Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Naseby and Baroness Grender

Committee stage
Monday 14th June 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments is an attempt to ensure that enforcement bodies have sufficient financial long-term sustainability. It also ensures that there are appropriate deterrents in the Bill to incentivise freehold landlords to understand just how serious a breach will be and the impact it will have on their current portfolio of properties. The additional aim is to create an incentive for local authorities to pursue financial penalties.

Today, of course, is the fourth anniversary of the Grenfell Tower fire where 72 people lost their lives, and I am sure that we are all thinking of those bereaved families, survivors and residents as they remember their loved ones. That tragedy underlines just how important it is that homes are safe and secure, and one of the first lines of defence is the enforcement authorities.

In addition to moving Amendment 14, I will speak to Amendment 15. While we appreciate that the Minister stressed at Second Reading that the fines would be for each individual lease, the danger remains that an enforcement authority will receive only £5,000. Indeed, Clause 9(3) states:

“Where the same landlord has committed more than one breach of section 3(1) in relation to the same lease, only one financial penalty may be imposed on the landlord in respect of all of those breaches committed in the period”.


Several noble Lords at Second Reading raised the issue of enforcement and resources to enforce. Local authorities’ trading standards departments have experienced staff cuts of at least 50% since 2010. It is not unusual for skilled and experienced—and therefore more expensive—staff to have been replaced with less skilled and lower-salaried staff. Sometimes trading standards has been contracted out to third parties completely. Local authority trading standards departments need greater sustainable long-term resource and that means generating greater levels of income.

Therefore, there should be a wider range for the fines and a higher start point for the penalty. The amount should be consistent with the Tenant Fees Act 2019 where landlords breach Sections 1 and 2 of the Act on more than one occasion. If you are a leaseholder, you are not a home owner, and therefore the levels of potential fines should surely be similar to those for rogue landlords in the Tenant Fees Act. The Bill relies on local weights and measures authorities—namely, trading standards departments—to oversee this new law. The Government will already be well aware of the sluggish approach to fining and banning rogue landlords under the Tenant Fees Act 2019. When originally launched, the Government predicted that there were 10,500 rogue landlords; so far, only 43 have been registered. Speak to many local authorities and they will report that an operation of this nature requires early up-front investment, but other priorities such as social care with chronic records of poor funding will inevitably come first. As Liam Spender, a trustee of the Leaseholder Knowledge Partnership, points out:

“It is likely most local authorities will decline to get involved, as they do in most private sector housing disputes now, on the grounds that leaseholders have civil claims they can use to recover any prohibited ground rent.”


Waiting for the next local government settlement is a short-term solution and, frankly, unlikely to solve this problem given other competing demands on local authorities. Now the Government are adding another task with too limited financial reward: as the fines currently stand in the Bill, the incentive to take the necessary action to fine a freeholder will not be worth the effort.

Amendments 14 and 15 would raise the minimum financial penalty from £500 to £5,000 and the maximum financial penalty from £5,000 to £30,000. The potential of greater fines would give local authorities an opportunity to invest in this operation, charge rogue landlords and freeholders and therefore sustain a longer-term, fully budgeted operation. If the Government are opposed to this increase, perhaps the Minister could share what level of financial penalty would make it worth while for a local authority to pursue a freeholder. If the argument is that this will have an impact if it is a penalty on a developer across several leases, what level of fine do the Government anticipate?

On Amendment 16, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Stunell, the arguments are similar. It contains a new clause that would be inserted after Clause 12 that would extend the banning order regime under the Housing and Planning Act 2016, with an exception for rent recovery orders. It would ban landlords who received three or more penalties in any six-year period from collecting some or all of the monetary ground rents arising under pre-commencement leases. That should be a clear signal to persistent offenders that, under Clause 9 of the Bill, if the maximum penalty has been charged three or more times against the same landlord or a person acting on their behalf, there will be restrictions and penalties.

We recognise how significant the failure is of this part of the Housing and Planning Act 2016. On 9 January 2018 the then MHCLG Minister, Jake Berry MP, said the Government’s estimate was that

“about 600 banning orders per year will be made”.—[Official Report, Commons, Fifth Delegated Legislation Committee , 9/1/18; col. 12.]

In April, the Housing Minister, Christopher Pincher MP, confirmed that just seven landlords had so far been issued with a banning order. As the National Residential Landlords Association says of this failure:

“The Government needs to work with local authorities to understand the true extent of the pressures faced by environmental health departments responsible for enforcing many regulations”


affecting this sector.

“Too often, government has introduced initiatives to crackdown on”,


for instance,

“criminal landlords without properly understanding whether councils have the resources and staff to properly enforce them. In short, regulations and laws to protect tenants”—

and to protect leaseholders from bad practice—

“mean nothing without them being properly enforced.”

When we look at the level of these fines, we must remember that this industry is vast. The MHCLG’s own estimate is that, of the 4.5 million leasehold properties in the UK, approximately 2.5 million are owner-occupied. All these people are likely to be paying some level of ground rent. The companies behind the freehold interests receiving these ground rents are huge undertakings. They are more than a match for any local authority seeking a £5,000 fine. For example, Proxima GR, a key company in the Vincent Tchenguiz freehold portfolio, reports in its most recent accounts that it expects to receive £2.4 billion in ground rent between 2019 and 2080. It is believed to control a portfolio consisting of freehold interests over hundreds of thousands of leasehold properties. The same accounts report cash income of £24 million in the same year. A fine of £500 or £5,000 for multiple breaches is no disincentive to any organisation of that scale. Information on other ground rent investors is hard to come by but, from the limited information available, there are many other substantial operators out there. For example, in 2016, leasehold properties worth £64.8 billion were sold. Of these, new-build properties were worth £13.7 billion, leasehold house numbers doubled, and developers made £300 million to £500 million a year from ground rent sales. Looked at from that perspective, £5,000 seems a very small sum to put as a maximum. Has the Minister considered an industry-funded redress scheme to support enforcement?

To conclude, there should be greater detail in the Bill about how to resource penalties and sanctions to sustain longer-term planning and funding. These are large industries with significant levels of income and profit: they need to be aware that their days of exploiting leaseholders are over and failure to recognise that will cost them dearly. I beg to move.

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I am delighted to support the noble Baroness on Amendments 14 and 15. I was just reflecting on how important this issue is: hundreds of thousands, maybe millions, of families are affected. The problem probably goes back over half a century. It is to the great credit of my noble friend on the Front Bench that the Bill is before the Committee now, and I say to him “Well done.” In 1968—I see my noble friend Lord Young sitting opposite me—I had the privilege of being elected, somewhat against the odds, as the potential leader of the London Borough of Islington. We won 57 out of 60 seats; we did a deal with the other three, because they were a local community group. I was then elected to be leader and chairman of the housing committee. Sitting here this afternoon, I still remember working really closely with the officers of that authority, from the town clerk down. It was not entirely to do with leaseholds, but it was to do with property and rogue landlords. Two in particular come to mind: a local one called De Lusignan and the one whom we all remember, Rachman. Those rogues and their successors have not gone away—the noble Baroness is absolutely right; they may well have multiplied for all I know. They were a huge problem even in those days.

There is another element, which I can talk about, though some noble Lords might have more difficulty. I have lived and worked in Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka. I have the greatest respect for those countries. I would go as far as to say that I love them dearly; I know them extremely well. As far as I can see, there is a rogue element, particularly in the poorer parts of our country, which exploits vulnerable migrants. That is wrong, and we know that it is wrong, but some local authorities appear to be slow, resistant, unwilling or too conscious of the social situation. In my view, as someone who has taken a deep interest in housing all my political life, that rogue element has to be addressed—it does not matter who they are.

The noble Baroness is right about the figures that are in the Bill. In today’s world, £500 is absolutely no deterrent to anybody: you only have to see what is happening out there in the market. She is right that £5,000 is the beginning of a reasonable deterrent. Personally, I would do a multiplier by five, because £25,000 somehow—perhaps it is the advertising man in me—sings out as even stronger than £30,000. I do not know why that is, but I thought about this when I was working on it over the weekend. I agree with the noble Baroness that £5,000 is the beginning of a proper deterrent, and I think that £25,000 should be the maximum.

Of course, it is for my noble friend on the Front Bench to decide what Her Majesty’s Government believe is appropriate, but all I say to him is that this area needs dealing with, and here is an opportunity to do it. I again congratulate my noble friend and his colleagues on bringing this Bill forward. Let us make a really good job of it.

Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Naseby and Baroness Grender

Committee stage
Wednesday 9th June 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I too pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Best. I am in my 80s and, from talking among friends, I am aware of at least two couples who are beginning to think about retirement homes. The noble Lord, Lord Best, is quite right. We discussed this issue before I even knew it was coming up in the Bill.

This sector of the market is, first, growing—that in itself is very encouraging—and as a country we have been a bit slow in this area compared with other countries. Secondly, it is growing in the sense that it was clear, back in my days as an MP, that there was a scepticism about retirement homes with all these extra facilities, but now it is taken as the norm and people are particularly fussy. If, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, says, a number are caught by this time dimension, it seems sensible that any business that started by the dates he puts in his amendment should be exempt.

I do not understand why 55 was chosen. The retirement age is still going up, so 55 seems a bit generous, frankly. Another 10 on top of it would not have gone amiss, but that is a minor issue. I hope Her Majesty’s Government take the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Best, very seriously; they need addressing.

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, developing adequate housing stock for an ageing population is a significant challenge for this and future Governments. The work of the noble Lord, Lord Best, and the publications by his APPG for Housing and Care for Older People have been essential reading in this area. While we recognise that what is now in the Bill is a compromise achieved following a total exemption for retirement homes in the original consultation, and in spite of the arguments of the noble Lord, Lord Best—whose expertise in this area is significant—when the Minister responds, I still want to understand where the essential difference lies between retirement and other leaseholders, in his or the Government’s opinion. If the straight answer is money required to be spent on common parts, surely a more honest and transparent way to do that is in either the original price or the service charges. However, I hear what the noble Lord, Lord Best, has said today and will study his explanation.

Given that ground rents appear to serve no purpose, as we have already discussed several times and at Second Reading, other than profit for the freeholder or security to borrow to develop more properties, why is this different when applied to retirement homes? I am sure that noble Lords are familiar with the Times investigation into this in November 2019, but it bears revisiting. It uses the example of one retirement property bought for £197,000, in 2009, from the FTSE 250 development company McCarthy & Stone, which was sold for only £26,000 six years later. By the time the flat owner died, she was paying the management company almost £8,000 a year.

The Times went on to say:

“Housebuilders such as McCarthy & Stone argue that without the money they make selling the freehold to management companies they could not afford to provide communal areas for their properties. Yet this is a poor excuse when there are far more transparent ways to raise revenue, such as simply selling their properties for a higher price.”


They often cover that in the service charge. The article continued:

“They insist, moreover, that the majority of their homes have increased in value.”


However, the Times then went on to find that

“one McCarthy & Stone property had lost £45,000 between 2015, when it was bought,”

and 2019. The same investigation found that, as with other leaseholders, elderly relatives are persuaded to use a solicitor who the developer has recommended, who turns out to be the very opposite of an advocate on behalf of the retiree. As the noble Lord, Lord Best, has explained, this group can often be exploited and manipulated.

For those reasons, we are minded to support the amendments in the names of the noble Lords, Lord Kennedy and Lord Lennie, but look forward to hearing the arguments in the closing stages of this debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Grender]

This group has two purposes. The first would be to remove Clause 6 altogether to ensure that informal extensions come under the regulations proposed in the Bill; the second, less dramatic amendment would increase transparency in both formal and informal renegotiations or extensions of the existing lease. I shall deal with Clause 6 stand part first.

We see informal leasehold extensions as a significant potential loophole and the next obvious area to exploit for the “something for nothing” industry in this area. Therefore, we wish to ensure that informal leasehold extensions are regulated in the same way. I appreciate that there may be extenuating circumstances where there is a need for an informal extension—for example, if someone inherits a home and needs to make a relatively quick sale on a very short lease—but those circumstances should be the exception, not the rule. I fear that this will become standard practice unless the Government find a comprehensive way to restrict its use. If noble Lords who speak after me in this debate have concerns and examples of the advantages that an informal leasehold extension provides, I am more than happy to hear suggestions of better solutions than this, but the key question for this debate is how to prevent informal extensions being used, as they currently are, to exploit leaseholders and how that can be reflected in the Bill.

I will be using, in particular, specific examples provided in a detailed blog on this issue by Louie Burns. Sadly, he died a year ago. He was a trustee of the Leasehold Knowledge Partnership and an expert practitioner in the area of leasehold extensions. I have taken the liberty of sharing the link to his blog with noble Lords participating in the debate on this group of amendments.

Louie Burns called such offers “Trojan horse offers”. He described an offer from a real case he dealt with, made by a large London-based freeholder, on a property valued at £230,000 with a ground rent of £75 a year, doubling every 33 years, and a current lease of 75 years. The cost of extending the lease using statutory legal rights would be a total of £13,250, securing a lease of 165 years with zero ground rent.

Often, the freeholders in this scenario are professional money makers. They make money from licensing fees hidden in the lease, through claiming a finder fee for the building insurance, when people have no choice as to who building insurance is provided by, through service charges and ground rent—and, of course, through money paid to extend the lease.

The freeholder writes to the leaseholder offering to extend the lease back up to 99 years—which means that, 17 years later, the lease will need extending again —for £10,200, plus VAT of £1,000, with ground rent at £250 doubling every 10 years, with a short deadline of 30 days to make a decision offered by the freeholder. In the small print, of course, the leasehold is extended only to 99 years—or the freeholder may offer 125 years, without explaining that the extension is from the date that the lease was originally granted, not the date of the extension offered.

Louie Burns went on to explain how the costs described, over a 24-year period, added up to more than £100,000, which will go to the freeholder. Please remember that this is a specific real case, which he provided as an example. When compared, unfavourably, with the statutory route, costing about £13,000, with zero future ground rent, that is beyond shocking. We need to bring this sharp practice under some form of regulation.

The other option is to accept Amendment 13, which would impose an obligation to explain. If leaseholders had the full picture and knew both their statutory rights and the full costs over 24 years, say, they would have much greater control. The alternative is an informal extension to 99 years—which, as I said, would have to be renewed 17 years later, and then in turn makes the flat impossible to sell, and prohibitively expensive to maintain, with the ground rent alone.

An informal extension of a lease also means that the leaseholder is not protected by the law, and the freeholder can make changes by saying things such as:

“We are not looking to amend your lease in any way, we will only modernise the terms of your lease.”


Louie Burns, in his blog, told people to beware of the term “modernise” as used here, because it means “amend”. An informal leasehold extension is a quick route for a freeholder to add additional payment. It is also a quick route for a solicitor to receive a fee—which may explain why, often, solicitors do not give a warning.

The statutory route is slower. With banks and building societies now showing reluctance to lend for such leasehold arrangements, yet again, the person who suffers the most, and is caught between freeholder and lender, and cannot sell, is the leaseholder, who has received minimal information. Sometimes Ministers like to solve such transparency issues through guidance. But if the aim is to ensure that the freeholder complies with the law, I suggest that the transparency approach should be in the Bill. I beg to move.

[Lord Naseby (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has done us a great service. We have all read about these situations. I am not aware of the details of any of them, but there has been enough coverage in the responsible media for me to see that this is a problem. I hope my noble friend on the Front Bench will be able to address it.

I assume that in this group we are also dealing with my noble friend Lord Young’s Amendment 12, although I notice that it is not listed. It says “After Clause 6”. Is that after this debate?