Superannuation Bill
Debate between Lord McKenzie of Luton and Lord Brabazon of Tara
Lord McKenzie of Luton
The purpose of this amendment is to consider alternative options to resolve the problem which the caps are said to be intended to address. We remain firm in our view that the caps are not necessary, are counterproductive and would present their own series of operational complications if they were ever in effect and applied.
As a responsible Opposition we have sought to get to the heart of the issue. Following deliberations in Grand Committee, we received a helpful letter from the Minister, dated 16 November. Based on this communication we understand that the Government’s concern is that, in the event of a challenge on the legality of any new scheme, the courts will reinstate the unaffordable current scheme. In his letter, the Minister notes that once litigation has been started, that alone will put a question mark over which scheme should be regarded as being in force at any one date before all the appeals have been exhausted. The Government are concerned that, in this interim period, the default position as applied by the courts will not be the new scheme which we understand the Minister intends to lay before Parliament in January, but the more expensive current scheme. The Minister states in his letter that it should be Parliament that decides the default position—which, by implication, is to be the caps. The Minister argues that if the challenge is on human rights grounds, the courts would not have the right to set aside limits in primary legislation but would be limited to declarations of incompatibility.
The purpose of our amendment is to address this uncertainty in another and, we hope, less complicated and more effective way. The effect of the amendment would be to state quite clearly in primary legislation what would happen during a period when the scheme was undergoing a legal challenge that had not reached a conclusion. Rather than revert to the caps, the Act would stipulate that the scheme in operation would be the default position until the validity of the new scheme had been determined. Things would eventually come out in the wash when the court process had run its course. We will come to a substantive debate on the caps in the next group of amendments, and we consider that there are compelling reasons to remove the caps in their entirety. We are supported in this position by the recent report by the Joint Committee on Human Rights which cast doubt on the benefit or extent of the certainty that the Government would achieve by relying on this mechanism.
I should make it clear that we do not intend to press this to a vote, nor are we wedded to this precise wording. However, we are firmly of the view that if the Government consider that a fallback in primary legislation is necessary—we do not—it must not be the caps locking in via primary legislation. The scheme most recently introduced, albeit by order, is potentially one way of achieving this. I look forward to the Minister’s reaction to this amendment. Perhaps, when he responds, he will also cover what alternative mechanisms have been considered to address his concern. I beg to move.
The Chairman of Committees (Lord Brabazon of Tara)
I understand that there is a mistake in Amendment 6 as printed in the Marshalled List. Instead of “(2) to (ii)” it should read “(2) to (11)”.
Lord Wallace of Saltaire
My Lords, I appreciate that we will come on to caps in a later amendment, so it is a little difficult to know whether to respond in detail now or to leave it to later. We discussed this delicate set of issues quite extensively in Grand Committee, and I subsequently set out in a letter, which the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has mentioned and which has been placed in the House of Lords Library, that I wished to avoid being in the position that followed the High Court’s judgment of May 2010, which resulted in the February 2010 arrangement being squashed and the pre-February scheme being largely revived. I reiterate our strong intention to ensure that the proposed new scheme is legally robust and our consequent view that the scheme would ultimately survive any legal challenge.
Nevertheless, it is open to anyone to seek to challenge the scheme now or in the future, regardless of whether their intention is rational or their arguments are ultimately found to be meaningful by the courts. Such a challenge could result in the scheme being suspended until due legal process has been pursued. The Government take court rulings very seriously; we would always give the most serious consideration to court judgments and would certainly take the necessary steps to take account of any final ruling. As I previously explained, the question that arises is what the default position should be during any period of uncertainty caused by litigation. The Government continue to believe that it is right that Parliament, a democratically accountable body, should decide in an Act of Parliament what the default position should be, and that is the reason for Clause 3 as it is currently drafted.
I do, however, feel certain that a court would have views of its own about an Act of Parliament containing the approach set out in Amendment 6. This seeks, in effect, to oust the court’s power to strike down a scheme, an approach which the courts have often felt to be misconceived and on which the Government would not therefore be confident to rely. I also note that the drafting of the amendment is a little vague, which would not be helpful in conveying to a court a clear meaning of Parliament’s intent. For example, given all the opportunities for appeal or for proceedings to be taken on to the European Court, how could anyone be certain that the “final determination” has been made? Even if the intention and the process could be made sufficiently clear, I am not convinced that a court would always accept that a compensation scheme that is being challenged qualified as a scheme that should remain in place during that challenge.
I emphasise once again, as we did on several occasions in Grand Committee, that the coalition Government hope not to need to use the powers in Clause 3, nor the powers in Clause 4 that support them. What we want is a new, reformed, sustainable, affordable and fair Civil Service Compensation Scheme that can be implemented once this Bill has received Royal Assent and which will mean that we will never need to use the caps in Clause 2. If we are taken to court and therefore need to fall back to a provision that means that the necessary reductions in the Civil Service workforce can be made without disproportionate cost and perverse effects, it is more reasonable to rely on such caps than on a clause that attempts pre-emptively to bind the court.
We shall shortly have the chance to discuss Clause 3 again as drafted, along with the provisions in Clause 4 that provide for the repeal, extension or revival of Clause 3. I do not think it would be right for us to agree to an amendment that might be interpreted by some as seeking to constrain the powers of the courts. So, for the reasons that I have given, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.