Patrick Finucane

Lord Mawhinney Excerpts

Wednesday 12th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

—as to the way forward. Sir Desmond de Silva will have the opportunity to go through paper after paper and to produce a report. That may well be the time for the noble Lord to express a view. But Sir Desmond will be reporting on what the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, and Judge Cory have already indicated about collusion.

[Lord Mawhinney]

My Lords, I was a Minister serving with my noble friend Lord King at the time of this murder and I agree with everything that he said, so I will not repeat it. Can the Minister assure this House that when this review is complete there will be no statute of limitations issues if—and I say if—the review specifies individuals who should be prosecuted as a consequence of the murder?

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

My Lords, I will have to write to the noble Lord on that precise point about limitations. All I would say is that we should not forget that when the report by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, was produced, in the end it was not possible for prosecutions to take place. Other matters may come up and people may contact Sir Desmond, but we cannot say what will happen. The idea is to get the truth about what happened with a murder. That is the position, and what happens subsequently is something for another day. However, on that specific point, I will have to write to the noble Lord.

Water Supply: Northern Ireland

Lord Mawhinney Excerpts

Wednesday 9th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

I was there at the time, so I can tell the noble Lord that there was a bit of bother in the south as well. Incidentally, a piece of work was published yesterday by the Consumer Council for Northern Ireland showing that the biggest problems were people understanding what was going on, indicating that they had problems, wanting assistance and getting through to those who could help. That was the problem in Northern Ireland. If you look at the 60-page paper that was produced yesterday by the consumer council, you will see that it believes that Northern Ireland Water—these are the council’s views, not mine—was not prepared for an emergency of this type. It has been asking Northern Ireland Water whether it could see the advanced planning in case there is an emergency and it had not had it.

[Lord Mawhinney]

My Lords, my noble friend has sought to distinguish between the crisis and the long-term structural inadequacy that most people believe is the reality in Northern Ireland. I hope he will not mind me saying that the big problem that the Northern Ireland people had was not a lack of information so much as a lack of water. Does he believe that getting structural change in the hope that such a crisis will not happen again is more likely to take place if the water service is privatised?

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

My Lords, it does not matter what I think about whether it is privatised or not. It is not up to the Government either. This is a devolved matter. You cannot devolve something and then say, “We are going to make the decisions”. The water service in Northern Ireland is a devolved service and it is up to the people in Northern Ireland—I believe there will be an election there before too long—and to those who are elected to decide what sort of water service is required. Northern Ireland and Scotland have state water and in England we have a privatised service. It is their decision because it is a devolved matter; it is not our decision.

Bloody Sunday Inquiry

Lord Mawhinney Excerpts

Wednesday 13th October 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mawhinney]

My Lords, as I do not want to spend time looking at the details of the Saville report, I start by saying that I share the view of those who think that some of the events recorded were unjustified and unjustifiable. However, I stress that they were events committed only by some. I noted the paragraph in the report that commended the appropriate and proportionate restraint of aspects of the Army activity on that dreadful day.

I start from a privileged position of having served as a Minister in Northern Ireland for more than six years—only one of two who has done so. I do not have a Peterborough accent; I am the only native-born son who has had the privilege of being a Minister during direct rule. I have seen violence and the consequences of violence and I have had to deal, on the Government’s behalf, with the consequences of violence. It is against that background that I want to make two points arising from the Saville report—perhaps two lessons. The first is to remind your Lordships' House that the action of the Army in support of the RUC was a slightly unnatural action for an army to have to take; it was training the Army to behave in a somewhat different way from that in which armies normally behave. That gives me the opportunity to express my personal appreciation for the work that the RUC did—it was the Royal Ulster Constabulary in those days—and the work that the Army did, at great personal risk and sacrifice, on behalf of the people of the whole nation, of the people of Northern Ireland and, indeed, of us Ministers. I owe my life to the diligence of some Army officers and some RUC officers, and I remain grateful.

As we think of the behaviour of some who should not have behaved as they did, I share the view of the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, that we must not tar the majority by the actions of what was, in the context, a very small minority. I come back to the behaviour of the Army, because, from all the Saville report, each of us will have been attracted by a particular sentence. I will tell you the sentence that attracted me. It was about the difficulty in separating out the potential rioters from the mass of ordinary marchers. That encapsulates one of the most difficult aspects of policing in Northern Ireland or in similar circumstances. The majority were doing what they were democratically permitted to do—to express their opinions, even if, on occasions, the Government did not like those opinions. Under the cover of that democratic process, a few evil people wanted to create danger and violence.

In other words, security and political development are inextricably linked. The problem which we all had—I pay tribute to my noble friends Lord King of Bridgwater and Lord Brooke of Sutton Mandeville, under whose leadership I had the privilege of serving—was that we all understood the fine intricacy of security and political development. If, on a dark night, a 19 year-old Army officer with half a second to decide whether his life was at risk shot someone, and it turned out to be an accident, the political consequences reverberated—as they did all the more in Londonderry. I became a Minister 15 years after these events, and the political problems in Londonderry were palpable. No one could have believed that the feelings of the local people had been stirred up by some political activity. Had that been the case, I would have loved to have had ownership of the political activity, abilities and skills that created that sort of a reaction. This was gut. It may or may not be a coincidence—I do not care today to choose—that, as a Minister, it was on the streets of Londonderry that I came closest to losing my life.

I pay tribute to Bishop Edward Daly—he was that iconic priest waving a white handkerchief photographed in the middle of the troubles on Bloody Sunday—for the work which he, the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, and other churchmen did to try to handle the situation. One of the things that I would have liked to have seen effected, which I spectacularly failed to achieve, was to make it a matter of government policy that when the Army is acting in support of the civil powers, and someone gets shot, the Army person is deployed somewhere else until an inquiry establishes the facts. If that is a matter of policy, no blame can be attached to the individual for the individual circumstances. In political terms—by which I mean trying to develop the circumstances in which political progress can be made across the Province—that would have been a big advantage. However, I have to say, as a member of Her Majesty's Government at the time, that that did not become government policy. I regret that and it may still be a lesson that might beneficially be learnt for the future.

The second lesson that I want to draw follows in parallel with the excellent speech, if he will permit me to say so, that the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, has just made. He and I have not colluded but your Lordships are going to hear some of the same messages that he so eloquently gave us. Twelve years and £190 million amount to an awful lot. We deal with numbers here. Outside, people think that the inquiry went on for ever and cost the earth, but we are supposed to have some sense of perspective. When I awoke one morning in Northern Ireland—I was the Finance Minister for the Province at the time—my officials told me that the previous night’s bombing had cost the British Exchequer £25 million. It was a part of the IRA’s strategy that, if it could do enough damage, eventually we would run out of patience to pay the money and go away. I pay tribute to my two noble friends for the way in which they made it clear at the height of the Troubles that, no matter what it cost, the British Government would not back off. However, now we find that there will be no more open-ended inquiries.

I remind colleagues that peace or the absence of violence are not the same as reconciliation. They are quite different. The noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, referred to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. I had some reason to be exposed to that and I do not advocate that we should go down the same road. However, I do advocate to your Lordships that we should learn the lesson that, unless we focus on doing something about reconciliation, we will continue with the danger, so adequately pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that the present fragility—her word—might continue. If fragility lasts too long, it becomes more fragile with the passage of time.

I remind the House that, when government or the organs of the state are in the dock, people can look to the Government to take action on their behalf. However, when it is not the organs of the state that are in the dock, to whom do the people look to get the sort of help and closure that Saville has given? People need help to heal the past. Therefore, although I do not challenge the Prime Minister’s comment that this is the end to open-ended inquiries, I say to the House, as did the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, that that leaves a problem unsolved. We need to find a new way to address those issues.

Perhaps I may illustrate the point by reference to the bomb at Omagh. We are outraged, and rightly so, that 11 people died on Bloody Sunday, but three times that number died in Omagh. Does Omagh not raise serious questions about the need for resolution and reconciliation and for trying to take a step to heal the past for the benefit of the future? I believe that it does. Twelve years and £190 million are not the answer, but an answer needs to be found if Northern Ireland is to prosper. Like the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, I passionately believe that it will prosper only on the back of reconciliation and healing, and I was pleased that the right reverend Prelate also used those words. Northern Ireland needs to be healed. People need the past to be addressed and, in my view, finding a way of doing that constitutes the biggest challenge that the Saville report has laid down for government.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

The noble Lord got the third one. He does not want to know about the first and second ones. Reference was made to the private all-party briefings. Those will commence; I spoke to the Secretary of State about them and he is happy to come along. We will endeavour to arrange one of those meetings before too long.

I want to say this about the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit. He has a personal position as a victim and because his concern is about an event in Brighton it is not covered by any procedures such as the HET. There is very much a serious case. It was interesting that he followed the noble and learned Lord, Lord Carswell, with an entirely opposite view, because it was that of the victim saying, “No, I can’t yet move on”. I would like to find a way of moving on. I believe that there ought to be a way—I do not know what it might be—in which even the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, can eventually move on, because he feels that he has had some satisfaction. In one sense—

[Lord Mawhinney]

I admit to being somewhat anxious about this personalising of the contribution of my noble friend Lord Tebbit. We all know that he has a personal involvement, and a memory and experience which none of the rest of us would have wished, but can my noble friend address the policy point that my noble friend Lord Tebbit was trying to make? Rather than personalising his contribution, the policy point was: what is the basis for determining what should and should not be the subject of an inquiry?

[Lord Shutt of Greetland]

My Lords, it is all about tone and using the right words. I am trying my best. I do not want any hurt in terms of what the noble Lord, Lord Tebbit, might feel. I used that example only because in one sense his was a personal contribution, which leads on directly to a policy point. That which is in place to address what many believe to be hurt does not appear to be in place as far as the noble Lord is concerned, because of an event that took place in England. The Government should look at that, and I will take it back to the Minister. I do not believe that anything is in place at the moment, so in my view there is a policy point which an endeavour should be made to address.