Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Davies of Gower

Committee stage
Wednesday 12th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, in an earlier day of Committee, the Committee heard an exchange between my noble friend Lord Davies of Gower and the Minister. It was pointed out that political gatherings of more than 200 people quite frequently happen in Members of Parliament’s constituencies. Quite often there is a local issue, or indeed a national issue, that encourages public engagement. One of the features of this Bill is that it is striking that there has been no discussion about the impact of the measures in the Bill on the right to protest. That is an ancient right under common law but it is now found also, in part, in Articles 10 and 11 of the European Convention, as scheduled to the Human Rights Act.

One of the Bill documents produced by the Home Office—quite rightly—when this Bill was produced was the human rights memorandum prepared for the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member. That document does not appear to engage with the question of whether this Bill will infringe or curtail any person’s Article 10 or 11 rights to protest. It is noticeable, given that omission from the human rights memorandum, that the Minister and his equivalent in the Commons certified on the front of the Bill that, in their view, it was compliant with the convention. I am afraid that I beg to differ with that analysis—at least to the extent of the amendment proposed on the Marshalled List today.

We will look at what the amendment does in a second. By way of background, it is important to point out that on 6 February this year, the Court of Appeal, presided over by the Lady Chief Justice, produced a judgment in the case of Sarti, Hall and Plummer against the Crown: 2025 EWCA Crim 61. The Court of Appeal considered, as part of the Just Stop Oil protests, appeals brought by individuals who had been protesting by closing Earl’s Court Road. The Court of Appeal, reversing or revising earlier decisions of the courts, determined that it was not necessary for a criminal court hearing a charge of this type to go through the elaborate proportionality tests required in the earlier Shvidler case, and therefore it was for the court to implement Section 7 of the Public Order Act 2023.

Noble Lords will be asking, “Why is all this relevant?” It is relevant for this reason: Section 11 in Part 2 of the Public Order Act 1986 imposes an obligation to notify the police in advance of the date, time and proposed route of any public procession or protest which is intended

“to demonstrate support for or opposition to the views or actions of any person or body of persons”,

or to

“publicise a cause or campaign”.

That obligation to notify the police is not addressed in any way in the provisions of Clause 3 of our Bill, which defines “qualifying events”, and it is not inconceivable to see that there may well be a situation where a public protest falls within the definition of Clause 3.

The Bill is silent about who may be considered the responsible person and who may be liable to regulation by the SIA. In fact, the whole thing is simply inapposite. But it is not inconceivable that, unless an amendment of the type that I propose in the Marshalled List is inserted, there is a risk—albeit, as I am sure the Minister will tell me, it is a small risk—that these measures might be used to curtail protest, or have the unintentional consequence of curtailing the democratic right to protest.

For those reasons, I draw the attention of the Committee to the provisions of my amendment. Clearly, the first proposed new subsection simply ensures, as a matter of construction, that nothing in the Bill should be viewed as curtailing those Article 10 and 11 rights. Similarly, it makes clear, in proposed new subsections (2) and (3):

“The provisions of this Act shall not apply to protests or demonstrations, provided that such protests or demonstrations do not directly incite violence, threaten public safety”,


et cetera. The third provision is:

“This Act shall not be used to impede, restrict, or unlawfully interfere with the right of individuals to express dissent”


or to protest. So, in that way, this measure will simply ensure that the Bill could not be misread by any future Government, or indeed by anyone. I can see no reason why His Majesty’s Government would not accept this amendment or something similar. I look forward to hearing some good news from the Minister. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak in support of Amendment 37B, tabled by my noble friend Lord Murray of Blidworth. The amendment seeks to insert a new clause after Clause 31 to safeguard the right to protest, as protected under Schedule 1 to the Human Rights Act 1998. The amendment makes it clear that nothing in the Bill should be construed as infringing on the right to protest, provided that such protests are conducted peacefully and lawfully, do not incite violence and do not threaten public safety or disrupt essential services. Furthermore, it proposes that any action taken under the Bill that impacts the ability to protest or assemble should be subject to review to ensure that fundamental freedoms are not unduly restricted.

The right to protest is a cornerstone of any democratic society and one of the primary means through which individuals and groups can express their views, voice grievances and influence public discourse. Throughout history, peaceful protests have played a transformative role in shaping our society, strengthening democratic governance and securing fundamental rights and freedoms. From the suffragette movement, which fought for women’s right to vote, to more recent demonstrations calling for climate action and social justice, the ability to gather, express dissent and campaign for change has been essential to our democratic values. Indeed, the richness and resilience of British democracy have often been reinforced by the willingness of citizens to stand up and speak out when they see injustice or seek reform.

However, the context in which we now consider this amendment is one of heightened security concerns. The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill rightly seeks to enhance public safety by imposing new security obligations on certain premises to protect against the ever-evolving threat of terrorism. As noble Lords will agree, this is a pressing and legitimate concern, and our duty to protect citizens from harm is paramount.

Yet, as we pursue this noble objective, we must be vigilant in ensuring that necessary security measures do not inadvertently erode the civil liberties that define us as a free and democratic society. The fight against terrorism must never become an excuse to undermine the very freedoms we seek to protect. Ensuring compatibility with human rights principles is not merely a legal obligation—it is a moral imperative.

This amendment provides much-needed clarity. It recognises that, although security is of the utmost importance, it must be balanced with the protection of democratic rights. The conditions it outlines are both reasonable and proportionate. They would ensure that protests remain peaceful, lawful and respectful of public order while preventing unnecessary or heavy-handed restrictions that could stifle legitimate dissent. The provision for review is particularly important. It would ensure accountability and create a safeguard against potential overreach by authorities. This is essential in preserving public trust, especially in the sensitive area of counterterrorism measures. If people perceive that security measures are being used to suppress dissent rather than to protect them, we risk undermining the very co-operation and solidarity needed to combat threats effectively.

Critics may argue that the amendment is unnecessary because existing legal frameworks already protect the right to protest. However, clarity within the legislation is crucial to avoid legal ambiguities or unintended consequences. By explicitly affirming the compatibility of this Bill with the right to protest, we would send a strong message that we value security and civil liberties equally and make it clear that security and freedom are not mutually exclusive but must coexist in a healthy democracy.

In practical terms, this amendment would also support public co-operation with counterterrorism efforts. When people see that their rights are respected and protected, they are more likely to trust and engage with security measures. Public trust is a critical component of effective counterterrorism strategies. A society that respects the right to peaceful assembly is one where people are more inclined to work with, rather than against, the authorities.

To be clear, this amendment would not weaken the Bill’s security provisions, or shield unlawful, violent or disruptive activities. Rather, it reinforces the principle that peaceful and lawful protest should not be treated as a threat to public safety or security. It provides assurance that this important legislation will not inadvertently target the exercise of democratic freedoms.

Moreover, we must consider the international dimension. The United Kingdom has long been regarded as a bastion of democracy and human rights. By enshrining protections for the right to protest in this Bill, we would reaffirm our commitment to those values on the global stage and demonstrate that it is possible to confront terrorism without compromising the fundamental freedoms that are the hallmark of a democratic society.

This amendment would strengthen the Bill by ensuring that it aligns with the fundamental principles of democracy and human rights. It would send a clear and important message that we can protect our citizens from terrorism without sacrificing the freedoms that define our society. Security measures that respect civil liberties are not only more just but more effective in fostering a cohesive and resilient society. I therefore urge the Government and noble Lords to support it. Let us demonstrate that we are committed to both safeguarding our citizens and upholding the principles that make this nation great. By doing so, we can ensure that our response to terrorism remains not only strong but principled, just and democratic.

Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Bill

Debate between Lord Murray of Blidworth and Lord Davies of Gower

Committee stage
Monday 10th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 35 seeks to extend the grace period for the payment of a penalty notice from 28 days to 42 days. The intention behind this change is to ensure that individuals and businesses who receive a penalty notice are not unduly penalised by an unreasonably short payment window, allowing them more time to address the fine in a manner that is fair and manageable.

In many circumstances, particularly for small businesses and those already facing financial pressure, a 28-day period may not provide sufficient time to arrange payment, especially if the penalty notice is unexpected or substantial. Extending the grace period to 42 days would offer a more reasonable timeframe for individuals and businesses to manage their obligations without rushing into payment or incurring additional costs. A longer grace period would also account for the reality that certain individuals or businesses may face logistical challenges in arranging payment within a short window. This might include delays in receiving the penalty notice, awaiting advice or support on how to address the fine, or having to co-ordinate the payment within the wider operational needs of their business. Extending the period to 42 days would provide the flexibility needed to handle these situations responsibly.

The principle behind penalty notices is not to punish excessively but to deter non-compliance while giving those who have committed an infringement a chance to rectify their actions in a reasonable manner. By extending the payment period, we can help avoid situations where individuals or businesses are unable to pay within the initial 28-day period and, as a result, face additional penalties or other consequences that exacerbate their situation unnecessarily. This amendment would therefore ensure that the penalty system remains proportionate and that the focus remains on encouraging compliance rather than imposing punitive measures that may create further hardship.

Extending the grace period would also encourage greater compliance with the penalty system as a whole. When individuals and businesses are given adequate time to pay, they are more likely to do so in full, reducing the administrative burden on chasing unpaid fines. Furthermore, it would prevent the risk of penalties escalating due to an inability to pay on time, which could of course undermine the effectiveness of the penalty system.

It is also worth noting that longer grace periods are common practice in other areas of regulation and penalty enforcement. For example, when it comes to tax payments, local government fines and other civil penalties, 42 days is frequently viewed as an appropriate balance between giving adequate time to pay and maintaining the deterrent effect of the fine. The amendment would align the penalty notice grace period with that established precedent, ensuring consistency across regulatory frameworks.

Extending the grace period for the payment of a penalty notice from 28 to 42 days would strike a fair and reasonable balance between ensuring compliance with public protection requirements and avoiding undue financial hardship. The amendment would provide individuals and businesses with the time they need to manage their responsibilities without excessive penal- isation, fostering a system that is both effective and compassionate. I urge the Government to accept the amendment and support a more balanced and equitable approach to penalty notices.

[Lord Murray of Blidworth (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to my Amendments 35A, 35B, 36ZA and 37ZA. When the Bill was considered in draft by the Home Affairs Select Committee, which reported in July 2023 under the then chairmanship of Dame Diana Johnson, she said of the Bill—which at that point had a threshold of 100 for the basic tier—with the endorsement of the committee, having heard evidence about the impact of these measures on volunteering:

“However, we are concerned that the capacity figure of 100 for standard tier premises, which will capture some small and micro-sized businesses, and community-run and voluntary groups, could be disproportionate and burdensome. This category is particularly troubling because it would include many smaller venues that may not have sufficient resources to cover costs of what is proposed. It would also cover village halls, places of worship and similar amenities that provide vital community support, often on low budgets. If such places are forced to close down, this represents a win for terrorism, rather than an effective means of combatting it”.


That is at paragraph 39 of the report, and I could not have put it better myself.

The committee made that cogent point and it was responded to; in my Second Reading speech, I praised the decision taken by the Home Office under the present Government to increase the threshold for the standard tier from 100 to 200. But I remain concerned that the effect of the measures in the Bill will be to greatly harm village halls and community centres up and down our country. In particular, the effect of the measures in the Bill will reduce the appetite for members of the public to step forward and volunteer in senior roles in village halls and community centres. In an era when public involvement in these sorts of institutions is waning, it is important that the Government do not make it harder and harder to be a volunteer or a trustee of these institutions. One of the unintended effects of the Bill might be that village halls are no longer the beacons of stability and assistance within the communities that they encourage. The amendments that I propose are directed to removing the worst of the disincentives for people to volunteer and to become trustees.

The way it works in my amendments—if the Committee were to look at the supplementary Marshalled List—is that Amendment 35A seeks to remove the risk that a volunteer or an unpaid trustee would be held personally liable for financial penalties imposed under Clause 17, provided that they were acting at all times in good faith and within the scope of their duties. I do not ask for a general exemption, whereby they can act in bad faith and still expect to be exempted.

Amendment 35B would exclude a voluntary unpaid officeholder or unpaid trustee from the daily penalties, which are described in the Bill as being up to £500 a day. I suggest that that is a powerful disincentive to volunteers due to the risk to their personal liability.

Amendment 36ZA would exempt from criminal liability those volunteers, unpaid officeholders and unpaid trustees, provided again that they have acted without wilful misconduct or gross negligence. I hope the Committee will agree that it is a significant disincentive to volunteering to think that you face, on a cursory reading of the Bill, the risk of up to two years in prison for failing to adhere to the strictures in the Bill.

I appreciate that, as the Minister will tell me, this will be used only in very rare cases and is a maxima. I am sure all of that is right. However, the fact that it is in statute will be a disincentive. People will say that they are happy to volunteer but will not be the responsible person because they do not want to take the risk of having to go to prison. This amendment addresses that concern.

Finally, Amendment 37ZA simply clarifies what I think is probably already clear in the Bill: that there is no right of action generated by the Bill against a voluntary unpaid officeholder or unpaid trustee in the event that a dreadful incident occurs at their venue and that they might be personally liable. Again, that would be a significant disincentive to volunteering.

I hope it is clear why I seek these amendments to the Bill. I very much hope the Government will look carefully at creating the kind of exemptions sought by these amendments.