Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Massey of Hampstead and Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted

Committee stage
Monday 22nd June 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bowles of Berkhamsted (LD)]

My Lords, I shall speak briefly to Amendment 30 in my name, which would introduce a fiduciary-style duty on firms in their dealings with consumers and small businesses.

This group is about affordable credit and consumer protection. The problem that we see time and again is not that firms set out to behave badly but that good intentions drift under pressure to increase revenue, under pressure from internal incentives and, sometimes, under pressure from government to deliver growth. When that drift occurs, the cost is pushed on to consumers and, as I said earlier, passing costs on to the people is not growth in any meaningful, national sense.

Motor finance, the example that keeps on giving, shows this clearly. The FCA did not intend to create misalignment, firms did not intend to breach the law, but because the rules were not anchored in a well-understood legal framework, the system drifted. The FCA’s rules permitted the non-disclosure of commission unless asked. The statute required disclosure. The gap widened over time and nobody noticed until the consequences were enormous.

We see similar patterns in insurance add-ons and premium finance arrangements. These products did not begin as bad faith practices, they began as convenience, but over time, margins accumulated, incentives shifted and the products drifted into a place where the consumer’s interests were no longer the anchor. That is not malice but drift, the same drift that we saw in motor finance, and it happens when rules are not anchored in well-understood legal principles. This is what happens in a rules-based system—that is what we have, however we may pretend—rather than a principles-based system.

Parliament has been here before. As the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, has already explained, when this House supported my noble friend Lord Sharkey’s proposal of a duty of care, the intention was to create a principle, a relationship-based obligation, that firms must not exploit unequal bargaining power or information asymmetry. What emerged instead was the FCA’s consumer duty. Is it valuable? I suppose so, but fundamentally it is a rules-based construct, shaped in part by industry pressure for something that their compliance departments could tick. Rules can be changed, narrowed or reinterpreted. Principles such as duty of care and fiduciary duty are legally understood, durable and resistant to drift.

My amendment does not attempt to rewrite the consumer duty. It would simply provide a well-understood statutory anchor—a benchmark against which to assess products and detect the kinds that end up exploiting imbalance. The test becomes, “Is it fair?”, and not merely, “Is it the next step on a path that might already have drifted?” In other words, it is about fairness versus incrementalism.

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests as a shareholder and a director of financial services companies in asset management and wealth management.

I have considerable sympathy with the objectives that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is seeking to advance. Access to affordable credit is a genuine problem in this country, as in many others, and the Committee is right to view financial exclusion as a problem. However, I am unable to support Amendments 28 and 29 on the grounds that the proposed solution will not solve the problem and may in fact exacerbate the issue that the Bill is partly designed to alleviate: excessive and complex regulatory demands on our financial institutions, which are making us less competitive.

My first concern is one of basic commercial economics. Banks and building societies are not lending to certain sections of the community, however deserving they might be, not because of a lack of understanding of the opportunity or a lack of data; they are not serving those clients at scale because the risk-adjusted returns of lending to higher-risk borrowers at affordable interest rates, and indeed the compliance risk of so doing, do not work commercially. A rating framework published by the FCA will not change that calculus, but it creates yet another compliance exercise, another box to be ticked and another issue to be managed without addressing the underlying economic reality that makes such lending unworkable.

My second concern is the risk of unintended consequences. A rule that would rate banks on their willingness to provide credit to financially-excluded populations—in some cases, very high-risk borrowers—could create an implicit incentive to lend more to people and companies who cannot really afford the loan. The amendment contains no credit quality safeguard and no minimum standard of affordability assessment, yet banks could be incentivised to lend just to improve their ratings. The pressure to improve ratings would not be cost free, of course. In practice, banks will not be carrying out this lending for solid financial reasons, so if they feel forced to extend credits into markets with reduced or zero margins, they will seek to restore those margins elsewhere, through higher charges on other products, reduced rates on savings or increased lending spreads in other parts of the business. The cost will not disappear; it will be redistributed invisibly to existing clients, who also deserve protection.

Moreover, I draw noble Lords’ attention to the stated purpose of the Bill, which is to reduce regulatory burden, not add to it. Yet here we are, being invited to add a new mandatory framework, new data collection requirements, new publication obligations and new performance ratings, all enshrined in primary legislation. This is precisely the regulatory ratchet: the cumulative, seemingly endless new measures that damage our competitiveness. The Financial Services Regulation Committee of this House, chaired by my noble friend Lady Noakes, concluded in its report last June that:

“The cumulative burden of regulatory compliance in the UK is perceived to be disproportionately high, diverting resources that could otherwise support … growth”.


As a serving practitioner in the sector, I strongly agree with this finding. Diverting lending from growing businesses to those effectively in financial need is not going to improve our economy. If anything, it will lead to loan losses for the banks and encourage excessive borrowing from those who cannot afford it, while piling even more costs and regulatory obligations on financial firms. We should resist the urge to reach for intervention every time a market imperfection is identified. Not every problem has a regulatory solution. Indeed, those solutions can often have unintended consequences that increase bureaucracy and undermine growth, so I cannot support the amendments.