Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill Debate
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Lord McNally
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Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill
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The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)
The noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis, was always known for his impetuosity.
I pay tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, and his ongoing interest in debt matters. However, this amendment would have the effect of broadening the availability of legal aid for debt cases, contrary to our current proposals, which are to retain legal aid for priority debt cases only, where the individual’s home is at immediate risk of possession because of rent or mortgage arrears or involuntary bankruptcy.
It is never an easy decision to restrict the availability of funding but economic reality dictates that we focus scarce resources on the cases that are the highest priority. The Government have taken a principled approach to making spending reductions, prioritising funding for those categories of case that are most serious, such as where life, liberty or immediate loss of home are at stake. The necessary corollary of protecting funding in the most important areas is that we have to make tougher choices in the lower-priority areas.
When making these decisions, we have taken into account the presence of alternative appropriate forms of advice. It is simply not the case that legal advice is the only—or even the best—response to debt problems. Figures show that liability for the debt itself was reported as successfully contested in fewer than 2 per cent of cases in 2009-10, and also reveal that 62 per cent of legal help funding for debt matters was spent not on complex matters of law but on negotiating payment arrangements and advising clients on managing their affairs better.
We recognise that debt problems can be difficult and stressful for the individuals concerned, but we believe that what people often need is practical advice and support, rather than specialist legal advice. This help is quite widely and effectively available from organisations such as Credit Action, the National Debtline, the Consumer Credit Counselling Service and the Insolvency Service inquiry line and website. Local authorities also signpost people to local sources of advice and assistance on debt matters. In addition, the Money Advice Trust, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, referred, has recently launched “My Money Steps”, an online tool for providing advice for people with debt problems. The Consumer Credit Counselling Service also offers a free online “Debt Remedy” service.
Such sources of help are best placed to deal with issues like debt relief orders, which this amendment suggests should be brought back into the scope of legal aid. These orders are relatively informal procedures, used by people who owe limited amounts of money and do not have assets. Indeed, the current legal aid scheme does not pay for their completion.
Given the availability of alternatives, and the pressing choices forced upon us by the economic situation, it does not seem a wise use of scarce resources to continue funding widely available legal advice, much of which replicates advice available elsewhere. We must move away from the assumption that for many problems that are fundamentally non-legal, the only answer is for the state to pay for legal advice.
I understand that this amendment is motivated in part by the noble Lord’s concerns about funding for citizens advice bureaux to provide debt advice. As I have said in earlier debates, we share that desire to see what can be done to help to ensure sustainability for the non-profit sector. However, let us not overstate the impact of our changes in legal aid on CABs. Legal aid funding is intended for specialist advice, not for cross-subsidy of other activities. As a matter of practice, in 2010, 85 per cent of all bureaux funding came from sources other than legal aid and half of all bureaux do not hold a legal aid contract at all. Moreover, it should be borne in mind—I am sure that the Opposition will be glad to know this—that we have already provided £20 million, which has come ahead of reductions in legal aid spend.
It is worth remembering that CABs have not had any cut in legal aid spend and will not until 2013. Of that £20 million, £16.8 million assigned to England is being used for the Advice Services Fund to support not-for-profit providers in delivering essential advice on debt, welfare benefits, employment and housing. Despite the concerns of the sector, the Money Advice Service will continue resourcing the existing free face-to-face debt advice services after 31 March, so that people in need have access to good, free advice. The Financial Services Authority has agreed to fund this provision from April.
I also understand that the Cabinet Office’s review is expected to conclude shortly and will provide recommendations on proposals to secure long-term sustainability of the sector. As my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace pointed out, it is only nine days to my right honourable friend the Chancellor’s Budget. Therefore, I would ask the House to be patient and to allow us to bring this important work to its conclusion.
It is always easy to make the case for spending but tough times require tough decisions. I hope that even our critics accept that we are making genuine attempts to protect the not-for-profit advice sector, not least by the pressures brought to bear by my noble friend Lord Shipley at earlier stages of this Bill and by other Members of this House who have raised the specific issue of the CABs and the not-for-profit sector. I have given assurances about this and, against that backdrop, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Stevenson of Balmacara
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, for her contribution to this debate and for sharing her experience of working directly in this field, which I echo. I recognise many of the points that she made around that. It was also nice to have the unprompted support of the noble Lord, Lord Clinton-Davis. I seem to be having a little run of these things because the previous time I tried to speak about this subject, the noble Lord, Lord Best, came in on housing, which, although again relevant, was not exactly helpful to my support. Never mind, we will battle on.
At last weekend’s Lib Dem conference, a Motion was passed calling for:
“The protection of fair and equal access to justice, through … A properly funded system whereby access to legal advice and representation before the courts is not denied to those otherwise unable to bear the costs”.
It was unanimously passed but I notice that the Minister did not mention it when he made his remarks a few minutes ago.
A lot of the points that I made, which were picked up by the noble Baroness, Lady Coussins, were about the difference that had to be made between legal advice and generic advice. It is certainly true that a lot of work is going on in the generic debt advice field but we have been facing problems in terms of legal advice. I notice that in his comments the Minister made more of a case for support of the voluntary sector in this area, which of course we are grateful to have, than about the individuals who we think will be affected by this. For example, if the bailiffs are at the doorstep seeking to seize someone’s goods and chattels, I think that everyone in this House would agree that they are reasonably said to be facing serious direct consequences. Yet, under the present proposals, they would neither be eligible for legal aid to contest the original order nor would they be able to access legal aid to challenge the manner in which the order had been carried out. Indeed, we know a lot about that. There are quite serious difficulties within the legal advice sector of debt which have not really been picked up in this debate so far.
It was interesting that the Minister made the point that currently debt relief orders were not being funded to any great extent by legal aid and that, to some extent, legal aid should perhaps not be used at all for this. The key reason why the DRO scheme is successful is its lower cost, which was much trumpeted by the Insolvency Service. That is because the administration fee is £90, of which £80 goes to the Insolvency Service, leaving £10 for those who have to administer it. I have looked carefully at the way in which these forms are created. It would take me a great deal of time to work through these things and I am an accountant. However, specialist support and advice is needed. I think that it is ingenuous of the Minister to say that somehow this will survive. My charity estimates that it costs us about £350 per case to deliver a completed DRO. Where will that money come from? I do not think that we have had any answer to that.
Finally, the way in which the noble Lord went on seems to suggest that he has not read the BIS Select Committee report on debt management, which was published last week. The report states:
“Citizens Advice informed us that the legal aid budget for debt advice in England and Wales is due to fall by 75 per cent from 2013”.
The noble Lord admitted that there would be some changes after 2013. The report continues that the,
“figures, from the Justice Department, suggest that the number of people currently helped with debt problems will fall by 105,000”,
which is a significant number.
Later in the report, a BIS Minister is reported as recognising that,
“the cuts to legal aid could be a problem. Clearly for particularly some Citizens Advice Bureaux and other advice agencies, it may well have quite a big impact … I am afraid these are not easy times. There are cuts being made”.
The situation facing those in debt in this country—very often not of their own accord and they certainly are not the feckless poor—is really difficult. I do not think that these proposals will help. I should like to seek the opinion of the House.
Lord McNally
On the point that the noble Baroness has just made, I for one would certainly not be worried if the provision increased trade union membership. That seemed to me to answer the question of whether certain kinds of advice should be made because people take the precaution of joining a trade union rather than expecting the taxpayer to pay for their advice. As I explained in Committee, we have thought very carefully about which areas should be removed from scope. We also considered whether there were procedures that would allow people to resolve their problems without legal assistance, such as tribunals or alternative dispute resolution, and we have looked carefully at whether all the matters currently funded through the legal aid scheme are strictly legal work.
Employment tribunals are designed to be simple to enable parties to make or respond to a claim without the need for representation. The rules of the employment tribunal place a duty on the tribunal and its chairmen to deal with cases justly and fairly, including, so far as possible, ensuring that parties are on an equal footing. While we recognise that clients find advice useful in the preparation of their case, we have had to prioritise funding on cases that involve fundamental issues such as liberty or safety, and proceedings in which litigants are generally unlikely to be able to represent themselves effectively. We do not accept that the employment tribunal cannot be accessed or that justice cannot be obtained without access to legal aid for advice—a point made by my noble friend Lord Faulks.
I should also mention that the Government are looking at referring all employment cases to the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service, ACAS, before the employment tribunal to try to resolve problems early on. Indeed, ACAS itself offers advice through a free helpline and help is usually available from trade unions. The noble Baroness, Lady Turner, made that point. BIS is still considering with ACAS the route forward on this issue. My honourable friend Jonathan Djanogly is in discussions with BIS and ACAS to take this forward. ACAS also offers a free arbitration service for some disputes concerning unfair dismissal or flexible working. As noble Lords will be aware, we propose that legal aid should continue to be available for claims relating to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 in employment cases that are currently within the scope of the legal aid scheme.
As with other things, we do not believe that the changes will have the impact that noble Lords opposite have suggested. The answer to many employment and other issues is economic recovery, which will provide the jobs. That is why those issues continue to be our priority. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Bach
My Lords, once again I thank noble Lords who have spoken with a lot of knowledge in this debate. It is a bit rich for the Minister to say that all these people should join trade unions. It is not easy for many employees these days to join trade unions, particularly those who work for private companies. I am not saying that it is impossible, but it is not easy. To throw that line as an excuse for taking away from those who are not members of trade unions their ordinary legal rights seems extraordinarily superficial.
The Minister talked about not strictly legal work. I would have thought that a claim for unfair dismissal was almost certainly a legal issue that has to be decided by a tribunal. It may be that the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, acted for the employer only in cases that were legal. I cannot think why the employer would employ a barrister as good as the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, must undoubtedly have been even then—the noble Lord tells me that it was not much, and of course I believe him completely—and bothered to pay him at all if these were not legal matters. Unfair dismissal is a legal matter, as are other matters that come before the employment tribunal, so let us please not use the excuse in this case that these somehow are not legal matters. They clearly are, and they mean a huge amount to the lives of the individuals concerned.
Lord Bach
The noble Lord is absolutely right; that is the thinking behind it. The same Government who say that this is not legal advice will of course have lawyers there to represent their interests at industrial tribunals. That will continue whether this legislation goes through or not, so let us have no more of that.
We have already heard mention of the unanimous resolution that was passed, I think only yesterday, at the Liberal Democrat party conference in Gateshead to support legal aid. I shall read three parts of that quite long resolution. First:
“A properly funded system whereby access to legal advice and representation before the courts is not denied to those otherwise unable to bear the costs”.
Secondly:
“The continued provision of legal aid”—
yes, legal aid—
“for those who cannot afford to pay for legal services, in serious cases where a failure to provide legal services may lead to injustice”.
That seems to me like an employment tribunal. Lastly:
“The implementation of the party’s policy on Access to Justice debated at Conference in 2011”.
Of course, the leadership of a party does not always take complete note of what the conference passes, even if it passes it unanimously. Yet it might have been better if the Government, who obviously did not agree with what was said in that unanimous resolution, had had the courage to say so during the course of whatever debate took place. It is very depressing.
Lord McNally
I actually spoke in favour of that resolution because, as we have been debating for some months now, ever since legal aid was started, people in successive Governments have had to draw lines and make difficult and tough decisions. As this point has often been made, the noble Lord has gone to some extreme extent to suggest that we are cancelling legal aid in any particular sector. As we then find out, whether it be with immigration, where we are retaining £70 million in legal aid, or welfare, where we are spending £50 million, that suggestion just does not add up. It is hyperbole and the facts are a long way apart. I had no difficulty in accepting that resolution because it shows that my party continues to give high priority to this issue but a high priority based in the reality of the economic situation that we face.
Lord Bach
I am much obliged to the Minister. He supported, then:
“A properly funded system whereby access to legal advice and representation before the courts is not denied to those otherwise unable to bear the costs”,
did he? He supported, to repeat:
“The continued provision of legal aid, for those who cannot afford to pay for legal services, in serious cases where a failure to provide legal services may lead to injustice”.
I admire him very much for being able to support those provisions and then argue today what I would argue is the precise opposite. If there is an example of a serious case in which legal aid is available now—for advice in many cases, and sometimes for representation—but will not be available if this Bill goes through in this form, that is it.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, like the noble Lord, Lord Best, I have the benefit of having received a briefing from Shelter, which in my case was sent with a covering letter from a solicitor of a very highly reputed firm. He says:
“I can readily attest to the importance of being able to advise clients upon their welfare benefits problems within the context of housing possession proceedings. It is very often the benefits problems that have resulted in the possession proceedings being issued in the first place”.
He goes on to say that it is far more cost-effective if the legal representative is able to help resolve the problems,
“whilst assisting in defending the possession proceedings themselves”.
Shelter is heavily involved in dealing with cases of housing benefit and support for mortgage interest where problems arise. Sometimes there are issues of delay but frequently errors are made in adjudicating on the amount of benefit or mortgage interest support that is to be made available. As the briefing says, unless that underlying problem is resolved, there is no hope of somebody whose home is threatened with repossession ever meeting the rental or mortgage payments and clearing any arrears. Significantly, Shelter deals with thousands of cases in which tenants have not received the housing benefit to which they are entitled and who would have been evicted but for its intervention. It is a complex world and it is not surprising that mistakes occur. I am not being unnecessarily critical of those who have to deal with a very large case load of benefits. Nevertheless, there is clearly a significant number of cases where the wrong decision is made and this can lead to very significant hardship.
Apparently, ministry officials have said that the mixed-case rule will allow for matters out of scope to be brought back into scope if it was otherwise impractical to run the case. However, Shelter points out that the rule excludes the kind of help that it is particularly capable of deploying, which is the most useful sort in resolving some of these cases—that is, dealing with the housing benefits department through letters and calls to sort out an incorrectly paid claim or one which has not been paid at all. Nor, apparently, does the mixed-case rule allow for backdating or appeals. That would lead to precisely one of the elements to which the noble Lord, Lord Best, referred, which is more adjourned hearings with a waste of tribunal and court time and, ultimately, probably more possession orders.
It is worth mentioning an interesting case cited by Shelter of a client to whom it had given advice as the latter had received a notice from his local authority seeking possession. It transpired that the Shelter adviser found that the possession claim was due to rent arrears caused by the same local authority failing to assess housing benefit properly. It dealt with a revision of the housing benefit decision and got six months of backdated housing benefit. The arrears were cleared and the notice was withdrawn. However, without Shelter’s assistance provided under the legal aid scheme, that simply would not have happened.
The briefing goes on to deal with a number of matters that were discussed in Committee. A series of points made by the noble Lord are rebutted in the briefing. In particular, the noble Lord indicated that while many people rely on benefits, they are primarily about financial entitlement and they have a lower importance than the liberty or safety of the person. He has used this phrase a number of times as we have debated the Bill. It is obviously true but it does not take us very far in dealing with the very difficult problems that people have to face short of losing their liberty or safety. Losing their home must be one of the more traumatic experiences that anyone has to suffer. Shelter points out that unless advisers can look at the underlying problems that cause the arrears, they will simply be unable to stop people losing their homes. It is not, therefore, simply a question of people going to someone to resolve a problem on the basis of advice. There is more to it than that.
Equally, the Minister, as an example, said that factual advice was available for Jobcentre Plus. As the noble Lord reminded us, housing benefit is likely to move towards Jobcentre Plus or, at any rate, the DWP. He referred also to the benefits inquiry line and the tribunal itself. However, Shelter points out:
“There is little or no overlap between the legal advice funded by legal aid and the sort of factual advice on entitlement offered by Jobcentre Plus”.
It is not equipped to deal with the complexities that Shelter has become used to dealing with. The tribunal, which is there to adjudicate between the parties, is not there to represent or assist one party against the other.
Finally, the Minister observed:
“Legal aid will be available to help tenants engage with landlords to try and resolve the actual or threatened possession issue wherever possible, including … delaying the possession matter until the benefit matter is resolved”.—[Official Report, 18/1/12; col. 697.]
However, that assumes that landlords are willing to wait. That is not Shelter’s experience. It is clear that,
“landlords will not agree to delay the possession matter unless they are assured that”
the tenant,
“will be actively assisted in resolving the benefits problem”.
That is an assumption that may be difficult to satisfy a private landlord about. There are sometimes, by necessity, delays and difficulties in resolving those issues, particularly without legal aid and advice being available.
The amendment is, as the noble Lord, Lord Best, said, confined to one issue. Other issues will be covered by legal aid—notably serious disrepair. Several other housing issues might have been brought forward by way of amendment, but it is clear that the Government will not accept them. I join the noble Lord in urging the Minister to look more sympathetically at this issue, given the serious consequences that can ensue and that could have an impact on other elements of public expenditure. If a family is evicted, one may find that the costs of rehousing fall on the public purse—perhaps even the costs of taking children into care and so on. That is less likely to happen when the landlord is the local authority, but it might well arise in the private sector. The economics are not therefore as straightforward as even the noble Lord would suggest. I hope that there will be a sympathetic response—if not tonight, then before and at Third Reading.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I listened with care to the views of the noble Lord, Lord Best, on matters concerning housing. However, our existing proposals make sensible provisions to keep people in their homes. Notably, they already preserve legal aid for advice and assistance for those facing immediate risk of losing their dwelling, whether the cause is housing-related or a consequence of welfare and debt issues.
Crucially, legal aid will be available when repossession action is contemplated, for example where a person is threatened with repossession action. Our plans do not mean that a case must reach court before legal aid is available. Therefore, for example, legal aid would be available on reaching agreement with a landlord to delay threatened possession action pending the resolution of a welfare benefits issue. In addition, in cases where possession proceedings have already started, legal aid could be used to argue for an adjournment if, for example, the individual is likely to be in a position to make the necessary payments if the benefits dispute is resolved in their favour.
Some argue that we need to fund welfare advice earlier to prevent problems escalating, but, crucially, what people often need is general advice on, for example, benefits, debt or housing, not specialist legal advice. That is one reason why we were pleased to announce that additional funding will be made available in the Budget for citizens advice bureaux on a sustainable footing. We recognise that many people rely on benefits, and my department is working with the DWP as part of the wider welfare reform programme to improve the quality and effectiveness of initial decision-making in applications for social security, reconsideration within the DWP and a system of subsequent tribunal appeals.
In addition, the Bill ensures that legal aid will continue to be available in judicial review about welfare benefit decisions and benefit matters which relate to the Equalities Act 2010. Noble Lords may not agree with the choices we are making, but I hope that they recognise that our proposals represent a genuine attempt to ensure that people can get access to legal advice on the most serious issues.
To cover one or two points raised, the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked about when a benefit appeal is lost and people are facing homelessness. Where the client loses their benefit appeal and subsequently faces action for rent or mortgage arrears that place the home at risk, legal aid will be available, including, for example, to negotiate with mortgage lenders, but it will not be available for welfare benefit matters. Where the benefit dispute is ongoing at the point where repossession action is taken, legal aid will be available in relation to the action. Legal aid could be used to argue for adjournment of possession, as I said.
On the point made by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Best, and others, that changes will mean more serious cases resulting in homelessness, we recognise that early advice can be helpful in a range of contexts. However, as I said, people need general advice. Where a debt or welfare benefit problem places individuals at risk of immediate risk of loss of their home due to, for example, rent arrears, legal aid will be available.
The noble Lords, Lord Howarth and Lord Beecham, both referred to the research by Citizens Advice, which has certainly not been short of resources for its lobbying activities. I note what Citizens Advice states in Towards a Business Case for Legal Aid. Although we have read that research with interest, it did not contrast the outcomes of legal aid recipients with those who did not receive legal aid, so our view is that the evidence is not sufficiently robust to allow the conclusions drawn about the impact of advice. That said, we recognise that early advice can be helpful in a range of contexts. However, what people often need is general advice. We propose focusing our limited legal aid resources on those cases which need it most: disabled people in dispute with local authorities about care needs; people detained under mental health legislation; or parents who are facing the removal of their children by social services.
We do not believe that we have got it very far wrong on housing, and I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
Lord Howarth of Newport
Will the noble Lord be kind enough to write to us with a detailed refutation of the specific figures that Citizens Advice has put forward in all good faith and on the basis of careful research? That is important and a lot of people would be interested.
Lord McNally
I will consider that matter, but quite honestly, during the passage not just of this Bill but of every Bill, lobbying organisations produce reports—as the noble Lord says, in all good faith. To answer every one might overburden a relatively small department working on a small budget. I will consider that request.
Lord McNally
“Terrorism prevention and investigation measures etc39A (1) Civil legal services provided to an individual in relation to a TPIM notice relating to the individual.
(2) Civil legal services provided to an individual in relation to control order proceedings relating to the individual.
Exclusions(3) Sub-paragraphs (1) and (2) are subject to the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule.
Definitions(4) In this paragraph—
“control order proceedings” means proceedings described in paragraph 3(1)(a) to (e) of Schedule 8 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (“the 2011 Act”);
“TPIM notice” means a notice under section 2(1) of the 2011 Act.”
Lord McNally
My Lords, with this amendment we intend to extend the scope of civil legal aid in Schedule 1 to include civil legal services provided in relation to terrorism prevention and investigation measures. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 replaced the old control order regime with TPIMs. TPIM notices impose measures on an individual for purposes connected with protecting members of the public from the risk of terrorism. The current legal aid scheme provides for civil legal services to be available in relation to control orders and TPIMs, and we intend to make similar provisions in the new scheme. This is consistent with our commitment to fund legal services where restrictions are placed on a person’s liberty. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
Without prejudice to one’s views about the change from control orders to TPIMs, I can give an unqualified welcome to the Government’s amendments. I congratulate the Minister on ensuring that legal aid is available in these cases.
Lord McNally
“(a) the exclusions in Parts 2 and 3 of this Schedule, except to the extent that regulations under this paragraph provide otherwise, and(b) any other prescribed exclusions.”
Lord McNally
My Lords, this is a technical amendment to the drafting of paragraph 40 in Part 1 of Schedule 1. I have written to Peers on this matter, but I am willing to go into further detail if noble Lords wish. However, I assure them that this is a technical amendment. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
My Lords, Amendments 86 and 87 are technical amendments to the drafting of the exclusion for damages claims under the Human Rights Act 1998. Again, I have written to noble Lords explaining the rationale behind the amendments and again give them the assurance that these are technical amendments. If noble Lords want a longer explanation, I am willing to provide it, but I hope that they will accept them as technical amendments. I beg to move.
Lord Beecham
My Lords, I hesitate to ask for a longer explanation, but perhaps a slightly longer explanation would help me. Others of your Lordships may have grasped the full implications of the amendment; I fear that I have not quite. It is not clear to me whether as a result of the amendments any claims brought under Section 7 of the Human Rights Act remain outside scope or are brought within scope. I confess that I do not recall having seen the relevant part of the noble Lord’s letter. Section 7 of the Human Rights Act seems to cover an extraordinary range of really quite serious issues. It would be unfortunate if they were to be excluded from scope, but perhaps that is not the intention of the amendment. If the Minister would be so kind as to elucidate, he need not feel that he has to do so at length this evening but could write me a short note.
Lord McNally
No, I fully appreciate the noble Lord’s position. We are aware that the current wording in paragraph 12 could be read as preventing funding for claims which involve a breach of convention rights, even where the client is not seeking damages under the Human Rights Act 1998 for that breach. The amendments are intended to make it clear that paragraph 12 of Part 2 excludes only a claim for damages for a breach of convention rights which is brought in reliance on Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
As I have said previously, the Government’s view is that damages claims are generally of a lower priority for funding than other claims; for example, claims concerning domestic violence or homelessness. Therefore, the Bill allows funding only for damages claims in certain areas. These include in relation to a contravention of the Equality Act 2010 or a previous discrimination enactment, or if they satisfy paragraphs 3, 19, 20, or 34 of Part 1 of Schedule 1. These paragraphs allow funding respectively for: claims concerning abuse of a child or vulnerable adult; abuse of position or power by a public authority; significant breach of convention rights by a public authority, and claims concerning allegations of a sexual offence.
The exclusion in paragraph 12 of Part 2 of Schedule 1 is lifted for the purposes of paragraphs 3, 19, 20 and 34, so that claims under these paragraphs can include a claim for damages made in reliance on Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. The Government have also tabled an amendment to make it clear that where a claim for damages is made in the context of a judicial review under paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1, the grant of legal aid would cover the work associated with the damages aspect of the claim. This includes a claim for damages for a breach of convention rights brought in reliance on Section 7 of the Human Rights Act 1998. Therefore, paragraph 12 of Part 2 has been lifted also for the purposes of judicial review proceedings.
I again assure noble Lords that these are technical amendments to the drafting of the exclusion for damages claims under the Human Rights Act 1998, but I appreciate that the noble Lord might want to read at leisure what I have just said, as will I. If there are still areas of confusion, I will be glad to engage with the noble Lord on them.
Baroness Hamwee
I, too, shall read the Minister’s reply with interest. Is he satisfied that there would not be other types of claim, apart from judicial review, with which a damages claim might be almost inseparably linked as part of the same proceedings? I do not expect him to answer that immediately.
Lord McNally
I think that we can all reflect. I will respond to my noble friend after such reflection.
Lord McNally
Lord Beecham
My Lords, when we considered this issue in Committee, I pointed out that the scheme for criminal injuries compensation—it has changed in terms of the tariff that is now being applied, but that is an irrelevance for the purposes of tonight’s discussion—ran to 55 pages and the guidance to 113 pages and that it seemed there were issues on which advice, if not representation, might clearly be helpful and necessary for claimants. For example, I referred to the fact that the compensation authority could take into account a failure to report an incident in proper time to co-operate with an inquiry, about which there may well have been difficulties for an applicant, and that the existence of a criminal record may also affect the size of a compensation claim.
Moreover, as I recall, the cash in question is fairly limited—a figure of £4 million comes to mind—and, although it is the noble Lord who is replying tonight, the noble and learned Lord who replied then said that he wanted to reflect on the matter and seemed to be sympathetic. I do not know whether the buck has been passed because the noble and learned Lord is unable to translate sympathy into action or whether he is giving his noble friend an opportunity to win plaudits all round the House by following through on not a promise but at least an indication that there might be some movement.
I wait to hear what the Minister has to say about this and I hope that those good intentions will be borne out. If a decision has not yet been reached, perhaps the noble Lord will undertake to bring the matter back on Third Reading for a final determination. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, Amendment 90 would have the effect of making legal aid available for services to support some compensation claims to the Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority. Proper support and help for victims of crime is a fundamental part of the Government’s vision of the justice system. However, as with the rest of our proposals on legal aid, the challenge before us is to reconcile the savings required as a consequence of our economic situation with the protection of those facing the most urgent and pressing problems. The logic across our reforms is that claims that are essentially financial in nature are of a lower priority than those concerning life, liberty or safety. On the basis that CICA claims are, by definition, primarily about money, the Bill seeks to remove them from scope by including a general exclusion in paragraph 16 of Part 2 of Schedule 1.
My noble and learned friend Lord Wallace indicated in Committee that we would consider the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. We have done so carefully but, giving his arguments due weight, I remain unpersuaded that Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority claims should be retained within the scope of legal aid. We recognise that victims of crime will have been involved in a traumatic event. However, the process for making a CICA application is relatively straightforward and there is guidance and support available from CICA to enable victims to make their applications. On the website there is an easy-to-use online form that takes no longer than half an hour to fill out. The section of the guidance about applying for compensation is comprehensive and straightforward. Noble Lords may find it helpful to know that CICA also operates a free telephone helpline to assist people in filling out the form, which is open five days a week. It also offers assistance to those who have difficulty reading or writing.
Lord McNally
(a) those services include the types of advocacy listed in this Part of this Schedule, except to the extent that Part 1 of this Schedule provides otherwise;(b) those services include other types of advocacy to the extent that Part 1 of this Schedule so provides.”
Lord McNally
My Lords, again, this is a technical amendment, of which I sent noble Lords details. It is a minor technical amendment, and the full explanation is contained in my letter. If any noble Lord who has read my letter or read the amendment wants further clarification, I am very happy to give it. However, I assure them that it is a technical amendment to the opening text of Part 3 of Schedule 1, which deals with advocacy. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
Lord Bach
I can be fairly brief here, as the Minister made an important concession in Committee by saying that there would be no means test on advice for individuals in custody. I was grateful for his concession, as was the Committee. However, I am still concerned—and I referred to this in passing in Committee—by the expression to be found in Clause 12(2):
“The Director must make a determination under this section having regard, in particular, to the interests of justice”.
I do not know what that phrase, which we debated a few minutes ago in a different context, means in the context of Clause 12. The really important part of the clause is the first sentence, which states:
“Initial advice and initial assistance are to be available under this Part to an individual who is arrested and held in custody at a police station or other premises”.
After that most of this clause is, to coin a phrase, otiose. It does not really matter; what matters is that there is the right to initial advice and initial assistance. What do the words “the interests of justice” add to the debate? In my view, they add absolutely nothing but they put me rather on edge. Do they mean that there may be some cases where the director thinks it is not in the interests of justice for there to be advice and assistance for someone in custody?
The Minister wrote us all a reassuring letter a few weeks ago. I am afraid that I do not have my copy in front of me as I address the House tonight, but I think it basically said, “Don’t worry about it. It doesn’t actually mean anything in this context”. I put down my amendment so that the Minister can explain why the phrase “the interests of justice” has to appear in this clause at all. Perhaps it is necessary for all the rest of the clause to be there, with regard to what the regulations may include and what initial advice and initial assistance mean. However, that phrase rather concerns me, lest some future director were to decide that “the interests of justice” meant that it was not necessary for advice and assistance to be given.
Without any doubt it is the view of the House—and, I suspect, that of many outside—that the change that the Police and Criminal Evidence Act effected, so that there was advice and assistance for those in custody, has been nothing but a good thing. It has meant that guilty men and women cannot get off their responsibilities because they can blame something on some alleged false admission. It also means that those who are innocent and have been arrested have the protection of some initial advice and assistance, so perhaps the Minister will explain to us why that phrase needs to stay in this clause at all. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I will try to help the noble Lord. I do not think there is anything sinister in this, and I hope that once I have finished speaking he will be happy to withdraw his amendment and leave my two amendments to go through. Perhaps I should start by saying that the scope of provision under Clause 12 is intended to reflect the existing provision in the Access to Justice Act 1999. The Government have no plans—I repeat, no plans—to change the existing provision of advice and assistance to those held in police custody. I indicated in Committee, after an extremely persuasive speech by my noble friend Lord Macdonald, that the Government intended to table an amendment to Clause 12 to remove the power to introduce means-testing for initial advice and assistance—
Lord McNally
I think that it lasted under 30 seconds, and what I was trying to draw to the attention of the House for future reference is that interventions do not have to be for 17, 20 or 25 minutes to convince me. It is to encourage the others that I make the point. As I say, the Government intended to table an amendment to Clause 12—
Lord Beecham
Would the Minister acknowledge that it does not necessarily follow that he has to speak for 17 or 25 minutes to convince us either, especially at this time of night?
Lord McNally
I take the point entirely. I will try again to say that Amendment 103 fulfils the commitment that I made. Government Amendment 104 also clarifies that initial assistance might include assistance in the form of advocacy. It ensures that the current position under the Access to Justice Act 1999 is carried forward in this respect in the Bill.
However, Amendment 102 would make police station advice and assistance automatically available to all. It would mean that the director would not be required to determine whether an individual qualified for police station advice, while having regard to the interests of justice. As such, the amendment is unnecessary. Determinations under Clause 12 are for the director to make. However, in practice, as is currently the case, solicitors apply what is known as a “sufficient benefit” test, which is deemed to be satisfied in circumstances in which a client has a right to legal advice at the police station and has requested such advice in accordance with Section 58 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. On subsequent attendances in the same investigation, the solicitor must ensure that the sufficient benefit test is satisfied before continuing with the matter.
Article 6 of the ECHR requires legal aid in criminal cases only where the interests of justice require it. The provisions of the Bill are based on the starting point that advice and assistance at the police station should be made available only where the interests of justice require it. Therefore, it is appropriate to allow the director to determine whether an individual qualifies for initial advice and assistance. However, our present view is that it will generally be in the interests of justice for those held in custody at the police station to receive advice and assistance in some form, whether over the telephone or in person. There are no plans to change the current system that operates in practice for police station advice. It is currently intended that initial advice and assistance should continue to be available to all those to whom it is available at the moment.
I should add that the Delegated Powers Committee recommended that regulations under Clause 12(9) should be subject to the affirmative procedure. We have accepted the committee’s recommendation and have tabled Amendment 109, which we will move when we reach Clause 40, to make the regulations under Clause 12(9) subject to the affirmative procedure. Given what I have said, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
I make one further clarification on this. Subsection (2) requires the director to have regard to the interests of justice when making a determination under Clause 12. As I have said, solicitors currently apply the sufficient benefit test. However, it is interesting that the Access to Justice Act, which we are reimplementing, does not make express reference to the interests of justice, although it is implied. We are covering something that ties in to the ECHR commitment and reinforces what is in the original Act. I do not think there is anything sinister in what the noble Lord is probing. With those assurances, I hope he will withdraw his amendment.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I think it would worry me as well. I will reflect on what the noble Lord has said and write to him on the specific point that seems to be worrying him.
Lord McNally
Lord Bach
My Lords, we give our total support to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford. The principle behind it was set out clearly in Committee. That principle remains. It has not been answered satisfactorily. The Government are rightly looking for ways of saving legal aid funds. This is an area of criminal legal aid where considerable savings could be made. The Government should take advantage of this amendment and make sure something like it happens very soon.
Lord McNally
I cannot remember whether the noble Lord was a Minister in the department responsible in 2002, because it was the then Government who decided that it was better to allow access to legal aid than to allow an individual to draw down restrained funds to pay for their defence.
Lord McNally
Yes, but there is some kind of responsibility for past acts. It is all right for the noble Lord to get to the Dispatch Box and say what a wonderful idea this is, which he has been doing throughout the Bill as regards £20 million here, £18 million there and £4 million there. He now of course wants to change something that the previous Government did.
Lord Bach
Again, I have déjà vu. I think I ate enough sackcloth and ashes, or whatever the expression is, on the previous occasion about what my role may or may not have been towards the end of the previous Government. We do not need to go through that again, unless the noble Lord insists. I should like to know why he does not accept the amendment.
Lord McNally
Excellent; that was good for the record. Amendment 105A would amend the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 to allow courts to release restrained assets to fund legal expenses in criminal proceedings. POCA currently prevents restrained funds from being released to a defendant for legal expenses in relation to the offences to which the restraint order relates.
The Government recognise that there is a public perception that rich people are being given free legal aid because their assets are restrained. There are good policy reasons behind the current regime, but I can assure noble Lords that my department is currently working with the Home Office and the Attorney-General’s Office to explore options that might allow the Government to recover legal aid costs wherever possible.
My noble friend—and this I welcome—has stimulated activity and cross-departmental examination of this issue in a constructive way. I cannot accept the amendment tonight, and I am not likely to within the context of the Bill. However, he can claim credit for stimulating active working with my department, the Home Office and the Attorney-General’s Office, and we will see where this initiative takes us. In the mean time, I hope that my noble friend will withdraw his amendment.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
My Lords, it takes a certain amount of, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, said, chutzpah—although I do not know whether that word is allowed in Hansard—to ask the House at any time to accept a grouping of 14 government amendments, but I can absolutely assure the House that I have written to noble Lords and that these are technical amendments. I recommend them to the House. I beg to move.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
Yet again the Opposition, with a completely straight face, agree with my noble friend, although, as the noble Lord himself pointed out, we are making use of a provision in the Access to Justice Act 1999 which was brought in by the previous Government. He is now against it, as he was against the previous one. It seems that things are only good ideas when the Opposition are in government.
Lord Beecham
My noble friend will confirm that from time to time I, in particular, was extremely critical of some of the actions taken by the previous Government in the field of justice. I am not bound by a 1999 Act at all.
Lord McNally
Is another noble Lord going to have a go? Is there to be more sackcloth and ashes?
Lord Bach
Not at all. It is late at night, so I think we can forgive the Minister what he considers to be his bit of fun. However, Governments do make mistakes from time to time and people do change their minds. Even the noble Lord—never mind his party—has been known to change his mind on a few occasions.
Lord McNally
Very good. On the specific issue at hand, we hope to bring in the scheme with the rest of the Bill in 2013 and it will be subject to the affirmative order, so my noble friend will have other opportunities to discuss this matter. As he has now acknowledged, the Explanatory Notes to the Bill make it clear that we intend to use the power in subsection (3) to establish a supplementary legal aid scheme. The scheme will apply to damages cases where the successful party has been legally aided.
As we also said in our response to the consultation on legal aid reform, under the regulations that we will make, 25 per cent of certain damages successfully claimed by legally aided parties will be recovered by the Legal Aid Fund. The relevant damages are all those other than damages for future care and loss. I had better stop there and say that I have just had a message that the procedure will be negative, not affirmative.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
It is negative in the Bill. My amendment would make it affirmative.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
That was a quick decision, if I may respectfully say so.
Lord McNally
The noble Lord did say that we were allowed to change our mind.
The power at subsection (3) is not new. Section 10(2)(c) of the Access to Justice Act 1999 explicitly allows for regulations to provide that a legally aided person can make a payment exceeding the cost of the services received. When we consulted on the legal aid reforms, we specifically consulted on introducing such a supplementary legal aid scheme.
As well as creating an additional source of funding for civil legal aid, the supplementary legal aid scheme will address the interrelationship between legal aid and the proposed reforms to the costs of civil litigation put forward by Lord Justice Jackson, which are reflected in Part 2 of the Bill. We want to ensure that as far possible the recovery level of damages by the supplementary legal aid scheme complements the Jackson reforms so that conditional fee agreements are no less attractive than legal aid. The recovery level of 25 per cent of all damages, other than those for future care and loss, is therefore based on the success fee cap for a conditional fee agreement in a personal injury case.
Under the Jackson proposals, there will also be an increase of 10 per cent in non-pecuniary general damages, such as damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenity in tort cases. This will help claimants to pay their conditional fee agreement success fee or a 25 per cent portion of the relevant damages, if legally aided.
There has been a suggestion that it is unfair for successful claimants to be asked to help to underwrite the cost of the legal aid scheme in the way proposed. We do not see it as unfair. A claimant who wishes to proceed in a civil action with the aid of public funding is asking the taxpayer to take a risk on his or her behalf. Where that risk bears fruit in the form of what may be a very substantial sum of money, it is perfectly reasonable for a share of that to go back into the public pot so that the continued taking of such risks can more easily be sustained.
In sum, the power to make a supplementary legal aid scheme has now been sought by successive Governments. It has previously been approved by Parliament. Financial constraints are now such that we believe that it would be wrong not to exercise it in the way that we have clearly proposed and consulted on. Omitting to do so would also be out of step with the wider reforms to civil litigation that we are making. In light of my explanation, I hope that the noble Lord will agree to withdraw the amendment.
I now turn to Amendment 130, which would make any regulations made under Clause 22 subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, necessitating a debate and approval of a resolution by both Houses before the regulations could be made. We believe that this amendment is specifically related to Clause 22(3), although it goes much wider. As I have explained, we intend to use the power in Clause 22(3) to make regulations to establish a supplementary legal aid scheme. We believe that this amendment is aimed at ensuring that the details of the supplementary legal aid scheme are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. An equivalent regulation-making power is contained at Section 10(2)(c) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. That power is subject to the negative resolution procedure. Our starting point is therefore, why should that change?
I am aware that there has been some suggestion that the Government have not been sufficiently clear about their intentions with regard to the use to which they intend to put the power in Clause 22(3). Nothing could be further from the truth. The proposal to introduce a supplementary legal aid scheme was clearly stated in the,
“Summary of the legal aid reform programme”,
contained in Reform of Legal Aid in England and Wales: The Government Response. That paper also contained a five-page annex explaining the proposal in the light of the response to the preceding consultation.
Paragraph 168 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill also made our intended use of the Clause 22(3) power perfectly clear. Both Houses have now had an opportunity to debate the clause in the light of explanations that we have given. Clause 22(3) was specifically debated both in Committee in the other place and in Committee in your Lordships’ House. We believe that all that, combined with the negative resolution procedure in respect of the regulations, allows adequate public and parliamentary scrutiny in relation to the supplementary legal aid scheme.
The Delegated Powers Committee of the House considered the delegated powers of this Bill and did not comment on the application of the negative resolution procedure in relation to Clause 22(3). The Government’s memorandum to the committee explicitly highlighted our intended use of Clause 22(3). This amendment is therefore unnecessary.
I should also point out that the amendment goes much wider than just Clause 22(3) and would require the affirmative resolution procedure for any regulations under Clause 22. That would be undesirable and disproportionate. The powers under Clause 22 are those that will be used to set out the detailed rules regarding payment of contributions and case costs in respect of both criminal and civil legal aid. The negative resolution procedure is clearly the most appropriate for the type of highly detailed and technical provisions envisaged here, which will require variation from time to time. In those circumstances, I invite my noble friend to withdraw his amendment. I regret the confusion in my note reading halfway through that explanation.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
I think it was Champerty rather than maintenance where a third party takes a chunk of the damages that a litigant obtains in court. It is curious how far we have come to defeat these very ancient principles of English law. You can see the Magna Carta barons around the Chamber looking down on us; you can see them trembling as they listen to my noble friend putting forward this proposition. It is true that it was in the Access to Justice Act, but I do not believe that it was ever brought into force. It is also true that it was mentioned in the consultation document, which I read. In a document of some 150 pages, it covered one-third of a page; one paragraph related to it. It certainly was not highlighted either in the House of Commons or in this House that there should be such a deduction from the damages that are obtained by a legally aided person. I regret that.
A supplementary legal aid scheme could have been an alternative to support for conditional fee agreements—an argument that was made a long time ago—and it is true that a supplementary legal aid scheme has been adopted successfully in Hong Kong for people who do not qualify for legal aid. However, to have it in addition to the other provisions of the Bill is regrettable. For the moment—well, for all time—I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
Lord McNally
“(6A) Regulations may provide that an individual is to be treated, for the purposes of subsection (1) or regulations under subsection (3) or (5), as having or not having financial resources of a prescribed description (but such regulations have effect subject to subsection (4)).
(6B) Regulations under subsection (6A) may, in particular, provide that the individual is to be treated as having prescribed financial resources of a person of a prescribed description.”
Lord McNally
My Lords, for the last time I make a solemn promise to the House that I covered the amendment in a letter that is lodged in the Library of the House, and that it is a technical amendment. I beg to move.