Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Meston and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Report stage
Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness for bringing this point up again. I mentioned it in Committee. The reference to the county court, currently in Schedule 2 to the Bill, is the only place in this jurisdiction where the county court is given anything to do. It seems to me now to be an anomaly and an anachronism. It is simply carrying forward the use of the county court from the 1959 Act and the 1983 Act, which provided for that court to deal with applications to displace nearest relatives.

I do not believe that, if the mental health legislation was now being started afresh, it would refer to the county courts. The county court is, in any event, now greatly overburdened, but that is not the only reason to replace it. A mental health tribunal, or indeed the Court of Protection, would be better equipped to deal with these cases, having specialist expertise and judiciary.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I support this amendment and, in particular, what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has said. He has considerable experience of the county court, which I do not have, excepting when I used to appear before it.

What concerns me is that, if a case is sent to the county court, to a judge who is not a family judge, there will be considerable difficulties for that judge. I support the idea that it should be either the mental health tribunal or—as I would prefer, and as the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has suggested—the Court of Protection. The judges of the Court of Protection are judges of the High Court, Family Division, of which I was president. That would be the right court. If it is said by the Government that they are not prepared to move on this issue, and I suspect they might not be, could they at least put in the court code of practice that, if it is sent to the county court, it will be dealt with by a family judge in the county court? The county court sits also as a family court. That would at least ameliorate the situation.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Meston and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Report stage
Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, in those circumstances, if I may, I shall now speak to Amendment 51, which is also in this group. This is the same amendment that I put forward in Committee to provide a statutory basis for determining the competence of a child under 16 to make decisions for the purposes of this Bill and the Mental Health Act 1983. I should emphasise that it is concerned not with the consequences of such decisions but with the determination of competence for the purposes of those decisions.

I will not repeat at any length the arguments from Committee but remind the House that this amendment was prompted by the report of the Joint Committee on the draft Bill, which referred to the complexity of the law in this area concerning those under 18 years of age and referred to the absence of consistent criteria to establish capacity or competence. Sixteen and17 year-olds are subject to the Mental Capacity Act and have the benefit of a statutory presumption of capacity applicable to adults. Children under 16 covered by this Bill do not have the benefit of that presumption and the existing Mental Capacity Act does not apply to them.

The competence or otherwise of those under 16 to make decisions is considered by reference to the principles decided judicially by the House of Lords in the case of Gillick, to which the Minister referred when rejecting my amendment. However, Gillick did not actually set out any test for assessment of competence or any method for such assessment. It simply provided that a child under 16 could consent to medical treatment if considered by professionals to have the maturity and intelligence to understand what is involved. There was no indication of how the broad notions of maturity and intelligence were to be assessed.

This has left professionals, legal and medical, with what has been called inherent uncertainty. The Bill will create a range of situations in which professionals will have to assess a child’s competence, but it is silent as to how that is to be done. In rejecting this amendment, the Minister suggested that it could cause confusion if it was seen to be a different test to that established by Gillick.

The more that I and others have thought about that and analysed the argument, the harder it has been to accept it. First, as I have said, Gillick does not establish any methodical test. The House of Lords in that case did not have to set out how competence was to be assessed. Secondly, this amendment does not conflict with or undermine Gillick. On the contrary, it is intended to build upon it and to provide a workable approach to problematic assessments which professionals sometimes have to undertake.

The amendment provides a clear, structured test for determination of a child’s competence to fill the gap in the Bill and to address the uncertainty to which the Joint Committee referred. I therefore suggest that, rather than create uncertainty or confusion, as was suggested by the Government, it will actually reduce or remove it, and it will provide a clear statement of parliamentary intention as to relevant considerations to be brought to bear.

The Minister has been kind enough to write to me recently, explaining further the Government’s reasons for not supporting my amendment. She stated concern that it could have unintended consequences. However, unintended consequences are by their nature unknown, unforeseeable and may never happen. I have therefore found it difficult to understand the Government’s concerns, particularly as my amendment is expressly limited, referring only to decisions under this Bill and under the existing statute.

The Government also suggested that it might have the effect of restricting the ability of children to exercise choice and autonomy. I have to say I do not understand how that could be suggested. On the contrary, I think it would facilitate the exercise of choice and ensure respect for Article 12 rights, which are expressly referred to in the amendment. The exact terms of Article 12 of the UN convention require that a child who is capable of forming his or her own views is assured of the right to express those views freely, and that those views are given due weight according to age and maturity. In short, I do not see the problems suggested by the Government, and accordingly I commend this amendment.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I agree with all three amendments that we are considering at this moment, but in particular I support Amendment 51 and agree respectfully with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said. He has set it out extremely carefully and clearly.

Despite meeting the most helpful Minister to discuss this and other matters in the Bill, I absolutely cannot understand why the Government do not realise that the absence of any information to help medical professionals looking at a 14 or 15 year-old who has mental health issues, which are why they are in hospital, but who appears otherwise to be very bright, is an issue. How on earth are they to judge whether that child has the degree of competence necessary for the professionals to listen carefully to what the child has to say? If you are over 16, you are included in the Mental Capacity Act 2005, but under-16s have not been included.

I emphasise the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, that Gillick is very long-winded. It would be unreasonable for any medical professional looking at a child of 13, 14 or 15 to settle down and read the judgments of the then House of Lords to find out that they say that Gillick should be applied but absolutely do not say how.

This is why we have this amendment. The Government might decide that they are not prepared to accept it. I did not see the letter that the Minister sent to the noble Lord, Lord Meston, but I cannot understand why there is any confusion. I cannot understand why a form of advice to mental health professionals on dealing with under-16 year-olds in mental health conditions might be applied in any other circumstance in any other litigation. It does not apply.

I have spoken not only to the Minister but to the very helpful team who surround her, and I have been completely unable to understand what on earth they are really worried about. I would be—and I would like the Government to be—much more worried about anyone over 16. There is primary legislation telling anyone how to judge that someone over 16 has the ability to make decisions, but there is nothing to tell anybody about someone under 16.

In my view, there will be a serious lacuna in the law that is very unhelpful, particularly to mental health professionals. What on earth are they going to do with a child who, as I say, is bright and cheerful despite what his or her mental health problems are? How on earth are they going to approach judging whether that child has the sort of competence that over-16s have?

I find it difficult that what is contained in this excellent proposed new clause by the noble Lord, Lord Meston, is seen as somehow confusing or that it will be used in the wrong circumstances, or anything like that. If Amendment 51 is not going to be accepted, what on earth is the help that the Minister expects to give to mental health professionals dealing with under-16s?

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Meston and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Committee stage
Monday 27th January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Indeed, we should be grateful to her for exposing the complexity and variety of situations which may arise and of which mental health professionals must be made aware, so that the decisions they have to make are properly informed by knowledge of the operative orders and the terms of any orders made by the family court. That seems absolutely fundamental. It reinforces the point I wanted to make at the end of the last group before I was very properly curtailed. It applies not only to the county courts if they are to retain some jurisdiction in this area but to the family court. Some serious thought must now be given to judicial training.

Has the Minister considered an approach to the Judicial College with a view to ensuring that both county court and indeed family court judges will be properly trained with regard to the obligations that will arise under this new legislation?

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, for the reasons that have been given I also support the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge. Just to add to what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, said, I respectfully point out to the Minister that if she does get in touch with the Judicial College, which I think would be a very sensible move, she should also let the President of the Family Division know.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Meston (CB)]

It certainly is not removed.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

It is shared.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Meston and Baroness Butler-Sloss

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Meston (CB)]

I am tempted to say that I really do not know. That was a faster ball than I expected to receive. I think the answer is that the case law would be consistently applied, even as it stands now, but would undoubtedly be aided by a statutory test. Whether it would apply in cases such as that which the noble Lord just mentioned, I do not know. The purpose of the amendment is to provide a test for decisions that have to be made consequential upon this legislation, not other situations.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)]

My Lords, I entirely agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Meston, just said. The two interjections were very interesting but they do not really affect the guidance. That is crucial. The question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, as to whether you can understand it but cannot make a decision, may well affect how the person applying the guidance does so. That would be one of the issues for whoever has the uncomfortable task of making the decision.

I think the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, is too cautious. If we go back to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, there is clear explanation and guidance in primary legislation as to how anyone who has to judge capacity is to do it. What we are talking about here—incompetence—is quite simply capacity. For some reason, which I find quite difficult, we seem to think that children under 16 have competence or do not, but over-16s have capacity or do not. It would have been far more sensible to use the same word for every person who will, in fact, be judged on whether they do or do not have capacity to make a decision of great importance, as it would be, in relation to mental health issues. I find it very odd.

However, and equally importantly, if it is in primary legislation for over-16s, why on earth would it be in guidance for under-16s? If it is good enough for over-16s, why is it not good enough for under-16s? The way the noble Lord, Lord Meston, has set this out seems admirable. It is very close to the Mental Capacity Act. I take and entirely agree with the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, but the Government seem to have ignored children to a very large extent, although children are a very important part of this Bill. I do not blame the Minister, because she did not draft it, but she has to bring it to us. I tabled a lot of amendments about parents and people with parental responsibility because they are largely ignored; I will speak about that later. But where we are dealing with children aged under 16, it is essential that they are treated in the same way as everybody else and that has to be in the Bill—in primary legislation.

Young people have had to deal with these issues ever since Lord Denning was presiding in the Court of Appeal in Gillick, but he did not help us at that stage as to how actually to deal with it. Like the noble Lord, Lord Meston, I have also had to make decisions as to whether under-16s were giving me advice that I thought was really worthy of listening to. Children of five can give extraordinarily good explanations, though I do not expect them to give them on mental health issues. I urge the Minister: it is crucial that everyone whose capacity is a matter at issue has it treated in exactly the same way. Therefore, to put it into guidance really will not do.

I will also speak on Amendments 55 and 56. I am very concerned about children. Bear in mind, however much we treat children aged over 16 with respect and as having the capacity to make decisions, and however much we listen to them, as we should listen to all children, there are stroppy teenagers—we all know about them—who, for one reason or another, will not do what adults tell or advise them. I am very concerned, and I am not quite sure about this because I am no expert on mental health legislation, that if a 16 year-old has the right to make advance decisions and they just say, “I do not want any injections, I do not want any pills, I absolutely refuse to have any treatment”, then unless there is an ability to override them they will have capacity and cannot be ignored. One has to view advance decisions for 16 to 18 year-olds with some degree of care. I am not saying that they should not happen, but I am not happy about them being universal and without some ability for them to be overridden.