(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I take part briefly in this debate because I was moved by what my noble friend Lady Altmann said in Committee. I go by one abiding conviction: we are all equal under the law and every subject of Her Majesty the Queen deserves the same consideration, the same protection and the same advancement as any other. As a great admirer of the Jewish community and what it has contributed to our national life over many centuries, I believe that what my noble friend is arguing for today is something that we should all recognise as a legitimate request. I was delighted to hear her comments that she believes that this will be covered, even though her own amendment will not be pressed to a Division.
I have tried to help a little in the work that the noble Baroness, Lady Cox, has done for Muslim women in the context of sharia law. Again, it is important that everyone in this country—every woman—has the same benefits as every other. The rule of law is what makes this a civilised country.
I sincerely hope that we will go forward from Report to see this important landmark Bill on the statute book very soon, and that it will indeed give true and equal protection to all those who suffer or who are in fear of domestic abuse. I am glad to support this amendment.
My Lords, I speak in support of this group of amendments, which I have signed. I associate myself with the excellent speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, and my colleagues. I also thank the Minister and the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and the officials of the domestic abuse commissioner for their engagements on these amendments.
There is indeed progress. As my noble friends have said, there are some clear indications for some modest but significant improvements as outlined. Crucially, I hope we will hear some reassurance, building on what was said in Committee, that statutory guidance, as provided for in Clause 73, will take into account the measures proposed in the amendments.
It is also important to note that there is a host of additional elements throughout this Bill which support the plight of victims and will provide new opportunities for assistance and help, including DAPOs, the role of the domestic abuse commissioner and many others. There is no doubt that more will be done over time. At its very heart, this is a form of gender discrimination that we really cannot accept.
The Government have made a number of arguments as to why they could not go further or place these matters on the face of the Bill. Indeed, there is a reasonable point that the Government have not had enough time to tease through all the different implications for all faiths on this matter. There is a less persuasive point about drafting preferences.
There are two arguments, however, that are surely utterly wrong and incompatible with the underlying intentions behind this Bill: namely, that this is only domestic abuse in certain circumstances and that English law alone cannot solve this matter. A plainly gender-specific arrangement which places women where they have less rights and power in courts, which are exclusively run by the decisions of men, is wrong. This is not a situation we should accept, nor is it an arrangement we should settle for, even under any calculation of what religious freedoms should be accorded to faith communities in our country.
In Holland, the courts have been making rulings which have included fines and even imprisonment of husbands unwilling to deliver gets, with all the support of the rabbinate and the religious courts. In fact, under Dutch jurisprudence since 2002, which was strengthened in specific legislation just a couple of years ago—and which has been accessed by Jewish women across Europe, including, previously, some from the UK who, unfortunately, can no longer access it now—the secular courts are able to unchain Jewish women in these circumstances. The distinguished Chief Rabbi Pinchas Goldschmidt, the head of the conference of European orthodox rabbis, supports this measure, as does rabbi Aryeh Ralbag, the former chief rabbi of Amsterdam, who now works in the orthodox courts in New York to bring reform and change. They support the Dutch judiciary’s proactive approach and recognise that, over 2,000 years, the role of the religious courts and the nature of Jewish communities in modern times is different. In response to the opposition of those who resist any notion that secular values or laws should ever interfere in how the Jewish law operates in liberal democracies. Rabbi Ralbag has powerfully said:
“Am I concerned that this is creating a precedent for interference? In some places, yes, I am. But I and every rabbi need to measure this against the pain and suffering that is being visited on Jewish women right now. And right now, this is what we can do to help”.
Regrettably, we are a long way from that here in the UK, but this is something that I think should inspire us that more can and must be done through this Bill—and indeed after it. I have been truly shocked and humbled over the issues presented by these amendments. I have been contacted by tens of women in this situation since I first spoke out. I have heard the most traumatic stories, including with people I knew, and in some cases people I have socialised with. How true it is that you never know what is going on, even with people you think you know well. The private torments, appalling behaviour, abuse and control—it has been utterly shocking. How important it is that there are excellent organisations such as the Jewish Women’s Aid and GETTout UK. I have been shocked at how some members of the legal profession have been providing the use of the get as a bargaining chip to ensure that women cannot receive what the law is clear and firm they are fully entitled to.
These issues go much deeper than the granting of the get and involve many cases that do not even touch the sides of the religious courts, where they are prepared to intervene. So while I am grateful to the Government for the progress that I hope the Minister will confirm during his speech, we cannot be satisfied with where we are. There is a huge duty on leaders in the Jewish community to face up to this dark side. While thus far it does not do what the Dutch have done, I hope the Bill will make them think and come round to proposing more legislative interventions themselves. I hope Jewish women will find comfort in the support that the Bill will give them in their struggles ahead, and for that we must be grateful.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to listen to and follow my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn and the other sponsors of these amendments.
I wish to make two brief points. The first is that whenever there is an unequivocal imbalance in power relations, that affects behaviour. The behaviour relayed to me in the context of these amendments particularly concerns women who remain in abusive relationships precisely because, in any definition of “negotiation”, the odds of getting out are stacked against them. One cannot go fairly into a separation negotiation if the other side has additional cards that are greater than the ones you possess. That imbalance affects ongoing behaviour; it will be affecting people’s behaviour now, as my noble friend Lord Mendelsohn rightly pointed out, in cases where perhaps no one will know anything at all other than the woman directly affected. There is a responsibility on the Government to listen acutely to the expertise being brought.
That brings me to my second point—and it is an apposite time to be making it in the context of Lord Speaker elections and people thinking about the size of the House—about the diversity of this place. There is no purpose in having an unelected Second Chamber if it does not represent the diversity of the communities out there. With these amendments and the Government’s arguments against them, we see a juxtaposition of the best and the not so good. Here we see a community effectively represented, by Members from across the range of the political spectrum knowledgably putting forward their expertise to the Government and to the House. But if we are to have a purpose here and carry out the precise role that an unelected Chamber needs to, we need to be far more inclusive of all communities across the country. The amendments, as clearly as any that I have ever seen, absolutely demonstrate the strengths of this House but also, in a sense—and I anticipate that this will be the Government’s response—part of its ongoing weaknesses, in that we are not inclusive enough of all communities.
I congratulate those who have brought forward their expertise from their community for the rest of us. With such cross-party wisdom, it would be foolish of us to ignore that expertise.
(3 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak in support of Amendments 3, 5, 168, 169 and 170. I pay tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for proposing these amendments and I applaud the compelling case that she made in her speech. I also thank all colleagues for their thoughtful comments and support for these measures which, as I say, I strongly support.
It is good to see the Minister in his place and ready to respond to the amendments. I am sure he is aware that it was his head of chambers, my noble friend Lord Grabiner, who introduced the Bill that became the Divorce (Religious Marriages) Act 2002 with the support of the then Government. These amendments come firmly from that tradition and the approach of successive Governments to these matters. The 2002 Act has been valuable, but, alas, the position of so many women who are caught in this situation continues to be a source of great anxiety. These measures would give real benefit and relief, not only to the women who are so chained but to the men who wish to marry them and, most importantly, to the health and well-being of any children caught up in this awful situation. I would like to pay tribute to Jewish Women’s Aid, GETTout and the many legal experts and professionals who have done so much for those too many who have been caught in this awful position.
These amendments do not seek to legislate on what I consider to be essentially matters of religious doctrine and custom. They do not seek to involve the civil courts in questions of Jewish religious law. In fact, these provisions would provide greater flexibility for the courts to apply matters so as to ensure a greater appreciation of religious law and those involved in it. Her Majesty’s judges have proved to be able to deal very effectively with these issues, and I am sure that the beth din of today will be able to do so too, as indeed it has since 1866 when the then Government told the Chief Rabbinate that it no longer had the sole or main right to determine marriage or divorce in the United Kingdom.
What these measures will do, most importantly, is support the person who in adverse circumstances is the most powerless, vulnerable and likely to be experiencing coercive or abusive behaviour. There has been a tendency in this debate to raise grounds for criticising rabbis for not getting a grip on the problem, but it is important to recognise that religious law is biblical in origin and therefore seen to be immutable. Changes in practice and interpretation are very hard to achieve, most notably in the orthodox and ultra-orthodox communities, especially in the absence of any central parliament and in the context of so many different traditions. In my opinion, their position must be understood.
Under our civil law, the process of divorce is straightforward and gender neutral. Neither party can control or manipulate the process, and once the conditions for divorce are satisfied, the divorce is granted. Jewish law is different, because it is gendered and allows the man to control the proceedings. There is a degree of mutuality, but, fundamentally, the process provides for the male to be able to make the final determination and empowers the religious courts with the ability to overrule women. Central to this is the place of the man to be judged as being able to make a decision under religiously defined obligations of “free will” or “free from coercion”. It is a definition absent of responsibilities, or even adherence to common accepted principles of right or wrong.
Unfortunately, these established rules of religious law sometimes bring out the worst in people. On these occasions, the giving of the get may be used as a tactical device or a weapon of blackmail in relation to the ancillary arrangements for the children of the marriage and the financial settlement made in connection with the civil divorce. Alternatively, a refusal to deliver a get may be motivated simply by malice or spite that is in turn driven by jealousy or some other, perhaps understandable but nevertheless objectively unreasonable, purpose. We have to place the needs of the victims at the centre and, as with this important Bill, rebalance our approach to deal with the needs of the victim.
Of course, the job of the beth din is not straightforward and should be recognised as being complex, and is, I am sure, as sensitive as it is agonising. We must avoid getting involved in its processes and matters that offend religious law and focus on helping the victims. In doing this—and this is why these amendments are so important—I will illustrate the predicament of victims through three real-life examples.
The first is of a woman who had been divorced in the civil court, but is still waiting for her get after five years. On finally securing an appointment with the religious court to receive her get, it was made conditional upon her signing to agree a financial settlement of £150,000 less than that awarded by the civil court, and being forced to sign a document relinquishing any ownership of the joint properties. She was encouraged by the beth din to accept the offer as a legitimate way to secure her get, but she did not choose to do so.
Another example is of a woman who has been waiting 20 years for her get, and whose estranged husband has left the religious community, so it has no hold over him. This, and the effect of years of emotional and violent abuse during the marriage, continues to blight her life.
A third woman’s husband was being prosecuted for the sexual abuse of children. In trying to secure her get, she was asked, including by presiding members of the religious court, to lie to the police and tell them that the accusations had been fabricated, so that she could be given her religious divorce. Additional financial sums were requested. The husband made further demands that were impossible for the wife to fulfil, such as clearing his name of all convictions and expunging references on the internet. The woman had non-molestation and restraining orders against her husband, but, nevertheless, she was subjected to a campaign of harassment at home, in the street and through the posting of offensive and abusive messages on social media. The perpetrators have not been easy to identify, nor has there been any co-operation in the investigations. While the beth din expressed sympathy with her plight, there was no movement on the securing of the get.
Not every matter can be resolved easily and not every situation will fall into neat boxes with regard to the roles that either the religious or civil courts can play. It is therefore essential that we take this opportunity to level the playing field and make sure that we give the support to victims that these amendments would provide. Their objective is to enshrine the right of Jewish women to secure their get where it is being withheld by a recalcitrant ex-husband in order to exert control over the woman. Having a specific inclusion for victims of this kind of coercive behaviour, psychological abuse and often economic extortion would be valuable to those women who may have secured a civil divorce but are not considered to be divorced within the Jewish religion. It is in line with the key objective of the Bill, which is to raise awareness and understanding of domestic abuse and its impact on victims. The provisions categorise domestic abuse as conduct whereby one party seeks to compel the other to remain in a marriage against their will and uses an existing religious structure to perpetuate abuse and exert control.
There is a provision in law for the withholding of a civil divorce if a husband does not give a get, but in abusive cases, husbands are often in no rush to obtain a civil divorce, and with the bulk of the matrimonial assets and resources often being in their sole name, they are content to remain married without the final separation under way in the civil court.
While the Jewish religious courts have introduced communal and social sanctions with some degree of effectiveness, they are severely limited by having weak enforcement capabilities. This is why the law needs to go further to protect victims of this kind of coercive control and mental cruelty.
Women in this position must be entitled to the support afforded to other victims of domestic abuse under the Bill, whereby unreasonably refusing to grant a religious divorce means an act or pattern of acts designed to make a person subordinate and/or dependent by isolating them from sources of support, exploiting their resources and capacities for personal gain, depriving them of the means needed for independence, resistance and escape, and regulating their everyday behaviour. That is the absolute definition of coercive control.
It is important to bear in mind that for women who experience get refusal, it is highly likely that that is just one of many abusive behaviours perpetrated against them, often escalating over the course of several years. Sustained domestic abuse serves to humiliate, degrade and slowly remove a woman’s sense of self, severely limiting her wherewithal to advocate for herself. Many women in this position have explained the trauma and absolute desperation it creates, and the fact that they have no way of legitimising their concerns. In some cases a man uses the imbalance of power in his favour simply out of spite—perhaps out of dissatisfaction with the way the civil marriage ended, or with the financial settlement afforded him by the courts.
In other cases, a man may have mental health issues—commonly a personality disorder. In one example, a young woman, A, converted to Judaism and at 19 married a man, B, who quickly became physically and sexually abusive, as he suffered from bipolar disorder, of which she had been unaware during their short courtship. She left him after less than a year, but six years later remained in limbo, unable to marry within the religion she had chosen.
These amendments would provide the opportunity to ensure that the provisions and protections were available to all, and specifically to recognise the plight of these women, removing the shadow of abuse and control. The law cannot restore their right to exercise their faith through their ability to remarry and have children within their faith, but these measures, in this Bill, can provide women with protection through the courts, and give them access to a domestic abuse protection order on the grounds of get prevention.
As noble friends have said, beth din-approved gets have been achieved by using the law, and these particular measures, more creatively and assertively, and in tandem with other steps. Nothing in the amendments makes a case for using them in the first instance, or even making them a normal feature of proceedings in Jewish law governing divorces, the overwhelming majority of which, as colleagues have said, pass easily. I am sure that such a prospect, of being urged to be in compliance, would be unnecessary and would raise deep concerns. But these measures need to be more readily available to support victims, so I hope that the Government are willing to support the amendments, as they are in the tradition of their own approach and of the important progress that the Bill offers.
My Lords, I first declare my interests as noted on the register; I think the relevant ones would be as a vice-president of the Jewish Leadership Council and as a long-standing member of the United Synagogue. I have signed all the amendments in this group, and I shall not refer to them individually. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Altmann, for leading on them. She said that she was speaking as a religious Jewish woman, so I thought it might be appropriate for me to speak as a religious Jewish man. These problems, which mainly affect women, are well known in the Jewish community.
Noble Lords will notice that the amendments in this group have been signed by Peers from the Cross Benches, the Conservative and Labour Benches, and by myself on the Liberal Democrat Benches. When I speak in debates, it is not often that I agree with all four of the speakers immediately before me—maybe this is due to my bad nature—but tonight I do, and I pay tribute to the details that they have added to the debate.
The questions we are asking are: what is abusive behaviour, and what is coercive behaviour? We are saying that spouses should not unreasonably prevent the dissolution of a Jewish religious marriage. Other noble Lords have mentioned the effects on the children of such marriages, and I shall expand a little on that. Previous amendments have said a lot about parental problems and responsibilities, but if no religious divorce—no get—is given, the children of that marriage cannot live separately with the divorced parent. Worse than that, the children of a marriage that is recognised in the civil courts but not in the Jewish religious courts are treated as illegitimate in the Jewish religion. What we need to do, if we can, is to use UK legislation to help those chained women.
Previous speakers have commented on recalcitrant husbands who demand to be paid off in order to give a get. We should do everything we can in UK legislation to give power to the women who have such problems. I would have given some examples, but the noble Lord, Lord Mendelsohn, has already given some graphic ones, which I am sure will be well known to the Minister.
(7 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise briefly to speak in support of Amendment 13, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, and to which I have added my name. He has raised a very important point in relation to how the discount is applied and we are all very grateful to him. He has made a compelling case, and I should like to make a couple of comments in this context.
Since the financial crisis, $321 billion has been paid out globally in fines, compensation and legal costs, and the UK has contributed some $60 billion of that. KPMG reported in 2015 that, between 2011 and 2015, 60% of bank profits had been paid in fines, compensation and legal costs. Since the financial crisis in general, payouts in legal fees, fines, compensation and bonuses are basically equivalent to the entire profits generated, with all the consequences for shareholders, corporate governance, the reputation of the financial sector and losses to the taxpayer. At its very core, the attempt to deal with culture, conduct and, in some cases, apparent contempt for customers has lacked one key element: accountability. Using the discount to emphasise this element of accountability is one of the compelling parts of this proposal.
We on this side do not agree with the argument that the FCA is not up to the job; nor do I believe that it has not used its powers or that its procedures are flawed. The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has found a very important gap, which needs to be plugged: there is an incentive that does not work because there has been no downside. Even the FCA has moved towards the senior management regime to support the noble Lord’s central argument.
I, too, am grateful to the Minister for her openness and engagement and for the provision of officials—a quite copious amount of officials—to try to help address these sorts of matters. We have enjoyed those discussions and are looking forward to them continuing. Further openness on the cases where the discount has been applied would be extremely beneficial. As the FCA moves towards pursuing less significant fines, and has limited resources to both police and investigate, the approach of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, is helpful in ensuring compliance, and places a sensible responsibility on the financial sector. It can mean that we can feel confident—and I hope that I am not tempting fate—that when the most egregious fines and compensation sums are probably now behind us, the lower aggregate level of cost does not allow us to believe that the industry is properly policed. Only the accountability and responsibility in this amendment will do so.
My Lords, I start by thanking the noble Lords, Lord Mendelsohn and Lord Sharkey, for the time that they have taken in entering into discussions with me and officials and representatives of the FCA, both today and yesterday. The discussions were very helpful but, as the noble Lord said, we have more to go.
Amendment 13 basically requires the FCA, as the noble Lord has said, to withhold a proportion of the discount to a penalty applied to a financial firm until that firm has completed any internal disciplinary actions agreed in the settlement. I really welcome the noble Lord’s objective of improving compliance and the culture across the financial services sector. The Government share this objective and we have made significant progress in the area in recent years. We have, for example, introduced the senior managers and certification regime, to which the noble referred. This will, where appropriate, ensure that the FCA can take action against individuals where they are at fault. I know that the culture at firms is also a priority for the FCA, which has observed that it is both a key driver and a potential way of mitigating risk, and therefore plays a role in the achievement of its statutory objectives. The senior managers and certification regime is a key workstream in the FCA’s work programme on culture, as is the FCA’s focus on those aspects of remuneration policy that drive individual behaviour and culture.
Noble Lords spoke about disciplinary action to be taken against individuals working for firms. At the outset, I want to emphasise that if the FCA thinks that a disciplinary action should be taken against individuals, it can and does take action itself, as opposed to leaving it to the companies to do so. The FCA and other enforcement agencies have powers to fine individuals, or to take other action such as prohibiting them from continuing to operate in the financial services industry. This approach can be seen in a number of high-profile cases, including those involving LIBOR manipulation. The FCA settled eight cases with firms totalling £758 million. It is also conducting a number of separate enforcement actions against individuals. There have been seven completed actions against individuals in cases that involved settlements with firms in relation to LIBOR or Euribor, but others are still ongoing. More generally, the FCA issued fines against 64 individuals between 1 April 2013 and 24 March 2017 totalling £15.5 million. They might be the cases that the noble Lord was referring to. Many of these were connected to previously settled cases against firms, although I am afraid that I am unable to provide noble Lords with an exact number.
That said, the FCA also expects firms to consider what action they themselves should take. If a firm has not taken appropriate action by the time the FCA imposes a penalty on it, the FCA can increase the penalty as a result. We went through a lot of that today. I am saying that not for the benefit of the noble Lord, but mainly for the benefit of the House, because we have been through this. Of course, in appropriate circumstances, the FCA can impose a requirement that a firm consider further whether it needs to take any additional action to remedy the breaches identified.
The noble Lord asked me today whether it would be a better arrangement to have an automatic system of withholding a proportion of the discount, so as to make it directly in the interests of the firms to take the action that they are supposed to take, rather than the FCA having to make an assessment later of whether it ought to impose an additional penalty. I commend him on his ingenuity, but having consulted with operational partners and Treasury officials, the Government’s view is that the existing regime gives the FCA the flexibility to apply penalties and impose requirements on a case-by-case basis. It allows it to leverage those requirements wherever needed in order to ensure that the firm acts appropriately. While there might be options to enhance this approach and better achieve the outcomes that we all seek, we should be clear about the potential benefits before pursuing any such options. That is kind of where we left it today.
I trust that noble Lords will agree that we should not seek to reform or amend without exploring the implications, both the advantages and any unintended or undesirable consequences. For instance, we are concerned that this amendment would weaken the incentives for firms to settle early with the FCA, given that the settlement would not be final, subject to the full discount being granted. As a result, they might instead choose to engage the FCA in costly and protracted action rather than all being involved in focusing on remedying the underlying issues.
Moreover, further detailed consideration would need to be given as to how this amendment would interact with established principles of employment law. In particular, when a firm disciplines an individual, it needs to follow due process rather than agreeing in advance a predetermined course of action. For the amendment to work effectively, consideration would need to be given as to whether the FCA would need to be given a power to require firms to take such action against their employees; otherwise the amendment would put the FCA at risk of liability when undertaking the duty the amendment creates. Moreover, appropriate amendments would also need to be made to the Employment Rights Act 1996 to ensure that such action does not give rise to unfair dismissal claims by relevant employees against their firms. It is also not clear whether the proposed approach would be the best way of achieving the aim of improving the culture of firms.
In summary, we can all agree that this an extremely complex issue, which seemed to be made even more complex as discussions went on today. We share the same objectives of improving compliance and the culture in the banking sector. Ultimately, the FCA already has significant powers to address the issues underlying the noble Lords’ amendment, not least the power to sanction relevant employees in appropriate circumstances. I trust that the House will see that it is far from clear that the amendment would deliver the positive outcomes that have been described. That being said, I found the discussions today to be very interesting, as did the relevant officials, and hope this has been an equally insightful discussion to the two noble Lords. There might be ways of enhancing the existing regulatory system; the FCA is, in fact, conducting a review of its penalties policy at present, and I know that it would welcome the opportunity to continue this discussion with both noble Lords.
I can confirm that, subject to the outcome of the election, I expect that the Government will consider how best to facilitate further discussions on this issue, and, as I outlined to the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, this would be my intention. I am very grateful to the noble Lords for their amendment. However, I ask them to withdraw it so that action not be taken in haste. I hope they feel comfortable to do so following some of the undertakings I have given.