(11 years, 11 months ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I strongly support allowing county courts to hear all but the most serious defamation cases. As the noble Lord has said, it was a recommendation of the Joint Committee; indeed, it was the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and I who advocated it very strongly on that committee. Quite apart from the complexity of the law and the arcane procedures that we have developed, one of the main reasons why costs have become so high in these cases has been the development of a highly specialist Bar and specialist solicitors, all conducting cases very expensively exclusively in the High Court.
The simplification of the defences in this Bill, coupled with the simplification of procedure and more extensive and earlier case management, should make it possible to reduce the complexity of defamation cases substantially. In those circumstances, the development of county court expertise with designated judges to manage and hear these cases would make justice, importantly, more local, quicker, cheaper, simpler, and in all ways more accessible. Of course there will always be cases that are complex, difficult and paper-heavy. They will require High Court expertise and the attention of specialist High Court judges. However, I hope that for the generality of cases county courts will become the norm and that therefore the cases will become simpler to sue, to defend and to resolve. We recommended trialling county courts for defamation cases; I ask that that happens soon.
My Lords, just as I paid tribute earlier to the noble Lord, Lord Bew, for his contribution, so I pay tribute also to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Without them I am not sure that the Committee would have come to this conclusion. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, has just eloquently explained our thinking and our reasoning. Indeed, my noble friend Lord McNally may remember that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, had one or two questions for him on this subject when he came to give evidence.
The noble Lord, Lord Browne, said that we proposed a pilot, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, has confirmed that. I would add that we proposed a pilot in part because we thought that this was such a radical idea that the Minister would need some help in dealing with the legal profession. We could hear the legal profession lining up against this idea and we wanted to side with the Minister, so we suggested a pilot. However, he should not be unaware of the fact that he will have one or two sessions of arm-wrestling with people who were not overly persuasive to the Committee before, hopefully, he gives effect to this particular amendment.
(12 years ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, the Joint Committee’s report was published 14 months ago. It is a fairly accurate account of the months of work it put in to produce that report. This is one of the instances where 14 months has assumed considerable significance. I will be truthful, as noble Lords would expect me to be, but I have not had time to go back, prior to this Committee stage, and read all the evidence that was given to us. However, my memory is that by and large we concentrated on the list because the list already existed. We listened to evidence from people who wanted to tweak the list. My recollection is that there was no discussion of a slightly more radical solution—or, if there was, it was of a passing, almost ephemeral nature. However, I do not believe that such a discussion actually happened. Given that three other members of that committee are present, they can correct me if my memory is in error.
I pay tribute to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who is a distinguished member of the committee. He took upon himself the role of reminding us that if we wanted a radical change of the law, we were going to create—to use his memorable phrase—“a cottage industry for the lawyers” until the new law had settled down. We paid attention to what the noble and learned Lord said. Had there been a significant discussion about a radical alternative to the list, I guess that at least some thought would have been given to whether or not we were going to generate a new cottage industry. He will recall that I was slightly more relaxed about cottage industries than perhaps he was, in part because it seems to me that any time the law is changed, lawyers and judges will always want to have a say in determining what it actually means before the whole issue moves forward.
I come back to the significance of the 14 months, because the conversation about a radical alternative to the list has emerged in that time. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Lester of Herne Hill, who, in turn, introduced me to Sir Brian, and we spent a certain amount of time talking about whether the list was the best way to proceed or whether something more general and more dependent on the common sense and good judgment of the courts would not be a better way forward. I do not wish to unduly embarrass him, but I thank my noble friend Lord McNally also, because he and I had some conversations around this issue as it became clear to all of us that doing away with the list and having a more general statement would almost certainly be the right way forward. From looking at Amendment 23, it is clear to me that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, was having similar conversations to those that I was having, because that amendment is a good summary of where the new thinking should be placed.
My noble friend Lord McNally concentrated on the words,
“all the circumstances of the case”,
and I have underlined them. I am not sure that I entirely buy the official interpretation of those words that his officials have given him. I am of either the old school or the new school but I am not sure which. I think that, just occasionally, it helps to have the obvious stated in a Bill for the avoidance of any misunderstanding or, indeed, any potential mischief-making. In supporting the thrust of what the noble Lord, Lord Browne, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, have suggested, having the words,
“all the circumstances of the case”,
in the Bill would be a happy addition.
Perversely, that takes me to the amendment I have proposed. It emerged out of conversations that were held 14 months ago and it is an accurate reflection of one more addition to the list that emerged from our considerations. However, I am happy to acknowledge that in the intervening time my noble friend Lord McNally, and indeed the noble Lords, Lord Browne and Lord Lester, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, have moved the conversation forward to a much better place. With that in mind, when the time comes, I shall not move Amendment 17.
My Lords, I found the question of whether we should or should not have a list of factors in Clause 4 a very difficult one. In the Joint Committee I was certainly of the view—a view I expressed at Second Reading—that a list of factors would be helpful, primarily because it would enable members of the public to look at the statute on the internet to see what kind of factors might or might not be important in determining whether a publisher would be held to have acted responsibly.
I remember the arguments around this issue in Joint Committee, and my noble friend Lord Mawhinney may like to think back to them. However, I have now been persuaded that the list of factors arising out of the Reynolds case has been treated as a checklist and used by claimants and defendants alike, and by their solicitors, to put their opponents to very costly proof at the pre-action stage in a way that has tended to be oppressive and increase costs. There is a serious risk that a codified list of factors as set out in the unamended Bill would have the same effect. I now accept that a statement of general principle is the right approach, but I have reached that conclusion with some difficulty.
It is important to note that the way the test is now expressed in government Amendment 14 combines an element of subjectivity with an element of objectivity. That is really the answer to the question put by my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury to my noble friend Lord McNally when he decided not to move his amendment. I am bound to say that I thought that my noble friend Lord McNally did himself an injustice in declining to answer the question because he had in fact already answered it in his opening remarks on his own amendment. The element of subjectivity is that the court will have to look at what the defendant believed, and that is a subjective test. It will then have to look at whether that belief was reasonable, and that is an objective test. That combination will enable the court to develop the law on the basis that it is an issue of fact which will necessarily take into account all the circumstances of the case. My concern is allayed by that because it seems unlikely that the case-by-case development—the cottage industry development to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, referred—will not create too much difficulty. However, it is a danger, and I hope that it is one that the courts will be careful to consider.
Amendment 15, tabled by my noble friend Lord Phillips—
May I offer my noble friend a personal apology? I said that there were three distinguished members of the committee here present. I will be honest with my noble friend and say that my eyes saw him but my brain did not register the fact. Of course, there are four distinguished members present. I want to correct the record and, in so doing, express my appreciation for his contribution to the committee.
My noble friend invited me to reflect back on our conversations about the list. I well remember conversations about whether the list would become a tick-box exercise and the damaging impact that that would have on courts having to make decisions so that every item was covered. However, I do not remember any conversations about a radical alternative to the tick-box approach. I hope that he will accept that that is my best memory of the conversations that we had.
My Lords, of course I accept that. I would like to say that I am grateful for the apology, but I am not sure that I am. I had worked out that there were four of us and I had not worked out who was left out, but now I know that it was me. It matters not, perhaps, what the conversations were, as I think that I have made the point.
(13 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Owen, demonstrate again why this Chamber is frequently held in the highest regard for the strength, clarity and coherence of the arguments that are advanced within it. I am not going to repeat what they said because I agreed with both of them. My noble friend Lord Newton and I are in danger of becoming Tweedledum and Tweedledee when it comes to trying to persuade the Government that there is a real world out there with around £130 billion worth of responsibility. Lots and lots of people are doing their best, but human beings have the inescapable ability of getting things wrong from time to time, no matter how good their intentions.
I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that one of the interesting things about this Bill is that it talks about a mandate. I think of my time in Richmond House when something had gone seriously wrong and civil servants came in to say, “Well, there’s a mandate, Minister,” and I would say, “Isn’t that fantastic?”.
Let us get down to the reality of what we are going to do about this latest mishap. That is not an argument for not having a mandate, it is an argument for not putting all your eggs in one basket, even if this particular basket is as widely constructed as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, thinks. I have not resiled from what I have previously said in this Committee in that the Secretary of State is responsible. He has to be responsible to Parliament, he has to be responsible in law, and in reality he has to be responsible in the health service. I am relaxed about the Government putting in place arrangements which they believe—it will all have to be tested over the next few years—will provide a more coherent way of delivering a better and more efficient service than we currently enjoy. I do not resile from the fact that when push comes to shove—and it will, because that is one of the characteristics of the Department of Health, more than any other single department in Her Majesty’s Government in my 30-odd years in this building, one end or the other—it must be clear that the Secretary of State can act, and in a way where the people of this country believe he is acting for them and on their behalf.
My Lords, if the noble Lords, Lord Mawhinney and Lord Newton, are Tweedledum and Tweedledee, they make a splendid double act in this Chamber. It has been heartening to hear the support for these amendments from all sides of the House. Adding to what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said about the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, the simple distinction is that the mandate and the regulations are intended to be and should be—if they are not to be entirely unwieldy and inappropriately used—prospective. They should set objectives and requirements as to how the strategy of the health service is to be implemented. The intervention powers are intended to be, and must be, reactive. It is the power to react effectively that is important, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, it has been used on a number of recent occasions.
May I make one observation to explain our position on Amendment 152, and the difference as we see it? It is not over what is included so much as in what is left out. What is left out is effectively the whole of the intervention regime and what is substituted is a general power to give directions which would take us back to Section 8 of the 2006 Act, which I know that the Government believe is undesirable. I also suggest it is undesirable because it reverts to an unacceptable kind of micromanagement, even though I quite accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, about that term being difficult to use in legislation.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested that I might explain why we used the words,
“in the best interest of the National Health Service”.
It is right, I suggest, that there should be a criterion for the intervention by the Secretary of State. The criterion that we have chosen is the interest of the health service. It is, of course, what the Secretary of State considers to be in the interest of the health service. That phrase finds repetition in the Bill, so amendments are consonant with the wording of the Bill elsewhere. I am bound to say that if I was called upon in a court of law to challenge the Secretary of State on what he or she considers the interest of the health service to be, on judicial review I would be very cautious about advising my clients of any prospect of success.
(13 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as my noble friend the Minister points out, the autonomy clauses are to form part of the Government’s discussions with other noble Lords about the Secretary of State’s duties. These clauses are of considerable significance. In my judgment, Clause 4, relating to the Secretary of State’s duty, and the new Section 13F, relating to the Commissioning Board, threaten the Secretary of State’s primary duty to secure provision of services, however that is ultimately worded after discussions are concluded.
In principle, promoting autonomy is to be welcomed; so is avoiding micromanagement within the NHS, as my noble friend Lady Cumberlege so eloquently pointed out in her speech. One of the best features of this Bill is that it establishes a well-defined decentralised structure in which decisions about arranging and commissioning services are made at a local level in accordance with local needs and conditions. However, as the Government have recognised, it is also essential that final responsibility, both for the quality of the health service and for the very large sums of taxpayers' money spent in providing it, should rest with the Secretary of State, and that he or she should be accountable not only to Parliament for the exercise of that responsibility but answerable in the courts for failure to exercise it in accordance with the law.
I will say a few words now about how the difficulty arises in drafting provisions that strike the right balance between decentralisation and the Secretary of State’s ultimate responsibility. As we all know, under Section 1(2) of the National Health Act 2006, the Secretary of State had a primary duty to,
“provide or secure the provision of services”.
That was underpinned by a direct duty under Section 3 to provide a list of specific services such as hospital accommodation. That duty was in turn supplemented and buttressed by powers under Sections 7 and 8 to delegate and give directions to other NHS bodies. So there was under the 2006 legislation a simple linear structure down from the Secretary of State. Under the Bill, the position is more complex, because under Clause 10 the Section 3 duty to provide the specific services is devolved to the clinical commissioning groups, and the general powers to delegate and give directions are removed. That is why it is challenging to provide for an overarching duty on the Secretary of State to secure the provision of services under Clause 1, and to provide for the exercise of all his other functions to that end. It is that challenge that is principally to be the subject of discussions.
If the Secretary of State is bound by a duty to promote autonomy, as proposed in Clause 4, the force of his duty to secure provision of services is weakened, because his failure to intervene in any given case would be very difficult to challenge on judicial review, except in an extreme case. Generally, the Secretary of State could respond to any challenge regarding a failure to act on his part by claiming in his defence that he was declining to act pursuant to his duty to promote autonomy. It does not help that the Secretary of State would only be bound to promote autonomy,
“so far as is consistent with the interests of the health service”,
in the context of any such challenge. That is because the arbiter of what those interests were would be the Secretary of State himself. A court would not substitute its own view of the interests of the health service for his unless it was satisfied that his view was irrational; and that is too high a bar. It follows, in my view, that there is an inconsistency between the proposed duties to promote autonomy and fulfilment of the Secretary of State's overall responsibility, however it is to be expressed.
The problem with proposed new Section 13F is that it is proposed that the board, with regard to its autonomy provision, be similarly bound to promote the autonomy of the commissioning bodies and others. So the board can argue that it should decline to intervene with the commissioning bodies in accordance with its duty to promote autonomy. That could be relevant if the board were challenged by judicial review on its failure to exercise its intervention powers or, alternatively, relevant if the Secretary of State wished to exercise his powers in respect of the board on the board's failure to intervene where the Secretary of State thought that the board ought to intervene. Thus, while it is desirable— and I entirely agree that it is—for the chain of responsibility to allow plenty of slack as a general rule, when the chain needs to be tightened in the event of failure or threatened failure, the danger is that the chain will be found to be weak in two important links.
I look forward to the discussions to be held with my noble friend the Minister and pay tribute to his and his department’s willingness to hold those discussions on a cross-party basis. I hope that we will see some way as to how this conundrum may be resolved, to retain a strong legal chain of responsibility without encouraging or permitting micromanagement of the bodies in the NHS, to which powers are rightly to be devolved. If we find a solution, that in itself will do a great deal to assist in the confidence that my noble friend Lady Cumberlege rightly points out is lacking among the public and the NHS in the political process.
I add only this. In my view, these two clauses could simply be deleted without doing any violence to the purposes of the Bill. That is because the principles of decentralisation and autonomy and the avoidance of micromanagement are defined and limited by the Secretary of State’s powers woven into the very structure of the Bill and into the way in which the bodies relate to each other under the provisions of the Bill. I suggest that these clauses merely serve to muddy the waters.
I noticed that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, pointed to me when he talked about making a theological point about a besetting sin. Because I was going to compliment him and say how pleased I was that he did so, I will happily share that endorsement with the right reverend Prelate.
The noble Lord also made an extremely important point, and around that point I want to speak for a few minutes, with the House’s indulgence. His second point was right; the problem with the health service is bureaucracy—it is not anti-liberation or shackles, but systems and procedures and a pressure coming from all sides that nobody should rock the boat. I listened to my noble friend Lady Cumberlege, and I shall come back in more detail in a moment on what she said, but I suspect that I cannot be the only one in this House to think that, for every case where outsiders did not like some political intervention, outsiders, including patients, did not like the lack of intervention from inside the health service.
On the whole, my experience of over 30 years at both ends of this Corridor has not been that patients come to me and say that the problem with the health service is the politicians. They more frequently say that the problem with the health service is the management or, as we discussed the other day, the doctors who will not admit when they have got something wrong, or the nurses who simply do not provide even the most basic care for the elderly in today’s health service. So the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Stamford, did us a favour when he pointed out that bureaucratic point.
I remain extremely grateful to the Minister for the willingness that he expressed the other day to take away Clauses 1 and 4. Those in the House for that debate will know that it was a widely held view across all the Chamber—and the Minister not only agreed to do it but did it with a tone and spirit that was widely admired. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, for her contribution in support of that. I would not want anything that I or others say to make my noble friend feel as though the House was reneging on the request made to him to take Clauses 1 and 4 away, which he showed a willingness to do. My contribution to this particular debate is to suggest a few of the things that he might like to think about when he does so which may need to be clarified, resolved or excised, so that when we get back to this on Report he will have a much smoother run—one which I and I suspect other noble Lords hope that he will be able to enjoy.
When the noble Lord, Lord Warner, made his comments, I intervened to say that he is not the only one in the House who thought what he thought. I was referring to a very pertinent phrase which he used. He said that he was not clear whether the purpose of Clause 4 was for the Secretary of State to be engaging or disengaging. I think that is part of the problem of the drafting of this clause. Those of us with some knowledge of the health service are still unclear whether this is meant to help the Secretary of State engage or disengage.
That takes me to my noble friend Lady Cumberlege. She and I served happily together in the department. We conspired for the common good on many an occasion, both in public and over a cup of coffee in our offices. She knows it to be true that there are few people in the health service who I hold in higher regard for a lifetime of work. But I am going to add a “but”. On this occasion, while I admired the tenacious adherence to what she read as the spirit of this clause, most of the rest of what she said left me wondering exactly where she was trying to go. Nobody is claiming that democracy is a clean and simple process. It can be messy. Part of my noble friend’s argument was that Ministers were not to be trusted and that it would be much better to hand it over to the professionals. I respect my noble friend for that view but I do not think it carries a lot of weight. I, too, read the NHS Confederation’s paper. In fact, I have it with me. Every time I read what it said on Clause 4, I thought to myself, “There is just the chance, Brian, that you are giving these people more credit than they deserve”. Perhaps this is a politically incorrect thing to say, but I was reminded just a smidgen of Mandy Rice–Davies in the sense of, “Well, they would say that, wouldn’t they?”.
The problem with this debate is that you have the masses of the health service with their procedures and bureaucracy intermingled with outstanding professionals who, I know from my experience, feel as frustrated with their colleagues as sometimes Ministers feel with the bureaucrats. On the other hand, you have this messy democratic process that occasionally shifts Ministers. Listening to my noble friend, you would be amazed by the claim that the NHS is the envy of the world. I think it is only the envy of the world in certain aspects and that there are other aspects where the world thinks it can do a better job than the NHS. The health service is right up there competitively but given the history of the past 40 years, in which Ministers have played a leading role, it is hard to envisage the outcome that my noble friend talked about. Therefore, I have to say to her that I had a real problem with what she was trying to convey to the Committee. If you do not have democracy, you do not have any public accountability.