Lord McFall of Alcluith
Main Page: Lord McFall of Alcluith (Lord Speaker - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord McFall of Alcluith's debates with the HM Treasury
(12 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this amendment is in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. The Minister has just said that the FPC is responsible for overall financial stability in the UK. That was a question that exercised us in the Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, the question being, “How do we work towards establishing financial stability indicators between the FPC and Her Majesty’s Treasury?”. We realise that it would be difficult to set indicators for the FPC and, unlike the MPC, which has a single measured target—namely, the rate of inflation—the FPC does not do that. We think it important that our indicators, particularly for external assessment, should see whether the FPC is doing its job and achieving the government target, unlike the MPC, where it is very easy for people to see that it is dealing with that issue.
We understand that the FPC’s performance will be the focus, but it is important to put forward an amendment to the Bill. The Court of the Bank of England said in its response to the Treasury Committee that it did not want this in legislation, and in a follow-up letter to the Treasury Committee the governor said that there should not be hardwiring of a narrow set of indices in legislation. He wanted flexibility on this issue and a review at regular periods.
We realise that the snapshot element of stability has to mean that we need flexibility on this issue, and that the financial stability report would be an important tool for accountability, just as the inflation report is for the MPC. However, the Government responded to the Treasury Committee that in an annual remit to the FPC they would recommend additional indices if that needed to be fleshed out. Something needs to be in the Bill, and primary legislation is a good place to put that.
The governor set out in his letter to the Treasury Committee a number of indices that we could discuss. I would like this amendment to provoke discussion of a number of those indices—for example, a simple averaged leverage ratio of the major UK banks, the aggregate leverage ratio of the UK banks, the UK long-term real interest rates, the household debt-to-income ratio and the growth of lending in the UK to the non-financial sector, which has been topical now for four or five years without any solution in sight. These indicators are important, but if the Minister thinks that the Monetary Policy Committee and the inflation report, when it is produced to Parliament, are going to cause a bit of heat, in terms of the FPC this will really exercise politicians. We can imagine that certain judgments of the FPC would be unfavourable to a number of politicians who have particular constituency interests, and the FPC would find itself in the eye of the storm. Ahead of time, looking at certain indices and working out, the FPC is extremely important. When a body such as the FPC is given responsibility, it should be allowed to get on with that. I do not want to see it in the eye of the political storm. In order to ensure that that is not the case, we have to get these indices so that we understand what the FPC is about. There is some external assessment so that politicians and others do not just jump on the FPC for a job that it is pursuing as the result of inadequate indicators that have been supplied to it. That is the basis of the amendment. I beg to move.
My Lords, I am sorry if my noble friend thinks that I mischaracterised her argument. My interpretation of the words,
“The Treasury and the Financial Policy Committee must agree … a set of indicators”,
is that effectively the Treasury would have a veto over the set of indicators. What would happen if the Treasury and the FPC did not agree? It states in the amendment that they must agree. They would therefore have to find some common ground and it would be difficult if the Treasury dug its heels in and said, “We believe that this and that should be in the indicators”. Our starting premise here is that the FPC is the expert body and it should be left to define the indicators. As I have tried to indicate to the Committee, the Bank and the FPC are already on the case, providing a high degree of transparency, and there will be a series of draft policy statements available in time for consideration of the passage in the relevant secondary legislation. There will be appropriate scrutiny, but we would be going into pretty dangerous territory if we were to hard-wire the Treasury into the set of indicators that should be for the experts to set. Appropriate parliamentary and public scrutiny is allowed for in the Bill in the way that I have described.
Amendment 73, which would require the financial stability report to include the FPC’s predictions about the likely future state of the UK financial stability, is unnecessary. Subsection (3)(d) of new Section 9T, which appears at the bottom of page 11 of the Bill, already requires the report to include an assessment of the risks to stability that is very similar to the suggestion of the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, that it includes a “range of … possible scenarios”. Subsection (3)(e) of new Section 9T already requires that the report includes the committee’s view of the outlook for the stability of the UK financial system. The interim FPC has already published three financial stability reports since its establishment. As I am sure the Committee is aware, the most recent report, published just last week, contains a whole chapter devoted to the committee’s outlook and the actions that the FPC felt necessary to tackle risks that it had identified.
I move on to Amendment 74. It is important that we learn from the mistakes of the previous system of regulation. In that system, the Bank was given responsibility for maintaining financial stability but no means of achieving that objective. That is why it is vital to give the FPC effective and proportionate powers to use certain macroprudential tools. However, the use of those tools will need to be monitored carefully. That is why the Bill already requires that the financial stability report includes an assessment of the extent to which the committee’s actions have succeeded in achieving its objectives, including its new secondary objective for economic growth. That is also why the FPC is required to publish and maintain policy statements for each of its macroprudential tools. We expect these statements to include estimates of their impact on both financial stability and growth. As we will discuss in due course, other amendments will require the FPC to produce explanations of how its actions are compatible with its objectives, including the costs and benefits of those actions. I do not therefore think that Amendment 74, which would require the financial stability report to include an assessment of the impact of each of its macroprudential measures on employment and economic growth, is needed.
Lastly, on Amendment 76, the smooth and efficient functioning of financial markets is a key requirement for financial stability. As such, the FPC’s objective to protect and enhance the resilience of the UK financial system extends to the functioning of markets. As I have mentioned, the Bill already requires the FPC to include an assessment of its actions as part of the financial stability report. The amendments that I have made require the FPC to explain how its actions are compatible with its objectives with regard to financial stability and supporting the Government’s economic policy. I therefore regard Amendment 76 as unnecessary because the same ground is already amply covered by the Bill.
I hope that on the basis of those explanations and reassurances noble Lords will withdraw or not move their amendments.
My Lords, this was the gentlest of amendments ever. The genesis of it was the tripartite authority, and how the link between the Bank and the Treasury did not work as well as it could. Here we have an ill-defined term—financial stability—for which there is no definition whatever. On that basis, in getting the balance right between the two institutions, the Joint Committee at the time recommended—and I promoted, because I did not want anything prescriptive—that they should agree indicators. That is a very general term, so that people knew what the Treasury was expecting, and what the Financial Policy Committee was asked, and tasked, to do. That was the genesis of it. If we do not get that balance right we could find, in a few years time, someone saying in this very place—if it still exists—why did they not come to some agreement, so that there was a general consensus on what was happening?
Far from it being dangerous territory, I think it is nothing more than plain common sense. I hope that the Minister will look at this again, particularly when we come back to the Report stage, but I do not intend to move the amendment tonight. I beg leave to withdraw.