Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 5th January 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Purvis of Tweed (LD)]

My Lords, I gave very careful consideration to the points raised in these amendments by both noble and gallant Lords. They raise significant issues, which I am very sympathetic to. I am also very keen to hear the Minister’s response, given her commitment in Committee, especially in relation to the consequences of Article 1 of the treaty, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, has indicated.

There are, however, elements of the amendments which I am perhaps not entirely persuaded by. They are the conditions within the bailiwick of the Mauritian Government that could give rise to the circumstances where we would seek to stop payments. They are not covered by this amendment, per se. They would, however, be covered in subsection (4) of the proposed new clause in my Amendment 50, which will be discussed much later during our considerations today and which would create the conditions where, if the Mauritian Government by their actions were putting at risk the consequences of our payments, Parliament would be able to pause the payments.

If there are reasons unspecified by Amendment 1 which are non-defence related, there is the potential for UK funding for resettlement support, the trust fund operations or Chagossian community-specific support to be put at risk, so it is worth while to separate out the defence interests from the other elements of the treaties. As the mechanisms in Amendment 50 are preferable in our view, we would find it difficult to support these amendments.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 26 standing in my name states that:

“Sections 2 to 4 come into force only when the Secretary of State has assessed … the impact of the termination of all rights granted by the Treaty to the United Kingdom with respect to the entire Chagos Archipelago through Article 15 of the Treaty”


and

“the impact of the arrangements in Article 15 on the leverage opportunities at the Secretary of State’s disposal in negotiating with Mauritius after ratification”.

Article 15(1)(a) of the Mauritius treaty states that Mauritius can terminate the Mauritius Treaty in the event of

“a failure by the United Kingdom to make payment as required by Article 11”.

This means that if a payment is more than 22 days late, the entire Mauritius treaty is terminated, subject of course to the fact that sovereignty over the Chagos Islands will be in the hands of Mauritius. In that event, we would lose absolutely everything, and if the United States wanted to keep its Diego Garcia base, it would probably have to do so by force. While the United Kingdom could no doubt seek to achieve this, China, Russia and other countries could protest very loudly and have international law on their side. It would provide an excuse for any other power to try to take Diego Garcia and could lead to a major war.

Of course, the Government can respond by saying that this will not happen if we pay on time—and, no doubt, they will assure that we will pay. While we are protected from this eventuality by dutifully paying up completely and always on time, Article 15(1)(a) places the United Kingdom, and by extension the United States, in a formally intolerable, weak position.

To understand the problems arising from the very weak footing on which the treaty places us when negotiating with Mauritius, we must appreciate the huge concerns about what happens in relation to the Chagos Islands beyond Diego Garcia. Mauritius has a clear incentive, arising from the income stream we have promised, to seek additional income streams for leasing other islands or parts of islands. The Government have sought to make much of the fact that we have a veto on the deployment of security and defence forces beyond Diego Garcia, but the problem is that the real threats do not announce themselves as deployment of security and defence forces and are much more subtle. Something that begins as a non-security and defence deployment, in relation to which we have no veto, can evolve into something very different—an emergent risk, over which the treaty affords us no right of veto but only a right to object. The right to object can be resolved only on a consensual basis within the joint committee between the UK and Mauritius proposed by the Mauritius treaty and could no doubt take a long time if Mauritius wanted it to. It is here that our complete lack of leverage provided by paragraph 1(a) of Article 15 is a particular cause for concern.

Mauritius could generally adopt a very unco-operative approach on the joint committee, knowing that, if it resists one of our concerns and we counter by threatening to withhold payment, subject to satisfactory resolution, that will serve simply to renounce all our remaining rights in relation to the Chagos Islands, giving them completely to Mauritius. Of course, if ever a deployment of non-security and defence personnel from another country becomes an emergent risk, and one wherein those concerned in effect become security and defence personnel, the UK would have a right of veto. However, the difficulty is that, by that stage, they will be established in place, and if they did not want to leave, they could be removed only by force, threatening war and international instability.

If we look at other categories of emergent risk, in relation to which we have powers only to lodge objections on the joint committee, we are further confronted by the way in which the terms of the Mauritius treaty—especially paragraph 1(a) of Article 15—rob us of leverage. These risks would all be avoided if the UK did the right thing and corrected the historic wrong of the forced removal of the Chagossians from their islands and afforded them self-determination. While it is plain that not all would vote to be a separate jurisdiction from Mauritius—in the same way that not everyone on the Ellice Islands voted to become a separate jurisdiction from the Gilbert Islands—polling suggests that a majority would vote to become a resettled, largely self-governing British Overseas Territory, legitimately under British sovereignty. In that event, none of the above difficulties would arise.

[Lord Callanan (Con)]

My Lords, as we begin our proceedings on Report, let me reiterate our view, as the Official Opposition, that the treaty that the Government have agreed with Mauritius puts the interests of the British people last. It is an abject surrender that we would never have agreed to. It was mentioned nowhere in the Government’s election manifesto, and it stands in stark contrast to their manifesto commitment to protect the British Overseas Territories. The British people were not consulted on the treaty, yet it will see over £34 billion-worth of taxpayers’ money paid to the Government of Mauritius over the treaty’s lifetime. That is a political decision by this Government at a time when taxes to the British public are being hiked to an all-time high.

In stark contrast, the Mauritian Prime Minister said that the money from the Chagos deal will fund debt repayments and tax cuts as part of a budget package that will see 80% of Mauritian workers exempted completely from income tax.

However, it is, of course, not just the British people who have not been consulted but the Chagossians themselves, who have suffered so much over many years and have not had their voice heard in this process either.

I am pleased to say that the Government have rightly shared some more details about the Chagossian Contact Group they have set up, but it should not have taken forceful pressure from the Opposition to deliver that transparency. Even with those details, the Chagossian people have not been formally consulted by the British Government on this treaty. We have only to look at the recent report from the International Relations and Defence Committee on the opinion of Chagossians to know exactly what they think of this treaty.

In the other place, we opposed the Bill at Third Reading, and we still oppose it. But, of course, now that we are on Report, we will work constructively with noble Lords across the House to seek to improve the Bill today.

My Amendment 6 would require the Secretary of State to seek to negotiate a right to extend the length of the treaty beyond 99 years before it can be ratified. When we suggested this in Committee, the Minister explained that Article 13 of the treaty establishes the process by which the treaty would be extended up to a limit of 40 years. One of the problems with that process is that it would require a renegotiation, possibly including additional payments, leaving the British taxpayer exposed to potentially even higher bills at the end of this period.

Ministers tell us that the UK will have the right of first refusal of the terms offered to any third party for the use of Diego Garcia following the expiry or termination of the treaty, but how can the UK ensure that those terms are reasonable? We therefore seek clarity from the Government on what happens at the end of this 99-year period. I hope that this time, the Minister will be able to provide us with more information on the Government’s exact understanding of the workability of Article 13 of the treaty.

My Amendment 40 would require the Government to clarify their understanding of the status of the Chagos Islands should the treaty be terminated. In Committee, the Minister emphasised that the circumstances in which Mauritius can unilaterally terminate the treaty are extremely limited, and we accept that. She also told the Committee that it is

“highly unrealistic that Mauritius would agree to a reversion to British sovereignty in the event of termination”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 781.]

That leaves open the question of who might agree to a transfer of sovereignty with the Government of Mauritius. In a circumstance where Mauritius is sovereign and the treaty is no longer in effect, is there a risk that the Mauritian Government may choose to transfer sovereignty to a third party? What guarantees have the Government sought from Mauritius on this? Again, I hope the Minister will be able to provide us with some more detail on those points at this stage in our legislative process.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, for his excellent amendment in this group. He is right to continue to press the Government on this point, and we share his concerns about the position should the treaty be terminated. I look forward to hearing the replies from the Minister on these points.

Finally, I turn to the amendments in the name of the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Craig of Radley, which is supported by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Houghton of Richmond—two well-respected Members of the House. It is unconscionable that British taxpayers should be forced to continue to fund the Mauritian Government under the terms of the treaty in circumstances where the military base, which the treaty relates to and secures, has therefore become inoperable. Therefore, we firmly support this amendment and, should the noble and gallant Lord wish to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches would support him in that.

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This amendment does not take sides in the litigation. It respects the court, respects Parliament and respects the principle that irreversible legislation should not be rushed through while its legality is actively being tested. I therefore urge noble Lords to support this amendment, not as a political gesture, but as a statement of constitutional responsibility. Let us pause, wait for the judgment and legislate with our eyes fully open. I commend the amendment to the House.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to the six amendments to which I have attached my name in this grouping—Amendments 23 to 25, 27, 52 and 53—and also in support of Amendment 32. I will begin with Amendment 24.

Since Committee there have been a number of critical developments, to which some noble Lords have already referred today. The rationale for the Bill and the treaty to which it relates was that they are essential if we are to uphold the international rules-based order. Yet on 2 December a key organ of the rules-based international order, the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination issued a formal decision, the substance of which I must put on the record. The decision:

“Calls upon Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to suspend the ratification of the bilateral agreement”,


and:

“Urges Mauritius and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to engage immediately with the Chagossian people … and to respect and guarantee their human rights under the Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, including: Their right to return to their ancestral lands in Diego Garcia Island; Their right to self-determination while ensuring the full and meaningful participation of the Chagossian people in all decision-making processes impacting them and their land; Their cultural rights, including their access to cultural and spiritual sites and to preserve their cultural heritage; Their right to effective remedies and full repatriation, including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition”.


Thus, we are confronted not simply by an organ of the rules-based international order criticising the Mauritius treaty and the Bill but by a call for the suspension of treaty ratification. It is particularly striking that this decision flatly contradicts what the Minister said on 18 November, when she asserted that self-determination does not pertain to the Chagossian people. From the perspective of the rules-based international order, it clearly does apply to them. That is why it is imperative that we vote for Amendment 32, eloquently spoken on by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster.

If the Government are intent on continuing with ratification, your Lordships’ House faces an immense responsibility because we constitute the one other means by which ratification can be suspended for 13 months if we refuse to give the Bill a Third Reading. In the intervening period there can be time for a rethink and the development of a response to the presenting difficulty that, rather than abstracting and thereby distorting one principle of international law above all others—colonial territorial integrity—places that principle in its proper relationship to self-determination.

Obviously, I hope that when the Minister responds, she will indicate that the Government will not pursue the treaty to ratification. If she does not, the responsibility we face will be very clear. Quite apart from all the other problems with the treaty and the Bill, the fact that they undermine the rules-based international order, rather than upholding it, demonstrates why this treaty and Bill must and should be abandoned.

On Amendment 23, quite apart from the fact that no territorial integrity is absolute in the sense that it is subject to self-determination—as the history of Czechoslovakia eloquently testifies—this point is greatly compounded in relation to territorial integrities that have been imposed by imperial powers, such as that pertaining to the colonial unit that covered Mauritius and the Chagos Islands prior to 8 November 1965. In this regard, it is quite impossible to understand the great wrong done to the Chagossian people if we have regard only to their forced removal. The root of the difficulty goes back to the decision to deny them the right of self-determination in 1965, which, if provided, would have made their forced removal between 1968 and 1973 unthinkable. In this context, neither the advisory judgment nor anything else in international law states that it is wrong for the territorial integrity of a colonial unit to be changed prior to decolonisation if this change is made to give effect to the principle of self-determination.

This point is eloquently demonstrated by the experience of the Gilbert and Ellice Islands, which provide arguably the most relevant comparator to Mauritius and the Chagos Islands. Although the Gilbert Islands and the Ellice Islands were separated by 800 miles and comprised different people groups, they were in the same colonial unit. When the UK Government proposed decolonisation, the representatives of the Ellice Islands strongly objected to the notion of a new independent sovereign state consisting of the two sets of islands because, quite apart from the distance between them and the fact that they were from different people groups, the population of the Gilbert Islands was far greater than that of the Ellice Islands, such that the latter would be condemned to being permanently outvoted by what they regarded as another country.

The UK Government responded by suggesting a self-determination referendum, in which the options were the Ellice Islands remaining part of the same jurisdiction as the Gilbert Islands or becoming a separate jurisdiction in their own right. Although not everyone supported separation, a very clear majority did. The UK then detached the Ellice Islands in 1976, creating a separate colony that went on to become the independent state of Tuvalu in 1978, while the Gilbert Islands became the independent state of Kiribati in 1979.

The imperative for the provision of a self-determination referendum for the Chagossians in 1965 was even greater than that pertaining to the Gilbert and Ellice Islands because the distance between Mauritius and the Chagos Islands was significantly greater, as was the population differential, with the Chagossians standing at far greater risk of being permanently outvoted by the Mauritians. There was and is, however, an even greater imperative for the provision of a self-determination referendum for the Chagossians, which is testified to by the definition of the presenting difficulty by the advisory opinion, page 1 of which states:

“Between 1814 and 1965, the Chagos Archipelago was administered by the United Kingdom as a dependency of the colony of Mauritius”.


Crucially, therefore, the Chagos Islands’ relationship with Mauritius was never on all fours, rather giving effect to colonialism within a colony such that, rather than being a full part of the colony of Mauritius, the Chagos Islands were only ever

“a dependency of the colony of Mauritius”.

Being on all fours is central to being part of the same territorial integrity, for the reasons set out by the UN resolutions set out in Amendment 23.

The absence of complete equality of citizenship demonstrates not the negation of colonialism but its presence. This, however, was completely absent, as demonstrated by the failure of the constitution of the colony of Mauritius to make provision for the election of representatives of the Chagos Islands to the Mauritian Legislative Council. All this sets out the very clear imperative for our voting in support of Amendment 32.

This takes me neatly to Amendment 25. The Mauritius treaty implies that the Chagossians want to be part of Mauritius, such that the change in the territorial integrity of the Chagos Islands back to pre-November 1965 days, when the islands were a dependency of Mauritius, is the right and proper thing to do. There are, however, four major difficulties with this. In the first instance, as a dependency of Mauritius rather than a full part of Mauritius, the Chagossians were, even at the happiest time of the relationship with Mauritius—

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Leong) (Lab)]

Could I ask the noble Lord to wind up, please?

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

In the second instance, this difficulty was greatly compounded by the willingness of the Mauritian Cabinet of Ministers to accept £3 million in 1965 to become a party to the forced removal of the Chagossians, agreeing to receive them from the Chagos Islands. Had they been part of the same people civically, this would have been unthinkable, and they would have fought for the rights of their brothers and sisters—not allowing citizens to be subject to this indignity.

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[Baroness Goldie (Con)]

My Lords, I endorse the comments of my noble friend Lord Callanan on the amendments in this group. I raised specific concerns about defence and security in Committee, and I have considerable sympathy with the remarks of my noble friends Lord Lilley and Lord Leicester on their amendments. I accept that the Minister has acted in good faith in repeating the advice that he has been given.

After the Committee debate on these defence and security issues, I read Hansard and the Pelindaba treaty with care. It seems that, as my noble friend Lord Lilley indicated, once UK sovereignty over the base is relinquished in consequence of this treaty, that sovereignty transmits to Mauritius and the base is then subject to whatever international agreements Mauritius has entered into. There are restrictive consequences for the base from the Pelindaba treaty, but my concern is slightly broader than that of my noble friend Lord Lilley. If, in the eyes of the other signatories to the Pelindaba treaty, Mauritius is deemed to be in breach, all the other signatories have a locus to raise an objection and deploy international law. That cannot be addressed unless this treaty is renegotiated to retain sovereignty of the base in the hands of the UK, and I wish to place on the record that that is my opinion and understanding of the position.

The Minister rightly does not wish to be drawn into discussing sensitive operational issues relative to the base, and I agree with that. However, before stage 3, I ask him to ask his officials to draft him a letter to be placed in the Library, explaining how the renunciation of sovereignty of the base by the UK and the acquisition of that sovereignty by Mauritius, then governed by the Pelindaba treaty, is compatible with free and unrestricted usage of the base by the US, the UK and our allies.

The Minister has been placed in an impossible position by his Prime Minister: this treaty was negotiated on a basis far removed from the harsh reality of the world we live in. Defence and security seem to have become incidental sacrifices to the worship at the high altar of heady diplomacy and international jurisprudence. It should never have proceeded as it did and, for that, I do not blame either of the Ministers sitting opposite, but I want the Minister to explain how the Government will fix it.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to make some comments on Amendment 22 in my name, and I will seek not to transgress my time in relation to this one.

In Committee, the noble Lords, Lord Lilley and Lord Callanan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, pointed out the difficulty arising from the fact that while the Mauritius treaty makes provision for the leasing of Diego Garcia by the United Kingdom, this does not change the fact that in the event that the Mauritius treaty is ratified, Diego Garcia would come under the sovereignty of Mauritius.

This is problematic for two reasons at least. First, the Republic of Mauritius is a signatory to the Pelindaba treaty, which means that no nuclear weapons can be held in the territory over which it is sovereign. Secondly, Article 7 of the Mauritius treaty expressly states:

“Each Party confirms that none of its existing international obligations or arrangements now in force or effect between it and any third party is in conflict with the provisions of this Agreement, and that nothing in this Agreement shall affect the status of existing international obligations or arrangements except as expressly provided for in this Agreement”.


Can the Minister confirm—I know the noble Baroness, Lady Goldie, has already made reference to this—that the Government have discussed this matter in its entirety with the Government of the United States and that they have confirmation from the US that they have secured their solemn pledge that no nuclear submarines or other nuclear weapons will be able to be taken to Diego Garcia if sovereignty is transferred?

I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on that point. But I very gently say that while of course he must not discuss operational matters, this cannot be pushed as an excuse for dodging questions about compliance with international law. Any attempt to deploy that stratagem, to the point of avoiding the demonstration of compliance with international law when non-compliance is feared, would form a deeply troubling precedent.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Defence (Lord Coaker) (Lab)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to get up for the first time on Report and address your Lordships on this important group dealing with security matters. I will try to come to some of the points that have been raised.

I will come to the point about the letter that the noble Baroness raised, but I will start with the challenge that she put at the end to explain how the Government are dealing with the position on the treaty from a security point of view. This answers some of the questions that have been asked, not least by the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and I will not go into some of the operational points that have been made by him and others. However, on the security matters, I can say that if your Lordships look at the expressions of support for the security aspects of this treaty, all our major international allies and partners have supported the security arrangements. That is a fairly significant point for us to make and a fairly important point for the House to recognise.

To answer the noble Baroness, the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, and the noble Earl, Lord Leicester: President Trump expressed support for the Diego Garcia arrangements within the treaty. US Secretary Hegseth said:

“Diego Garcia is a vital military base for the US. The UK’s (very important) deal with Mauritius secures the operational capabilities of the base and key US national security interests in the region. We are confident the base is protected for many years ahead”.


That was not me but the US.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

That was my understanding, but even that was too much for me. Even if we had been able to get continued sovereignty on the base and some kind of shared sovereignty on the outer atolls, that would still have been exchanging a freehold for a leasehold. It is a preposterous thing to do when we are being told to do it by a court that has expressly been denied jurisdiction in cases between Commonwealth states. We would be doing it, setting a terrible precedent, to satisfy a tribunal that has no authority.

I was very critical of the previous Government for countenancing these changes. I have told the people involved what I think of it. I am equally critical of this Government, as I suspect are quite a lot of the people on the Labour Benches. I look at the expressions of some noble Lords opposite. I know they are decent patriots and democrats, and I know they feel a sense of obligation to our dispossessed Chagossian colleagues. Of course, they have to do their duty, such is the essence of politics.

I finish by holding out the prospect—just the vision—of people coming back: of civilian and military life coming back; of stories told again by grandmothers under newly thatched roofs, their voices stitched with salt and memory; of footsteps remembering the pale coral paths; and of the islands themselves remembering their old inhabitants, as the tides remember the moon.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 31 standing in my name. I want to place on record my appreciation for the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, stepping in last week during the difficult situation I had back home. It again demonstrates clearly that, when you throw an awkward ball to a good player, he will pick it up, make you look good and carry on as if nothing has happened, but I appreciate his assistance in that instance.

I was about to say three lines on this amendment, but then I thought I was perhaps being too presumptuous, because I hoped that the Government, just by reading the amendment, would simply have said that there was no reason why they could not support it. I hope that that is exactly what they will say at the end of the debate, but I think I had better say more than just one or two lines in relation to it before sitting down.

Even if one accepted that it was just £101 million every year for 99 years and considered the proposition in its own terms, without regard for the preceding history, the contrast between this and a one-off payment of £40 million to the Chagossians conveys the message that, while the Mauritians are important and worthy of respect, the Chagossians are, by contrast, worthy only of a few crumbs from the table, relatively speaking, which is deeply hurtful and insulting.

Secondly, to really understand the injustice presented by the arrangement, it obviously needs to be seen in the context of history. The Chagossians do not, for the most part, regard themselves as Mauritian.

I have heard what the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Jay, have said. As the noble Lord, Lord Weir, rightly said, across the United Kingdom there is a multiplicity of views on many issues, so it is difficult to get a concise, exact and single supporting view on this, but I will say these things anyway. In this context, the decision to also pay Mauritius a fantastically large sum of money for the use of just one of the Chagos Islands, while the Chagossians are afforded just £40 million, compounds the present injustice.

To appreciate the menacing nature of the way this monetary injustice greatly compounds the underlying injustice, one must point out that the monies for resettlement set out in the KPMG report are significantly less than the monies it is now proposed the Republic of Mauritius be paid for the UK to lease just one of the Chagos Islands.

Finally, the funding for the Chagossians is also important. Article 11 of the treaty undermines the UK Government’s argument for it by addressing the Chagossians apart from the Mauritians. They are, in effect, saying that it is right to return the islands to the Republic of Mauritius because the pre-8 November 1965 boundaries of the colony express the self-determination of the people of the territory, which implies that everyone, at least from a civic perspective, can be happily Mauritian. However, in that context, there would be no need to address the Chagossians separately and allocate payment to them. In addressing the Chagossians separately, the treaty, in effect, hoists itself with its own petard.

[Lord Kempsell (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to the amendments in my name in this group, and I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hannan, who masterfully adumbrated his litany of development ideas, as well as those in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, the noble Lords, Lord Weir and Lord Callanan, and others.

The theme before the Committee in this group has surely been, as the noble Lord, Lord Weir, put it, an attempt to understand the views, wishes, legitimate desires and concerns of Chagossians. How is it possible to do so without a proper process for consultation with the Chagossian community? Much has already been said in the Committee about the inadequacy of the consultation process followed by the Government that has brought us to this point in the design of the Bill and their policy. My Amendment 81C would make the Chagossian contact group, the Government’s official consultation forum, more robust. Indeed, it would ensure that the Chagossian contact group remained in existence throughout the lifetime of the treaty.

In all the impenetrable fora, groups and organisations within Whitehall, the Chagossian contact group has been shrouded, I think it is fair to say, in a little secrecy. I have repeatedly asked Written Questions of Ministers about the operation of this consultation mechanism. We know that it met earlier this year and was attended by a Minister and that it is chaired by a deputy director in the FCDO and has a small secretariat. My amendment would ensure that it remained active and that Chagossians continued to be enfranchised to a greater extent than they have been thus far by the Government.

My Amendment 81G pertains to the theme of resettlement, which has already been mentioned extensively in the debate. The Government prayed in aid the notion of resettlement as one of their key motives for pursuing this policy, and they have taken the word of the Mauritian Government, I think it is fair to say, on trust when it comes to resettlement. To a certain extent, that is to be expected at international negotiations and in bilateral fora, but there is no reason why the Government should not take steps to ensure that the important issue of resettlement is continually checked on by Ministers in future. That is why, in Amendment 81G, I suggest that within 12 months of Royal Assent the Secretary of State should publish a report made in connection with Article 6 of the treaty as to progress on resettlement.

For the sake of timing, I shall speak also to my Amendment 20C, which is grouped here, on the marine protected area. With this amendment, I seek to ensure that the Government take external expertise and consultation of the kind that the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, mentioned, from universities and scientific experts, who have deep concerns about the potential administration of the marine protected area by the Mauritian authorities and the standards to which those authorities will hold the administration of the MPA and its future designations—whether they will truly be in accordance with the standards that have thus far been set by the UK Government, in terms of both environmental protection and the quality of expertise, scientific and otherwise, used in governing those important regions for marine and broader conservation. My Amendment 20C seeks to ensure that an independent panel is commissioned before those elements of the treaty come into force to provide a serious and well-thought-out independent view, away from the scientific advice that the UK Government will take from their own resources, and to publish that advice so that the international community can see that the Mauritian Government will be held to those international standards.

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[Lord Bellingham (Con)]

My Lords, following on from the noble Lord, Lord Beamish, surely the fundamental difference with the two bases on Cyprus that he mentioned is that we kept them in perpetuity—they are sovereign bases. Yes, we have an arrangement with the Cypriot Government to inform them of activity after deployment takes place, but what concerns me about this particular lease arrangement is very simple.

At the moment, we have in place a Government in Mauritius headed by His Excellency Navin Ramgoolam, who is a democrat and a friend of his country. I had the privilege of meeting him a number of times when he was premier before. Indeed, he took over from a Government who were also democratic and had all the right intents. We had many arguments about this issue but, fundamentally, we were two democratic Governments discussing a matter.

The concern I have is this: what would happen if there were some sort of coup or a military Government in Mauritius? In these worst-case scenarios, we have to be prepared for the future. Let us hope for the best but prepare for the very worst. Could the Minister comment on what would happen to these arrangements in the treaty in that event? If, indeed, a military coup took place and an alliance was made with a hostile power, the operations of this base could be jeopardised.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendments 20G and 20H in my name. I have tabled them because I want to probe more deeply whether the consequences of non-ratification are such that non-ratification is not an option.

Furthermore, it is important that we are clear about what we can and cannot do. The Minister has told the Committee that the treaty is a done deal; that it cannot be changed; and that the role of your Lordships’ House in relation to it and to the Bill before us today is really very limited. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, has supported the Government in this view, suggesting that, going forward, there is only scope for possibly impacting the details of the implementation. It is clear that, although the CRaG process did not prevent the Government ratifying the treaty, the treaty was defined between the UK Government and the Republic of Mauritius in terms that place not only a clear distinction between the act of signing and ratification but unusual distance between the two, in that the treaty cannot come into focus unless and until the Bill before us today is passed and Clause 2 transfers sovereignty.

The comments of the noble Lord, Lord Murray, on day one in Committee were important. He said:

“Because of the way the treaty is drafted and the way Article 18 operates, the treaty can come into force only when this legislation is implemented. That is unusual”.


After an exchange, the Minister helpfully clarified the situation further and said:

“Before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass both primary and secondary legislation, update the UK-US exchange of notes, and put in place agreements on the environment, maritime security and migration”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; cols. 708-13.]


In this context, it is clear that, although the treaty has been negotiated and cannot be changed without reopening negotiations, it has been defined in terms to which both parties consented. This means that what could be drawn from the act of signature on 22 May was, by definition, inherently provisional and contingent. It was signed subject to recognition that the act of signing did not bring the treaty into force; and that the treaty would not come into force unless and until the respective political processes of both countries had been properly honoured. In this context, because the coming into force of the treaty depends on an Act of Parliament, this is plainly not a done deal, in my estimation.

Furthermore, as a legislature on its toes, we have to let the Executive know that we understand that, having negotiated the treaty, they will encourage us to pass this legislation so that it can move to ratification. We know that this does not mean that we have to pass this piece of legislation any more than we have to pass any other piece of legislation. If we reject this Bill, the islands could not be given to Mauritius. If the Government chose, they could then invoke the Parliament Act, which would delay things by some 13 months or thereabouts, in the context of which there is a good chance that common sense would prevail. The Republic of Mauritius could not object to this because it signed up to the treaty knowing that it depended on domestic processes that, in this case, require the passing of legislation through a legislature that cannot be dictated to by the Executive. It is really important that we are open, transparent and honest about the opportunity that we have both to stand up for the Chagossians and to say no to this treaty because, if we have the power to do so, we have the responsibility to do so. That is, I think, is of equal importance; it may even be more important.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th November 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Morrow]

20J: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report setting out any reasons for rejecting any remedies otherwise than this Treaty for resolving challenges to the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago.”

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 20J in my name proposes that Clauses 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report setting out the reasons for rejecting the alternative legal remedies to those set out in the Mauritius treaty for resolving challenges to the United Kingdom’s sovereignty of the Chagos Archipelago.

At the heart of the Government’s justification for proceeding with the Bill to bring the Mauritius treaty into force is the non-binding judgment of the International Court of Justice from 2019. The Government have, I think, acknowledged that it is not binding but have sought to ensure that, if it is ignored, binding judgments will quickly arise and other countries upon which we depend to run the base would then refuse to help. The Government have not clearly explained what these feared judgments are and why they would be binding. I invite the Minister to do so in detail and to tell the Committee which countries we depend on to run the islands, which we think would then refuse key services and what those services are.

However, in this amendment, I want to probe a different approach. The Government tell us that this is a critical Bill because its passage will facilitate the coming into force of the Mauritius treaty. The treaty is vital because the United States has told the UK Government that it is unhappy about having a major US base on Diego Garcia when the sovereignty of Garcia is contested. Furthermore, it has paused investment on Diego Garcia, which will not recommence until the legal standing of the Chagos Islands has been resolved.

It is crucial that this matter is resolved, because the security—not just of the United States but of the United Kingdom and the West—depends on full US investment in Diego Garcia. In this context, the reason why the Bill and the treaty, which will come into force if it becomes an Act of Parliament, are vital is because they set out the only route to legal certainty for the standing of the US military base. However, this solution does not provide the only way forward to secure legal certainty, and there are alternative ways forward that would better secure legal certainty than the Bill and the treaty. It is the purpose of my amendment to ask the Government to consider these alternatives.

The problem with the Government’s approach in claiming that the treaty constitutes the only legal way forward is that it is the product of a non-binding legal judgment that was a response to the disagreement between two parties—the Republic of Mauritius and the United Kingdom. The Chagossians were not a party to the case because at that time they did not have international personality. Had they been a party then, the judgment would have dealt with a wider range of issues and considered a wider range of ways forward.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Minister of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

In relation to Amendment 20J, the House has dedicated at least 15 hours to debating the Government’s rationale for entering this treaty. It has been subject to two reports, by the International Agreements Committee and the International Relations and Defence Committee. Three separate committees—the IAC, the IRDC and the Foreign Affairs Committee—have held evidence sessions and questioned the Minister for the Overseas Territories.

The Government have been consistently clear throughout. The legal case was compelling and there was no credible alternative. A policy of hanging tough, which I assume the noble Lord has in mind, would have been a real gift to our adversaries. As we have stated on numerous occasions, the continued operation of the base was under threat. Courts were already making decisions which undermined our position. If a long-term deal had not been reached, further wide-ranging litigation was likely, with no realistic prospect of the UK successfully defending its legal position on sovereignty in such cases.

Legally binding provisional measures from the courts could have come within weeks, affecting, for example, our ability to patrol the waters around Diego Garcia. Both the IRDC and the IAC recognise that the treaty provides legal certainty for the base. I hope the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken in this debate. I have noticed that no one has spoken against the amendment, other than the Minister who brought her explanation and reason. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20J withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Morrow]

20K: Clause 1, page 1, line 7, at end insert “, subject to subsection (2A).
(2A) Sections 2 to 4 do not come into force until the Secretary of State has produced a report assessing the ability of the Government of Mauritius to govern the Chagos Archipelago under the terms of the Treaty and the implications for international peace and stability of transferring sovereignty.”

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, there has been lot of talk about the rules-based international order in recent years, largely in response to the concern that the reality to which it testifies looks considerably less certain in the context of the development of what some scholars are now calling Cold War II. The truth, however, is that international relations has never been a strictly rule-based order, in the sense that it has approximated life in the domestic context. On the other hand, informed by social conventions that testify to the common humanity of all the people of the earth, international relations has never approximated to international anarchy. There have always been rules, and yet they have been different from the domestic sense because of the absence of a world state with all the sanctions of domestic government.

In this context, those rules have to accommodate considerations of power in a way that we do not see domestically. Sound thinking about international relations has never been just about rules abstracted from considerations of power any more than it has been about power abstracted from rules.

We can get into real difficulty if we lose sight of questions of power. One critical way in which international relations has conventionally had regard for questions of power arises from the point at which a new sovereign state, whether arising from the break-up of an existing state, decolonisation, or some other kind of reconfiguration of territorial integrity, is recognised by other sovereign states. This act of recognition conveys on the state sovereignty as the international personality. It involves those states saying that they recognise the right of the other state to exist, with its territorial integrity, and the right of that state to make the laws to which it is subject in relation to that territorial integrity.

This process is mutual in the sense that if state A will not recognise state B, then state B usually will not recognise state A until state A recognises it. One of the critical questions facing a sovereign state in determining whether it recognises another state is whether it recognises its full territorial integrity and right to make the laws of that territorial integrity, together with an assessment of its physical capacity to govern that territorial integrity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey, and the noble Lord, Lord Callanan, for their contributions. Having listened to the Minister, I am wondering whether she will get time to reflect on this debate and on what has been asked and what has been said. Perhaps, if she does, she will write to us and put her reply in the Library, for the availability of every Peer in this House. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 20K withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Hoey (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, my Amendment 50B is very clear and simple, and nothing to do with security on Diego Garcia or the details of the treaty between Mauritius and the United Kingdom. It is simple: it is for our Government to recognise the Chagossian people in the law of the United Kingdom as an indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago.

I raise this because so many of the Chagossians we have met and know are men and women who have lived on these islands, who were baptised in the island chapels, who fished, who tended their gardens, who raised children and buried their dead there. They are the indigenous people of the Chagos Archipelago. It is important that what they have asked for, that they are recognised by our country, is agreed to.

The need for this amendment arises because even now, more than half a century after their removal, the Chagossian people are still being told by Ministers that they never existed as a permanent population, that their islands were never self-governing in any meaningful sense and that there is therefore no question of self-determination. Only last week, on the first day in Committee, the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Chapman, repeated that claim, saying:

“The Chagos Archipelago has no permanent population nor has ever been self-governing. No question of self-determination for its population can therefore arise”.—[Official Report, 18/11/25; col. 795.]


That statement is not true. It is contradicted by every serious historical study, by the records in the National Archives, by the findings of the International Court of Justice, by the judgment of our own courts and most importantly by the lived memory of the men and women who have written to and met us and live all over in the diaspora.

The noble Lord, Lord Hannan, said that he would not go into the history, but it is important when we are discussing a people that we understand the history. Archival records from the 19th and 20th centuries list births, marriages and burials across multiple generations on Peros Banhos, Salomon and Diego Garcia. Parish registers from Notre Dame de L’Assomption on Diego Garcia record entire family lines. Children were born there, married there and died there. The High Court in the Bancoult judgments accepted that the Chagossians were a settled people. The International Court of Justice —one of the reasons we have this treaty—in its 2019 advisory opinion recognised the Chagossians as the people of the territory with a right to self-determination. Research and documents from various academics have shown that there is at least 150 to 170 years of continuous multigenerational residence.

That is what an indigenous people is; that is what a permanent population is. Yet the Government continue to repeat a narrative first invented back in 1968, when the Foreign Office issued internal instructions to describe the Chagossians in public as temporary contract workers to avoid United Nations scrutiny. Those instructions are still in the archives and still legible. They show unequivocally that the United Kingdom knew the truth then, and it should know the truth now. It is time for this Parliament in discussing this treaty to put the truth into law.

The Minister also claimed that the islands were never self-governing but, as every historian of the archipelago now agrees, the islands were in practice run not by resident British administrators, who were almost never present, but by the Chagossians themselves. Families organised communal work, maintained chapels and community buildings and settled disputes. Testimony from multiple surviving islanders shows that respected elders served as local leaders.

One of the older Chagossian families that has been mentioned before in Committee, the Mandarin family of Peros Banhos, has given oral testimony that their ancestor, Jean Charles Mandarin, a blacksmith serving the whole island, was nominated by the community to act as a local headman in the long absence of any resident British authority. His leadership was even recorded in a scholarly Brill volume on the dispossession of the Chagos Islands, describing him as “a thorn in the flesh of the administration”. His grandson, Fernand Mandarin, born on Peros Banhos, later led the Chagossian Social Committee, represented his people at the United Nations and wrote one of the most detailed oral histories of island life. Today, his descendants continue that leadership in ongoing legal actions before the High Court. How can the Minister stand in this Chamber and say there was no permanent population and no self-organisation when the evidence is so overwhelmingly clear?

The amendment puts this right. It recognises in law what the world’s historians, courts and international institutions have already recognised: that the Chagossians are the indigenous people of the Chagos Islands. The amendment clearly defines them as those born on the islands

“prior to their depopulation between 1968 and 1973”

and their direct descendants. It requires the Secretary of State, when exercising any function under the Bill, to have regard to their identity, cultural integrity and rights.

The amendment is necessary, because the Bill does exactly the opposite with Clauses 2 to 4, which would abolish the British Indian Ocean Territory for every island except Diego Garcia, stripping away the only remaining statutory recognition of the Chagossian people’s historic and legal connection to their homeland. It would remove the very provisions in the British Nationality Act through which they are currently recognised in law. It would hand their homeland to another state without any act of self-determination, despite the clear findings of the International Court of Justice that the Chagossian people are entitled to that right.

We now know what that means in practice. Mauritian authorities have already begun issuing new birth certificates to Chagossians, in which the place of birth is rewritten as Mauritius, erasing all mention of the islands. That is actually happening. I have seen some of that documentary proof.

The recognition in the amendment would prevent that erasure. It does not settle the question of sovereignty, prejudge the right of return or determine citizenship policy, but it ensures that the people who lived on these islands for generations, who were removed without consent and who have been fighting to preserve their identity ever since cannot be written out of their own history or out of our legislation.

One native islander wrote:

“We want our name to exist before we die. We want to be seen as the people of our islands, not as shadows erased from paper.”


Another wrote:

“They took our homes. They took our animals. They took our graves. Please, do not let them take our identity in law.”


Another important one says:

“The Minister says we were never a people. I lived my whole childhood on Peros Banhos. My father and mother were born there. How can she say we were not there?”


The world knows that there was a people in the Chagos Islands. The archives know, the courts know, the UN knows, the historians know and the survivors who still bear witness know. Only this Bill seems to pretend otherwise. I believe that recognition is the minimum moral duty owed to a people who were removed from their homeland, denied their rights and then told that their existence did not matter.

The amendment affirms that they did exist, they do exist and they will continue to exist in the law of this country. I know that a group of Chagossians have written to the Minister in the last few days questioning why she made such a statement. I hope that she will be able to give them some support tonight and say that she recognises their existence and that they should be recognised in the law of the United Kingdom. The amendment does not affect anything to do with security, which seems to be and rightly, perhaps, is the real reason for what the Government are doing. This does not affect one single bit of anything to do with the security of the Chagos Islands, so I hope that the Minister will go back and accept the amendment on Report.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, Amendment 81 in my name is in some key senses the most important of all the amendments that I have tabled in Committee. The purpose of Amendment 81 is to probe the question of what will happen to the Chagossian people if the Bill receives Royal Assent and the Mauritius treaty comes into force. The logic that underpins the Government’s position is that Chagossians are, from the civic perspective —the perspective of their citizenship—Mauritian.

Of course, this will not change their ethnicity, but it will extinguish a critical dimension of their identity, which, while in a very real sense it was suspended as a result of the gross injustices that were committed against them in 1968 and 1973, has not been extinguished. Although the splitting of the Chagos Islands from Mauritius in 1965 was imposed on the Chagossians, it bestowed on them a civic identity apart from Mauritius that they were pleased to receive and enjoyed while living on their islands from 1965 until their forced expulsion.

King’s Speech

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Wednesday 15th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, we live at a time of greater international uncertainty than we have known for many years. That places special importance on upholding the norms and assumptions of international society, informed by international law, in which the bearers of international personality are sovereign states. Indeed, in the absence of a global Executive, the well-being of that society depends on our protecting the norms and conventions that constitute international relations. At the heart of these is the doctrine of recognition and the principle that international relations depend on two states recognising each other. This amounts to each acknowledging and respecting the right of the other to govern itself across the extent of its territory. That is foundational, because it is only when two sovereign states afford each other their reciprocal dignity that international relations can really happen.

To be sure, there are other important doctrines, such as pacta sunt servanda, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. Agreements must be kept, but we cannot collapse international society into that principle abstracted from the other conventions that make international agreements a possibility—otherwise, a treaty to promote slavery or disfranchisement would be inviolable, because it would rest on an agreement between states. In truth, the operational impact and importance of pacta sunt servanda in treaty-making assume the basic integrity of the actors—sovereign states—between which those agreements are reached. If we wish to uphold the integrity of the international society of states that is definitive of world order, and on which international law is based, we have to remember that valid treaties are not just whatever two parties agree; they are agreements made in a context that respects the foundational norms or assumption on the basis of which the peace and stability of the international area depend.

For example, it states quite plainly in the UN Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations:

“Every State has an inalienable right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural systems, without interference in any form by another State”.


It also states:

“Nothing … shall be construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States … Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country”.


Lest there should be any doubt about the importance of these principles, the declaration also affirms:

“The principles of the Charter which are embodied in this Declaration constitute basic principles of international law, and consequently appeals to all States to be guided by these principles in their international conduct and to develop their mutual relations on the basis of the strict observance of these principles”,


and:

“Where obligations arising under international agreements are in conflict with the obligations of Members of the United Nations under the Charter of the United Nations, the obligations under the Charter shall prevail”.


One of the most obvious ways in which a state, A, or a group of states, AB, can act in violation of the territorial integrity of another state, C, is to apply pressure for the right to make some of the laws over part of C, and to insist on the imposition of a customs border across C at the point at which their law ceases to have effect and the laws of C alone obtain. This is what the 27 member states of the European Union have decided to do to the United Kingdom, imposing laws made by a legislature in which we are not represented and imposing a border cutting the country in two and requiring the construction of border control posts for its enforcement.

Some might say that this is acceptable because the Parliament of the United Kingdom has agreed to embrace this humiliation entailed in the violation of its territorial integrity. However, that does not change the fact that Parliament would never have considered such an outcome had the EU not proposed it and thereby sought to disrupt the national unity and territorial integrity of our country. Nor does it make Parliament’s decision to acquiesce to this pressure anything other than a serious mistake, setting an unsettling precedent for international society that is quite unbecoming of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council.

In contemplating this, I greatly rejoice that no Parliament can bind its successors. I welcome the sentence in the King’s Speech about the union. We urgently need legislation to fully restore Article 6 of the Act of Union.

Cadet Forces: Funding

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Thursday 22nd July 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Morrow (DUP) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, on securing this debate, following on from Questions on 1 March. I am very encouraged when I see people of the calibre of the noble Lords, Lord Lingfield and Lord West, and other Peers in your Lordships’ House take such an interest in voluntary youth organisations such as the cadet force, which are based on the fine traditions of the British Armed Forces but, of course, are not part of them.

I pay tribute to all those who give up their talents and time in promoting our cadet force. I do not overstate it when I say that it is a wonderful organisation that the whole of the United Kingdom can be rightly proud of. The Government say that it offers challenging and enjoyable activities. This statement could not be bettered.

My remarks will centre on the Army Cadet Force, or ACF, because as a teenager I was a member of the ACF located in a small rural town in the west of Northern Ireland—a town then, in the 1950s and 1960s, with a population of fewer than 1,000 inhabitants. It was there, through the dedication and commitment of volunteers, that I learned many important lessons that would stay with me for the rest of my life. The late Captain McAfee, our dedicated senior officer, instilled in all those under his command the importance of living lives that will enhance the lives of others. He sought to make good citizens of us all and in most cases that is exactly what resulted.

The briefing notes provided by the Library state that an independent analysis suggests that the cadet forces

“provide benefits both for participants and wider society”—

something I know to be undoubtedly accurate. The notes continue:

“An ongoing government scheme aims to increase the number of cadet units in state schools.”


I hope this can be extended beyond our schools and into wider society. The unit I was privileged to belong to was not attached to any school but was part of the whole community of that small rural town in Country Tyrone in Northern Ireland.

I encourage the Government to take a closer look at the funding for our cadet forces with a view to investing in more resources and funding. New incentives should be adopted to encourage more of our youth to join the cadets and ensure the future of our voluntary youth organisations. A study by the University of Northampton, in a report commissioned by the Ministry of Defence, concluded that

“expenditure on the Cadet Forces is a very good use of taxpayers’ money that supports social mobility and community cohesion.”

Others have already quoted this. In addition, cadets are able to access the Cadet Vocational Qualification Organisation—known as the CVQO—which can equate to GCSEs; the noble Lord, Lord Lingfield, mentioned this.

I conclude simply by saying that cadets provide an excellent and positive return on the expenditure of taxpayers’ money. The benefits of being a cadet cannot be overstated. I look forward to our cadets being fully operative again, subject to the conditions of the pandemic permitting.

Cadet Forces

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Monday 1st March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Goldie (Con) [V]]

I thank my noble friend for his support of and interest in the cadet forces. Taking his latter point first, I entirely agree that the proven benefit to young people of being in the cadet forces is demonstrable; it has an extremely beneficial effect on them in the development of their personal skills and as they prepare for life in the future. As to return, we shall require to be informed by the relevant guidance and rules at the time. There is certainly an appetite to resume face-to-face activity.

[Lord Morrow (DUP) [V]]

My Lords, I am most familiar with the Army Cadet Force, because I am a former member and I benefited much from that in my teenage years. The guidance and instruction I received stayed with me. However, it is extremely difficult for cadet forces to function properly without face-to-face activity. Will the Minister assure the House today that the ACF and other cadets—and, indeed, other voluntary youth organisations, which are an intricate part of society—will be given every assistance when some normality returns? Where does she see the ACF and other cadets on her list and what is the indicative timetable? Please will the Minister help us with that information?

[Baroness Goldie (Con) [V]]

The noble Lord will understand that I cannot give a specific timetable, but I can reassure him that there is certainly a desire throughout the United Kingdom, where the cadet forces are such an important presence for our youth in the four nations, to let them resume their activities as soon as guidance and rules permit.