that is a matter for them. It is a sort of boundary dispute. It would perhaps be a proper matter for a county court—or if, for that matter, there was a financial settlement of some substance, maybe for the High Court—but the idea that the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council or the Supreme Court should be involved in a quarrel between two people claiming to be a hereditary Peer is complete nonsense.

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[The Attorney-General (Lord Hermer) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Wolfson and Lord Northbrook, for their amendments, and all noble Lords for their contributions. These amendments seek to provide how peerage claims in the future will be dealt with. As the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, pointed out, from his own personal experience, there is a need for clarity. In the Government’s view, with respect, that will not be achieved through these amendments, but I hope that this address to your Lordships can provide the clarity that is sought.

I start by providing a brief overview of the Government’s intention for peerage claims, starting with the process as it currently is, as was set out by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson. As many of your Lordships will know, a peerage claim is when a person seeks to be formally recognised as the holder of a title of a hereditary peerage. Usually, it is the case that the claimant of a peerage is the undisputed heir and is entered on to the Roll of the Peerage following an application to the Lord Chancellor. However, as the experience of the noble Lord, Lord Moynihan, illustrates, if the Lord Chancellor refuses—for example, if the claim to title is not immediately made out or the claim is disputed or complex—a person can pursue it by way of petition to the Crown.

Currently, these petitions are referred to the House of Lords to advise the Crown on how to determine the claim. As a matter of high principle, since the Bill removes the final link between hereditary peerages and membership of your Lordships’ House, the Government consider that it is no longer appropriate for hereditary peerage claims to be considered by your Lordships’ House. Clause 2 therefore removes such jurisdiction from this House.

In future, the intention is that any complex or disputed peerage claims, which would have been referred by the Crown to this House, will instead be referred to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. The Judicial Committee’s constitutional role is to advise the sovereign, so it is ideally placed to consider these matters. In answer to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, the position will be precisely the same in respect of disputed Irish peerages.

With those principles in mind, I turn to the amendments. Amendment 93, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, seeks to set out a new process for making claims for hereditary peerages by replicating the provisions of the House of Lords Reform Bill of 2012, which, your Lordships will remember, did not proceed. There are two reasons why we do not consider it appropriate.

The first reason is that it seeks to provide an express power to refer claims to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. However, that power already exists in Section 4 of the Judicial Committee Act 1833, which provides that His Majesty may refer matters to the Judicial Committee for consideration and advice. I am sure noble Lords would agree that, where it is unnecessary to duplicate legislative provisions, we should avoid doing so.

The second reason is that the amendment is based on disproportionality, as it would require all peerage claims to be made to His Majesty in Council, rather than through the filter of a first application to the Lord Chancellor, as the royal warrant provides for. It would place a duty on the Judicial Committee to deal with all peerage claims, including straightforward claims that are not currently considered by your Lordships House.

The amendment would therefore result in a significant increase in claims already considered beyond the stage of consideration by the Lord Chancellor to be entered on the Roll of the Peerage. It would lead to an increase in work of the already hard-working—indeed, overworked —Judicial Committee of the Privy Council. Based on recent figures, the amendment would result in the Judicial Committee having to consider an average of 12 claims per year. By contrast, the House of Lords has considered only seven complex claims over the course of the last 50 years. It would be a very considerable increase in business for the Judicial Committee, and, with respect, it would be disproportionate to place that burden upon it.

Amendment 93A, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, seeks to place a duty on the Judicial Committee to

“seek the advice of and evidence from Garter King of Arms … and the Lord Lyon … when determining peerage claims”.

The royal warrant of 2004 established the Roll of the Peerage, which is prepared in consultation with Garter and the Lord Lyon. The warrant also outlines the first stage in the peerage claims process, which is an application to the Lord Chancellor to be entered on the Roll of the Peerage, which the Lord Chancellor may refuse or accept. Following such an application, advice is sought from the Garter King of Arms or the Lord Lyon, who prepare a report on the claim and make a recommendation to the Lord Chancellor. The noble Lord’s amendment would place a statutory requirement on Garter or the Lord Lyon to advise the Judicial Committee. However, that is not necessary, because the Judicial Committee will already have access to the reports of the Kings of Arms during any consideration of the claim. For those reasons, the amendment would place what we consider to be an unnecessary and duplicate burden on the Kings of Arms.

I hope that I have answered already the noble Lord’s question as to why it would be appropriate for these matters, where they are disputed, to go to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council rather than to the Supreme Court. In essence, it is because the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council is, constitutionally, the appropriate place for the monarch to refer disputed claims. Therefore, we consider it to be the appropriate body, not the Supreme Court.

In answer to the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, as to when the last hereditary Peer will be able to sit in your Lordships’ House, as your Lordships will know, the aim of the Bill is that that will happen at the end of the Session after Royal Assent.

Grateful as we are for the amendments tabled by the noble Lords, we respectfully ask that they consider withdrawing them.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble and learned Lord the Attorney-General for his detailed and considered reply. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 93A (to Amendment 93) withdrawn.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 1st April 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 109 in this group, which follows on rather nicely from my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment but takes it a stage further. The Labour manifesto of 2024 stated:

“Labour is committed to replacing the House of Lords with an alternative second chamber that is more representative of the regions and nations”.


Hence I am, in this probing amendment, reminding the House of the proposals of the royal commission of 2000, chaired by my noble friend Lord Wakeham, in its paragraphs 33 to 38, to receive the opinions of the Government and other noble Lords on them.

The commission recommended that

“a new second chamber of around 550 members should be made up as follows: A significant minority of the members of the new second chamber should be ‘regional members’ chosen on a basis which reflects the balance of political opinion within each of the nations and regions of the United Kingdom. The regional electorates should have a voice in the selection of members of the new second chamber. Those members in turn will provide a voice for the nations and regions. Other members should be appointed on the nomination of a genuinely independent Appointments Commission with a remit to create a second chamber which was broadly representative of British society and possessed all the other characteristics mentioned above. The Appointments Commission should be responsible for maintaining the proportion of … ‘Cross Benchers’ … in the new second chamber at around 20 per cent … Among the politically-affiliated members, the Appointments Commission would be required to secure an overall political balance matching the political opinion of the country as a whole, as expressed in votes cast at the most recent general election. To facilitate a smooth transition to the new arrangements, the existing life peers should become members of the new second chamber”.

The commission then stated that

“party patronage and Prime Ministerial control of the size and balance of the second chamber should cease. The Appointments Commission should ensure that the new second chamber is broadly representative of British society. It should make early progress towards achieving gender balance and proportionate representation … of minority ethnic groups. In order to identify appropriate candidates for the second chamber it should maintain contacts with vocational, professional, cultural, sporting and other bodies. It should publish criteria for appointment to the chamber and invite nominations from the widest possible range of sources”.

The royal commission then presented

“three possible models for the selection of the regional members”.

Each model had the support of different members of the commission. Model A proposed

“a total of 65 regional members, chosen at the time of each general election by a system of ‘complementary’ election. Votes cast for party candidates in each constituency … would be accumulated at regional level. The parties would secure the number of regional members for each region proportional to their shares of the vote in that region, drawing the names from a previously published party list. Regional members would be selected for one-third of the regions at each general election”.

Model B proposed

“a total of 87 regional members, elected at the time of each European Parliament election”.

Clearly, the timing of this would have to be refined, now that we have left the EU. It said:

“One-third of the regions would choose their regional members at each election. The system of election used for electing members”


suggested was the same as was previously

“used for electing the United Kingdom’s members of the European Parliament, although a majority of those supporting this model would prefer a ‘partially open’ list system of proportional representation (PR)”

where electors have the option to vote for the candidate or the party.

Model C proposed a much larger

“total of 195 regional members elected by thirds, using a ‘partially open’ list system of PR, at the time of each European Parliament election”.

Again, this timing would have to be refined.

Model B had the support of a substantial majority of the commission, which proposed that to

“promote continuity and a longer-term perspective, all members (under all three models) should serve for three electoral cycles or 15-year terms, with the possibility of being reappointed for a further period of up to 15 years at the discretion of the Appointments Commission”.

With regard to religious faith, a substantial majority of the commission recommended a

“broadening and deepening of religious representation in the second chamber. Representation should be extended beyond the Church of England to embrace other Christian denominations … and representatives of other faiths”.

In conclusion, the report states that its proposals

“represent a significant change from what has gone before. No new member of the second chamber will arrive there on the same basis as any existing member of the House of Lords. No new member of the second chamber will get there via an Honours List. The new second chamber will be more democratic and representative than the present House of Lords”.

The Chamber would be more democratic because it

“as a whole will reflect the overall balance of political opinion within the country. Regional members will directly reflect the balance of political opinion within the regions”.

The House would be more representative because it would

“contain members from all parts of the country and from all walks of life, broadly equal numbers of men and women and representatives of all the country’s main ethnic and religious communities”.

In conclusion, I believe that the Wakeham commission proposals would make the House of Lords more representative of the regions and nations, as per the Government’s election manifesto.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendment 111 in this group. Over the last four days of debate, I think I have been convinced that there are better ways of achieving this.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

My Lords, I want to say to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, that while I am a hereditary Peer, I am not here to try to stay here; whatever happens, happens. The reason that I and the other 91—92 in all—stayed here was to ensure the further democratic and proper reform of the House of Lords. That was the promise given; not that we would be turfed out, 20 or 25 years later. The whole point is that the Government are trying to do one bit, and I bet we will not see more. That is why Amendment 55 is essential, to try to start putting a timetable on reform happening. Otherwise, after this, nothing will happen; we will end up with a House with no democratic legitimacy, and that will be a problem. I therefore very much support Amendment 55.

I am here because my mother was here before me. She was one of the first five Peeresses to sit here when they allowed Peeresses to sit; she was the Countess of Erroll, in her own right. It was quite amusing, as my mother and father used to have trouble getting tickets for the train. If they were travelling from Perth, where they were known, they could travel down in the same compartment as the Countess of Erroll and Captain Iain Moncreiffe, as he was when they were first married. If they booked from London, they had to go up as Mr and Mrs Moncreiffe, or otherwise that would not be allowed—they did not allow that sort of behaviour. In fact, Claridge’s would not give them a room on the night of their honeymoon for the same reason, so this has been a perpetual problem.

Interestingly, there was always that issue of equality. My mother was also Lord High Constable of Scotland, as that has been in the family since about 1314. As such, at the Coronation, when the Queen went up to receive the Honours of Scotland, my mother was not allowed to carry the sword, as it was not thought suitable for a woman to do that. The Earl of Home carried it as her deputy, but she stood next to the Queen as the Queen received the Honours of Scotland. She had to be there to supervise and to make sure that it was done properly. As a woman, there was no bar to her holding what was traditionally thought of as a male position, and there is no reason why there should be in the future.

I heavily support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Devon, which I think are very sensible. We have got to move forward. There comes a point when it gets too difficult.

I want to say a little about how things get taken over. My father always told me that the communists took over the colour red, not as the people’s blood but because the nobles in Russia, as everywhere, used red as their colour; it is the colour of nobility. What they were doing was usurping the nobles, and taking over their mantle and structure. That is why the communists wave a red flag.

Personally, I am looking forward to future reform of this House, to bring it forward into the 21st century and onwards, in a proper form, not just as a whole lot of people appointed by one person who may be so-called democratically elected but not necessarily by the majority of the country. It is wrong.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendment in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon. I declare two interests: first, as a hereditary Peer, and, secondly, as having three daughters and no son.

I promoted the Succession to Peerages and Baronetcies Bill, which said that daughters should be able to inherit the title when there were no sons. This upset the House; the mood was that the eldest child should be enabled to inherit titles regardless of sex, as per the Royal Family. My concerns are over existing expectations, as mentioned by the noble Earl, and matters such as long-established family trusts. I am not sure about children born to unmarried parents—this might lead to some title-hunters. But I like his amendment on this, which gives some flexibility.

As regards the name of the House, I feel it should perhaps be called the Senate, and that we should go with the Wakeham commission’s idea of LPs—lords or ladies of Parliament—or senators.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

My Lords, I shall make one point about the amendment in the name of the noble Earl, Lord Devon. Until the Law Lords were removed from the House, these peerage claims were decided by a committee on which the Law Lords sat. Members of the House who were not Lords were not allowed to vote in those committees, so he would in effect be restoring the position to what it always used to be.

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[Lord Hermer (Lab)]

The noble Lord’s intervention exemplifies the important conversations that lie ahead as we try to unpick those tensions.

As I have just alluded to, there are wider questions around the future composition of this House. The Government are committed to other reforms, not least the alternative second Chamber set out in our manifesto. There is no doubt that this House will continue to be blessed with legal expertise. There is also no doubt that, with any appointment to your Lordships’ House now or in future, the expertise offered by former members of the senior judiciary will be a blessing to your Lordships’ House. Although noble Lords have pressed an important point and this has been an important conversation, I respectfully ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, may I kindly ask him to comment on the claim by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, that the amendments to the Bill in this group are too wide-ranging in scope? The clerks have been clear that amendments on the composition of your Lordships’ House are in scope on the basis that the removal of one group of Members is closely connected to, and has repercussive effects on, the wider membership. I believe it is against the practice of the House implicitly to criticise the clerks on the Floor of the House, which the noble and learned Lord appeared to do. Apparently, on 12 March the Government tabled amendments to change the scope and long title of the Employment Rights Bill. The Government have therefore done it on another Bill, so there is no need for the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on this Bill.

[Baroness in Waiting/Government Whip (Baroness Anderson of Stoke-on-Trent) (Lab)]

My Lords, on behalf of the Government, I thank the noble Lord for his question. Obviously, it is not appropriate for the Government Benches to respond. The clerks have been clear, and we are discussing all amendments as laid out. We are on the second group of 12 today, so I beg we move forward.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th March 2025 Lords Chamber

To conclude, a limit on the size of the House would restrict appointments to be no higher than the number of leavers, incentivise the House to establish mechanisms to increase the average number of leavers annually, and encourage party leaders to appoint individuals who would add most to the deliberations of the House. I beg to move.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 110 in this group. The report of the Lord Speaker’s Committee on the Size of the House was published in 2017. As most noble Lords sitting here before then know, the Lord Speaker tasked the committee with exploring methods for reducing the size of the House. From the start, it took the view that any reduction in the number of Members must not be undone by reversion to the persistent historical tendency of the House to increase in size. The committee and the report designed a system intended to keep a reduced membership within a fixed cap for as long as the House remains an appointed Chamber, while allowing it to be refreshed and rebalanced in line with general election results over time. It has been strongly supported by the Campaign for an Effective Second Chamber.

At the time, the Lord Speaker’s report proposed a system that could be implemented without legislation. It required a working agreement between the parties and a willingness by existing Members voluntarily to take the steps needed to achieve the target reduction in the size of the House. It did not propose time limits or compulsory retirement for existing Members. The report proposed setting the cap on the size of the House at 600—a reduction in existing membership of more than a quarter, making it smaller than that of the House of Commons.

The committee report proposed, as per the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Burns, that until the target of 600—which the noble Lord’s amendment would increase to 650—was reached, there should be a guiding principle of “two out, one in”, whereby one half of all departures, retirements and deaths from the House as a whole would be earmarked for reducing its size and the other half allocated to new appointments, distributed between the groups on a fair basis. Once a target had been reached, all vacancies would be allocated to new appointments: a “one out, one in” system.

To meet the aim of reducing the size of the House in a reasonable timeframe, the committee believed that it would be necessary to agree the rate of departures from the House. The extent to which the rate was to be increased—a matter for the House to decide—would determine how long it would take to reach the target of 600 under the “two out, one in” system. In deciding the rate, the committee believed it would be necessary to agree the basis on which future Members should be appointed, so that the current and new systems could be interwoven in a way that worked effectively.

Two other key areas in the report, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Burns, were, first, fixed terms of 15 years for new Members, to generate sufficient turnover, and, secondly, fair allocation of appointments to reflect the result of the most recent general election.

The fifth report of the committee, published in July 2023, detailed progress since 2017. Initially, then Prime Minister Theresa May responded positively to the report and, in the first two years of the scheme, good progress was made in reducing the size of the House. Prime Minister Boris Johnson showed no interest in the issue of the size of the House. While the number of departures from the House continued to be in line with the committee’s benchmark, the number of appointments far exceeded departures, and were granted predominantly to members of our party.

There was concern that, as the Conservatives now had so many more Members than Labour, the next Labour Prime Minister would appoint a large number of new Peers in order to get the Government’s business through the House. Of course, this has come to pass, with Keir Starmer having created, I believe, 45 new peerages.

The committee summarised the lessons learned over the previous six years. It now accepted that its original timetable for a transition to a House of 600 was too slow and vulnerable to political events. However, it felt that one of the lessons of the previous six years was that there is little point in going through a difficult period of reducing the size of the House if the progress is undone by excessive new appointments subsequently, particularly if those appointments are not fairly balanced between the parties in the way proposed by the committee.

Instead, it believed that it would be effective to seek to secure a limit on the size of the House and a fair way of allocating appointments before endeavouring to reduce the size of the House or introduce term limits for appointments. Ideally, the committee emphasised, this should be achieved through legislation. As the committee felt that this would not be a government priority, there could be a formal agreement between the main party leaders for the time being. This would ensure that retirements would not be cancelled out through excess future appointments, thus encouraging more Members to take retirement with confidence.

The committee focused on the process for appointing the Cross-Bench Peers, stating that the system was now “a muddle”. The regime introduced by Tony Blair involved the House of Lords Appointments Commission, HOLAC, appointing most of the Cross-Bench Peers, and the Prime Minister making up to 10 non-HOLAC Cross-Bench appointments per Parliament.

By 2023, this was no longer being observed. Instead, there have been a great number of prime ministerial appointments of Cross-Bench and unaffiliated Peers, while HOLAC has been limited to a maximum of two or three appointments per year, with none at all in five out of the last 10 years. While HOLAC appointed 59 Peers in its first 11 years, it has been granted only 15 appointments in the subsequent 11 years.

HOLAC’s aim is to appoint individuals who will add to the breadth of experience and expertise that already exists within the House of Lords, and to help to ensure that the House fully represents diversity within our country. It puts considerable effort into selecting and vetting the people who can best meet the needs of the House and show a willingness to participate regularly. HOLAC’s vital task cannot be achieved with the small number of appointments made over the last 11 years. The Prime Minister should revert to a maximum of 10 non-HOLAC Cross-Bench appointments per Parliament and increase the number of Members that HOLAC is allowed to appoint.

In summary, the amendment seeks to follow three key elements of the fifth report of 2023. First, there should be a cap on the size of the House, although 600 could be optimistic in the short term. Secondly, there should be term limits of 15 or 20 years to allow refreshment and rebalancing of the House. Thirdly, there should be a fair allocation of new party appointments. Fourthly, there should be a mandatory retirement age, which is not in the Burns report but was emphasised earlier by the Government as per their manifesto, although they are rowing back on this as the largest number of political Peers over 80 are Labour. Also, they have appointed several Labour Peers over the age of 80. I believe the combination of all four would bring the House size down to the level required, and a draft Bill should be published to implement these proposals before the end of this Session.

[Lord Hain (Lab)]

My Lords, I do not want to add to the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Northbrook, and certainly not to the excellent case made by the noble Lord, Lord Burns—that is why I put my name to his amendment—except to say that we cannot continue as we are. We are over 800 strong and we keep ballooning, and that has to stop. The size of the House is too great. I ask my noble friend the Leader of the House to reassure the House that she will take this seriously and consider the report by the noble Lord, Lord Burns. Incidentally, that report—I remember the debate; I took part in it—was supported by every party. The noble Lord’s all-party committee was not pushing against a great wall of opposition; it was supported by everyone, and we ought to do something about it. Will my noble friend consider doing so after the Bill is passed? We want this Bill passed as quickly as possible, but then we must return to this issue because it cannot be left on another shelf for ever.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for moving his amendment. However, I am not convinced that it is a very good idea, not least because it would alter the constitution and enable this House to exclude Members of another place from coming here at some point, without affording them the opportunity to say no or to express their concerns.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am not quite sure what

“resolution of the House of Lords”

means: whether it is by amendment and, considering the mechanics of the whole thing, whether it would also have to go through the House of Commons. I am slightly perplexed at how this amendment would work in practice.

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, I find this a very attractive way of approaching the amendments proposed previously by the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, because it moves the initiative back to the House of Lords, which has to initiate the change. Given that it has to result in a vote of both Houses, the Government can just vote it down—so in reality it would have to be something negotiated between the House of Lords and the Government.

The amendment does two really important things. First, it produces a mechanism that can actually happen. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hermer, said that this Government are determined or committed on making further changes. Some of us heard that 26 years ago and it sounded just the same—and I believe it was just as real. There was a real determination then to move forward with stage 2, but it did not happen. I do not believe that under the circumstances in the world, in this Government, in this country or in this economy, any Government could find the time in the next four and a half years for another House of Lords Bill. It just will not happen. If we use this mechanism, we get the ability to change most of the important things that we are talking about in this Committee. The Government would retain control because it would require a vote in the Commons—but the House of Lords would take the initiative. That is a very attractive way of dealing with a lot of what we have talked about in the past three days.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 10th March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus on paragraph (3) of Amendment 11, suggesting what should be in the consultation paper on methods for introducing elected Members to the House. House of Lords reform has been unfinished business now for well over a century, as emphasised in the Parliament Act 1911. I believe the Bill provides an opportunity for looking at several different ways of reform for the House: elected or appointed, or a mixture of both.

The Electoral Reform Society produced an interesting paper on an elected House in December 2023. I will first explore how other countries select members of their upper houses, to give comparison for an elected House of Lords here. The majority of second chambers choose their members by election, whether direct or indirect. The Inter-Parliamentary Union—the IPU—categorises 55 second chambers as predominantly chosen by either direct or indirect election, and only 22 as predominantly chosen by appointment. Many chambers do, however, combine a direct and/or indirect election with a small element of appointment. For instance, while the Italian Senate is nearly wholly directly elected, a handful of life seats are held by ex-officio members, formerly presidents, and up to five citizens are appointed by the President for outstanding service.

In Ireland, of the 60 members of the Senate, 43 are elected by panels representing different vocations, six are chosen by graduates of the two major universities, and 11 are nominated by the Taoiseach, creating a mix of direct and indirect election for some appointments.

In Spain, the Senate combines direct and indirect election based on different territories. The majority of senators are directly elected in multi-member constituencies based on the 50 provinces. Around a fifth are appointed by the legislatures of the autonomous communities, which are themselves elected by closed-list proportional representation—PR.

Concerns are often raised about the potential conflict arising from having two directly elected chambers. Wholly directly elected second chambers can be found in Australia, Brazil, the Czech Republic, Japan, Mexico, Poland, Switzerland and the USA. Within this group are significant differences in the electoral system used, which in turn affects their composition. It is generally agreed that one party should not have a majority in both chambers. Because of this, few parliaments with direct elections for both chambers choose similar electoral systems for both chambers.

Two notable exceptions are Italy and the United States. Italy employs a similar mixed system for both the upper and the lower house, with both chambers also electing on the same day. Because of this, while there may be some differences, the party balance tends to be the same in both chambers. The United States is the only country to use a majoritarian system for both chambers. While using the same system, the two USA chambers have different compositions because of the difference in size of their constituencies and the length of term. However, with party competition forcing a two-party shape due to the nature of the electoral system, the opportunity for gridlock is high. In both Italy and the USA, similar electoral systems are also matched by similar powers.

The majority of parliaments with wholly directly elected upper chambers use different electoral systems in the lower chamber. Brazil, the Czech Republic, Poland and Switzerland have PR-elected primary chambers and use majoritarian systems for their second chambers. Australia has a majoritarian-elected lower house and a PR-elected upper house. Japan and Mexico use mixed systems for both chambers.

Using different electoral systems for both chambers tends to produce different electoral outcomes, which are also supported by arrangements such as different term lengths and staggered elections. For a wholly or partly elected second chamber, the question remains as to which system of election to use. If direct election is chosen, there are many options for the type of electoral system that could be used.

Previous suggestions for Lords reform have put forward different options, including versions of party lists and single transferable vote, STV. The STV option was recommended in the cross-party Breaking the Deadlock proposals in 2007 and the House of Lords reform draft Bill in 2011. As Liberal Democrats will know, STV is a proportional and preferential election system in which voters get to choose their choice of candidate. Constituencies are multimember, returning usually around three to five candidates per district, although constituencies can be larger, and voters can put a number to as many or as few candidates as they like. Candidates who reach the quota are elected, and any votes over and above what they need are redistributed to vote as second preferences, and so on until the places are filled.

The 2011 draft Bill selected STV to ensure that those elected have

“a personal mandate from the electorate, distinct from that of their party”.

STV is a candidate-based system, which means that independents are placed on an equal footing with party-political candidates. In addition, because it is a candidate system, voters are able to choose between candidates of the same party, putting an emphasis on which party candidate they think will be most suitable. Candidates such as community leaders, who have a party leaning but would rather stand as independents, are able to do so without harming their party’s chances by splitting the votes.

According to the Electoral Reform Society:

“In the Scottish local elections of 2017, between a third and a fifth of voters gave their second preference to a candidate of a different party to their first choice. And, whilst many voters are loyal to their party, when no more candidates are available for their first choice party … the majority go on to give lower preferences to candidates of other parties. This opportunity for voters to make more nuanced choices would likely result in a chamber that has a different political character to the Commons.


STV could also help elect a more diverse chamber. Because STV is a multi-member constituency system, it encourages parties to put forward candidates who differ from each other in order to maximise their vote. District magnitude, the number of people being elected in an electoral district, has an impact on the diversity of those elected, so larger STV districts are … more likely to create a more representative chamber without needing additional measures … STV would likely go furthest to fulfilling the goals of a more politically diverse and independently minded chamber where voters would be able to select candidates according to their expertise and experience, as well as ensuring representation from across the regions and nations of the UK”,


which I believe the Labour Party wished for the Lords in its manifesto.

Another form of rank ordering preference is the AV system. While STV is considered a form of proportional representation using multimember constituencies, AV would operate in single-member constituencies and is not. There are of course other forms of PR, namely list PR, which was recommended by the Wakeham commission and the subsequent White Paper in 2001. In 2010-11 the House of Lords reform draft Bill put forward semi-open regional lists. List PR systems can be open, closed or semi-open.

With apologies to the Lib Dems, I will briefly go into the three main types of list. First, there is the closed list PR; secondly, the open list PR; and, thirdly, the semi-open list. There is a range of these types of list PR. Finally, we must not forget the first past the post system.

The 2008 White Paper modelled the options for election to the House of Lords on the basis of an 80% and 100% elected Chamber of between 420 and 450 seats. Using the four different systems I have outlined, while the first past the post and AV options produced results close to those in the Commons, the list modelling showed a greater proportion of seats for other parties, with no single party gaining an overall majority, but highlighted the problem for independents to get a place under this system.

[Baroness Laing of Elderslie (Con)]

My Lords, with all due respect to my noble friend who has just spoken, there is no point in going into all those details about methods of election, interesting as they are. Amendment 11 is wrong, and I oppose it because it would undermine the very basis of our democracy, which actually works very well.

The noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, referred to the Joint Committee report published in 2012. I had the duty—I almost said pleasure—to sit on that committee, along with the noble Baroness and others, for eight months while we went into these matters in very great detail. I recommend that report to noble Lords. The report itself was critical of the then Government’s plan to introduce a directly elected second Chamber. The minority report, which was signed by 12 of the 25 members of that committee, was even more critical of the Government; I especially recommend that to noble Lords.

If we had direct election to this upper House, it would not only upset the delicate balance of our constitutional settlement. It would also totally undermine the delicate relationship between the House of Commons and the House of Lords. I seem to recall that in speaking on this matter back then in 2012, I said something like, “Mr Speaker, I don’t care about the House of Lords; I care about the House of Commons”. If I may correct myself, I do now care passionately about the House of Lords. It is for that very reason that I hope Amendment 11 does not have support here.

The great value of your Lordships is that the majority are not politicians, as the noble Lord, Lord Moore, most articulately said a few moments ago, whereas if we had direct election, the moment anybody stands for election and puts their head above the parapet, they become a politician. I can be critical of politicians because I am one to my fingertips; I have been a full-time one for more than 30 years. As a new Member of this House, I appreciate just how valuable noble Lords who are not politicians are in the work that they do and the scrutiny that this House brings to holding the Government to account.

My second point is that if the upper House is elected, that undermines the position of the House of Commons. It undermines the authority and accountability of the House of Commons. The electorate have to know where the buck stops. There is a direct relationship between the voter and the elected person, which is embodied in our House of Commons, one of the best democratic institutions anywhere in the world. If the upper House were to have democratic accountability and authority, that would challenge the House of Commons—and then the electorate would not know where the buck stops. As Tony Benn used to say, “If you don’t know how to get rid of the people you elect, then you don’t have accountability and you don’t have true democracy”. It is very strange to find myself agreeing yet again with Tony Benn.

My third point is simply that a well-functioning democracy is not just about elections. Our democracy works because of the checks and balances of civic society. That includes the work of your Lordships’ House as a revising Chamber, not as a representative Chamber. I beg your Lordships not to support Amendment 11.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Leigh of Hurley (Con)]

My Lords, the amendments in this group raise some very serious questions—perhaps the most obvious being the opaqueness of HOLAC and how it will work and conduct its business under these proposals. Why on earth would the public be happy for Peers who are their legislators to be appointed by a group of people most of whom they will never have heard of and who are, frankly, regarded just as members of the same elite club?

This is a political Chamber where the Prime Minister of the day needs his ideas turned into law and the Opposition need champions to challenge them respectfully. The PM and the leader of the Opposition must be allowed to choose their own team. The team need not be political people or people with political experience, but they must be people who the PM and the leader of the Opposition will regard as being helpful to what they want to achieve. A while ago, the Labour Party, I think—forgive me if it was another party—went down the route of their Cabinet being selected by someone other than their leader. It was an absolute disaster, as indeed it would be here.

As my noble friend Lord Howard of Rising said—I do not agree with him that HOLAC should be got rid of; I think it has a very useful role—one can see that, under these proposals, it could overreach itself and decide for itself who to appoint on grounds that might be a mystery to the rest of us but feel good to it. The very minimum is, of course, that such people who are appointed are fit and proper, but that is not enough by any stretch of the imagination. Under these proposals, we do not know on what grounds people would be selected in the future.

In previous Bills that have tried to address this issue, there has been discussion of conspicuous merit. I think the Bill brought forward by the noble Lord, Lord Norton, with whom I agreed on everything he said this afternoon—talked about “conspicuous merit”. How does define one that? I am not sure that I could say I have any conspicuous merit. I would ask each of your Lordships to ask yourselves whether you really do have conspicuous merit. Is long service conspicuous merit? We see that some sports people are put in here on conspicuous merit. I do not think that has gone particularly well. As the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, has quite rightly reminded us, what this Bill has got to focus on is hereditary Peers. I was taken by the remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Moore, about the point being that people should be in this House to contribute—to make it more effective, to deliver—which is not a function of what they have done in the past but a function of what they will do in the future. Personally, one reason why I was very keen on hereditary Peers is that they do not come here to get a title, as many people do; they come here knowing, with their eyes wide open, that there is a job of work to do, and, by and large, they do the job of work.

An argument is also made that every person coming here must, in effect, be vetted by HOLAC, and that vetting is to be binding. I note that proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 47 would allow representations to be made, but, as ever, my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne addressed the problem of those representations leading to further judicial review. However, there is no right of appeal—as far as I can see in this legislation—so that cannot be right. Of course, if we go down the route of judicial review—which, as my noble friend Lord Howard pointed out and the noble Lord, Lord Kakkar, suggested in the previous debate, would happen—I suggest that very few people would want to sit on a committee knowing that they were going to be subject to the awful process of a judicial review.

If HOLAC were to be made all-powerful—much more powerful—that committee would need to be investigated very carefully. Is it going to be balanced in ethnicity, gender, age, geography, politics, religion or diversity? We can see a real mess developing. Why would that committee be given so much power when it seems to me that we appoint a PM as we trust his—or, hopefully soon, her—judgment and we must let them get on with it? We elect our MPs to select their leader and, like it or not—obviously I do not at the moment, but I have in the past and I respect the will of the people—we must allow them to get on with their job.

If HOLAC is to be on a statutory basis, or if its recommendations are to be binding, surely we will need much greater access to its deliberations. Does HOLAC now work fully effectively? No, clearly it does not. In my case, I was told on 12 December that I was going to be elevated to the House, but it did not happen until the following December, so there was a huge gap, and I was told that part of the reason for that was HOLAC deliberations. Therefore, the idea of giving HOLAC more power, just when government has said that it wants to reduce the number of quangos, seems to me inappropriate.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly. While I can understand the logic behind the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Newby, I believe that HOLAC, for which I have the greatest respect, is not totally infallible. I examined the issue of my noble friend Lord Cruddas’s rejection by the committee, and to summarise the matter, he was involved in a sting with Sunday Times journalists. He was then cleared by the Electoral Commission of any wrongdoing, sued the Sunday Times in a court and was given extensive damages. He is a respectable businessman, so I feel that, in that case, the Prime Minister was right to overrule HOLAC. There should be some sort of appeal mechanism in that case.

[Lord Mancroft (Con)]

My Lords, before this debate concludes, I think this House owes a great debt of gratitude to the noble Lord, Lord Butler, who has confirmed for the Committee now what I feared in the past: that it is HOLAC’s duty to advise the Prime Minister, the Prime Minister’s duty to advise the King, and the King’s job to appoint. That is as it should be. What he does confirm, however, is that the sole power of appointment to the Second Chamber, from the passage of this Bill onwards, now rests in the hands of the Prime Minister, who has the majority in the House of Commons. If that is not an unbalanced and damaged constitution, I do not know what is.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 3rd March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

I cannot possibly interpret at this juncture the views of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine—I know that the noble Lord, Lord Howard, has resurrected him during this debate. I really do not know precisely why he used the wording, but I know the context in which that “agreement” took place. I was working in No. 10 at the time. We were told by the then Chief Whip, my predecessor, that he feared for the whole legislative programme if we did not concede to the 92 hereditary Peers remaining. I do not feel in any way guilty or dishonourable by regarding that as an agreement that is not valid.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

I am grateful for the noble Lord giving way. Does he recognise Alastair Campbell’s book when he said that he was very astonished that Viscount Cranborne did the deal and that it was only going to end in tears for him?

[Lord Grocott (Lab)]

One person asked me to answer for Viscount Cranborne and I am now expected to answer for Alastair Campbell. The noble Lord needs to ask my good friend Alastair Campbell about that, but I know the facts are precisely as I described. Please do not take my word for it; take it from Viscount Cranborne. We are going to have a long debate, and I know that I have gone on far too long, but I hope that no one will again use that tired, dishonourable excuse that somehow a crucial agreement was reached which was binding to all subsequent Governments, when it was reached under duress.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Thurso (LD)]

My Lords, I have bitten my tongue for the first two or three groups our Committee has considered, but I feel obliged to make a quick comment on the amendment tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Devon—and also because my gluteus maximus has gone to sleep.

We have a constitution, which is the Crown in Parliament. The Crown, based on heredity, works extremely well. Parliamentary democracy, based on heredity, works extremely badly, and I can make the difference between the two. We need a second chamber that is either selected or elected—my preference is elected—and I will stand with the noble Lord, Lord Brennan, in defence of our King.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to say that, as the royal representatives and great offices of state—the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Earl Marshall—are being removed from the House, is it reasonable not to sever the Royal Family’s link entirely with the Floor of the House? I might draw the line at the Duke of York or the Duke of Sussex, but I could tolerate some others.

[The Earl of Erroll (CB)]

I think the noble Lord is speaking to the amendment in the next group. While I am on my feet, I will say very quickly, because this has made me think of it, that if the King does get removed, we will end up with something very close to the constitution of the People’s Republic of China.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Strathclyde (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 4 is a short amendment with a very small impact on two Members of this House. It is less a probing amendment and more one that I very much hope the Front Bench will be able to accept. The Leader of the House, at Second Reading and other points of the debate, has mentioned these royal officeholders and said that there would be some sort of arrangement to allow them to continue to come into Parliament. But I think they should be treated even better than that. They are obviously apolitical Members and do not play a great part in political debate, so would it not be right and proper to allow them to remain as full Members of your Lordships’ House to carry out their tasks?

The Lord Great Chamberlain carries a responsibility for the royal parts of the Palace of Westminster—which are on the other side of the Prince’s Chamber, including the Royal Gallery, the Robing Room and everything else in that direction—through Black Rod. The noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, as Earl Marshal, has been responsible for all the great occasions of state, some of sadness and others of great celebration, over the past few years. Most importantly, and of greatest effect in this House, the Earl Marshal is responsible for the State Opening of Parliament; the noble Duke forms part of the procession and signals to Black Rod to start the great walk between the House of Lords and the House of Commons. My amendment simply allows them to continue as Members of the House of Lords; it is very humble.

Some Peers have asked me if I know whether the Lord Great Chamberlain and the Earl Marshal actually want to stay. Whether they want to stay is not, strictly speaking, relevant. They do not have to come often, apart from the very few occasions when they are required to come. I hope that the Leader of the House will find favour in this principle and that, even if the amendment is incorrectly drafted, she might come forward with her own on Report. I beg to move.

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I too have put my name to this amendment. These two Great Officers of State have been in existence since 1386, in the case of the Earl Marshal, and 1130, in the case of Lord Great Chamberlain. It was intended that they were required not only to perform their constitutional duties at the State Opening of Parliament and other events related to the sovereign but to be a vital link between the Crown and Parliament. To sever that link is a severe challenge to the monarch and deeply regrettable. Therefore, they should be allowed to remain as Members of the House.

I have it on reasonable authority that, originally, the Cabinet Office informed the officeholders that their positions were safe. Apparently, two weeks later, the change of mind was made. I highlight the contributions over the years, and since I have been in the House, of the noble Duke, the Duke of Norfolk, and the current Lord Great Chamberlain.

The Leader of the House has issued conflicting messages on how the officeholders will continue to have access to the House of Lords. She concluded at Second Reading:

“On the specific issue of access … for the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain, I completely recognise that they need access. I have written to the commission to ask that they keep their access passes, and the usual channels have agreed that … There is nothing that impedes the work they do or their roles in this House”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1861.]


However, in opening that debate, she had stated:

“I have already raised this with the Lord Speaker to ensure that necessary arrangements can be made”.—[Official Report, 11/12/24; col. 1723.]


Quite apart from the lack of clarity as to whether these two officeholders have to rely on the approval of the commission or the Lord Speaker, what would happen if one refused to give them access? I therefore propose that, if the Government cannot agree to this amendment, there should be an alternative one in the Bill to guarantee that they have access to the Chamber to perform their ceremonial duties.

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I too put my name to the amendment. My point is wholly pragmatic. It seems that the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain would be better placed to perform their functions, which they have to perform, if they were entitled to come here on a regular basis and were familiar with this place and the staff. To deny them that opportunity makes it more difficult for them to perform the functions that they will be required to perform.

House of Lords (Hereditary Peers) Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

2nd reading
Wednesday 11th December 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, the Bill to remove the remaining hereditary Peers from the House eliminates many centuries of tradition, a golden thread going back to the 13th century. In considering the legislation, I believe there should be further reform included, as promised in the previous hereditary Peers abolition Bill by the then Lord Chancellor. On 30 March 1999, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, stood at the Dispatch Box and said the 1999 Bill to abolish the majority of the hereditary Peers,

“reflects a compromise negotiated between Privy Counsellors on Privy Council terms and binding in honour on all those who have come to give it their assent”.

The noble and learned Lord continued his most carefully worded statement. He said that the “10 per cent”—that is the 92—

“will go only when stage two has taken place. So it is a guarantee that it will take place”.—[Official Report, 30/3/1999; col. 207.]

The words could not have more unequivocal, and 650 Peers left quietly on the basis of that promise. Will the Leader say whether this overrides the convention that no Parliament can bind its successors? That Privy Council promise has now been broken, so why in consequence should we honour the Salisbury convention on this Bill, particularly as there is legal opinion that it should not apply to constitutional changes? I believe that it is the responsibility of the remaining 92 and those colleagues who believe that the former Lord Chancellor’s promise should be adhered to in order to make sure that the proposed legislation includes provision to move to the stage two promised.

I will highlight areas that need to be discussed in greater detail in the proposed Bill. First, because this is a major constitutional issue, there should be a referendum to ask the public what sort of second Chamber they would prefer. Secondly, there should be measures to restrict the size of the House. It cannot be right that the number of Peers keeps increasing so that only the National People’s Congress of China has more members. The right size of the House should reflect the political balance of the parties at each general election. Measures proposed by the Burns commission on retirement and new Peer creations should be included in legislation.

Next, there should be an attendance and contribution minimum, and I note the comments of my noble friend Lord Astor that 50 noble Lords have not spoken in the past five years. There should also be a debate on the retirement age of 80 that was proposed in the Government’s manifesto. The current retirement procedure works well, but unfortunately its effect is totally negated by the more than compensating appointment of new Peers. Slightly confusingly, the Prime Minister has already authorised the appointment of two Peers over the age of 80. I believe that new Peers should not be appointed over the age of 80 and that 85 should be considered the retirement age. The only Prime Minister to limit appointments was Theresa May, and more should follow her example. Next, the Appointments Commission should be put on a statutory basis and be firmly applied to all new appointments, political appointments included, thus controlling the quality of prime ministerial patronage.

In addition, amendments should be considered on the structure of the membership of the House. First, whether the Chamber should be elected should be debated and genuine attention should be paid to the Liberal Democrats’ views on this. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, opined in the interesting TV programme “The Lady and the Lords”, this is what the general public would expect, as is reflected by public opinion polls. We should also consider rebalancing the 25 Bishops to include representatives of all faiths. Next, I propose that the name of the House should change to the Senate, as it will not allow hereditary Peers to be Members or claims to hereditary peerages to be considered by the House of Lords.

Another issue that should be looked at, which is probably outside the scope of this Bill, is the powers of the House. We should be able to amend the reams of secondary legislation that come before us rather than just having the stark choice of agreeing it or throwing it out. Also, I believe that we should have the power to amend badly drafted Finance Bills, particularly where, due to the guillotine procedure, clauses are not even discussed in the other place.

Finally, will the Leader say how some business mechanics are going to work when the hereditaries are gone? Can there be life peerages for shadow Ministers and Whips on the Front Bench? Will there be enough noble Lords to sit on the Woolsack?

I understand that a key reason for the proposed Bill is to remove a number of Conservative Peers from the House, which means that the Government will not have to create the equivalent number of new Labour Peers. However, I feel that the Cross Bench hereditaries have been caught in the crossfire unnecessarily. Very often under the previous Administration they supported Labour and Lib Dem amendments, so they are no major threat to the Government getting their business through. In particular, the convenor should be spared abolition.

What will happen to the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain? I note that they are also to be excluded from the House. Why can the Government not make an amendment to the Bill to make clear that they can still carry out their ceremonial duties at State Opening?

In conclusion, I am sure that without negotiation the proposed legislation will need the most thorough scrutiny so that it honours the promise made by the then Lord Chancellor in 1999 and includes the additional issues I have mentioned.

House of Lords Reform

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Tuesday 12th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will focus on one aspect of House of Lords reform: the Bill to remove the remaining 92 hereditary Peers from the House, thus eliminating many centuries of tradition and a golden thread back to the 13th century. I will also suggest further reform that should be included in the Bill.

In March 1999, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Irvine of Lairg, stood at the Dispatch Box and said that the 1999 Bill to abolish the majority of the hereditary Peers

“reflects a compromise negotiated between Privy Councillors on Privy Council terms and binding in honour on all those who have come to give it their assent”.

He continued by saying, in the most carefully worded statement, that the 10%—that is, the 92—

“will go only when stage two has taken place. So it is a guarantee that it will take place”.—[Official Report, 30/3/1999; col. 207.]

The words could not have been more unequivocal. Some 650 Peers left quietly on the basis of that promise. It has now been broken so why, in consequence, should we honour the Salisbury convention on this Bill?

Also, in 1998, the Opposition Front Bench spokesman, Lord Kingsland, said:

“As I understand it, we shall be faced with a Bill which seeks to replace a House based on a mixture of nominated Peers and hereditary Peers by a purely nominated House. That proposal does not go as far as the preamble of the Parliament Act 1911: it is a proposal that looks backwards rather than forwards and one which reduces the independence of this House without adding to its legitimacy. It is a solution to a problem that I do not recognise. Therefore, in my submission, the Opposition would be entitled to think most carefully about whether or not the Salisbury Convention applied to the Bill.


Perhaps I may put it in another way. We are talking about a constitutional Bill. It is not a Bill which seeks to change the law; it is a Bill which seeks to change the way in which we change the law. It goes to the composition of the sovereign Parliament, of the Queen in Parliament. The Salisbury Convention applies to a settled set of relationships between Commons and Lords, but this Bill seeks to change the nature of one of the two component parts of that relationship. In those circumstances, does the Salisbury Convention apply?”—[Official Report, 15/10/1998; cols. 1053-54.]


I believe that it is the responsibility of the remaining 92, as well as those colleagues who believe that the former Lord Chancellor’s promise should be adhered to, to make sure that the proposed legislation includes provision to move to stage two, as promised. I will highlight areas that need to be discussed in more detail in the Bill.

There should be a referendum to ask the public what sort of second Chamber they would prefer. There should be measures to restrict the size of the House. It cannot be right that the number of Peers keeps increasing so that only the National People’s Congress of of China has more members. The right size of the House should reflect the political balance of the parties at each general election. Measures proposed by the Burns commission on retirement and new Peer creations should be included in the Bill.

There should be an attendance and contribution minimum. There should also be a retirement age of 80, which is already proposed. However, this should not be mandatory; it would be fairer to have a secret ballot of the whole House once a year to decide whether a Peer over the age of 80 should continue. The current retirement procedure works well, but unfortunately its effect is totally negated by the more-than-compensating appointments of new Peers. Slightly confusingly, the Prime Minister has already appointed three Peers over the age of 80. The only Prime Minister to limit appointments was Theresa May. More should follow her example.

Next, the Appointments Commission should be put on a statutory basis and be firmly applied to all new appointments, political included, thus controlling the quality of prime ministerial patronage. Amendments should be considered to the structure of the membership of the House. It should be debated whether the Chamber should be elected. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jay of Paddington, opined in the interesting TV programme “The Lady and the Lords”, this is what the public would expect. I would like to consider the rebalance of the 25 Bishops to include representatives of all faiths. We should consider changing the name of the House to “the Senate”, as it would not allow hereditary Peers to be Members.

Another issue that should be looked at is the powers of the House. We should be able to amend the realms of secondary legislation. Also, on Finance Bills, we should have the power to amend badly drafted legislation, particularly where, due to the guillotine procedure, the clauses are not even discussed in the other place. Finally, how will certain business mechanics work when the hereditary Peers have gone? Can there be exemptions for shadow Ministers and Whips on the Front Bench? Will there be enough noble Lords to sit on the Woolsack?

I understand that a key reason for the proposed Bill is removing a number of Conservative Peers from the House, meaning that the Government will not have to create the equivalent number of new Labour Peers. However, Cross-Bench hereditary Peers have been caught in the crossfire, necessarily. Very often in the last Administration they supported Labour and Lib Dem amendments and so are no major threat to the Government getting their business through. The convenor in particular should be spared abolition. What will happen to the Earl Marshal and the Lord Great Chamberlain? Can the Government make an amendment to the Bill to make it clear that they can still carry on their ceremonial duties at the State Opening of Parliament?

In conclusion, I am sure that the proposed legislation will need the most thorough scrutiny so that it honours the promise made by the then Lord Chancellor in 1999 and includes the additional issues that I have mentioned.

Levelling-up and Regeneration Bill

Lord Northbrook Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 18th September 2023 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Northbrook]

282: After Clause 226, insert the following new Clause—
“Control of Pollution Act 1974: publication of notices and consentsIn the Control of Pollution Act 1974—(a) in section 60(2) for “may if it thinks fit publish notice of the requirements in such way as appears to the local authority to be appropriate” substitute “must publish notice of the requirements promptly and permanently on its planning website”;(b) in section 61(6) for “may if it thinks fit publish notice of the consent, and of the works to which it relates, in such way as appears to the local authority to be appropriate” substitute “must publish notice of the consent, and of the works to which it relates, promptly and permanently on its planning website”.”

[Lord Northbrook (Con)]

My Lords, before I withdraw the amendment, I make a small request for a letter from the Minister. My noble friend Lady Scott of Bybrook said at Report:

“Legislating for information to be published on a specific platform, when it is routinely made available on local authorities’ websites, would remove their ability to publicise decisions at a local level.”—[Official Report, 6/9/23; col. 543.]


However, these consents and notices are not routinely made available by my local borough, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea; they are kept secret and are not published anywhere on its website. I ask my noble friend the Minister to write to me to explain whether he agrees that they should be made available somewhere on an LPA’s website. If not, why not; and if so, what is the objection to having them on the planning website, rather than a separate register, which might be hard to find and the existence of which might even be unknown? After all, the planning website is what everyone looks up to see what conditions have been imposed on an applicant, and the idea that an LPA should be able to hide them on another part of its website is absurd.

Amendment 282 withdrawn.