Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Bill

Lord McNally Excerpts

Tuesday 10th January 2012 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally)]

My Lords, Amendment 7 seeks to require a novel situation whereby specific arrangements that the Lord Chancellor may make under Clause 2(2)(c) would have to be included in an order subject to the affirmative resolution procedure. I believe that it will be beneficial to expand on the purpose of the provisions in question before addressing the amendment itself.

The specific provision is designed to provide the Lord Chancellor with the powers to create a body to provide or facilitate the provision of services. In practice, this provision is included in the Bill to allow the Lord Chancellor to continue to provide services through the Public Defender Service. The PDS is a body established under the auspices of the Legal Services Commission that directly employs lawyers to provide legally aided criminal defence services, alongside solicitors’ firms in private practice that are contracted with by the LSC. This dual model tends to be used in areas where there have historically been issues with the level of availability of supply. The PDS must necessarily be distinct from the Lord Chancellor, given its role of defending individuals accused by the state of committing criminal offences.

Let me turn now to the proposed amendment. It appears to me a very novel suggestion that the legislative processes of these Houses would be used to consider arrangements that are not intended as legislative instruments but would nevertheless become so were the amendment to be adopted. The specific arrangements envisaged under this proposal—the continued provision of the Public Defender Service—do not and should not require parliamentary scrutiny. There is no question of protecting independence. Lawyers employed by the PDS are subject to the same professional obligations and ethical codes as those in private practice, regulated as they are by the Solicitors Regulation Authority. In addition to this, PDS lawyers are also subject to a PDS code of conduct, which is designed to help ensure independence. It is the Government’s intention that all current arrangements should continue under the new framework, including the PDS code of conduct.

This is explicitly dealt with in Clause 28, which provides for a code of conduct to be observed by civil servants and employees of a body established and maintained by the Lord Chancellor, the latter dealing with those individuals employed as part of the PDS. The PDS has operated unencumbered by interference since it was first deployed in 2001, and there is no basis for assuming that its continued operation should be in any way different under the revised framework before the Committee. I stress that this power will be used in law to re-establish the PDS under the new framework. However, in practice nothing will change: the PDS will operate in exactly the same manner and in the same locations, and it is not appropriate to use parliamentary time to endorse what is already in existence. Given those assurances, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment. There is no need to put powers in the Bill to create the LSC’s replacement. This is a departmental administrative arrangement and the legal aid agency will be an executive agency of the MoJ.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am tempted to apologise to the Minister for not having the telepathic powers that would have enabled me to understand what the clause is about. It does not specifically refer to the Public Defender Service. Of course I accept the noble Lord’s explanation but it would be helpful if the Government were to amend the clause before we get to Report to make it clear that it is the Public Defender Service that is referred to. On the face of it, it could be any kind of arrangement that is being made, so, if I may say respectfully, it would be helpful for that course to be taken.

[Lord McNally]

If it would be helpful, I will write to the noble Lord to clarify and I will consult with colleagues on the point that he makes.

[Lord Beecham]

In the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, the noble Lord may say that this amendment relates only to the Public Defender Service, in which case I suspect that my speech will be rather shorter than it might otherwise have been. The amendment refers to Clause 2(4), which refers to,

“arrangements for the purposes of this Part”—

not just this clause—

“that provide for a court, tribunal or other person to assess remuneration payable by the Lord Chancellor, the court, tribunal or other person … in accordance with the arrangements”.

The previous subsection provides that the Lord Chancellor may make such provision for remuneration by regulations. I apprehend that this will not refer to the Public Defender Service. If that is the case, I will proceed to outline the position that we wish to take.

On the assumption that this amendment is of general application, which appears to be the position, the amendment would require the Lord Chancellor to consult the Bar Council and the Law Society, which is the present position under the Access to Justice Act. In addition, it is suggested that consultation should take place with the Institute of Legal Executives, which is now a recognised and substantial body of contributors to the legal system, and with organisations that represent the legal advice movement—law centres and the like. These have, with cross-party support since their inception, played a growing and important role, again supplying legal aid and advice.

As we heard in the context of the debate on today’s first amendment—on expert witnesses—there is a potential issue about remuneration, which is linked to the possibility of maintaining an adequate supply of lawyers in this case, and to providing choice for consumers. Therefore, the amendment would make it necessary for consultation to take place, whereas the Government’s view is that it is not necessary to have that in legislation. They have indicated that they will continue to consult the Bar Council and the Law Society. We would say that consultation needs to be wider and that it needs to be statutory, rather than simply rely on the good will of the Government of the day. Consequently, any regulations that then come forward would also require approval.

Amendment 9 would make it a requirement—rather than, as matters presently stand, discretionary—for the Lord Chancellor to set and monitor standards of service in legal services. That seems a sensible provision, which would reinforce the need to ensure that there is access to advice that meets a standard. At present, under the legal aid scheme, certain quality standards have to be passed by practitioners and that should remain the case. Amendment 10 effectively reinforces that provision, again making it necessary for the Lord Chancellor or other persons to set and monitor standards of service under the Bill.

Amendment 11 refers to the need to consult the relevant organisations—the Law Society, the Bar Council and the Institute of Legal Executives—in devising and maintaining a system of accreditation for the purpose of providing legal services.

There is a question raised by Amendment 12, which as it stands would remove Clauses 3(4) and (5), which provide for the Lord Chancellor to charge for accreditation. This is designed to elicit a response from the Minister as to what the Government’s intentions are in this respect. It may be that charging for accreditation would act as a deterrent in certain areas, particularly perhaps in the voluntary sector and for law centres that would seek accreditation.

Amendment 104 again requires the Lord Chancellor to carry out consultation before making regulations in relation to criminal proceedings. He should consult with the Lord Chief Justice, the Director of Public Prosecutions and, again, the three legal bodies. There is a concern that the current pattern of reductions in support for organisations will impact on market sustainability, to use a phrase of the chief executive of the Legal Services Commission. People consider there is a danger that organisations will not survive, particularly in the voluntary sector. That is something on which the Government need to reflect when they are making regulations to secure the delivery of advice and support services.

The Access to Justice Act provides:

“When making any remuneration order the [Lord Chancellor] shall have regard to— … (a) the need to secure the provision of services of the description to which the order relates by a sufficient number of competent persons and bodies, … (b) the cost to public funds, and … (c) the need to secure value for money”.

That measure has commanded cross-party support for well over a decade. The thrust of these amendments is to ensure that that remains the case and to involve those who will be engaged in providing that legal advice and assistance in the regulations that the Lord Chancellor will be required to make regarding remuneration, the supply side of the service, as it were, and maintaining the quality of the service. I hope the Minister accepts that these amendments are designed to reinforce and support the system which the Bill seeks to create. I beg to move.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I note that the noble Lord spoke not only to Amendment 8 but to Amendments 9, 10, 11, 12 and 104. I hope that that was intentional. I am happy to reply to both groups. According to my batting order they were supposed to be spoken to separately. However, the noble Lord spoke to them so well that I am happy to reply to both groups. If anybody wants to speak to the group beginning with Amendment 9, I will sit down while they do so; otherwise, I will reply to both groups at the same time. I commend the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, on his splendid—

[Lord Beecham]

Inadvertence.

[Lord McNally]

Perhaps he would like to move the next four groups formally as well.

Amendment 8 seeks to achieve two things. First, it provides for the inclusion of provisions akin to those in Sections 25(2) and (3) of the Access to Justice Act in relation to the matters the Lord Chancellor must take into account when setting remuneration rates for barristers and solicitors in regulations under Clause 2(3), specifically,

“the need to secure the provision of services of the description to which the order relates by a sufficient number of competent persons and bodies”.

I realise that a number of the amendments that the Opposition have put forward have harked backed to the Access to Justice Act.

The second effect of the amendment would be to create a statutory requirement to consult with the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Institute of Legal Executives and organisations representing the legal advice movement before making regulations under Clause 2(3) setting remuneration rates for barristers and solicitors. I recognise that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee drew the attention of the House to Clause 2(3) in light of the lack of a provision in the Bill equivalent to Sections 25(2) and (3) of the Access to Justice Act 1999. However, in our view Amendment 8 is unnecessary. In respect of factors the Lord Chancellor must take into account when making regulations setting rates of remuneration for barristers and solicitors, the matter specified in the amendment is naturally a matter that falls to be taken into account, along with other relevant considerations, when deciding how to set those remuneration rates, and it is therefore unnecessary to include a reference to them on the face of the Bill. It is also unhelpful specifically to list these factors when there will be a range of other factors that, in the particular circumstances prevailing at the time, also properly fall to be considered but may appear excluded, or be given a lesser status, by the proposed provision. I am sure that noble Lords will agree that, when making regulations setting remuneration rates, the Lord Chancellor should properly have regard to all the relevant considerations and give them appropriate weight and that the Bill should not imply otherwise.

In respect of the proposed duty to consult with the Bar Council, the Law Society, the Institute of Legal Executives and organisations representing the legal advice movement before making regulations under Clause 2(3) setting remuneration rates for barristers and solicitors, we also consider this to be unnecessary. We will continue to engage the Bar Council, the Law Society and other representative bodies on remuneration matters wherever it is appropriate and constructive to do so. The absence of a statutory duty does not preclude this. With that assurance, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

If there are circumstances in which it would be inappropriate to consult the Law Society and the Bar Council about payments to be made to their members from public funds, will the noble Lord please explain to us what those circumstances are?

[Lord McNally]

No, my Lords. I go back to what I have said. Neither I nor my noble friend the Lord Chancellor wants to allow the Opposition to sprinkle the Bill with “must” in this respect. We need to apply common sense to this matter. I would be as hard put as him to find a reason why one would not consult such bodies—indeed, I would add the Institute of Legal Executives to the list. Common sense dictates that a Lord Chancellor would want to do this. I will give way but I add, to help the noble Lord with his next shaft, that that seems to me the sensible thing to do.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I am very grateful to my noble friend and I apologise for interrupting him again but this is intended to be a shaft of light and not a bolt of lightning. Can he think of any circumstances in which a failure to consult ILEX, the Bar Council or the Law Society about their respective members’ pay would not be judicially reviewable? Surely, it is right that a failure to consult would provide a certain judicial review against the Government.

[Lord McNally]

One of the joys of this job is answering questions on the law posed by learned QCs. I honestly do not know whether that situation would be judicially reviewable. However, we do not think that it is necessary to include “must”. We have made it very clear that a sensible Lord Chancellor would consult these bodies and perhaps if some future—

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

I am very grateful to the Minister but, speaking as another lawyer, the problem with “may” is that something may not take place. That is the point that the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, is making. If the Lord Chancellor has to do something, it is straightforward. However, if he may do something, he does not have to do it. The words used by the Minister may not actually meet the point.

[Lord McNally]

But if he “may” and he does not do it, again from my layman’s view and from what I gather my noble friend Lord Carlile was saying, that “may” would be tested by judicial review.

[Baroness Butler-Sloss]

How is that acceptable?

[Lord McNally]

The noble and learned Baroness asks that from a sedentary position. That is the position that the Government have come to. Again, my right honourable and learned friend at the other end of the Corridor will see this exchange. Whether or not this is a matter on which one should go to the wall, I do not know. I am not sure how many consultations went on with the previous Administration.

[Lord Bach]

I may not have been party to many of them, but I can assure the noble Lord that of course there were consultations with the various bodies representing lawyers of various kinds about payment. They did not always satisfy the lawyers involved, but the important point is that there was genuine consultation on these matters. For the life of me, I cannot see why the Minister cannot accept the amendment.

[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord knows very well why I cannot accept it, but I hear what has been said. If the noble Lord will withdraw the amendment and the position remains the same at Report, it is best that we return to the matter then. I cannot take it any further now. I also have a slight feeling that this desire to replace “may” wherever “must” appears is not always entirely helpful to good government, but we will see.

Amendments 9 and 10 seek to convert into duties the Lord Chancellor’s powers under Clause 3 to set and monitor quality standards, as well as to accredit organisations against those standards—here we go again. As I shall explain, these amendments are unnecessary. The current provisions in Clause 3 enable the Lord Chancellor to establish a system of accreditation of legal aid service providers. Accreditation may be either by the Lord Chancellor or by those authorised by the Lord Chancellor to do so. These powers are similar to those currently given to the Legal Services Commission in relation to the Criminal Defence Service and Community Legal Service.

The Legal Service Commission’s existing quality assurance standard is the specialist quality mark. This standard aims to demonstrate that organisations that hold a contract with the commission are well managed, provide a good level of client care and have systems in place to ensure delivery of good-quality advice. The Legal Services Commission also accepts the Law Society’s Lexcel quality standards as entry criteria to providers seeking to obtain an LSC contract. The LSC is committed to ensuring that it contracts with providers that deliver high-quality services for its clients. Its successor will have the same job. The standards must be met and accreditation obtained prior to award of contract and throughout the lifetime of a contract. This compares favourably to the privately funded market, where these standards are not mandatory.

This is all done under the existing arrangements and ensures high-quality advice. There is no intention to derogate from the existing model in future under the provisions of this Bill and, accordingly, a duty to establish, maintain and accredit against quality standards is not required when the clear intention is to continue with the arrangements that have served the legal aid market and the quality of service delivered by that market so well under the current framework.

Amendment 11 concerns the Lord Chancellor’s power to make arrangements for the accreditation of legal aid service providers against quality standards under Clause 3. Specifically, the amendment seeks to require the Lord Chancellor to consult with the Bar Council, the Law Society and the Institute of Legal Executives prior to making arrangements for accreditation. This amendment assumes that the Lord Chancellor would seek to introduce a new accreditation scheme to replace the existing quality standards that must be met by a potential legal aid service provider prior to contracting with the Legal Services Commission—namely the LSC’s specialist quality mark and the Law Society’s own Lexcel standard.

In practice, it is highly unlikely that the Lord Chancellor would seek to develop a new standard. Legal aid providers are familiar with the existing standards, and these have worked well since the introduction of contracting to the legal aid sphere. Given their efficacy, and the inherent costs and time required to establish any new standard, there is no obvious need to develop and introduce one.

However, we cannot of course completely rule out the possibility that a new standard might be introduced at some point in the future under the provisions of the Bill. In that eventuality, the Lord Chancellor would, so far as it would be constructive and appropriate, engage with relevant representative bodies in the development and design of any such scheme. There is no need to make this a requirement in the Bill. The regulatory aspect of any such scheme would, in all likelihood, require engagement with the bodies mentioned in the amendment, as well as with the Legal Services Board and others—for example, the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies—to ensure that such a scheme was fit for purpose and had the support of the professions.

Historically, this engagement has always taken place and there is no reason to assume that the situation in the future would be any different. A recent example of this kind of collaborative working is the quality assurance scheme for advocates. The work was initially taken forward by the LSC and the Ministry of Justice, with the input of all relevant stakeholders, and is now being led by the regulators operating as a joint advocacy group. The JAG is made up of the three main regulators of advocates: the Bar Standards Board, the Solicitors Regulation Authority and ILEX Professional Standards. This situation did not arise as a consequence of statutory requirement; it simply represents what is required in order to get any new quality standard established with the requisite support from the sector, and this would apply irrespective of the statutory framework under which any such scheme would be introduced.

Amendment 12 concerns the provisions in Clause 3 that enable the Lord Chancellor or persons authorised by the Lord Chancellor to charge for accreditation and monitoring of persons providing legal aid services. There are, of course, significant resource implications attached to the running of such schemes. These provisions would allow any accreditation body to meet its costs in carrying out any accreditation and monitoring function, which is entirely appropriate if they are to commit resources to such a function, and this reflects the current statutory provisions under the Access to Justice Act.

The same considerations arise in respect of where the Lord Chancellor undertakes accreditation and monitoring. Significant resource implications are attached to accreditation and monitoring and it is perfectly proper that those who wish to seek accreditation in order to undertake legally aided work are able to be charged in respect of that accreditation and the monitoring of the services that they provide. In conclusion, the provisions on charges for monitoring and accreditation are entirely appropriate and reflect the current statutory position.

Amendment 104 would require the Lord Chancellor to consult prescribed individuals and bodies before making regulation for criminal legal services for individuals involved in criminal investigations or proceedings. Clause 14 creates a power to make regulations that prescribe the advice and assistance that must be made available if the director has determined that a person qualifies for advice and assistance. This largely reflects the provisions in Section 13 of the Access to Justice Act 1999 that require the Legal Services Commission to fund such advice and assistance as is considered appropriate. The circumstances in which such advice and assistance will be made available are prescribed in regulation. Advice and assistance for criminal proceedings are distinct from those provided under Clause 12 to individuals arrested and held in custody. The services that we are talking about include those provided by a duty solicitor in court or to a prisoner preparing for his appearance before a parole board.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Go on.

[Lord McNally]

No, I recognise a red rag when I see one. I will think about the point that the noble Lord made. I commend him for merging two groupings and ask him to withdraw the amendment.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Before my noble friend withdraws his amendment, perhaps I can ask the Minister a question. I am sure that the Committee is grateful to him for the full explanation that he has given in response to the amendments. He has assured the Committee that it is unimaginable that the Lord Chancellor would not consult regularly with bodies representative of those who provide legal services and he has insisted on the importance of due monitoring and accreditation—all processes no doubt designed to uphold standards. Can he give some account of how all those processes that he has said that the Government will undertake assort with something else of which the Lord Chancellor has made much? He said in his article in the Guardian on 20 December:

“This year we've begun deregulation of the legal sector, a change comparable in its possible impact to the Big Bang in the City in the 1980s”.

That suggests that there will be some very different procedures and that the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the legal profession could become very different indeed.

In the context of the ministry's zealous desire to deliver substantial savings in public spending and its desire to break open some of the traditional structures and ways of carrying on, I wonder how the consultation, monitoring and continuing assurance of standards are to be reconciled with the exciting and radical new approaches that the ministry is developing.

[Lord McNally]

If I may say so, that is an extremely helpful intervention. One reason why my right honourable friend is reluctant to have these things battened down is that, as I have said from this Dispatch Box, the provision of legal services and the structures of the legal profession will be changed not by any radical zeal from the Ministry of Justice but by market forces and changes that are happening in our society. Much of what we have been talking about since the dinner break has concerned the machinery to be put in place, which very much replicates machinery already there but anticipates a more fluid situation in the legal profession.

That is why specifying named organisations and people could be dangerous. What must be clear is that the Lord Chancellor has those responsibilities, including the overriding one of protecting justice. I also invite the House to have some common sense: any Lord Chancellor or Secretary of State for Justice who tried to ignore or ride roughshod over the various bodies involved would soon come to grief.

I agree with the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Bach: successive Ministers will find that you can consult but you do not always agree. I am sure that there was not total agreement when the previous Government imposed cuts in various fees for parts of the legal profession. That is the nature of things. Any sensible Lord Chancellor would involve and consult those bodies. That makes the amendments unnecessary.

[Lord Beecham]

I am glad to have given the Minister the opportunity to buy one group of amendments and get another free. I am sorry that he has not accepted the offer. He twice used the pregnant phrase that this does not “preclude” consultation. If I may say so, that is a very negative way of looking at the responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor and a rather worrying phrase. It is not a question of not precluding; the Bill should lay down what is expected of the Lord Chancellor and what he should do.

The Minister has repeatedly objected to the substitution of “must” for “may” in my amendments. The word “must” is in Clause 1, which states:

“The Lord Chancellor must secure that legal aid is made available in accordance with this Part”.

In some ways, this is a mirror image of another debate that I am involved in, with other Members of your Lordships' House, on the health Bill. Many of us, including some on the government Benches, have been trying to secure that the Secretary of State for Health has the duty to provide health services. That aspiration is one which, in respect of legal services and legal aid as defined in the Bill, is embodied in the government's wording.

Given that, it is not enough for the Minister to say that the LSC has those powers now. After all, the LSC effectively disappears. The Lord Chancellor becomes the authoritative body for the provision of legal services. It seems to me sensible and in fact desirable to protect the Lord Chancellor from succumbing to the temptation not to consult properly or to do things in perhaps a rather rushed or narrow way either of his own volition or at the behest of the Treasury or other organs of government, looking, for example, to make savings very quickly and perhaps very radically. I dare say that that may not be the intention of the present Lord Chancellor but it would be better to protect him from the possibility of judicial review, to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred, in the first place by providing a clear responsibility.

I was rather worried by the Minister’s reference to market forces. This is, I suppose, a reference to the sort of Tesco law that we are beginning to see happening. It rather worries me that, particularly in relation to Amendment 104, which deals with the criminal justice aspect, market forces might be deemed to be fit and proper effectively to run the legal aid service, whereas in the particularly important area of public policy and justice there is no requirement to consult such responsible bodies and persons as the Lord Chief Justice, the Director of Public Prosecutions and the three legal professions. I do not think it is good enough just to say that any Lord Chancellor would do this. One would hope that that would be the case but I am not sanguine enough to accept that it is proper in dealing with these matters to leave it to the potential good will of a future Lord Chancellor.

I would hope that the Minister would recognise that there ought to be a duty here. It is something that, in the absence of any movement before Report, we will have to come back to, as we might with regard to some of the other aspects to which he referred—in particular, the issue of charging for accreditation. I can see some case for making charges but I can also see a strong case in the realm of the voluntary sector for a different scheme. I give way to the noble Lord.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, we have heard short but very impressive speeches on this very important group. Clause 4 is particularly important and it is absolutely vital that the Government get this right. We want to help them get it right all across the House. I hope that the Minister will have some freedom of manoeuvre on this matter, which is, in the end, a matter of some principle.

Perhaps I may start by commending the Government for bringing the Legal Services Commission inside the Ministry of Justice. When we were in power, we set up the Magee committee to produce a report on whether that would be an appropriate thing to do. It seemed to us at the time, and clearly to this Government, that there were a number of very good reasons why it is not satisfactory for the Legal Services Commission not to be an agency of government. In our view, it is appropriate that it should be and we commend the Government for doing that.

The problem always—it would have been as much a problem for us as it is for the present Government—is with the words “independence” and “perception of independence”. The Minister will know, as all of us know, that many interested people outside this House are very concerned about the drafting of Clause 4 and whether it meets what the Government clearly intend. No one is accusing them of bad faith here. Clause 4(4) shows that they clearly intend that this should be a system that works fairly and well. As the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, pointed out, the wording is extraordinarily ambivalent and ambiguous, certainly as regards the relationship between subsections (3) and (4). The Government need to look at it again, and, I would argue, it probably needs to be redrafted.

I do not know whether noble Lords have had the opportunity to see an interesting, short note from Justice on this topic. Mr Roger Smith, who I think is well known to a large number of people who are interested in this issue and who has huge experience in this field, makes a very good point as to why this present drafting is not satisfactory. He says on what I think is an important part of the argument that:

“The provision will be most objectionable where the Director makes a decision to refuse legal aid for judicial review against his own minister. However justified that might be on the individual facts, it would be argued that the Lord Chancellor is being a judge in his own cause. Indeed, it may well be”—

this is the clever point—

“that interest groups are motivated to make exactly that accusation, regardless of the substantive worth of their application, precisely to obtain more publicity for their cause”.

As an example, among many others that could be referred to, he has shown where the Government have to tread extraordinarily carefully to make sure that independence is real and is perceived to be real. I therefore ask the Minister to be sympathetic and to look very carefully indeed at how this clause is currently drafted.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for the way he has summed up the debate. This clause reflects the Government’s absolute determination to make it clear that the director will be independent. I have to say that when I look at this cluster of amendments and see the names that are attached to them, I am tempted to repeat a phrase that I use occasionally about my own collection of legal advisers: if I had to pay them, I could not afford them. This is a very distinguished group of legal opinion and I make my reply conscious that that weight of opinion has been reflected in the debate.

Clause 4(4) gives clear guidance on the limits of the Lord Chancellor’s powers. However, I take on board the fact that there have been cases in the past of friction between senior civil servants and Ministers, and if Parliament is going to create an important body and function it will need to be perceived very clearly. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach, that perception is also important. We have to get this right.

I want to make clear the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf. As I told him earlier, I have in fact signed off a letter to him, but cock-up often triumphs over conspiracy in these matters. As far as I can see, there was no intention to block the meeting he wanted, and somewhere in the postal system—this is not the Government’s standard promise that a letter is in the post—is his letter. I am sure that when he gets it, he will respect me in the morning because it does say that we certainly have no objection to the kind of meeting he seeks.

I am not sure that I would go as far as the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, on the point that the demonstration of independence needs civil servants to figure in television interviews and so on, although I have noted the points he made. It is also worth noting that some suggestions were made about dangers to the director’s independence—here I tread lightly into suggesting a legal form of words—but it would be ultra vires for the Lord Chancellor to interfere in directorial decisions in individual cases, and in that respect he is well protected by Clause 4(4). However, it is true that the Lord Chancellor will decide the criteria by which exceptional cases are granted funding, and these criteria will be published. Although the director must comply with directions and take account of guidance given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying-out of the director’s functions under Part 1 of the Bill, the Lord Chancellor cannot give directions or guidance to the director about the carrying-out of those functions in relation to individual cases.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

Will the annual report say what the directions are? How are the legitimately interested public to know what directions the Lord Chancellor will give the director? Will the Minister tell us how they are to be known and what ground they would cover? What would be the subject matter of the directions?

[Lord McNally]

I think that we will have to await the document, but I will take advice on it. As far as I understand, the directions and guidance on the director’s functions will be published by the Ministry of Justice.

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

It is covered by the Bill, in subsection (5). The directions have to be published. Whether they should be in the Bill at all is another matter; but if they are in the Bill, they have to be published.

[Lord McNally]

I am also told that the director’s terms and conditions will govern the circumstances in which they could be dismissed. Some of the concerns that have been raised are either in the Bill or will be covered by guidance or in published directions and terms of reference from the department.

I go back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Bach. Clause 4 is not an attempt to create some stooge of either the Ministry of Justice or the Lord Chancellor of the day; it is to have somebody who will command public confidence and respect. I am not in a position to take note, here in a Committee stage, of the points that have been made; I will, as I said earlier, draw the Lord Chancellor’s attention to the views of the contributors to this debate. It would probably be of help both in looking forward and in winding up this debate if I were to set out the position as we see it now.

Amendment 13 seeks to introduce into the Bill a specification for the role of the director, in particular requiring that the person designated as director has such qualifications and experience in securing access to legal services for individuals as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate. The amendment also seeks to have the concept of independence, and specifically the independence of the director when carrying out functions under Part 1, incorporated into the terms and conditions of the director’s employment. Amendment 17 provides a definition of “Minister of the Crown” to reflect the reference to the same in Amendment 13.

These are unnecessary amendments. Relevant experience and qualifications are, of course, factors that are taken into account in any appointment, and the recruitment of the director is no different. We can see no persuasive reasons why it should be necessary to include these considerations in primary legislation. The Committee should also note that the framework document which will govern the relationship between the Ministry of Justice and the new executive agency will also reflect the principle of independence of decision-making. The incorporation of this principle into the terms and conditions of the director would add nothing as the effect is already secured through the existing provisions.

Clause 4(2) requires the Lord Chancellor to,

“make arrangements for the provision to the Director by civil servants or other persons (or both) of such assistance as the Lord Chancellor considers appropriate”.

This means that the director will also be assisted by those with relevant experience and qualifications in discharging the director’s functions under Part 1 of the Bill, providing the necessary expertise alongside the director’s own. This support is essential as, in practical terms, it is not the case that the director will personally make all decisions on eligibility. That would be unworkable given the volume of applications made for legal aid.

Clause 5 sets out the director’s powers of delegation and, of course, this anticipates the delegation of decision-making on an individual application. As such, the need to ensure the requisite knowledge, skills, experience and qualifications for those making decisions applies to all and the proposed amendment does not further this imperative.

On the limb of Amendment 13, which seeks to have the concept of independence incorporated into the director’s terms and conditions, this is also an unnecessary amendment. The existing provisions of Clause 4 provide statutory protection to the director against ministerial or other political interference. In particular, while the Lord Chancellor can issue directions and guidance to the director about the carrying out of the director’s functions under Part 1, the Lord Chancellor is specifically prevented under Clause 4(4) from issuing directions or guidance about the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to individual cases.

It is important to note that the prohibition in Clause 4(4) extends to anyone, including civil servants, to whom the director may delegate his or her decision-making functions in accordance with Clause 5. This is an important safeguard.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend’s flow, but surely for him to argue, as he just has, that all is well on the independence front because Clause 4(4) states that the Lord Chancellor cannot direct the director of legal aid casework in individual cases is small comfort given that it leaves intact Clause 4(3), which enables the Lord Chancellor to give directions, which the director must comply with, on anything to do with the director’s functions except in an individual case. A whole wide sea of discretion is given to the Lord Chancellor by that provision, which goes to the heart of the independence of the director.

[Lord McNally]

The noble Lord is repeating the thrust of a number of contributions that I have heard today. My response indicates the Government’s position at the moment. Again, along with this response will be the comments that he and other noble Lords have made. Let us see where we go from there. It is an important safeguard to ensure the director’s independence in carrying out his or her functions in relation to individual cases, which in the Government’s view is not improved or added to by the amendment.

Amendment 14 seeks to amend Clause 4(2) by removing reference to other persons who may be provided to the director under arrangements to assist in the discharge of functions under Part 1. Again, this is an unnecessary amendment. To the extent that independent persons are envisaged under the new scheme, the current drafting of Clause 4(2) does nothing to prevent such individuals being engaged. The amendment also may have unintended consequences that could serve to undermine the efficient operation of the new scheme. Were this amendment to be accepted, it would limit the range of those individuals who could be engaged to assist the director to either civil servants or independent persons. It may of course be that the director will in future only ever need the assistance of civil servants and independent persons to discharge their functions. However, we cannot be sure with any certainty that this would be the case in all eventualities in the future.

The current formulation of “or other persons” provides the requisite flexibility to meet any future scenario, including the provision of independent persons. Accordingly, Amendment 14 merely limits the pool of people that might be available to assist the director, with potentially problematic unintended consequences for the operation of the scheme.

Amendment 15 to Clause 4 is intended to alter the provisions in relation to the independence of the director of legal aid casework. As I hope to explain, we believe the amendment, again, is unnecessary. I will briefly set out for the benefit of noble Lords the role and key functions of the director and why I believe that independence is important and why it is already enshrined in the Bill. Under Clause 4, the Lord Chancellor is obliged to appoint a civil servant as a statutory officeholder who will be responsible for making funding decisions in individual cases, including funding decisions in relation to exceptional funding applications under the Bill.

The statutory officeholder is to be known as the director of legal aid casework. The Lord Chancellor is also obliged to provide civil servants or other persons, or both, to assist the director in carrying out their functions. The director must make determinations in legal aid cases in accordance with the provisions of Part 1 of the Bill.

Under the new arrangements, Clause 4 is potentially the most important. It ensures that the director has independence in carrying out functions and is free from any political interference in making decisions in relation to individual cases. This independence is enshrined by the specific provisions within this clause, specifically subsection (4), which the amendment would delete. Subsection (4) prohibits the Lord Chancellor from giving guidance or directions in relation to the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to individual cases.

There are provisions within Clause 4 that oblige the director to comply with directions given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of the director’s functions, and to have regard to guidance issued by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of those functions, but crucially such guidance and directions cannot relate to the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to individual cases. This protection of the director against interference when carrying out their functions in relation to individual cases is an important safeguard.

I would like to assure noble Lords that the protection of this independence is a fundamental tenet of the new arrangements, which provide the necessary safeguards that are required to make the new arrangements work. It should be noted that the director is a separate office from the Lord Chancellor created by statute. As I have said, under Clause 4(4), the Lord Chancellor cannot give directions or guidance to the director about the carrying out of the director’s functions in relation to individual cases. That is a very explicit assurance about independence. The protection offered by Clause 4(4) extends to anyone, including civil servants, to whom the director may delegate his or her decision-making functions in accordance with Clause 5 of the Bill. I believe that the Bill already establishes a proper role for the director, free from any political interference in relation to the carrying out of his functions in relation to individual cases.

I now turn to Amendment 16, which seeks to amend Clause 4(4) by specifying a category of case in relation to which the Lord Chancellor cannot issue guidance or directions. As I have said already, Clause 4(4) provides the director of casework with statutory protection against interference in individual cases; to seek to specify classes of case in a clause that bars interference in any individual cases cannot in my view add anything to the existing provisions. The Government’s policy has been consistently that proceedings where the litigant is seeking to hold the state to account by judicial review are important and should generally be retained within the scope of civil legal aid. This is expressly covered in paragraph 17 of Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Bill. As with other areas within the scope of civil legal aid, in a judicial review case that is within the scope of civil legal aid, the director’s functions under Part 1 of the Bill are to decide whether in each particular case the individual qualifies for funding.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

I wish to add further concerns, having heard the Minister’s reply. I understand that the director would have to follow directions and guidance given on matters of merits and eligibility. Standards would have to be set as to what has to be satisfied, and eligibility in relation to finance is something that the Lord Chancellor would be concerned with. But I have some concerns about the emphasis on individual cases as opposed to a category of cases.

We sought in Amendment 16 to take one category of case—namely, cases against the Government or government agencies, or whatever. The Lord Chancellor ought not to be able to interfere in any category of case that is within the scope of Part 1 of the Bill. He should not be able to say that there are too many of these cases and we have to cut down, and the wording leaves that open.

Another matter that concerns me is exactly what is intended. The Minister used once the expression “an executive agency”. What is that? Is it a body within the Ministry of Justice or is it to be set up separately? Is it to be staffed only by civil servants or is it to be able to recruit its own people to it? What is the relationship of the executive agency headed by the director to the Ministry of Justice? We are very familiar with the concept of the Director of Public Prosecutions and the sometimes rather fraught relationship between the DPP and the Attorney-General, who is responsible for the director’s decisions in a parliamentary sense but not necessarily able to give him directions or control him in any way. So the independence of the DPP is a very interesting model which I would have thought the director of legal aid casework ought to follow. That means having an executive agency recruiting its own people and a constructive tension between the director and the Lord Chancellor, or whoever the Minister of Justice happens to be at the time. I would like to probe the concept a little further at this stage. What is this executive agency? How will it be staffed? What is the relationship between its director and the Minister of Justice? It may be that I am posing these questions at the wrong stage in this debate. If my noble friend is not able to answer these questions at the moment, I am sure he will explain them to me at a later stage.

[Lord McNally]

I can do no more than suggest that the noble Lord reads the Bill, because it sets out the structure for carrying out this function within an agency which is within the Ministry of Justice and staffed by civil servants appointed on the criteria which have stood us in good stead for the past 130 years. Again, as with the other contributions to this debate, I will take those matters back and see whether there are areas that can be better clarified to give my noble friend the assurances that he requires.

[Lord Pannick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the constructive approach that he has taken to the important issues raised by this debate. I would ask him to reflect with the Lord Chancellor on the central points which have been made by noble Lords on all sides of this Committee, and to whom I am very grateful. A civil servant—the director—is going to have the crucial task of determining who has effective access to justice. The director is going to do that, often in contexts where the Government are the potential defendants. It is then striking, as many noble Lords have pointed out, that Clause 4 says nothing express about ensuring the independence of the director. This is a particular concern, as noble Lords have emphasised, in the light of the uncertainty as to the limits of Clause 4(3).

Clause 4(4), as the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, has emphasised, is not sufficient protection because it does not prevent directions from the Lord Chancellor to the director about categories of cases, or indeed as to the general approach to be adopted by the director. As I understood it, the Minister's response to this was that the Government's position today—although the Minister emphasised that that may change—is that they are as keen on independence as everybody else. If I understood him correctly, he said that independence is a fundamental tenet of this arrangement. The position of the Minister and the Government today is that Clause 4 is designed to achieve that objective and therefore these amendments are unnecessary.

The noble Lord will appreciate, and I hope that he will communicate this to the Lord Chancellor, that around this Committee the view is taken that, with great respect, that is not good enough because noble Lords prefer an express statement of the basic constitutional principle on which we are all agreed as to independence. Noble Lords prefer the drafting of Clause 4 to contain clear limits on the powers, in this context, of the Lord Chancellor and clear safeguards of the independence of the director. I hope that the Minister will be able to ask his officials to look again at the wording of Clause 4 so as to achieve these objectives, otherwise we will undoubtedly be returning to this matter on Report. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bach]

My Lords, I am sorely tempted to test the opinion of the House on Clause 4 tonight; I think it would be the better course to take. I am going to resist that sore temptation, but only just, because—here I am supporting what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said in his closing remarks—apart from the Minister’s final remarks, his response to the debate was unsatisfactory. His response runs the severe risk—against the Government’s real instincts, I am sure—of being careless of the independence point. That is a fundamental point and, as the Minister himself pointed out, exactly the sort of point that this House is quite good at dealing with in revising legislation that comes from another place. Frankly, the current draft is just not good enough, and this point is so central that at some stage the House will have to take a view on the issue. I very much hope that the Minister will use his powerful persuasive powers to persuade others in the ministry that the clause must be altered for the better.

[Lord McNally]

I have a full speaking note on Clause 4, but I have heard what the noble Lord has said. I am not sure how persuasive my powers are. I want to read the debate in Hansard; one of the good things about Committee stage in the Lords is that it gives us a chance to hear the voices. I will consider this with my right honourable and learned friend, but I will spare the House my speaking note on Clause 4.

Clause 4 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, having inherited a number of returns from my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford when we were both barristers outside London many years ago, I share the memory of the effectiveness of those committees, including the gloss placed on it by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf.

I would like to point out a parallel that exists today. Those of us who from time to time undertake very high-cost criminal cases have to apply for permission to the Legal Services Commission to do certain aspects of preparation. If the commission refuses permission, for example to obtain an expert witness’s report or to make photocopies of original documents—believe it or not, it can descend to that—there is a committee made up of practising lawyers who determine whether that permission should be granted, and it works very well. If the committee decides against the applicant, he or she has the opportunity to apply for permission to apply for judicial review. That involves a paper process, initially before a judge. If permission is refused, it is open to the applicant to have an application heard before the full court, but it is far from universal that that is done.

We therefore have in the existing provisions for very high-cost cases something very similar to that described by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford. I suggest to the Minister that this would be a practical way of dealing with this appeal problem that would cover the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Bach, those who have signed his amendment and those of us who have signed my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, the intention of the amendment is to establish a tribunal to review determinations made by the director about whether an individual qualifies for legal aid. This is very closely related to Amendment 96, which would make it a requirement for all reviews concerning determinations by the director under Clauses 8 and 9 to be referred to an independent panel.

The amendment is unnecessary. The Bill already establishes the director in a way that maintains and protects the director’s independence of decision-making in individual cases. The director is created by statute. Although the director must comply with directions and take account of guidance given by the Lord Chancellor about the carrying out of the director’s functions under Part 1, the Lord Chancellor cannot give directions or guidance to the director about carrying out those functions in relation to individual cases. There is already provision in the Bill for review of the director’s decisions and appeals against them. This means that there is no need for an amendment to create a separate tribunal.

Clause 11(5) provides that regulations must make provision for procedures for the review of the determinations of the director under Clauses 8 and 9 as to whether a person qualifies for civil legal aid and for the withdrawal of such determinations. There is also power in Clause 11(6) to make provision for appeals to a court, tribunal or other person against the making or withdrawal of a determination in relation to civil legal aid. The Government intend to continue with the Legal Services Commission’s existing appeal and review procedures for cases determined under Clause 8—that is, those within the general scope of the civil legal aid scheme—including the use of independent funding adjudicators. Those procedures are well established and understood, and the intention is that they will include provision for internal review of decisions by the director.

Additionally, where a client is dissatisfied with the conclusions of a review on merits grounds concerning a decision on legal representation in civil and family proceedings in scope under the Bill, the client will be able to appeal to an independent funding adjudicator. As at present, there would be no appeal against refusal on means grounds, although a client can ask for their means to be reassessed.

In reflecting the current review arrangements, there will also under Clause 9 be a right of internal review for exceptional case determinations, although independent funding adjudicators will have no role in the review of exceptional funding decisions. This is because of the particular nature of the assessment at the heart of such cases, which will focus on an interpretation of the relevant obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights to provide legal aid. Exceptional case determinations, along with all other decisions by the director, would be subject to judicial review.

This is more than adequate provision to ensure that scrutiny can be applied to the decisions of the director where an individual believes that there are grounds for review. There is also provision for making regulations about the review of and appeals against the director’s determination on criminal legal aid. I refer noble Lords to Clause 14(9)—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I apologise for interrupting my noble friend, but he referred in passing to Clause 11(6). Can he explain to the Committee the difference between subsection (5), which requires provision establishing procedures for the review of determinations, and subsection (6), which provides that regulations may make provisions for appeals to a court? Why the difference between “must” and “may” in those two subsections?

[Lord McNally]

Which was the first one to which the noble Lord referred?

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Clause 11(5) says “must”, whereas Clause 11(6) says “may”—perhaps echoing a point made by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, earlier.

[Lord McNally]

I will have to take advice on that, but I thank the noble Lord for drawing it to my attention. I sometimes wonder whether mays and musts are not spread through a Bill according to whether parliamentary counsel gets bored with the use of “must” and decides to put “may”, but I am sure there are far more legal reasons why those choices are made.

As I was saying, there is more than adequate provision to ensure that scrutiny can be applied to the decision of the director where an individual believes that there are grounds for review. There is also provision for making regulations about the review of and appeals against the director's determination on criminal legal aid.

Amendments 97 and 98 would change Clause 11(6), which concerns determinations of whether funding should be granted for any of the matters included in Schedule 1 or any excluded cases under Clause 9. These amendments would require regulations under Clause 11 to make provision for appeals to a court or tribunal against determinations made by the director under Clauses 8 and 9 and against the withdrawal of such determinations.

I have described the intention and effect of Clauses 11(5) and (6), as well as the intention to continue with the existing, effective processes and procedures currently used by the LSC in the new model, and I do not propose to cover the same ground here, although I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile. However, requiring provision to be made for appeals to a court or tribunal against all determinations by the director would be expensive, resource intensive and likely to lead to delay in the hearing of appeals.

Clause 14 creates a power to make regulations that prescribe what advice and assistance must be made available if the director has determined that a person qualifies for advice and assistance. That largely reflects the provisions in Section 13 of the Access to Justice Act 1999, which requires the Legal Services Commission to fund such advice and assistance as it considers appropriate. The circumstances in which such advice and assistance will be made available are prescribed in regulation. Advice and assistance for criminal proceedings is distinct from that provided under Clause 12 to individuals arrested and held in custody. The services we are talking about here would include those provided by a duty solicitor in court or to a prisoner preparing for his appearance before a parole board.

Although Clause 14 and Section 13 of the Access to Justice Act are framed differently, their overall effect is essentially the same. Clause 14 is intended to replace Section 13(1)(b) of the Access to Justice Act. The Bill confers a power to make regulations under Clause 14 for consistency with Section 13(1)(b) of the Access to Justice Act. That section provides that the Legal Services Commission's duty to provide advice and assistance to the individuals mentioned there arises only in prescribed circumstances, and “prescribed” means prescribed in regulations made by the Lord Chancellor.

The combined effect of Amendments 105 to 107 would require regulations made by the Lord Chancellor under Clause 14(1) to provide for appeals, but not reviews, to a court or tribunal in relation to the aspects of determination on legal aid set out in Clauses 14(9)(a) and (b).

Amendment 107 would preclude regulations allowing for appeals to any other person. The Government judge it more appropriate to allow the Lord Chancellor to make regulations, if he considers it appropriate, than to require him to do so. We will retain the existing arrangements whereby advice and assistance for criminal proceedings provided under Clause 14 are subject to a “sufficient benefit” test. In practice, this would be conducted on behalf of the Director of Legal Aid Casework by the litigator, who would provide the legal aid services. The LSC criminal contract provides that advice and assistance may only be provided on legal issues concerning English or Welsh law,

“and where there is sufficient benefit to the Client, having regard to the circumstances of the matter, including the personal circumstances of the Client, to justify work or further work being carried out”.

There is currently no appeal to a court or tribunal in relation to the sufficient benefit test. However, there is a right, set out in the LSC contract, for the person refused legal aid to apply to an independent funding adjudicator for a review of the decision not to grant legal aid. There are no plans to introduce appeals provisions immediately, although subsection (9) would allow for the introduction of provisions for reviews and appeals in the future if it were considered appropriate.

Procedures for review and appeal might, in any event, not be necessary or proportionate in establishing whether all criteria specified in regulations under subsection (5)(b) were met. For example, if a criterion was that the provider had to hold a contract to provide such services, then an appeal would not be necessary to establish whether a provider held a contract. The Government therefore believe that a duty to secure such arrangements is unnecessary and heavy-handed. In such circumstances, a right of appeal to a body other than a court might be more appropriate. The Government believe it is appropriate to have the flexibility to make regulations that could provide for either a review or an appeal, or a combination of both, and that a review or appeal might be made to a body other than a court or tribunal.

The noble Lords, Lord Bach and Lord Thomas, raised points concerning Article 6. It is intended that any arrangements made will comply with the ECHR.

On the rather interesting background to previous systems, it was the previous Administration that brought to an end what sounded like a nice little earner for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lords, Lord Thomas and Lord Carlile.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

It was free.

[Lord McNally]

Free? Oh my goodness. I withdraw that remark.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, this cannot pass. It must be in Hansard that on this occasion, rare though it is, lawyers acted pro bono.

[Lord McNally]

As I say so often, I am not a lawyer—thank God.

There was a question about how the independent funding adjudicator system is working. Some 11,560 reviews were received in 2010, of which about 3,500 were subsequently appealed to an independent funding adjudicator at a cost of about £18 per case. The total cost of these appeals was just over £63,000, so it appears to be a very cost-effective scheme. I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Bach]

I will withdraw the amendment, of course, but there is a real issue here which goes to the independence issue that we debated in the previous group. We argue that it is not satisfactory for there to be a system in which the LSC, as it were, comes in house and becomes an agency of government, with the old process of reviewing decisions remaining exactly the same. That is because the adjudicators, independent though they may be, are appointed by the ministry, so again there is the problem of the perception of independence. There must be a system of appeal against a legal aid decision.

I am certainly not in the mood to fall out with noble Lords opposite who believe that there is a better system than that of tribunals. They may be right or wrong, but what we agree on is much more important than what distinguishes us: namely, there must be a genuinely independent appeals procedure. Of course we do not want it to be expensive or long-winded, but there must be one in order that the perception of independence is there. I am afraid that the Government have not yet got the point that the system proposed in the Bill is not satisfactory for those who are refused legal aid and go to the adjudicator who has been appointed by the Ministry and are refused again.

For the perception of independence, it would be so much simpler and easier for there to be either a chamber of the tribunal or another totally independent body that will decide these issues. There are not that many of them each year; it would not cost the state a great deal of money. However, the principle of being able to appeal against a decision made in this case by a civil servant who has been appointed by the Lord Chancellor is very important. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but we may come back to this on Report. If we are coming back to the earlier independence issue, we shall have to come back to this one as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

My Lords, my name is on this amendment. As persuasively put by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, it seems to be an unarguable proposition. The only fiddling point I would make about calling it “collaborative law” is that it is not the law that is collaborative but the process. It might be better to call it “collaborative resolution”, but that is a detail. I hope very much that my noble friend will feel that this is an advance.

[Lord McNally]

My Lords, we are approaching the witching hour, as the opposition Whip moves stealthily to consult the government Whip. I do not want to give any clues as to whether this is going-home time, but if it is I am very grateful to my noble friend for ending our evening on a matter on which there is some hope of collaboration. I do not want to raise his expectations too much, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, that this concept, which is new to many of us, seems to have great potential. Again quoting from the noble Lord, it appears to be adaptable and flexible. It now has the not inconsiderable badge of approval from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, as an admirable scheme run by an admirable organisation. Like book reviews, I am sure that Resolution will have that as a strap-line.

How does this fit in with what the Government are trying to do? In response to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Beecham and Lord Howarth, I should say that we have never seen mediation as a cure-all. The Lord Chancellor has made it very clear that he wants to wean us away from almost automatic litigation at the taxpayers’ expense, which is one of the attractions of mediation. The collaborative law concept certainly has its attractions.

As the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, pointed out when he quoted from Resolution, the MoJ has said that the Bill as it stands does not exclude the possibility of funding collaborative law in the future. Clause 7 refers to funding,

“mediation and other forms of dispute resolution”.

The amendments are accordingly unnecessary in so far as they set out to make it possible, as opposed to requiring, for funding to be made available for collaborative law. However, given the reduction in the budget that we need to make and the additional costs of involving two lawyers, as would be required for collaborative law when compared with mediation, we cannot commit to the additional resources required to fund collaborative law at this stage. We would not, however, rule it out at some time in the future.

I should like to make one other point. The Government understand that some mediation cases are complex and need additional legal support. We will be providing further legal advice in such family cases where an agreement reached through mediation needs to be turned into a court order, with an independent fee set at this level of service at £200. This is in addition to the £150 fee for legal advice accompanying mediation as originally proposed, and taken together this means that there will be considerable scope for publicly funded legal advice to accompany mediation, especially in more complex cases.

As I have said, I cannot take out the chequebook this evening so far as collaborative law is concerned, but I assure my noble friend that by putting this on the agenda, as it were, there is no doubt that it will play a part in future. Again, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, has said and as I have said a number of times from this Dispatch Box, legal services are on the move and I can very well see that the concept of collaborative law or collaborative resolution, if my noble friend Lord Phillips has his way, may well play a part in the future. At this time of night, however, I ask my noble friend to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, perhaps the Minister might suggest an experiment with collaborative resolution. If the Prime Minister and the Deputy Prime Minister underwent the process, it might help the noble Lord to get the resources needed to extend the principle more widely.

[Lord McNally]

That is a merry jest with which to end the evening.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, I have to confess that I am disappointed with my noble friend’s response and I shall certainly return to this issue on Report. The Government have to appreciate that they are taking family law out of scope, which means that there are going to be couples who are at each other’s throats. There are various ways in which they can resolve their problems. They can say, “He hit me on one occasion. It is domestic abuse, so I want legal aid”. All the fears that have been expressed by the Government of people pushing domestic abuse up the agenda in order to get legal aid and thus making it more difficult to settle will become prevalent.

Here is a system where, on a fixed fee, issues of finance, housing and children can be settled, which is exactly what we as solicitors used to do. We would pick up the phone and talk to the opposing solicitor in order to sort things out without having to go to court. If you do not have a system like this to resolve issues, inevitably it is going to cost more. As I say, there will not necessarily be made-up allegations of abuse, but the little disputes that have occurred in a marriage may perhaps be tarted up just enough to make it possible for legal aid to be involved. You are then into an expensive system. I will therefore return to the matter on Report and I shall continue to advocate this very excellent system. I am pleased to see that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, is involved. So far as I am concerned, the process has been given the seal of approval. For the moment, however, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.