Health and Social Care Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 30th November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Crosby]

My Lords, may I offer a quick explanation to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the Members of the Committee, as to why we have asked for these amendments to be separated? I am very conscious, as I sit in the Committee, of what is often said on the “Today” programme, when somebody is asked the question “How would you improve the health of the entire population”, and the interlocutor says “Please answer briefly”, which means “You have four seconds”. I shall be as quick as possible.

This amendment, along with Amendment 152—which we are not debating at present, as I am merely explaining why we have separated them—is deeply significant. This will emerge much more clearly when my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames speaks in a few moments’ time, but it is important because it deals with the fact that the earlier Amendment 152—I have to refer to it to make any sense of my current remarks—would actually remove all powers of intervention in the current Bill. The powers of intervention associated with the Secretary of State are directly related to the failure of the board or of the CCGs.

The deletion that the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, and the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, have moved, would take the whole of the failure regime out of this Bill. It would therefore be directly in conflict with one of the principles of the Bill, which is the principle of decentralisation. It moves back to the Secretary of State only the direct intervention with the board and the CCGs. It is well known now, from the long and explanatory speeches around this whole debate, that the Secretary of State passionately believes that decentralisation is one of the major principles of the Bill.

Therefore, my noble friend will explain why Amendment 153 is not on the same lines at all as Amendment 152. It is a different argument: there should be the right of intervention by the Secretary of State, but it should be limited in a way that saves the decentralisation principle. Why does it do that? It does that by referring back to the Secretary of State’s overall responsibilities for the health service as a whole—which we all accept as a crucial element of the constitutional discussions now going on—as distinct from a direct intervention at the level of the board and the clinical commissioning groups, which would be to restore the very central principle that the Bill has rejected. This is not a deceptive amendment simply about some powers; it is in fact to make it clear that there is a distinction between decentralised responsibilities by the board and the CCGs and the essential, ultimate right—expressed, for example, in the amendment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, at an earlier stage—of the Secretary of State to have responsibility for a comprehensive health service while not intervening in a detailed way in the clinical commissioning groups or the Commissioning Board. I will now pass the further part of the argument on to my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I beg to move.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this is a most significant area of the Bill, as my noble friend Lady Williams of Crosby has said. This group concerns the regime whereby, in the event of a significant failure, the Secretary of State can intervene in the board’s exercise of its functions. That is in Amendment 153. The board in its turn can intervene in the exercise by a clinical commissioning group of its functions. That is the purpose of Amendments 220ZAA and 220ZAB. I would add Amendment 220ZA, which is not currently in the list of the group, which simply amends the title of the proposed new Section 14Z19. Also in the group is Amendment 277, which removes the restriction on the Secretary of State’s intervening where there has been a significant failure by Monitor to act in relation to a particular case.

May I first address the question of the Secretary of State’s intervention in the board’s exercise of its functions? When we debated at some length Clauses 1 and 4 and the proposed new Section 13F, noble Lords were clear that whatever may be the outcome of those discussions and debates on those clauses, this House must ensure that the Secretary of State will have powers and functions that are up to the job of enabling him or her to carry out those overarching duties. Those duties involve him or her in carrying ultimate responsibility and accountability to Parliament and in the courts for the NHS. We should remind ourselves that my noble friend the Minister and my honourable friend Mr Paul Burstow have repeatedly assured Parliament that the Government are determined to make it clear that the Secretary of State will remain responsible and accountable for the NHS in Parliament and at law.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mawhinney]

My Lords, the contributions of the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Owen, demonstrate again why this Chamber is frequently held in the highest regard for the strength, clarity and coherence of the arguments that are advanced within it. I am not going to repeat what they said because I agreed with both of them. My noble friend Lord Newton and I are in danger of becoming Tweedledum and Tweedledee when it comes to trying to persuade the Government that there is a real world out there with around £130 billion worth of responsibility. Lots and lots of people are doing their best, but human beings have the inescapable ability of getting things wrong from time to time, no matter how good their intentions.

I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Warner, that one of the interesting things about this Bill is that it talks about a mandate. I think of my time in Richmond House when something had gone seriously wrong and civil servants came in to say, “Well, there’s a mandate, Minister,” and I would say, “Isn’t that fantastic?”.

Let us get down to the reality of what we are going to do about this latest mishap. That is not an argument for not having a mandate, it is an argument for not putting all your eggs in one basket, even if this particular basket is as widely constructed as the noble Lord, Lord Warner, thinks. I have not resiled from what I have previously said in this Committee in that the Secretary of State is responsible. He has to be responsible to Parliament, he has to be responsible in law, and in reality he has to be responsible in the health service. I am relaxed about the Government putting in place arrangements which they believe—it will all have to be tested over the next few years—will provide a more coherent way of delivering a better and more efficient service than we currently enjoy. I do not resile from the fact that when push comes to shove—and it will, because that is one of the characteristics of the Department of Health, more than any other single department in Her Majesty’s Government in my 30-odd years in this building, one end or the other—it must be clear that the Secretary of State can act, and in a way where the people of this country believe he is acting for them and on their behalf.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, if the noble Lords, Lord Mawhinney and Lord Newton, are Tweedledum and Tweedledee, they make a splendid double act in this Chamber. It has been heartening to hear the support for these amendments from all sides of the House. Adding to what the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, said about the observation made by the noble Lord, Lord Warner, the simple distinction is that the mandate and the regulations are intended to be and should be—if they are not to be entirely unwieldy and inappropriately used—prospective. They should set objectives and requirements as to how the strategy of the health service is to be implemented. The intervention powers are intended to be, and must be, reactive. It is the power to react effectively that is important, and as the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, pointed out, it has been used on a number of recent occasions.

May I make one observation to explain our position on Amendment 152, and the difference as we see it? It is not over what is included so much as in what is left out. What is left out is effectively the whole of the intervention regime and what is substituted is a general power to give directions which would take us back to Section 8 of the 2006 Act, which I know that the Government believe is undesirable. I also suggest it is undesirable because it reverts to an unacceptable kind of micromanagement, even though I quite accept the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, about that term being difficult to use in legislation.

Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, suggested that I might explain why we used the words,

“in the best interest of the National Health Service”.

It is right, I suggest, that there should be a criterion for the intervention by the Secretary of State. The criterion that we have chosen is the interest of the health service. It is, of course, what the Secretary of State considers to be in the interest of the health service. That phrase finds repetition in the Bill, so amendments are consonant with the wording of the Bill elsewhere. I am bound to say that if I was called upon in a court of law to challenge the Secretary of State on what he or she considers the interest of the health service to be, on judicial review I would be very cautious about advising my clients of any prospect of success.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, does not the noble Lord make my point for me, apart from believing that the 2006 Act is perfectly formed in every way? Surely the point is that it should not be open to any doubt whatever. In the end, if a Secretary of State intervenes, it must be because he considers it in the best interest of the National Health Service. Why should we complicate matters by potentially giving at least an argument for judicial review when, in the cases mentioned, the Secretary of State simply will need to, or be required to, intervene?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

The answer is that we are not at one about the vulnerability of my amendment to judicial review. I rather hope that that is never tested; nevertheless, I hope that the amendments are accepted.

[Earl Howe]

My Lords, the policy of the Government and the vision that we have consistently set out is that Ministers will be responsible for overseeing and holding to account the national bodies, backed by extensive powers of intervention in the event of significant failure. I say to my noble friend Lord Newton that that is what the Bill provides for. These powers are essential if Ministers are to be able to retain ultimate accountability for the health service, for the very reasons that he stated. I have to say that some of his phraseology was, in my view, unnecessarily extravagant, if I may use that phrase. The Secretary of State will not stand back; nor will he wash his hands of what is going on, as my noble friend put it. The Bill enables the Secretary of State to intervene where he believes that Monitor, the board, the Care Quality Commission, NICE, HealthWatch or the Information Centre are failing or have failed to exercise their functions, and that failure is significant. In the event that Ministers use these intervention powers, they will be required to publish the reasons for doing so, including an explanation of why they consider the failure to be significant. These requirements will provide transparency to the decision-making process.

I will deal with the question posed by my noble friend Lord Marks. Why should we use the word “significant”? The clear aim of its use is, exactly as my noble friend suggested, to stop Ministers intervening in inconsequential matters. There is no case law on the meaning of “significant failure”. The Secretary of State will need to decide whether a failure is significant. However, cases have considered the meaning of “significant” in other contexts and have taken the approach that, while a dictionary definition of “significant”—

“noteworthy; of considerable amount or importance”—

is not to substitute a different expression for the statute, it remains a helpful indication of what the term means. There is a degree of flexibility inherent in the term “significant”, and I believe that that is helpful in the context of the arguments put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Owen—who is not in his place—and my noble friend Lord Mawhinney.

I will first deal with Amendment 152. I respectfully suggest that there is a gap between that amendment and that of my noble friends Lord Marks and Lady Williams. Amendment 152 seeks to amend the Bill to give the Secretary of State wide powers to direct the board and clinical commissioning groups in how they carry out their functions. I said “wide powers”, and that fundamentally cuts across the vision of a health service free from political micromanagement. It therefore gets us back into exactly the territory that we want to get away from.

Of course it is important, as I have said, that there are intervention powers if things go wrong and those powers are in the Bill. The Bill also sets out a robust system by which the board will hold CCGs to account. I will come on to that in a moment. Creating a sweeping power of direction would seriously undermine the autonomy of the board and local commissioning groups and allow Ministers to use directions or indeed the threat of directions to second-guess operational decisions. In addition, any direct power over CCGs would duplicate and undermine the role of the board which is responsible for overseeing local commissioning.

Amendment 153 makes a more subtle point. It seeks to enable the Secretary of State to direct the board should he consider it to be failing to carry out its functions in the best interests of the health service. Let me reassure my noble friend of what I am sure he does not need to be told. We would always expect the board to act in a way that is consistent with the interests of the health service. This is made clear by the duty on the board to promote the NHS constitution and the duty set out by proposed new Section 1E(2), which ensures that the board is also subject to the duty to promote the comprehensive health service. If the board were acting in a way that was not consistent with those duties, then it would be acting unlawfully. That may constitute a significant failure by the board to exercise its functions properly or indeed at all in relation to which the Secretary of State would consider intervening.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am sorry to intervene at this stage but does my noble friend the Minister not accept that there may well be two divergent views of what the best interests of the health service are, and that the board may hold one view, the Secretary of State an entirely different view—or, on the other hand, CCGs may hold one view and the board an entirely different view—and that undermines any notion of accountability if the Secretary of State has to stand up in Parliament and say, “I do not believe what the board has done is in the interests of the health service but the board does and I cannot do anything about it”? That is the mischief at which these amendments are directed.

[Earl Howe]

I take the point but I hope my noble friend will agree that I have an answer. The crucial point is that, while we would expect the board to have a clear shared understanding of what the interests of the health service are, the Secretary of State has mechanisms over the board which he can use if necessary to clearly set out what these interests are. He can do that by setting objectives and he can hold the board to account for those. So he has other levers.

Amendment 277, also in the name of my noble friend Lady Williams, would prevent the Secretary of State from intervening in specific cases where he considers that Monitor has failed or is failing to perform its functions. We believe that it is important for the Secretary of State to be able to intervene in the event of a significant failure by Monitor to perform its functions. That intervention power does not exist at all under current legislation, and we believe it should. We do not believe Ministers should have the power to intervene in individual cases. Such a power would risk politically motivated interference and undermine the independence of the regulator. That point is extremely important.

However, there is an important exception to this rule in relation to the continuity of services. Amendments introduced in another place allow the Secretary of State to intervene in relation to proposals for securing access to services where a provider has become unsustainable. The Secretary of State would be able to exercise a veto if Monitor and clinical commissioning groups have failed to discharge their functions, to follow the proper procedures or to secure access to services.

We are clear that the wording of the clause as it stands strikes the right balance, enabling the Secretary of State to intervene when necessary to address systemic failure, while ensuring that Monitor is able to carry out its functions free from potentially time-consuming and politically motivated interventions relating to individual cases. The NHS Commissioning Board will also have powers of intervention, as set out in new Section 14Z19, to support CCGs and take action where necessary if there is evidence that they are not meeting their statutory duties or that there is a significant risk of them failing to do so.

I recognise that the intention behind Amendments 220ZAA and 220ZAB, which look to ensure that the board only intervenes in a CCG when it is satisfied that the CCG is failing, or is at significant risk of failing, is to exercise a function in the best interests of the NHS. However, as the Bill is drafted, the board can determine when a CCG is not exercising its functions properly and that is surely the better approach. We are giving the board discretion to determine when intervention is necessary, based on the terms of each statutory function that CCGs have, not in relation to a separate criterion. The amendment would actually narrow the grounds on which the board would have power to intervene, which I do not think would be at all helpful.

Finally, I would like to address the point put to me by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, about waiting time objectives. The noble Lord implies that Ministers would be powerless in the face of waiting times. That is simply not the case. Ministers’ main weapons on this issue would be the standing rules and the NHS constitution. Current contractual requirements relating to waiting times, such as 18 weeks, are covered by the constitution through the handbook and will form a key feature of the standing rules pending passage of this Bill. If the Secretary of State wanted to act on a new waiting time issue, the option is there for the NHS constitution handbook to be revised and the standing rules updated accordingly.

I hope that I have provided enough detail on these clauses to enable my noble friend to withdraw the amendments.