Rwanda

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Tuesday 23rd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, the Government are very much committed to reforms within the Commonwealth. As the noble Baroness will know, we led a reform package in 2019. I presided over the Foreign Ministers’ meeting which agreed this across the Commonwealth 53—now 54. On the appointment, or reappointment, of the Secretary-General, that is very much a matter for the Heads of Government; it will be looked at in Kigali next year.

[Lord Moynihan (Con) [V]]

My Lords, the communiqué refers to the role that sport can contribute to the 2030 agenda. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that the work done by the 2022 Birmingham Commonwealth Games Organising Committee and the Commonwealth Games Federation on human rights, the accessibility strategy and the Games-wide sustainability plan is world-leading, showcases what can be done when we organise major international sports along these lines, and should be supported by the Government?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My Lords, I am happy to agree with my noble friend; I also pay tribute to his leadership over many years in this area.

Water Industry (Specified Infrastructure Projects) (English Undertakers) (Amendment) Regulations 2020

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Monday 8th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I also welcome the Minister to this hybrid House, and I welcome these regulations. I had the good fortune to be one of the Ministers responsible for water privatisation in the Department of the Environment, working with my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, back in the late 1980s when the water authorities finally concluded their annual struggles to make forlorn cases in Whitehall for much-needed capital investment for large infrastructure projects. After privatisation, they moved into a world where they could access market-driven capital investment regimes. That long-term access to capital markets was critical to funding the much-needed investment programmes that have subsequently served the country well.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Scott of Needham Market, I recall that, prior to privatisation, the annual battles in Whitehall were depressing times, as Ministers and officials from the Department of the Environment sought to make the case to the Treasury to fund water and sewerage treatment works in the face of competing cases being made to the Chancellor for better roads, hospitals and politically popular priorities. It was a very difficult task.

The 2013 regulations, which the Government are rightly seeking to extend through a release of the sunset clause, relate back to those days and the implementation of Part 2A of the Water Industry Act 1991 in relation to water and sewerage undertakers in England. Now, with the water industry in the private sector, it is right that the Secretary of State should seek and gain support from Parliament to continue the 2013 regulations, ensuring that infrastructure providers work within the proven framework that now exists. The delivery of large, complex projects under the current arrangements needs to work well, and it does. The infrastructure provider is well regulated by Ofwat to finance and deliver such contracts.

In the case of London, we have the first: we have the pioneering and far-sighted genius of Sir Joseph Bazalgette back in the 19th century to thank. His foresight enabled London, with a population confronted by reeking, unhealthy open sewers, to be transformed by a remarkable civil engineering project which projected scale into his design work on the diameter of the sewers. He worked on the basis of the densest population and what has best been described as,

“the most generous allowance of per capita sewage production”,

before coming up with the diameter of pipe needed. Apocryphally, and probably literally, he added:

“Well, we are only going to do this once and there is always the unforeseen”—


and he doubled the diameter to be used. His genius allowed London to cater for the subsequent increase in population density, with the introduction of office tower blocks, when with the original, smaller pipe diameter would have overflowed in the 1960s, rather than coping until the present day.

However, investment is now needed and has come in the form of the only project currently to meet the criteria of the 2013 regulations: the Thames tideway tunnel. My noble friend the Minister has made it clear that the regulations have created a parallel regulatory regime to help financially de-risk the Thames tideway tunnel project. This is a project of which Bazalgette would have been proud. It will capture, store and convey almost all the raw sewage and rainwater that currently overflow into the River Thames. The Thames and London will be the cleaner for it. Bazalgette Tunnel Limited, which carries his name, is the infrastructure provider. On completion, there will be a 16-mile long tunnel running mostly under the tidal section of the River Thames.

Does my noble friend the Minister know what effect the Covid-19 pandemic has had on the project’s timing and construction costs, which were nearly £5 billion? In recognising that this is the only project which is covered by the regulations, I congratulate Defra officials on delivering a framework which has kept the cost of procuring the tunnel as low as possible, with remarkably little evidence to date of the cost escalation so common in other infrastructure projects. In doing so, the department has also provided a dispute resolution framework and shown a sensitivity to community disturbance in a usually overcrowded city which to date has been commendable.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 28th May 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, in the brief time available to speak on the gracious Speech, I shall focus my remarks on the UK’s relationship with the European Union. This will be one of the seminal questions facing us in this Parliament and the source of much newsprint and many hours of debate, not least in your Lordships’ House.

Today sees the publication of the European Union Referendum Bill, as promised in the gracious Speech. The result of the referendum that it provides for will chart the course of the UK’s history for the next generation. The Prime Minister’s dialogue with EU leaders in Riga last week marked the beginning of a two-part process: the negotiation of the package of reforms, followed by the referendum campaign itself. These are very early days and the Prime Minister is absolutely right to start with a broad-brush approach that lays the groundwork for a deal, sounding out the views of others in Europe and putting the desire for reform in the UK in context before revealing his full negotiating hand in the detailed discussions that lie ahead.

Prior to the election, there were some discordant murmurings about the dearth of concrete proposals on the table and objections to their vague, unquantifiable nature. However, nothing would have been more guaranteed to backfire spectacularly than a hectoring list of British demands laid before our European partners. For this process to succeed it must be about the interests of Britain—those are plainly paramount—but also about a determination to improve the EU as a whole.

Britain does not stand alone in wanting the EU to work better—far from it. Many in Europe share the same vision of a reformed, recalibrated EU with a vibrant single market freed from the stranglehold of red tape. To succeed, we need to work with the grain of that opinion, not against it. This cannot be seen across the channel as a zero-sum process in which the recalcitrant is pitted stubbornly against the reluctant, and where the best deal for Britain by definition will result in a diminished EU. Indeed, the opposite is true. Our interests are aligned with a great many in Europe. In securing real reform, Britain will work better within the EU and the EU will work better for all its citizens.

Paradoxically, it sometimes seems that those with the pragmatic perspective that location on the geographical periphery often bestows are best able to provide the impetus, energy and momentum for positive change at the centre. While we must allay concerns that ours will be a pick-and-mix approach that will undermine EU cohesion, fears that a British deal could open the floodgates for other countries to seek concessions and create a free-for-all of competing demands should be squarely countered on the basis that institutions that are not prepared to adapt and to flex in accordance with the needs and wishes of their members become over time at best irrelevant and at worst extinct. Straitjacketing 28 member states to achieve unity is no long-term solution.

Monday’s meeting at Chequers with EU Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker set a constructive tone and it is to be hoped that the Prime Minister’s meeting with Mrs Merkel tomorrow will do likewise. Her support for a deal will be essential, and while we should not suppose that Germany will support the unpicking of the treaties governing the EU to accommodate a British wish list, there is reason to suppose that our liberal-market advocacy earns us a certain amount of good will in Berlin. Indeed, the mood music from our European partners since the Prime Minister’s decisive election victory has become far more emollient. The hypothetical is now real: Britain will decide the European question through a referendum. This is surely concentrating minds in Europe on how a fair deal for the UK might be agreed.

I do not believe there is any appetite in Europe to see Britain leave the EU. The UK is no longer considered an affordable loss, as former EU Commissioner Günter Verheugen put it. The UK is crucial to both the economic future of Europe and its political future, but that still does not mean a blank cheque to write whatever changes we want. Just as we will have red lines, so too will our European partners, and we cannot demand other countries change any more than they can demand that we must. While stating our position clearly and firmly, we must address concerns that there will be a reductio ad absurdum of the fundamental essence of the EU, even if we do not share those concerns.

I have spoken about the need for EU reform and the prospects for a deal from the perspective of an unapologetic and instinctive Eurorealist, with the roots of my conviction firmly based in the history of the 20th century. I want to see the best outcome for the renegotiation effort, followed by a government campaign in favour of membership of a reformed EU. I echo the Foreign Secretary’s words:

“That is how I want this process to end up: a good package of reforms; a ‘yes’ vote; and a step change in the way the relationship works, with Britain being really engaged and a loud voice in the union”.

The Prime Minister has made it clear that he wants the UK to stay in a reformed EU that is,

“more competitive, more flexible and more accountable to the people”.

The start of his efforts to achieve that is not the time to ask the Government what they will do in the referendum if that necessary reform is not forthcoming.

Of course, there will be those who seek to defeat a deal before it is even struck, and those who say that any promise of reform is no more than a chimera or fig-leaf, unable to cover the deep fractures and fissures that the European question always opens. But the deal is a prelude and the referendum is the denouement. I agree with the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, that unlike with the last referendum in 1974 the result needs to settle the European question for a generation, with no room left for disgruntled malcontents to express their resentment at the outcome or to suggest that the British public have been hoodwinked into a deal that is not really a deal. For this reason, voters are right to be asked only the simple in/out question.

ISIL: Iraq and Syria

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

The noble Lord, Lord St John, refers to the sale of oil, as others have. Clearly, one of the difficulties has been that in its initial push ISIL took control over oil supply places. It certainly controls that oil and can sell it, as it has, on the black market. If it is selling it on the black market, perhaps to Syria, one can understand that our influence on Assad might be rather minimal. But if we can have discussions with other colleagues, as we do, we would hope to find a way of encouraging others to bear down on Assad and ensure that they are not in any way assisting the black-market sale of oil. We all know it is happening, even if we cannot prove where it is going or who is selling it, because ISIL is controlling the production and benefiting from billions of pounds. There has to be a link somewhere.

Reducing access to other funds will be a matter of negotiation with other colleagues in the coalition. I am sure that they will be in discussions about how they can have an influence on individuals and countries, but there is no proof at the moment that the money is coming from a particular country.

The point about propaganda is a critical one. This organisation is very sophisticated, and I think we all have a duty in our civic life here to ensure that every time people mention it to us, we do not give voice to what ISIL has been spreading.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the Statement and the timely initiative by the Foreign Secretary. I particularly welcome the comments that the Minister has made about the critical role of Turkey. There is one aspect of domestic policy that is noted in the Statement: the Foreign Secretary has said that,

“we are seeking to strengthen the powers of the Charity Commission to counter terrorist abuse of the charity sector”.

Given that such action would already be illegal, will the Minister undertake to ensure that in due course the House is briefed on how this will be achieved?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, I certainly will. In the Statement I have made a series of statements about what we hope to do with regard to our own security and changes that will be made, and the issue that my noble friend raises is one of those. I know that the Home Secretary has already started negotiations, both within the coalition and elsewhere, and as soon as we are in a position to be able to make clear what steps we may take, obviously I will be in a position to assist the House.

Russia

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, on two occasions in my career I have been involved in British foreign policy, as a political adviser in 1982 to the then Foreign Secretary Francis Pym, and then as foreign affairs spokesman in your Lordships’ House—prior to the outstanding work undertaken by my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford, with whom I am in strong agreement today—where for years the noble Baronesses, Lady Symons and Lady Williams, and I sparred and reflected on the need to offer sound advice and effective stewardship to those in Russia seeking to undertake an economic revolution; prevent the lurching to and fro between revanchist politics; and alleviate the threat of civil war in 1993 and the chaos of monetary, military and economic relations among the successor states of the Soviet empire. As Professor Sachs reflected on the early years after the ending of the Soviet era,

“the West did almost nothing to affect the outcomes for democracy and market reforms in Russia, despite all the high-minded rhetoric to the contrary”.

From the power vacuum that Vladimir Putin experienced as an insider at the early stages of his political career, the Russian people have sought political resurrection through strong leadership, “a strong hand”, always aware that deeply embedded in the Russian DNA was a growing link between a yearning for nationalism and an awareness of what they perceived as the historical injustice to the sizeable Russian-speaking minorities in the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union, especially in the other major Slav state, Ukraine, and in Crimea.

Like the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, I believe that it is only by wiping the fog off the history lens that we can identify the building blocks to design a foreign policy towards Russia to counter perceived Russian aggression to the outside world and resurgent domestic nationalism. This pragmatic foreign policy should be equally beneficial to Russia and the successor states of the Soviet empire. On the one hand, such a policy should consistently reflect our belief in human rights, the rule of law, parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions. In so doing, we should never lose sight of recognising that, despite the Russia/Ukraine history, where the borders frequently changed in the 20th century, this House today rightly believes that international law should never be ignored, borders must not be changed by force and countries under the rule of law must be entitled to make their own choices.

So, the questions that we need to answer are as follows. Are the steps that we are taking now likely to achieve the goal of a new Ukraine that is acceptable equally to its people and to the interests of Russia and of the West? Is there a direct correlation between strengthening sanctions and the likelihood that Russia will withdraw support from eastern Ukraine? I am unconvinced that the current approach will necessarily succeed. If I am right, we need to be absolutely sure that our actions will not succumb to the law of unintended consequences. What is important is the need to explore a foreign policy based on compartmentalisation.

Let me briefly explain what I mean by compartmentalising our approach to Russia. Russia should be, and is, critical to the overall success of the war against ISIS. Russia is a key conduit to Iran and Assad. I am sure that Russia should and would welcome our approach for a joint policy towards ISIS, especially so since Russia itself is not immune to fanatical and murderous extremism. That was amply demonstrated only a few days ago when a suicide bomber blew himself up in the Chechen capital, Grozny, killing five police officers and wounding at least 12 civilians. It is therefore essential that we seek to separate out a row we have with Russia on the key issue of Ukraine while designing a framework of engagement on strategic, political and economic matters that are relevant to us both. That is not to say that we should not maintain strong pressure on the Russian Federation about Ukraine and Crimea using a range of measures, but we should compartmentalise that approach in order to pursue areas of mutual interest.

The key date woven into this growing tapestry of cross-border interests was 30 August 2013, when the vote about taking concerted action with the United States against Assad was lost in the House of Commons, with a corresponding collapse of momentum in Washington. Once the West backed down from taking action in the face of the blatant use of chemical weapons, the pendulum had swung. A new era—sadly but correctly interpreted by President Putin as an age of reluctance—was born in which American power remains dominant but no longer determinant. Months later, the timing of Crimean annexation could wait until President Putin had returned to Moscow after the closing ceremony of the winter Olympic Games, while public support continued to climb across Russia as the troops moved in, dismissive of the United Kingdom in particular. We risk failing to grasp the importance of Russian influence in achieving our foreign policy goals.

Martin Wolf, writing on the conflict, concluded that,

“there is no greater foreign policy question than how to deal with today’s Russia”.

I add that there is no greater foreign policy question than how we see ourselves and, from that perspective, how we win the peace as well as wars, and how we define our role in foreign policy in the 21st century. If we do not follow a policy of compartmentalisation towards Russia and the successor states of the Soviet Union then, as you move east through Europe, starting in France and Germany, you can rest assured that Governments on mainland Europe, through either the front or back doors, will deliver on this agenda. In the mean time, as my noble friend Lord Howell said, the global oil price is most likely to prove the most potent foreign policy factor for a change in Russian policy direction towards both Ukraine and the West.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Wednesday 11th June 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend the Minister highlighted the forthcoming Commonwealth Games and the World Cup in her opening speech. She spoke of soft power, and sport was, of course, a key part in the deliberations of the committee chaired on that subject by my noble friend Lord Howell of Guildford. I note that “culture” lies in the title of today’s debate, Either there is a typo in the omission of “media and sport” or, more likely, it is an all-embracing recognition of the Corinthian ideal of sport for the able-bodied and disabled alike as inherent in the Foreign Office’s lexicon of a civilised culture.

In reflecting on the brave speech of the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, I believe that it is the governance of sport that is the central issue for the solution to the development of sport in the United Kingdom, and it should be central to our influence within international federations of sport. The rapid global commercialisation of sport over the past 30 years has transformed the relationship between sports policy and the law-makers across the world. The autonomy of sport or, as the European Union calls it in the Nice treaty, the specificity of sport, is important, but it must be earned—it is not a right. Governments, either directly through Treasury support on financial guarantees for major events or indirectly through lottery funding, have significantly increased investment in the sector and placed growing importance on sport and recreation in government policy formulation, including overseas development and diplomacy.

We need to address the consequences of this generational change. We must capture the inspiration of a nation that embraced the Olympic and Paralympic Games, and will do so again through the Commonwealth Games. The soft power accrued from these Games should not be underestimated. We need to look to government to deliver a sports legacy from the 2012 Games—a legacy still capable of transforming the sporting landscape of the United Kingdom in terms of facilities and opportunities, especially for our children, able-bodied and disabled, in all our schools.

We need to bring professional management, accountability and transparency to the organisations that run British sport, and through our influence abroad, to the international bodies that regulate and direct international sport. The need for good governance in sport—along the lines of that required for FTSE 100 companies or major not-for-profit organisations in the United States—is essential if we are to protect the interests of athletes in the future. Only by demonstrating good governance in sport can the Government and British sports administrators use their influence internationally. Only through taking action to introduce best governance among international bodies and federations will the problems that have already beset many of the international organisations—from FIFA today, as the noble Lord, Lord Triesman, bravely stated; to the IOC in Salt Lake City in 2002; to Formula One in recent years—be consigned to history. This is all the more important in the complex world of lex sportiva, in which international organisations and federations set the administrative regulations and dispute-resolving mechanisms of sport, while national Governments and international law are ineluctably playing an increasingly important and active role. It is simply no longer the case that sport and politics can or should be neatly separated.

We need action on behalf of spectators and supporters. Supporters should have at least some representation on the boards of their clubs, thus ending years of disfranchisement. We should substantially strengthen the opportunities for disabled access to sporting venues, in line with the guidelines of the International Paralympic Committee. We need an athletes’ charter to ensure that the voices of our sportswomen and men are heard, and that the many concerns they are expressing are acted upon by sport governing bodies that must follow unimpeachable good governance. We need the Government to become accountable to Parliament for the formulation and delivery of such a sports policy—principally but not exclusively through the Department of Health in the fight against obesity, the Department for Education in all our schools, the Home Office and the DCMS. We need a policy which looks to the Government to act as an enabler, not a micromanager, and to the Minister responsible to have the influence to co-ordinate policy from the centre.

China: Air Defence Identification Zone

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 16th January 2014 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Moynihan]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of China’s introduction of an Air Defence Identification Zone over the East China Sea, and of heightened tensions in the wider Pacific Rim.

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I am very glad to have the opportunity to raise this important topic. There is no doubt that China shocked both its neighbours and the international community when, last November, it announced its highly controversial decision to create an ADIZ beyond its territorial airspace in the skies above the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the East China Sea. Those shock-waves are still reverberating around the region and beyond, and I believe it is essential for British interests that we adopt a clear position when assessing the significance of China’s abrupt unilateral action. In particular, China promised emergency defence measures in the case of non-compliance and an intent to establish more of these zones in the future.

In this latest escalation, Beijing insists that the ADIZ was drawn with no specific country in mind, but it seems highly likely that it was intended as a rebuke to the Japanese Government for their private purchase of three of the islands in September 2012—a move that gave rise to anti-Japan protests across China and caused concern among Japan’s allies. Since then, Chinese coastguard vessels have repeatedly asserted an operational presence in the territorial seas around the islands, raising the spectre of a new Sino-Japanese conflict and sparking fears of tit-for-tat retaliatory measures spreading volatility and uncertainty across the region.

Of course, ADIZs are hardly uncommon in the region and have been used to political ends in the past, but no other country in the region extends its ADIZ to cover disputed territory that it does not control. Following the announcement, the United States expressed its “deep concern”, as did the EU. Does the Minister agree that incorporating the skies over the Senkaku/ Diaoyu islands within its alert zone is, at best, a significant misjudgment on China’s part and that, beyond the present war of words, it will increase the likelihood of further escalation, creating fertile conditions for a serious incident in the region as a result?

This particular dispute in the East China Sea has attracted much attention because of the potential for war between the region’s biggest economies. However, as this House well knows, the resource-rich South China Sea is the subject of a number of equally contentious territorial disputes between China and its neighbours, particularly the Philippines and Vietnam. Worryingly, clashes in the South and East China Seas have risen significantly over the past two years, with Japan, the Philippines and Vietnam all accusing China of a more aggressive posture over disputed territories and waters.

It would cause international outrage if China were to create an ADIZ over the whole South China Sea, but this has not stopped Beijing from choosing to provoke its neighbours, most particularly in its decision to use an image of the highly controversial “nine-dash line” in Chinese passports in 2012. A Chinese ADIZ in the north of the South China Sea would be particularly sensitive, especially if it overlapped with Vietnam’s ADIZ and included the disputed Paracel Islands.

Of course, we cannot debate this issue without reference to British interests in the region. The region’s economic vitality, its influence and its ever-increasing importance are without doubt and its dynamism fuels the global economy. Last year, ahead of a visit there, the Foreign Office Minister, Hugo Swire, in a candid and important statement, rightly called Japan,

“our closest partner in Asia”.

He said:

“Whether it is global trade or international peacekeeping our relationship with Japan is fundamental to UK foreign policy, not just in Asia but around the world”.

Our close ties and mutual interests with Japan are particularly articulated through our long record of working together to maintain Asia-Pacific regional stability, as well as in a host of other global security issues, from reconstruction in Afghanistan and counterproliferation in Iran to cyberdefence. It is equally important that we work together with China to improve international stability and security, to increase mutual prosperity and to support China’s process of modernisation and reform.

From the Sino-Japanese wars and the occupation of Manchuria, the relationships in the region are deep, complex and historically multilayered. The China-Japan relationship is at the very core of this inextricable enmeshing of old rivalries, wars, antagonism and competition. Memories of Japan’s early 20th century empire-building are still raw within the region—thus the Chinese reaction to Prime Minister Abe’s recent visit to the Yasukuni shrine. China’s past empire, too, is surely heavy and emotive historical baggage for today’s Chinese leaders to carry as they contemplate the future regional hierarchy.

Beijing has argued that its latest move is no more than legitimate defence. However, the Chinese concept of defence is notoriously broad. Officially, all Chinese security policies and uses of force since 1949 have been defensive, this being the most recent case of China defending Chinese territory. However, in recent years in particular, Beijing has seemed unwilling to recognise that, in the eyes of its neighbours, Chinese defence might appear indistinguishable from Chinese aggression.

It is, of course, the law of unintended consequences that we fear: stoking simmering tensions and raising the temperature for short-term political gain can be the touch-paper for conflagrations that quickly get out of control. This is a real flashpoint—not because any country necessarily individually wants to start a shooting war, but because accidents happen.

This is all happening at a time when the security balance of the region is changing. The present poor state of relations between Japan and China is certainly a catalyst for that change, if not a cause. In the face of sharp criticism from China, Japan is increasingly moving away from its post-war pacifist stance. Last month, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe approved a new five-year defence spending plan that calls for the acquisition of drones, jet fighters, destroyers and amphibious assault vehicles to bolster the nation’s armed forces. Prime Minister Abe described the spending plan as “proactive pacifism”, but—significantly, given Japan’s traditionally pacifist public—with a substantial measure of popular support, it continues a trend of reversing a decade of military cuts to counter China’s rapid military build-up and the relative decline of American influence. Although the US still provides the basis for Japan’s national security, under the new draft strategy, Japan will,

“build a comprehensive defensive posture that can completely defend our nation”.

That is an important declaration of intent.

Much of the new spending will go towards strengthening Japan’s ability to monitor and defend the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands among others, and will include more early-warning aircraft stationed in Okinawa and the purchase of unarmed surveillance drones. China’s efforts to pursue a more proactive diplomacy with its neighbours, in quiet rejection of Deng Xiaoping’s famous low-key approach to foreign affairs, saw Beijing hold a major conference on peripheral diplomacy last September. Ironically, it was at this conference, intended to demonstrate the leadership’s wish to promote a stable regional environment for China’s future development, that final approval was reportedly given to the long-held objective of establishing the East China Sea ADIZ and reinforcing China’s claim to disputed maritime territories.

The question remains: what can and should the UK do? With the public mood in both Japan and China being one of renewed nationalism and self-assertion, how can a period of political quiet and trust between China and Japan be engendered, prior to the resumption of high-level discussions on confidence-building measures? Will confidence-building measures be enough?

As noble Lords are well aware, two days after the Chinese ADIZ announcement, the US Administration flew B52 bombers over the disputed islands without alerting China, in what can only be described as a warning to Beijing. The key dynamic is clearly the relationship with America. For the US in particular, it will be a fine balance to urge restraint by all parties and diffuse these looming confrontations on the one hand, while robustly reaffirming its security commitment to Japan.

It remains to be seen what tangible support Britain might be able to bring to bear in future and what, if anything, we—or, indeed, Europe—could do practically in terms of hard power to shape or respond to the present situation in East Asia, should the need arise. We can and should use our very effective diplomacy and soft power to act as an influence multiplier in support of stability and to help to build a capable regional, multilateral security structure that would encompass a workable code of conduct to avoid a new round of ADIZs announced in the South China Sea. But what comes next, if confidence-building mechanisms such as hotlines, agreements on incidents at sea and mid- and high-level diplomacy do not prove sufficient?

My remarks today would not be complete without some thoughts on where this competition for influence will end. This is about the whole shift of economic and political power and influence to Asia. It seems to me that the tectonic plates of geopolitics are shifting and that the rearrangement of the post-war settlement in the wider Pacific Rim ultimately lies ahead of us. As we know, China is rapidly and profoundly changing. China’s rise inevitably challenges the current system, built by Western states and reflecting their interests and rules-based values.

The issue of the Chinese ADIZ, while pressing, is a jigsaw puzzle piece in a much bigger picture. With China’s rise, the dynamics of the region are changing, and it remains to be seen who will win and who will lose in this global shift of power and influence in the Asia-Pacific region. Will we see a change from a US-led regional security system to a Chinese-led one, and who will decide? The extent to which countries in the region continue to want an American counterweight to the rise of their mighty neighbour and the extent to which the US will continue to provide is key.

We have heard a great deal about Mr Obama’s rebalancing to Asia, to extricate the US from more than a decade of war in the greater Middle East and to pivot America’s strategic focus and resources towards Asia and the Pacific Rim, and about the highly complex relationships with China and key US allies there. For the United States, China has become, if not the key, certainly a key bilateral relationship.

In conclusion, within its region China remains a solitary rising power, facing potentially insurmountable domestic challenges and currently encircled by US military bases and allies. There is still a major risk of mutual misunderstanding, miscalculation and strategic non-comprehension between China and the United States, and it seems clear that our policy should be to help diffuse that trust deficit when we can. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on whether she believes that is a sensible way forward and on how we in the UK can help realise it for the future peace, security and prosperity not just of the region but of the world.

Commonwealth

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 17th October 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moynihan (Con)]

My Lords, I am indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Luce, for introducing this debate. He was critically influential in providing guidance and assistance to me exactly 30 years ago when I was elected Member of Parliament for Lewisham East, for which I thank him. His wise counsel continues to illuminate subjects dear to his heart and his family history, notably in the context of the Commonwealth.

While this House focuses primarily on legislation in its capacity as a revising body, it occasionally takes on the important role of offering advice and steering policy, particularly when the timing of debates is fortuitous. The Foreign Secretary was right to say,

“From our very first day in office I pledged to put the ‘C’ back into the FCO”.

For it is a striking fact that even though the Commonwealth has its historical roots in the 19th century, it is perhaps one of the international organisations or platforms that is most suited to the world of the 21st. One great characteristic of CHOGM is that, similar to the hosting of the Olympic Games, the spotlight of the world’s media comes to shine into the recesses of that country. In the run-up to the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games, it focused on Tibet. Now, increasingly, it is focusing on the question of why the Sri Lankan Government have not yet independently or credibly investigated the allegations of war crimes; why there continues regrettably to be a lack of accountability for human rights violations; why the concerns of UN human rights chief Navi Pillay have not been addressed in full; and why political intervention with the media and judiciary go, as my noble friend Lord Black stated, far beyond the norms of acceptability.

As a number of noble Lords have commented, this year marked the adoption by all member countries of the Commonwealth charter, which sets out for the first time in a single document the Commonwealth’s core values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law, and commits its leaders to upholding these values. If, in year one of the existence of the charter, Sri Lanka does not recognise that the brick that has been removed from the base of the Commonwealth edifice by the decision of the Canadian Prime Minister may not be the last one, as my noble friend Lord Chidgey hinted, and that the organisation is structured on values, any further “tinkering” or “inconsistency” by Commonwealth leaders—I quote the Commons Foreign Affairs Select Committee report—will not number among the last steps taken. If Sri Lanka does not recognise these realities, it is blind to its own destiny.

It is critical that the values of the Commonwealth, which are under scrutiny, are brought under the international spotlight and that the Government of Sri Lanka are encouraged to respond positively. When the current emphasis of the Commonwealth is, rightly, on young people, we must convey to them the values of, and describe the institutions that underpin, the Commonwealth. Now is the time for stronger diplomatic intervention by Commonwealth leaders and a determined response by the Sri Lankan Government.

We should not turn a blind eye to the dogmatic reaction from Keheliya Rambukwella that Prime Minister Harper’s decision not to go to CHOGM in Sri Lanka is “a lone battle”. In fact, the lone battle is that being waged by the Sri Lankan Government. At this stage, the answer for me is a protracted and absolutely necessary process of diplomacy and engagement, not isolation. Now more than ever, the Commonwealth must stand in defence of freedom and respect for human dignity. Brad Adams, Asia director of Human Rights Watch, was right when he stated that:

“The meeting … is a chance for the Commonwealth to show that its stated principles actually mean something”.

We owe that to the wider world of the Commonwealth, and we owe it to the young people and the athletes of the Commonwealth, including those from Sri Lanka, who will be gathering in Glasgow for the Commonwealth Games next year. These issues must be resolved by politicians and diplomats, and must not lead to the easy resort of some politicians to call for sporting boycotts.

European Union (Croatian Access and Irish Protocol) Bill

Lord Moynihan Excerpts

Thursday 10th January 2013 Grand Committee

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

My Lords, I understand that no amendments have been set down to the Bill and no noble Lord has indicated a wish to move a manuscript amendment or to speak in Committee. With the agreement of the Committee, I will now put the Question that I report the Bill to the House without amendment.

Question put, That the Bill be reported to the House without amendment.

[Lord Moynihan]

My Lords, before proceeding, I would like to place on record the respect of the whole Committee, I am sure, for, Zlatko Mateša, Prime Minister of Croatia between 1995 and 2000. I was with him in Andorra only a couple of months ago when he suffered a very severe heart attack. I am glad to say that he is on the mend.

The reason why I mention him is because as Prime Minister in 1995, he provided the leadership, the inspiration and the commitment to the European project through signing the first agreement between the European Union and Croatia. As Prime Minister, he also established the office for European integration in his country and appointed a Deputy Prime Minister, Ljerka Mintas-Hodak, as Minister for European integration.

Zlatko Mateša is a great European who has been a good friend of this country, not least through matters Olympic. He has led the Croatian national Olympic committee for many years. I am sure the whole Committee will wish him well and hope that he makes a speedy and full recovery, recognising the remarkable and important contribution that he has made. His work and the work of his successors have been good news for British relations with Croatia and good news for Croatia. This is an important year for Croatia, which will go down in its history. We will all celebrate and support that country on its road to full integration within the European Union.

[Lord Monks]

My Lords, is it in order for me to say something about the Irish protocol? I apologise for not having given notice that I intended to do so.

There is a bit missing from the Irish protocol, for which the UK bears some responsibility. The story starts with the rejection of the EU constitution by French and Dutch voters, which prompted Chancellor Merkel and President Sarkozy to propose a social clause to be incorporated into European treaties to reflect the fact that the single market is a vehicle for social progress and that economic freedoms and competition in the market should not have priority over fundamental social rights and not be used to evade or circumvent national laws and practices.

The idea was dropped as the constitutional treaty was minimised; certain things were concentrated on—some things were withdrawn, not added, to the process. Then came along two legal cases turning on the relationship of the free movement principles with national employment law systems. I refer to the Laval case and the Viking case. In both cases, the European Court of Justice ruled that the free movement principles would prevail.

There has been a series of other cases, some of which noble Lords will probably be familiar with because they are closer to home. One involved British and Irish Ferries where the predominantly Irish workforce was replaced by an eastern European workforce. This caused a lot of consternation in Ireland at about the time that the Irish voters rejected the EU constitutional treaty. This protocol is designed to permit the Irish Government to put the issue again to the Irish people, which they have done. But at that time the initial rejection was put down in a major way to the Irish Ferries case, employment issues and workers’ rights.

There are other cases. The British Airline Pilots Association—I declare an interest as the unremunerated president—in a dispute with British Airways, which was establishing subsidiaries in Paris and Brussels, was seeking clarification on whether the British collective agreement, which covers Hong Kong, Australia and other places, would also cover Paris and Brussels.

There was also a dispute at Immingham in 2009 in a petrochemical plant that attracted a lot of attention under the heading of “British jobs for British workers”, a phrase that the previous Prime Minister had used. In each case, employers were seeking to take advantage of the ECJ rulings in the Laval and Viking cases. Let me make it clear that unions are not objecting to the employment of foreign labour—absolutely not. We are trying to protect collective agreements and to be able to enforce those agreements in the country where the dispute arises. We are looking to protect the collective agreement to ensure equality between migrants and indigenous workers, particularly where there is a loophole in the posting of workers directive where a migrant employer brings in his or her own workforce.

This is when the idea of a social protocol re-emerged to be attached to the Irish protocol. It was based on a clause on the free movement of goods originally drafted by Mario Monti when he was European Commissioner. He said then that in relation to the movement of goods, the single market would not interfere with fundamental rights. We have been seeking to get that phraseology shoved into the provisions on the free movement of services.

We have the support of the Taoiseach, the Irish Government and most Governments. It all went through the diplomatic channels and COREPER in Brussels, but it was blocked at the eleventh hour by the UK Government, who were worried about red lines in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights and feared that it would strengthen calls for a referendum in the UK on Britain’s EU membership.

Interestingly, for those who think that powers should be repatriated, if we had been then in the Norway position, this particular measure could never have been blocked; the rest would have agreed it. The British influence worked against my interests in that case, but it showed Britain’s influence in the EU through participation.

The response of the European authorities was to establish another exercise, also under Mario Monti, who proposed a regulation rather similar to the one he had proposed 10 years earlier in the free movement of goods legislation. The Commission drafted a regulation based on his report but, interestingly and importantly, said that they could not go further than the ECJ decisions because it was important simply to recognise that free movement is a European competence and labour law is a national competence. They were going to respect that as no doubt the British Government wished.

That has produced a lot of disillusion. I am certainly not holding my breath for any prospect of change, but the campaign for a change goes on. As Brendan Barber, my successor at the TUC, has said, we managed to get Monti 1, we did not manage to get Monti 2, but now we would really like the full Monti. The full Monti is a social protocol which we came close to achieving in the Irish protocol that is before us today.

I emphasise that the campaign for the trade union principle of when in Rome, do as the Romans do—advice given many centuries ago to St Augustine—is very important.

I will not go into the broader implications of social Europe. I am presuming a little on the Committee’s time at the moment, and I am grateful for its patience. However, it is important to recognise that social Europe is a crucial part of Europe’s future. That concept made Europe popular, certainly on the left of British politics. Ever since, it has been chopped and cut back, and this is an example. Funnily enough, the number of supporters decreases. If we pro-Europeans are going to fight for the European Union in future, do not be careless with the concept of a social Europe. Do not be careless with the rights that have been established, or how social Europe can be used to move us in the direction of the more successful European countries such as the Nordics, Germany, the Netherlands and the eastern side of our North Sea.

I thank the Committee for its attention and for this opportunity.