Digital Economy Bill

Lord Morrow Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 2nd February 2017 Lords Chamber

As I have made clear, these are all procedural amendments that spell out the detail that the Delegated Powers Committee said was lacking. We had hoped that the Government would have tabled their own amendments to achieve a similar outcome, but in the absence of that positive government response I hope that noble Lords will feel able to support our amendments. I beg to move.

[Lord Morrow (DUP)]

My Lords, when I spoke at Second Reading on 13 December, I addressed the enforcement provision in Part 3, and want to do so again today. I warmly welcomed Clause 23, as have other noble Lords, which the Government introduced on Report in another place, and I continue to do so.

Clause 23 is a robust provision and I believe that it would be far more effective than the proposal in Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Clement-Jones, which would replace Clause 23 with one entitled “Court orders”. The truth is, as I shall explain when speaking to amendments in the next group, that there are real problems with the enforcement mechanisms provided by Clauses 21 and 22 of the Bill, especially in relation to websites based outside the United Kingdom. This has always been a special concern, because the vast majority of online pornography accessed from within the UK is accessed from sites based in other jurisdictions.

The failure of Clauses 21 and 22 to provide credible enforcement mechanisms for the age verification requirement in Part 3 was highlighted very effectively in another place by parliamentarians from across the political spectrum. The critical thing about Clause 23 is that it gives the age verification regulator the power to enforce the age verification check provision without delay. The knowledge that, regardless of where in the world the site is based, it can be blocked by the UK age verification regulator will give those sites a strong incentive to introduce robust age verification. Amendment 66, by contrast, would place this in great jeopardy.

I want to raise three major problems with Amendment 66. First, it causes delay in the sense that, if it were to become law, we would then have to wait for the Secretary of State to introduce regulations, without which the age verification regulator would have no power to initiate IP blocking. Secondly, Amendment 66 makes the provision of these regulations, and thus the provision of IP blocking, entirely optional. If the Secretary of State does not get round to producing the regulations, there will be no IP blocking at all. Thirdly, in depending on a court injunction process, this amendment apparently prefers a very much slower, more expensive and more cumbersome mechanism, which websites will know cannot be used very often. This will give them hope that they can carry on without age verification checks because the chances of their being caught will be much less. Of course, the existence of the current Clause 23 powers does not mean that those powers will be used frequently, but the fact that websites will know that they could be deployed quickly and easily will make them much more wary about taking such risks, and will therefore keep children that much safer.

In setting out these objections, I make two other points. First, I understand the argument that there is a copyright precedent for the use of court injunctions, but the idea that we should therefore necessarily follow it is not remotely compelling. There was once a time when injunctions were not used in relation to copyright, but—rather than saying that there is no precedent to act and therefore we should not act—the decision was made that we should act and, in the case of copyright infringement, the use of injunctions was appropriate. Today, though, we are not dealing with copyright infringement; we are dealing with something quite different, which has a concern for child protection at its core. In this context, the mechanism set out by the Government in Clause 23 is more effective and much more appropriate. Secondly, if Amendment 66 is based narrowly on a civil liberties concern, I would have to say that, quite apart from the fact that this concern has to be balanced with a concern for child protection—which, in my view, Amendment 66 does not manage to achieve—it is important not to lose sight of the fact that any decision on the age verification regulation could be judicially reviewed.

When faced with a relatively robust provision of an enforcement mechanism for age verification that would help keep children safe, Amendment 66 with its delays and optional, rather than mandatory, standing cannot but be seen as an attempt to weaken the child protection provisions in the Bill, which I find deeply disturbing. Part 3 of this Bill entered your Lordships’ House as a robust and progressive measure placing us at the cutting edge of child protection online. If we were to replace Clause 23 with Amendment 66, it would leave us much weaker and—in the sense that websites would know that they could risk never being held to account for not having age verification checks—fatally compromised. I believe that this is misjudged, misconceived and mistimed. I very much hope that the Minister will stand by Clause 23 and oppose Amendment 66.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I am absolutely delighted that we have had the views of the noble Lord, Lord Morrow, about my amendment before I had a chance to speak to it, but maybe that’s life—he has given me the benefit of his views before I have set my own on record. I thought that the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, set out extremely well the frustrations of those of us who, in the words of my noble friend Lord Storey, are very keen to make sure we get the right shape for this part of the Bill. There is absolutely no difference between us, in that we wish to see Part 3 be as effective as possible in preventing access to child pornography. We have been debating for only an hour and it is quite clear that this part of the Bill is worryingly embryonic.