Tax: Church Action for Tax Justice Reports

Debate between Lord McNicol of West Kilbride and Lord Hendy

Thursday 21st January 2021 Grand Committee

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

I congratulate the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans on securing this debate. I wholeheartedly endorse the reports Tax for the Common Good and Fair Tax Now. If we are to rebuild a sustainable and just economy and end the blight of inequality, the evil of tax-dodging by powerful corporations, facilitated by accountants and lawyers, must be ended. For the reasons set out in those reports and by other noble Members in this debate, we need to make taxes of all kinds less regressive and to tax wealth, property and inherited income properly. We need to work internationally to prevent national competition on low taxation and end the blight of tax havens.

One thing that Covid-19 has shown those of us who, unlike the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Portsmouth, are not economists is that Governments are not dependent on tax income to balance public expenditure in a notional account book. It is now clear that they have other sources of spending for the public good, especially in times of low inflation. But tax has functions beyond simply raising revenue for the Government. Most particularly, it is a means to reduce inequality—the most appalling blight on our society, as the reports make clear. The consequences of economic inequality on every aspect of life were drawn to our attention a decade ago in the work of Wilkinson and Pickett, and are strikingly reiterated in the latest of the reviews by Sir Michael Marmot and his team, Build Back Fairer: The COVID-19 Marmot Review. The adverse impact of inequality on the economies of the world has been pointed out time and again by the OECD and the International Labour Organization.

In the UK, the share of national income going to workers has been relentlessly declining for 40 years, as company profits and dividends to shareholders increase at the expense of wages and salaries. In 1976, 65.1% of gross domestic product went to wage earners; by 2019, wage share had slumped to 49.2%. After a year of lockdown, we can be sure that the scales have tipped yet further against—[Inaudible.]

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

I think we had some interference on the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

[Inaudible]—I am ending now—forward to redress the growing and dangerous levels of inequality in the UK and across the world. I ask Church Action for Tax Justice to keep up the good work.

Trade Bill

Debate between Lord McNicol of West Kilbride and Lord Hendy

Committee stage & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 6th October 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to speak to Amendment 17 and open the batting on a group of amendments on dispute resolution. Put shortly: Amendment 17 opposes investor-state dispute settlement arrangements —ISDS; Amendments 43, 44 and 52 seek to constrain it; Amendment 91 deals with tax matters; and Amendment 94 deals with disputes between state parties.

Amendment 17 is intended to prevent regulations permitting ISDS in the agreements, envisaged by Clause 2, which the Government are negotiating to replace existing EU agreements. Existing EU agreements are listed in the Library briefing. Some of them include ISDS; others do not.

The new agreements will differ from the existing EU agreements, not least by making the UK a party. There will be other modifications too, as explained in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Explanatory Notes. The Bill envisages modifications. It does not require replication of the content of EU agreements—contrary to the Minister’s comment last Tuesday. Amendment 17 seeks, in the new UK agreements, modification of the content of existing EU agreements by the exclusion of ISDS where those agreements provided for it and its non-inclusion where EU agreements did not.

ISDS is often found in international trade agreements. Where it exists, it is wholly objectionable. ISDS has the power to override the supremacy of Parliament, to defeat the rule of domestic law, and it discriminates on grounds of nationality. Far from taking back control, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out in our last sitting, ISDS is the surrender of control.

The inclusion of ISDS in the then proposed EU-US trade deal, TTIP, was the principal reason for 3 million signatures—half a million of them in the UK—on the petition against it. The legitimacy of ISDS in EU agreements is now in doubt. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in Slovak Republic v Achmea on the Netherlands/Slovakia trade agreement, held that ISDS has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is therefore incompatible with EU law. This is an EU judgment we should follow.

ISDS is a mechanism whereby a corporation of one state party to the FTA can bring a claim for compensation against the other state. That sounds fine, until one appreciates that such claims are not brought in the courts of either state, nor under the laws of either state. ISDS is a system of arbitration usually conducted in secret. The usual basis for claims is that the accused state has failed to ensure “fair and equitable treatment” or has expropriated some asset of the investing corporation. Such claims are not open to any but foreign corporations. The claim is not that the host state has breached the law of the land but usually the converse: that domestic law has caused the foreign corporation loss of hoped-for profits.

Take the Philip Morris case, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

My Lords, we are having some technical difficulties online. A number of our colleagues who are participating remotely cannot hear you as well as we can in the Room. If we cannot resolve it in the next minute or two, I will adjourn the Grand Committee for five minutes, until 2.42 pm. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, but it is more important that people online hear his comments.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)]

My Lords, the Grand Committee is resumed. We now resume debate on Amendment 17. I apologise to the noble Lord, Lord Hendy, for having to call on him to start again from the beginning. We have now resolved the technical difficulties so, from the top, the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.

[Lord Hendy (Lab)]

No apologies are needed. It is a pleasure to speak to Amendment 17 and open the batting on a group of amendments on dispute resolution. Put shortly: Amendment 17 opposes investor-state dispute settlement arrangements—ISDS; Amendments 43, 44 and 52 seek to constrain them; Amendment 91 deals with tax matters; and Amendment 94 deals with disputes between state parties.

Amendment 17 is intended to prevent regulations permitting ISDS in the agreements, envisaged by Clause 2, which the Government are negotiating to replace existing EU agreements. Existing EU agreements are listed in the Library briefing. Some of them include ISDS; others do not. The new agreements will differ from the existing EU agreements, not least by making the UK a party. There will be other modifications too, as explained in paragraphs 37 and 38 of the Explanatory Notes.

The Bill envisages modifications. It does not require replication of the content of EU agreements—contrary to the Minister’s comment last Tuesday. Amendment 17 seeks, in the new UK agreements, modification of the content of existing EU agreements by the exclusion of ISDS where those agreements provided for it and its non-inclusion where EU agreements did not.

ISDS is often found in international trade agreements. Where it exists, it is wholly objectionable. ISDS has the power to override the supremacy of Parliament and to defeat the rule of domestic law, and it discriminates on grounds of nationality. Far from taking back control, as the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, pointed out, ISDS is the surrender of control.

The inclusion of ISDS in the then-proposed EU-US trade deal, TTIP, was the principal reason for 3 million signatures—half a million of them in the UK—on the petition against it. The legitimacy of ISDS in EU agreements is now in doubt. The judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Slovak Republic v Achmea on the Netherlands/Slovakia trade agreement held that ISDS has an adverse effect on the autonomy of EU law and is therefore incompatible with EU law. This is an EU judgment that we should follow.

ISDS is a mechanism whereby a corporation of one state party to the international trade agreement can bring a claim for compensation against the other state. That sounds fine until one appreciates that such claims are not brought in the courts of either state, nor under the laws of either state. ISDS is a system of arbitration usually conducted in secret. The usual basis for claims is that the accused state has failed to ensure “fair and equitable treatment” or has expropriated some asset of the investing corporation. Such claims are not open to any but foreign corporations. The claim is not that the host state has breached the law of the land but usually the converse: that domestic law has caused the foreign corporation loss of hoped-for profits.

Let us take the Philip Morris case, referred to by the noble Earl, Lord Caithness, and the noble Lord, Lord Lansley. The Australian Parliament passed legislation requiring plain-paper packaging for cigarettes. Philip Morris challenged the legislation on constitutional grounds. It failed at every level, including in the High Court of Australia. It then transferred ownership of its Australian companies to a subsidiary it had set up in Hong Kong so as to enable an ISDS claim under the Australia-Hong Kong trade agreement. The claim failed, but only because the transfer of ownership of the companies to Hong Kong post-dated the activity giving rise to the claim.

Corporate Insolvency and Governance Bill

Debate between Lord McNicol of West Kilbride and Lord Hendy

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 16th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

I now call the noble Lord, Lord Hendy.

[Lord Hendy (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendments 83 to 86, I will begin with an introduction and then make two points, which will also shorten my contributions to amendments in later groups. The Government rightly foresee that, in consequence of the pandemic, many companies will run into or are already in financial difficulty. Companies become insolvent all the time; we all know the fates of Woolworths, Bernard Matthews, Mothercare, Thomas Cook, Wrightbus, Jamie’s Italian, Carillion, Flybe and many more. There were 17,196 company insolvencies in 2019 alone, but Covid-19 will make it worse.

Hundreds of thousands of workers are directly engaged by the companies in danger. There are hundreds of thousands more in their supply chains. Many will find themselves among the 2 million unemployed workers estimated by the Office for Budget Responsibility to join the 1.36 million unemployed before lockdown—a total of 3.36 million unemployed: a catastrophe. Not only are livelihoods at risk, but the terms and conditions, and the pensions, of those whose jobs are saved are also at risk. We have already seen this in companies that are not insolvent: pay cuts of 10% at the Daily Mirror; of 20% at BAM Construct; of 20% at Ryanair, with a loss of possibly 3,000 jobs; and up to 60% at British Airways, with 12,000 jobs to go.

There can be no doubt that the opportunities offered by the Bill, though generally welcome, will be utilised, as in Chapter 11 proceedings in the USA, to scrap jobs, cut pay and dump pension liabilities. I understand that the Minister has recognised the risk to pensions, yet the remarkable fact remains—and this is the first of my two points—that, in the 234 pages of the Bill, the workers, even those directly engaged, are not mentioned. They are at risk, but not protected.

Most strikingly, the Bill provides no requirement for workers and their representatives to be involved in the decisions that follow the recognition that a company is in financial difficulty and the consequences of such decisions—decisions that are profoundly likely to affect their futures. In the other place, it was said that, in court approval for restructures, the court will have regard to the workers and pensioners in its duty to ensure that the outcome is just and equitable. That will not wash. There is no duty to have regard to the interests of workers and pensioners, and no provision requiring workers or pensioners to be represented in or heard by the court.

It is true that Section 172(1)(b) of the Companies Act provides that among the considerations that directors must take into account are the interests of the employees. But the directors are not obliged to ask them for their views or discuss with them the possible consequences of an application under the Bill. Still less is there any requirement to bargain collectively over these matters. Directors commonly ignore the interests of workers when a company is in financial difficulty. Often, the workers first learn that the company has gone into liquidation on the TV, well after all key decisions have been taken—for example, at Carillion, or Flybe earlier this year.

Section 188 of the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act requires consultation before redundancy. We know that too often, that does not happen, even where administrators have been appointed. It is often cheaper to liquidate the company than to keep it going while consultation takes place. In the administration of Woolworths, £67.8 million was paid in compensation for failure to consult. For Comet, it was £26 million. But the companies, directors and administrators that choose to break the law by not consulting do not pay. Where there are insufficient funds, the burden falls on the taxpayer, under Part XI of the Employment Rights Act, by which the National Insurance Fund pays—capped at £538 a week—up to eight weeks’ unpaid wages, wages in lieu of statutory notice, holiday pay and basic awards for unfair dismissal. Why does the taxpayer pay? Insolvency law distributes the risk of economic failure in a grossly unfair manner.