Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Lord McKenzie of Luton Excerpts

Tuesday 21st December 2010 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

27: Schedule 1, page 16, line 19, leave out “Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission.”

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to seek fully to understand and evaluate the rationale for including the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission in Schedule 1 and the reason for its conversion announced on 14 October back to an executive agency of the DWP.

Noble Lords will be aware that CMEC is a relatively new body—a crown non-departmental public body—created by primary legislation in the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act just two years ago. It was then the subject of considerable debate. Accepting its demise via the process in this Bill therefore needs considerable justification.

CMEC was charged with completing the operational improvement plan and to carry out a fundamental redesign of the child maintenance system. The operational improvement plan was part of a twin-track approach to radically improve the performance of the Child Support Agency.

The CSA was established in 1993 to assess, collect and enforce child maintenance payments from non-resident parents. It was set up because the system of collecting maintenance through the courts was perceived as failing to establish fair and consistent awards which were not necessarily kept up to date or indeed enforced. Despite the best efforts of CSA staff, the complicated calculation process, IT failures and inadequate enforcement contributed to poor performance and unacceptable outcomes for children.

The CSA struggled to administer the complex rules in the child maintenance system and to handle the difficult and emotional circumstances that often surround parents when child maintenance becomes an issue. It was widely seen as a means of clawing back benefit rather than providing additional resources for children. Reforms in 2000 brought some simplification to the maintenance calculation. The introduction of a child maintenance premium where those in receipt of benefit kept some of the maintenance payments was a positive development. However, the changes still did not deliver the improvements expected. In particular, there were chronic problems with the IT and operational systems, which meant that old scheme cases could not be transferred to the new, simplified system.

Again, the result was that too many children did not receive the benefit of maintenance, which led to the approach of a three-year operational improvement plan, and the call for a longer term redesign of the child maintenance system. The latter was the subject of a report commissioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hutton, when he was Secretary of State at the DWP, from Sir David Henshaw. Sir David argued that the system’s failings reflected both policy and operational problems, and recommended a break with the past to create a new start for child maintenance arrangements. CMEC was to be that new start. It was established with the primary statutory objective of maximising the number of effective maintenance arrangements. This was bolstered by subsidiary objectives of encouraging and supporting voluntary maintenance arrangements and the operation of a statutory scheme.

CMEC is specifically charged with the promotion of raising awareness among parents of the importance of taking responsibility for and making arrangements for child maintenance. It also has a duty to provide information and guidance to parents for the purpose of helping to secure effective maintenance arrangements. Its role is to seek to ensure that all parents who live apart put in place effective arrangements to maintain their children, whether they do this privately, through the courts, or through the statutory service. This is much different from the old CSA, run directly by the DWP, which had only one function—the statutory maintenance service. The enhanced role with a new focus was considered at the time to be best undertaken by a new body, an NDPB, to be led by a commissioner for child maintenance. For certain very practical reasons, the NDPB was set up as a crown body. It was intended to operate at arm’s length from government and through its commissioning powers to be able to develop a high-quality and efficient service. Its board would be focused entirely on delivering a successful child maintenance system, not distracted at the top from the shared responsibilities which the very senior managers would have as an executive agency of the DWP.

The timeline for change was planned to span from the launch of CMEC in October 2008 until 2014, when the new unified child maintenance system is planned to be fully in place. Major steps have already been completed and these include the setting up of the options service, fulfilling the information and guidance obligation for all parents, the removal of the compulsion for parents with care claiming benefits to use the CSA, implementation from April 2010 of a full maintenance disregard, and the deployment of at least some the new debt and enforcement powers. However, CMEC has just completed its first full year of operation, and the forward programme still shows much to do. In fact, 2011 is the year in which the new basis of calculation is due for introduction with a gradual migration of old cases to the new system until in 2014 when there will be a closure of all existing CSA cases and a unified system in place.

CMEC's business plan for 2010-11 is clear that the current year will be a critical year for CMEC as it moves to the launch of the new system. The options service has, seemingly, made a good start. In its evidence to the DWP Select Committee, CMEC set out its focus on promoting the service to new and separating lone parents. It records how Jobcentre Plus and HMRC refer parents to the service when they claim relevant benefits and tax credits.

There can be little doubt that over the period of the operational improvement plan and since, performance of the CSA has improved despite continuing problems with the CS2 system. Currently, its performance under CMEC is the best it has ever been. The number of children benefiting from statutory maintenance has exceeded 850,000, with more than £1.14 million collected. Uncleared applications, a particular bugbear of the past, have declined by over 90 per cent to under 20,000. Telephony has improved out of all recognition. Running costs have reduced from £600 million to under £500 million a year. Nevertheless, the Select Committee report shows that more remains to be done in terms of collection of arrears and maintenance outcomes.

Unlike most of the other bodies included in this schedule, CMEC is not yet in steady state. It is part way through a programme which will finally lead to the clean break recommended by Sir David Henshaw. As the Work and Pensions Select Committee reported, it will be a challenging phase with the continuing problems with the CS2 IT programme, and the operation of three different maintenance systems through to 2014 when it was planned for there to finally be just one simplified statutory system. So in seeking to understand the decision for CMEC to become an agency of the DWP, I should be grateful if the Minister could answer the following questions.

First, what are the type of clear policy and decision-making responsibilities which Ministers consider they are precluded from taking at present in respect of child maintenance, which drives this approach? Secondly, is there any basic change in policy for the child maintenance system? Is it still planned to proceed with the new system, starting at 2011, with the gradual migration of the old and current systems? Is it envisaged that this process will be completed before the operation becomes an executive agency? Thirdly, will the full disregard for benefits remain and will this apply also for the purposes of the universal credit? Fourthly, given that CMEC is currently a crown NDPB, what will its changed status as an agency mean for the staff? Fifthly, given that the decision has already been taken for a transfer to an executive agency, is it considered that being run by DWP will bring operational efficiencies not available to CMEC? If so, what are these, and what evidence base is available to support such a conclusion?

Sixthly, what analysis has been undertaken of the costs involved in any transfer back to the DWP, including novation of supplier contracts, changes to enforcement notifications, et cetera? Are there any VAT ramifications of a transfer, and how does this differ from transfers from non-crown NDPB's? Seventhly, on what grounds is it considered that CMEC fails all the three tests set out by the Minister for the Cabinet Office in October: does it perform a technical function; do its activities require political impartiality; and does it act independently to establish facts? Eighthly, what is the future for the options service under any changed arrangements? Is it not right that considerable effort has gone into branding this service as being at arm’s length from government? What assessment has been undertaken of how parents would react to this becoming an executive agency of the DWP? Would any different requirements apply in respect of information sharing—say, income details of non-resident parents for the DWP, in contrast to CMEC as an NDPB?

Fundamentally, on what basis can we be reassured that the switch to an executive agency will neither disrupt the vital work of getting the new maintenance system up and running as quickly as possible? Moreover, will there continue to be a clear focus on improving child maintenance outcomes as an integral part of the challenge of tackling child poverty?

Our anxiety over this issue has been heightened by the most recent briefing note from the IFS covering child and working age poverty. Clearly, progress in improving child maintenance outcomes should contribute positively to reducing child poverty and any disruption to current arrangements need to be examined from this perspective, especially given the IFS report. This analysis makes grim reading. The conclusion is that the coalition Government’s reforms have no discernable impact on absolute and relative child poverty in 2011-12, but for 2012-13, the IFS estimates that the Government's reforms will increase relative poverty for children by 100,000 and absolute poverty by 200,000. For 2013-14, it is considered that the reforms will increase relative poverty by about 200,000 children and absolute poverty by 300,000 children. So much for the claim that the Government’s reforms will not have a measurable impact on child poverty. They clearly will. What role does the Minister see, therefore, for the child maintenance system in combating child poverty, especially given the shocking figures in the IFS report? I beg to move.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Work and Pensions (Lord Freud)]

My Lords, this seems to be a relatively short debate, which has shown evidence of the great knowledge and experience that the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, has in this field. There was a debate recently on the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008, which informs a lot of his questions and points. However, I have not heard anything in those arguments that undermines the primary objective of the coalition Government to restore ministerial accountability for child maintenance.

The amendment would remove the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission from the list of bodies to which the Public Bodies Bill applies. The Government’s intention is to increase the accountability of Ministers for public services. This amendment would go directly against that intention.

The change of status for CMEC from a non-departmental public body to an executive agency within the DWP is driven by the coalition Government’s desire to have greater accountability for the hugely important issue of child maintenance. We feel that it is important to strengthen ministerial accountability when the Government are considering the role that the child maintenance system can play in their overall commitment to support shared parenting and promote parental responsibility.

We acknowledge that CMEC has built a stable base, following on from the success of the operational improvement plan to which the noble Lord referred. As it currently stands, however, with CMEC operating at arm’s length from the Government, the Government feel that it does not have the right level of responsibility and ministerial accountability. In order to regain that control, this change in status will make that happen. Removing the commission from Schedule 1 to the Bill would adversely impact on that intention.

There is a long and often painful history of poor performance within the child support system, as the noble Lord pointed out. A simple picture could suggest that the Child Support Agency was a failure and that only the introduction of the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission turned performance around. I would like to point out that that is not entirely the case. From 2006 to 2009, the Child Support Agency’s operational improvement plan significantly improved the performance of the administration of child maintenance. That was because of the activity taken forward by the Child Support Agency, at that point an agency of the Department for Work and Pensions. Responsibility for child support functions transferred to the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission in November 2008, near the end of the period covered by the operational improvement plan.

Since its formation in 2008, CMEC has taken these improvements much further. It has also been given a much broader remit than the CSA ever had. Most notably, it has developed a very effective information and support service, Child Maintenance Options, which has received much praise in dealing sensitively with separating and separated parents. Indeed, the noble Lord endorsed it a few minutes ago. The Government want to maintain and build on the progress that CMEC has already delivered. In response to the noble Lord’s question, that is one of the areas where we want to see further progress.

Let me be clear: this is not about scrapping the commission, nor is it about undoing the progress that the commission has made through the hard work and dedication of its people. I can confirm, in answer to the noble Lord’s question in this area, that we are looking to see the progress made and the plans that it has. We are looking closely at our own plans for improving the position in this area.

As the noble Lord said, however, the major reforms that were set out in the Child Maintenance and Other Payments Act 2008 are still to come. The improvements that the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission has made to date have been despite the inadequacies of its IT infrastructure. The legacy of past problems still casts a long shadow over the administration of the child maintenance system.

The Government believe that it is right—indeed, essential—that Ministers are directly accountable for the significant changes that still need to happen within the child maintenance system, not least the introduction of a new scheme for calculating child maintenance and the associated new IT platform. This Government, in including CMEC in the Bill, are clear that we must avoid reintroducing the well catalogued problems of the past.

To avoid destabilising the organisation at such a critical time, the new executive agency would essentially have the structure and functions of CMEC. The key difference, and the key purpose of this reform, would be the direct accountability and governance lines to Ministers. Many of the questions that the noble Lord raised are answered in that assurance about what will be happening.

I recognise that noble Lords have a keen interest in this matter, given their involvement in the redesign of the child maintenance system in 2006. I am referring, of course, to the noble Lords, Lord Hunt and Lord Kirkwood, who, alongside the noble Lord, Lord McKenzie, have proposed the amendment.

The independent review undertaken by Sir David Henshaw made some strong recommendations about the steps required to reform child maintenance. However, the review recognised that the issue of whether or not that should be administered in a body positioned at arm’s length from the Government was a finely balanced debate. The key argument on which the Government rest our position was the need for a clean break, as it was then called—I think that it was referred to today as some other kind of break, but anyway those are the essential grounds on which the argument was made, in response to the well publicised problems that the CSA had been enduring.

I reiterate that this reform is not about dismantling the Child Maintenance and Enforcement Commission in its current form. Neither is it about jeopardising the performance improvements that have been made in recent years. It is fundamentally about restoring ministerial leadership and accountability at a time when child maintenance reforms are reaching a critical stage.

I shall pick up one or two of the questions that I have not already dealt with. The implications for staff are relatively few, given the nature of the transfer. What we are trying to do in the universal credit, in terms of information, may become highly relevant here. We still need to look at that; obviously, it is at a very early stage.

We have looked at costs overall as part of SR10. We are determined that, in undertaking the transfer, we do not divert attention away from the need to get systems up and running. Clearly, this area is vital in tackling child poverty. Family breakdown is one of the main drivers of child poverty. We are determined to move forward on this and maintain targets. As the noble Lord will know, the introduction of the universal credit will have a powerful impact on child poverty. That is not yet included in the IFS calculations, although I imagine that it is working on that. We will be looking closely at other ways of ensuring that we stem the problems arising from family breakdown. Given all this, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Minister for that very full reply. I have no intention of pressing this amendment, as I tabled it in order to seek information. I am comforted by what he said about the progress and planned progress of the child maintenance system and that it is still the objective to try to introduce the new basis of calculation next year and the systems that will support that. I understand that it is intended that all the CSA cases will eventually migrate to the new system by 2014.

However, I am still a little mystified by this issue of ministerial accountability, as there is accountability to Parliament through the Secretary of State. I am a little curious as to what difference the measure would make for Ministers in practice, as for most, if not all, NDPBs there is a way for Ministers to engage and influence. A framework agreement defines not only the financing of NDPBs but their governance arrangements and their relationship with Ministers, so the argument that the Government are switching just to achieve that purpose is a little thin.

I wish to make it clear that I certainly do not contend that improvements came about only once CMEC came into being. Improvements were made under the operational improvement plan before CMEC came into being. I certainly assert—I think that the Minister agreed with this—that CMEC has carried that on and has made continuing progress, although matters still remain to be resolved. I am comforted by the fact that this will not be done in a way that would disrupt the progress that has been made and disrupt the introduction of the new systems.

[Baroness Hollis of Heigham]

Before my noble friend decides what to do with his amendment, as he may be drawing his remarks to a close, I wish to ask the Minister a question through him, so to speak. Do I understand that what the Minister is doing is maintaining the policy drive of CMEC while reinventing the structure of the old CSA? As he may know from his briefing, that structure was that there was a chief executive, who reported quarterly or at six-month intervals to the Minister, supported by an advisory board and shadowed, so to speak, by a policy directorate within the department—a grade 5 and above that a grade 3—who would, so to speak, act as the interface between the policy development and the operational work done by the CSA, headed by its chief executive. Is that the proposed structure that the Minister seeks to reinvent or has he a different version in mind? It would be helpful to know how he thinks the organisation will function at the top level and what independent advice—research advice and expertise—he can expect to draw on, which obviously CMEC has taken further and developed in a far more effective way than under the old CSA.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

That is probably a belated intervention on the Minister if he wishes to answer it. One of my questions concerned what would happen to the board and whether and how it would be reconstituted.

[Lord Knight of Weymouth]

My Lords, specifically on that question on the board, if the Minister is minded to comment further, it would be interesting to know, if the board is to continue, what sort of remuneration it would have for what purpose, if the Minister is now to be much more accountable and have that proper oversight.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

If the Minister wants to pick up those points now, perhaps I can come back to my points later.

[Lord Freud]

We want to move to the new arrangements as soon as we can. The details of the arrangements for the agency will be elaborated on, but our intention is basically to leave the CMEC structure unaffected. The accountability point is much more political. I imagine that it would delight any Opposition, and slightly worry any Minister, to be directly responsible for what this very important agency does. That is the key difference. There is direct accountability for what is happening across these Dispatch Boxes and, of course, those in another place. We think that that is right, given the very many millions of parents and children affected. The figure is not quite 10 million on my count but it is getting on for that. For that reason, it is vital that there is direct political responsibility.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

I wonder if I might assist the Committee. We are in Committee and we try to enable as much discussion and latitude as possible. I appreciate that the noble Lord, Lord Knight, may not be aware that the procedure is that, once the Minister has concluded his answer, and then the person moving the amendment seeks to sum up and decide what to do with the amendment, the Minister should not then be subject to further questioning. Naturally, the Minister has wanted to assist the Committee as much as possible but the noble Lord has trespassed a little far on our usual procedures. I invite the Minister not to comment further. However, I am sure that, like all Ministers—as the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis of Heigham, used to do when she was a Minister—he will be pleased to consider constructive discussions between now and Report.

[Lord McKenzie of Luton]

I am grateful to the Minister for participating in the additional exchanges. However, we still need clarity over what the structure will look like in the future and what in practice enhanced ministerial responsibility and accountability will come from that. Having heard the Minister’s comments, I cannot see a great difference from current practice.

I return to the options service, which was not a responsibility of the DWP or the CSA before the creation of the commission. It has been heavily, and properly, marketed as offering support for parents and information and guidance that is independent of government. I have not heard the Minister address my next point directly, but it seems to me that we need to think through the consequences of putting at risk the status that that service has achieved, where parents with care and non-resident parents can feel that they can genuinely and confidentially engage with the service and get impartial advice. I remember that during the passage of the Bill we had interesting discussions about the obligations on that service in terms of reporting its findings if it became aware of information that was inconsistent with other information in the system on benefits and income. One of my questions is whether that will change with the service no longer being conducted by an NDPB but directly by an executive agency of the DWP. It would be good to have clarity on those sorts of issues.

We have probably had a useful starting exchange on this. We would now like to read the record and reflect. If there is an opportunity, perhaps we can get some clarity on these issues even before we reach Report stage. My colleagues and I would greatly appreciate that. For the time being, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 27 withdrawn.