Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Debate between Lord Morrow and Lord Callanan

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:

“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”


and

“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.

Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of

“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.

This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.

Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.

To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.

Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.

If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as we begin our proceedings on Report, let me reiterate our view, as the Official Opposition, that the treaty that the Government have agreed with Mauritius puts the interests of the British people last. It is an abject surrender that we would never have agreed to. It was mentioned nowhere in the Government’s election manifesto, and it stands in stark contrast to their manifesto commitment to protect the British Overseas Territories. The British people were not consulted on the treaty, yet it will see over £34 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money paid to the Government of Mauritius over the treaty’s lifetime. That is a political decision by this Government at a time when taxes to the British public are being hiked to an all-time high.

In stark contrast, the Mauritian Prime Minister said that the money from the Chagos deal will fund debt repayments and tax cuts as part of a budget package that will see 80% of Mauritian workers exempted completely from income tax.

However, it is, of course, not just the British people who have not been consulted but the Chagossians themselves, who have suffered so much over many years and have not had their voice heard in this process either.

I am pleased to say that the Government have rightly shared some more details about the Chagossian Contact Group they have set up, but it should not have taken forceful pressure from the Opposition to deliver that transparency. Even with those details, the Chagossian people have not been formally consulted by the British Government on this treaty. We have only to look at the recent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee on the opinion of Chagossians to know exactly what they think of this treaty.

In the other place, we opposed the Bill at Third Reading, and we still oppose it. But, of course, now that we are on Report, we will work constructively with noble Lords across the House to seek to improve the Bill today.

My Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to seek to negotiate a right to extend the length of the treaty beyond 99 years before it can be ratified. When we suggested this in Committee, the Minister explained that Article 13 of the treaty establishes the process by which the treaty would be extended up to a limit of 40 years. One of the problems with that process is that it would require a renegotiation, possibly including additional payments, leaving the British taxpayer exposed to potentially even higher bills at the end of this period.

Ministers tell us that the UK will have the right of first refusal of the terms offered to any third party for the use of Diego Garcia following the expiry or termination of the treaty, but how can the UK ensure that those terms are reasonable? We therefore seek clarity from the Government on what happens at the end of this 99-year period. I hope that this time, the Minister will be able to provide us with more information on the Government’s exact understanding of the workability of Article 13 of the treaty.

My Amendment 40 would require the Government to clarify their understanding of the status of the Chagos Islands should the treaty be terminated. In Committee, the Minister emphasised that the circumstances in which Mauritius can unilaterally terminate the treaty are extremely limited, and we accept that. She also told the Committee that it is

“highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 781.]

That leaves open the question of who might agree to a transfer of sovereignty with the Government of Mauritius. In a circumstance where Mauritius is sovereign and the treaty is no longer in effect, is there a risk that the Mauritian Government may choose to transfer sovereignty to a third party? What guarantees have the Government sought from Mauritius on this? Again, I hope the Minister will be able to provide us with some more detail on those points at this stage in our legislative process.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his excellent amendment in this group. He is right to continue to press the Government on this point, and we share his concerns about the position should the treaty be terminated. I look forward to hearing the replies from the Minister on these points.

Finally, I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, which is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond—two well-respected Members of the House. It is unconscionable that British taxpayers should be forced to continue to fund the Mauritian Government under the terms of the treaty in circumstances where the military base, which the treaty relates to and secures, has therefore become inoperable. Therefore, we firmly support this amendment and, should the noble and gallant Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches would support him in that.

Brexit: Preparations

Debate between Lord Morrow and Lord Callanan

Tuesday 8th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

As always, the noble Lord makes very good points. Most people will of course accept that it is the legal default, and we should be preparing appropriately. I also entirely accept his other point. A lot of security co-operation takes place outside of the EU sphere, and we have been assured by the people responsible that that co-operation will continue, but of course, some security co-operation relies on access to EU databases et cetera. It is extremely disappointing that the Commission does not wish to discuss how we can better keep people safe in these areas.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, do not the comments of the German Chancellor to the Prime Minister—that Northern Ireland must remain in the EU customs union for ever—now reveal the true nature of both Dublin and the European Union? Furthermore, this demonstrates clearly what some of us have been saying for quite a while: that the backstop was intended to be neither temporary nor an insurance policy; rather, it was a device to remove Northern Ireland from the United Kingdom.

[Lord Callanan]

I have seen lots of these rumours flying around on social media, and I adopt the same policy as I do towards other off-the-record briefings. I have not seen an official read-out of that phone call, but I hope that those were not comments that the German Bundeskanzlerin would make. If that were the case, the noble Lord would be correct, in that it is unacceptable to have a customs border within the territory of the United Kingdom.