Myanmar: Protesters

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Wednesday 10th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate again brings the focus on to the humanitarian assistance. I assure your Lordships’ House that we are working—not through government agencies but through international NGOs—to ensure that those corridors of humanitarian assistance can be kept open. But we have seen an uptick in violence being perpetrated against protesters in Myanmar. Particularly worrying are the recent actions taken by the military and security forces during the night.

[Lord Marlesford (Con) [V]]

My Lords, did HMG note the piece in the 13 November issue of China Daily, welcoming the renewed mandate of Aung San Suu Kyi and her success in the election, and quoting President Xi Jinping as having said:

“China supports Myanmar following the development path of its own choice and is ready to consolidate and deepen the friendship between the two countries”?


Do my noble friend and Her Majesty’s Government believe that China could have a role in the ending of military rule and restoring Aung San Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy to government?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, I totally agree with my noble friend: China has an important role. The statement that he quoted is of course welcome. Equally, referring to the question raised by the noble Lord, Lord Hussain, China’s intervention in resolving the situation for the Rohingya is also an important part of finding a lasting solution for all in Myanmar and in the region.

Burma: Military Coup

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Tuesday 2nd February 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, on the noble Lord’s last point, there is already concerted European action—specific sanctions on both the general and his deputy. On the wider point on Aung San Suu Kyi, he is quite right that we have had challenges and we have expressed deep regrets, through interactions by the current Foreign Secretary and his predecessors, about her lack of condemnation of the situation of the Rohingya. Nevertheless, she is the civilian elected leader, and she should be restored. My right honourable friend the Foreign Secretary was due to speak to her on that very issue later this week, but, of course, that is not taking place at the current time.

[Lord Marlesford (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I was working in Burma in 1962 when General Ne Win took over the Government. At that time, the Burmese military were completely naive; they asked a friend of mine in Rangoon University to draft them a manifesto, which he called The Burmese Way to Socialism, but we ended up with more than 40 years of what was, in fact, fascism. Does the Minister recognise that that is the danger now, and will he try to get the United Nations Security Council to recognise this in approving an appropriate resolution? Normally, Russia and China might be hesitant to support it.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend’s personal insights are valuable. Indeed, I recall visiting Myanmar just after the first election and what he talks about—the lack of governance, the inexperience of state institutions and the inability to govern effectively—was very clear to me. I take note of what my noble friend says and, of course, today’s meeting is focused specifically on Myanmar.

Hong Kong: National Security Law

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Thursday 7th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con) [V]]

As the noble Baroness may know, an issue at the International Court of Justice requires both parties to consent. It would not, to my mind, be an option that we should pursue because it is highly unlikely that China would consent to such actions.

[Lord Marlesford (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I declare an interest in Hong Kong that goes back to 1961, when I first went to work there. Does my noble friend agree that one lesson that applies to China and the USA is that, in any civilised nation state, the exercise of authority needs both the support and consent of the people? Does he also agree that China must be well aware that it was fortunate to inherit from Britain the world’s third most important financial centre, and that to flourish, such a tender plant needs sensitive treatment?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con) [V]]

I agree with my noble friend on his final point. As someone who worked in financial services for 20 years before joining the Government, I totally agree that Hong Kong has long been a centre for financial services. It is therefore appropriate that, in Hong Kong, the Chinese authorities look to create the conditions and environment that allow firms to flourish and that centre to progress. I equally share his views that we must ensure freedoms and protections. He cited his long experience since 1961; he has had more time in business than I have had on God’s earth. Nevertheless, I totally share his view and opinions in this respect.

Hong Kong

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Thursday 24th October 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I refer the House to my entry in the register of interests. I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Alton, on introducing this debate. He has long been a beacon of morality in your Lordships’ House.

I first went to work in Hong Kong in 1961 and I have made numerous visits there over the last 58 years, most recently in May last year. In 1975, when I was a journalist, the Economist sent me to write a survey of Hong Kong, for which I had the most generous guidance from Sir Murray MacLehose. Sir Murray was Hong Kong’s longest-serving, hugely respected and, in the view of many, greatest governor. He served four terms from 1971 to 1982; from 1982 he was, of course, a distinguished member of your Lordships’ House.

I pay tribute also to my noble friend Lord Patten, whose governorship I was able to observe quite closely. Two parts of his legacy are especially relevant. First, during the run-up to the handover, he focused the eyes of the world on Hong Kong. Secondly, he taught the people of Hong Kong how to stand up for themselves.

I refer to Lord MacLehose because, together with Sir Philip Haddon-Cave, the financial secretary, he oversaw the development of Hong Kong from a trading outpost of the British Empire to a flourishing city state. He did so by advocating the interests of Hong Kong in London during the height of the British political struggle between socialism and capitalism. This aspect of the role of the British governor is, I believe, a clue to the cause of the tragic events over the last five months in Hong Kong.

Under the imaginative formula of “one country, two systems”, Hong Kong has for 20 years had a Chief Executive, selected—as the noble Lord, Lord Luce, explained—after some sort of consultation with Hong Kong, but really chosen by Beijing. Unfortunately, each Chief Executive has been perceived by Hong Kongers as representing the interests of Beijing in Hong Kong rather than being an advocate for Hong Kong to the leadership in Beijing. Indeed, Carrie Lam seems to have tried to anticipate what would please Beijing. That seems to be how the disastrous extradition Bill was conceived. The obvious sensitivities should have excluded such a provocative initiative, especially as we gather that it was not initiated by Beijing. When the storm first burst, it should have been withdrawn immediately, instead of which matters have been allowed to drag on and, indeed, deteriorate for some months.

During this period, Beijing has actually been remarkably restrained, and rightly so, in its own interests. I have sympathy also with the Hong Kong police, although they have not behaved perfectly. The initial protests were wholly justified, but the escalation into violence was not. It has become counterproductive to the cause and concerns of the protesters, rather as the actions at Canning Town tube station last week have been for Extinction Rebellion.

Let us face the fact that the “one country, two systems” regime will continue for another 28 years and that this is not likely to mean full democracy for Hong Kong; certainly, it will not mean any form of independence. Beijing was fortunate to inherit the world’s third most important financial centre. For China, that was indeed a treasure. While Shanghai is a world-class commercial centre, it is not under starter’s orders as a global financial centre to replace Hong Kong. There are many reasons for this. Perhaps the most obvious is that the judiciary in China is under the control of the Communist Party and will remain so. The only challenge to Hong Kong’s financial role comes from Singapore.

Mrs Lam should be allowed to retire. China’s leadership—which means President Xi Jinping—should rise to the challenge of appointing a successor who can acquire and maintain the trust and respect of the people of Hong Kong, without forfeiting the confidence of Beijing.

UK Foreign Policy in a Shifting World Order (International Relations Committee Report)

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Tuesday 21st May 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, how lucky the House of Lords is to have had this committee, and how lucky the committee is to have had my noble friend Lord Howell as its first, very distinguished, chair. I intend to focus on just two points on the challenge to the rules-based international order: economic migration and political Islam. First, I want to suggest how this rules-based order needed to come about.

Economic progress and prosperity in much of the world comes, as it always has, from investment in technology advances by entrepreneurs, who have the freedom, opportunity and inclination to take financial risks, with the consequent personal profit from success or loss from failure. It is not a coincidence that the transistor was devised in Bell Labs. The Americans first of all thought that its main use would be in hearing aids. It took Mr Ibuka, who founded Sony, to open the door for the widest use of the transistor. I suppose what I have said is a simple-minded definition of capitalism; of course, in Beijing, it is known as “socialism with Chinese characteristics”.

This progress and prosperity, however, can be threatened by political instability. Political stability requires security, predictability and acceptance by populations of the form of government that they endure—or perhaps, preferably, enjoy. For a century, from the publication of Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations, economic progress was largely generated in Europe, then, after the American civil war, for a magical half-century in the newly formed USA. Europe’s colonial era and the British Empire promoted and sustained world growth, although that was on the back of some shameful exploitation. It was from these challenges that the need arose for a rules-based international order.

The great advances from electronic technology—the digital age—have provided amazing opportunities in the half-century from 1960. As the report suggests, the great benefits also brought high social and political costs. The instant worldwide availability of virtually all information has enriched lives and reduced inequality to an amazing extent. Interpersonal communications, once an expensive luxury for the affluent, are now available at virtually zero marginal cost for most of the world.

However, the arrival of electronically facilitated terrorism has resulted in one of the biggest non-productive, disrupting and destabilising use of resources, for which the opportunity cost has probably been comparable with conventional warfare. The emergence of social media has played a major and almost wholly irresponsible role in fanning the flames of discontent, with the consequent alienation of people from their political leaders and widespread disillusion with the political process.

One disrupting factor has been uncontrolled migration. It was triggered by refugees from the political instability in the Middle East which followed the Arab spring. It has morphed into economic migration, mainly from sub-Saharan Africa, driven by market forces. The attraction for people in poor countries of the much higher standard of living and better opportunities in the developed world, particularly the United States and Europe, has proved irresistible.

It is becoming ever clearer that the EU, with neither the political support nor the capacity to process, let alone absorb, the scale of migration, needs an alternative strategy. I shall mention a proposal for immigration into the EU which I have put forward before: the designation, with a UN mandate authorised by the Security Council, of a large holding area—probably in north Africa—to which refugees could go. There, they could be assessed and helped; some would go home, some would go where they wanted to and some would remain. In the long run, we might even form a new state, which one might call Refugia. I recognise it is a difficult project, but I believe it is well worth trying.

I want to say a word finally about political Islam, which is perhaps the biggest threat today to a rules-based international order. Authoritarian secular government can be far from democracy, but it can morph into democracy. Political Islam aims, through jihad, to replace secular government with theocracy, which is the antithesis of democracy and by definition precludes it. A key thread has been the Muslim Brotherhood. Based on Sunni 18th-century Wahhabi teaching, it was established in Egypt in 1928, and still operates there today; only last week, it blew up a bus full of tourists near the Pyramids.

The Islamist threat met crisis level with the emergence of Islamic State in July 2014, which swept through much of Iraq and Syria. Its declared aim was the eventual replacing of nation states with a world caliphate. ISIS was defeated in March this year after military action, and its leader, al-Baghdadi, remains at large, threatening worldwide vengeance. Building on decades of Wahhabi finance through Saudi Arabia and Qatar, ISIS, with its affiliates, has established a large number of widespread, rapidly growing, highly malignant jihadist tumours which, by penetrating national Governments, are still threatening world peace and prosperity.

Yemen: Humanitarian and Political Situation

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, was Her Majesty’s Government in a position to warn Prince Mohammed bin Salman, then defence Minister, now Crown Prince, how unwise it would be to intervene in this military conflict, for several reasons? The obvious one is that using sophisticated western weapons on their own would never win that war. The only way, as we have seen in Iraq and Syria, is boots on the ground, and the last time there was a major boots-on-the-ground intervention in Yemen was in 1964-66, when Egypt suffered 28,000 casualties.

Secondly, does he realise how undesirable it has been to extend the Sunni-Shia conflict in this way? Thirdly, it is very clear that the humanitarian results have been a disaster. Fourthly, the Statement referred to the ungoverned spaces. Those of us who have been to Yemen know that a large part of the interior of Yemen is ungoverned. The Sanaa Government had control only over the main highways. Finally, does he realise how dangerous it has been for Saudi Arabia itself? It is not unconnected with the recent purge of princes in Saudi Arabia, under the pretext of fighting corruption.

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

My noble friend makes a number of important points. I can assure him on one of the central points that he makes, when he gets to the heart or crux of the challenge and the issue on the ground in Yemen—the protracted dispute and regional rivalries being played out in Yemen. In recent history, the current crisis was exacerbated when the then legitimate Government, who had support, was removed by the rebel Houthis, supported again by other regional players in the area. It is important to recognise, as he says, that, as we have made clear to all parties, including the Saudis, protracted conflict through use of military actions and the restrictions that are being applied will not result in the long-term solution required on the ground, which can be achieved only by all parties coming together. That is what we are emphasising not just through the political solution that we seek through the United Nations but through the work that we are doing with key regional players, including the Emiratis—yes, the Saudis as well—but also the Omanis, in ensuring that through the Quint and the Quad we bring all relevant parties forward towards that political solution.

Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Bill [HL]

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 1st November 2017 Lords Chamber

[The Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for attending the debate and for the useful comments already shared with me and my noble friend Lady Goldie during the meetings we have held since the Bill was introduced. This is an important piece of legislation and we need to get it right.

The United Kingdom has long played a leading role on the global stage in tackling threats to international peace and security. One method of influence increasingly used by the international community is the imposition of sanctions. Sanctions encompass a range of measures, such as travel bans, asset freezes, trade restrictions and broader economic measures. In recent years they have been employed in relation to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the conflict in Syria, and to put pressure on Iran to come to the negotiating table. Anti-money laundering regulations are also increasingly important in this globalised world and vital if the international community is to continue to protect itself from financial crime. The effectiveness of these measures depends on the consistent enforcement of technical and procedural controls mandated by the Financial Action Task Force, an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a founder member.

I shall briefly set the scene as to where we are. The UK currently implements 35 sanctions regimes. These include country-specific regimes, such as those on North Korea, Syria and Iran, and regimes targeting terrorist organisations such as al-Qaeda and Daesh. Within these regimes there are currently around 2,000 individuals, groups and businesses subject to restrictive measures.

In broad terms, the UK implements four main types of sanction regime. The first is based entirely on UN Security Council resolutions. As a member of the UN, the UK is obliged to implement them. Indeed, our position as a permanent member of the Security Council means that we have agreed to those regimes in that forum before they become international law under the UN charter.

The second type of regime is where the EU has acted alone or with allies such as the US, generally where it has not been possible to reach agreement at the United Nations. I shall give an example of the former: after the annexation of Crimea, the UN was unable to impose sanctions on Russia because of Russia’s veto in the Security Council, so the EU decided to act in concert with the United States and other like-minded countries. The third type is hybrid regimes. These are where the EU has adopted UN sanctions but has decided to top up the provisions within those regimes with additional measures. An example of this occurred recently on North Korea. Finally, the UK has some domestic powers to impose sanctions—for example, under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010.

This is a technical Bill which ensures that the UK can continue to meet its international obligations and to implement UK sanctions and anti-money laundering measures after we leave the European Union. New domestic legislation is necessary because most of the UK’s powers to implement sanctions and anti-money laundering measures currently come from the European Communities Act 1972. When the EU withdrawal Act, as the Bill going through the other place will become, repeals the European Communities Act, it will freeze any sanctions regimes which are in force on the day on which the withdrawal Act commences, but we do not possess sufficient powers under current domestic legislation fully to impose, amend and lift existing or new EU UK autonomous sanctions regimes. Similarly, we do not currently possess sufficient domestic legal powers to update anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing legislation after the UK ceases to be a member of the EU. This means that, without this Bill, the UK would quickly be in breach of international law.

Before I go into detail about the content of the Bill, I reassure noble Lords that there has been significant government engagement with individuals and businesses on this domestic framework. In April, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Department for International Trade published a White Paper and launched a public consultation on the UK’s future legal framework for imposing and implementing sanctions. My officials held round tables with a number of sectors including financial services, NGOs and the legal profession, as well as international partners. My right honourable friend Sir Alan Duncan, the Minister for Europe and the Americas, took part in a debate on sanctions in the other place on 19 July. On 2 August, the Government published their response to the consultation. This process had been transparent over the previous six months, and I intend to continue the same level of transparency with noble Lords as the Bill passes through this House.

Turning to the content of the Bill, I emphasise that it is about powers and not policy—it is a technical Bill which creates the legal framework for the UK to be able to continue to impose sanctions where appropriate. Part 1 allows the Government to impose a number of sanctions: financial, trade, transport and immigration. This will allow the UK to maintain the full range of sanctions available at the moment. Part 2 deals with anti-money laundering and counterterrorist financing regimes, and Part 3 deals with general matters such as supplementary provisions and definitions. For each new UK sanctions regime, the Government intend to bring forward a statutory instrument which contains details for that regime.

I know how important it is that we have robust parliamentary scrutiny of these new powers. I also know that the noble Lord, Lord Collins, in particular shares this view. This Bill allows for such scrutiny. Regulations which deal with UN regimes will be made under the negative procedure. Once agreed at the UN Security Council, the UK has an obligation to implement these sanctions under the UN charter. Not doing so would leave the UK in breach of international law. Regimes which both deal with UN obligations and include additional sanctions or hybrid regimes will also be made under the negative procedure. Regulations which do not deal with the UN regimes will be made under the made affirmative procedure. This will allow regimes to come into force immediately, thereby negating the risk that assets are removed before restrictions take effect, while allowing Parliament to debate the regulations.

The vast majority of anti-money laundering regulations will be made using draft affirmative procedures. The one exception to this will be where the UK makes updates to the current EU regulation. This requires enhanced due diligence measures to be applied to persons in countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering regimes. Such updates need to be made quickly, and will be made by using the affirmative procedure. At present, anti-money laundering regulations are transposed into UK law through the negative procedure, so the Bill will increase parliamentary scrutiny.

Risks arising from money laundering and financial crime evolve quickly, as reflected by the Government’s active agenda to address these threats. The Bill therefore provides for the Government to take a sufficiently broad power to ensure that the UK’s anti-money laundering regime remains fit for purpose and is able to respond swiftly to emerging risks. The content of the current money laundering regulations is sufficiently technical that it is better suited for secondary legislation, rather than primary. This is in keeping with the approach typically taken in the UK and elsewhere to establish detailed obligations on the regulated sector.

In some of the meetings that we have held, engagement with noble Lords suggested that the current requirements of the fourth EU money laundering directive should be included in the Bill, and therefore capable of being amended only through primary legislation. I have listened to the discussions we had very carefully but it remains our view that this would dramatically increase the size of the Bill, adding more than 100 new clauses, and would not reflect the rapidly evolving nature of anti-money laundering policy. As many noble Lords will know, the EU is already in the process of amending the fourth money laundering directive, in spite of it being transposed only earlier this year. This demonstrates again the need to act swiftly. Similarly, when a Government of the future need to anticipate or react to new threats, they may wish to create new types of sanctions. It would be remiss of us not to ensure that the Bill was future-proofed so that it remained useful. Regulations which create new sanctions will be exercised through the draft affirmative procedure, thereby allowing Parliament to have a full say.

An important element of the Bill is the threshold for designations. The Bill proposes that, to impose restrictive measures on an individual, a Minister must have “reasonable grounds to suspect” that they are involved in an activity we want to change or prevent. This is the same standard that we currently use when considering designations at the United Nations and the EU. It is broadly equivalent to the “sufficiently solid factual basis” applied by EU courts. The application of this threshold was considered and endorsed by the Supreme Court in the case against Youssef in 2016; it was also considered acceptable by the EU General Court in the case against Mohammed Al-Ghabra, again in 2016, where the court emphasised the need for the threshold to be supported by sufficient evidence.

The importance of a clear threshold of this kind was also underlined by colleagues involved in the European Union Committee’s 11th report of the 2016-17 Session, The Legality of EU Sanctions, an inquiry conducted by its Justice Sub-Committee. Having the same threshold that we currently use when considering designations at the UN and EU will allow us to align with our international partners where our political objectives converge. Sanctions are always best applied by a broad coalition of countries. Working with partners increases the impact of the agreed measures and reduces the compliance burdens on business. I will return to this later.

As set out in our consultation response, the Bill also aligns the threshold for domestic counter-terrorism sanctions to this test of “reasonable grounds to suspect”. This is a change to the current approach under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010, where Treasury Ministers must have “reasonable grounds to believe” that an individual is involved in prohibited activity and that the measure is necessary for the protection of the public. No new designations under the TAFA threshold have been made for two years and a reduced threshold will have a number of benefits. It will bring counterterrorism sanctions in line with other UK financial sanctions regimes, improving the coherence and clarity of our sanctions framework as a whole. It will allow the Government to impose sanctions based on similar levels of evidence to those required by our international partners, ensuring that we can maintain productive international co-operation on this issue. It will also give the Government more flexibility in using asset-freezing tools domestically, and thereby help to mitigate the threat from terrorism.

Noble Lords will be aware of how this threat has changed even in the short time since TAFA was passed. I need not dwell on this matter too long, but terrorists and others who wish us harm can cause significant damage without significant resources. Therefore it is an important point, especially in the light of the foreign fighters flooding back to their own countries, including the United Kingdom, as Daesh is dismantled in Iraq and Syria.

That said, a fine balance must also be struck between keeping our citizens safe—a priority for any Government is the security of their citizens—at the same time as protecting the fundamental rights of individuals. While the threshold for designating individuals for counterterrorism asset freezes may have been lowered by the Bill, the protections and procedural safeguards offered elsewhere are robust and in line with international best practice. Let me highlight two areas.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, just a moment ago the Minister—if I heard him right—said that terrorists are flooding back into the United Kingdom. Is that really what the Government think?

[Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon]

I shall repeat what I said for my noble friend. I said terrorists are flooding back to their places of origin, and of course there are people who may seek to return to the United Kingdom from Iraq and Syria. With the defeat of Daesh, that is a real possibility, so we need to ensure that there are measures both to keep them where they are in terms of prosecution and, if they do return, to ensure that any sanctions that we need are readily available.

I was about to provide practical examples of, first, challenges to designations allowing a route for redress for sanctioned individuals and entities; and, secondly, of reviews of regimes to ensure that the Government conduct due diligence on the restrictive measures they impose. In the Bill, there are two methods by which an individual can challenge their designation. The first allows them to request a reassessment of their listing by the Secretary of State. This is designed to offer quick redress to individuals, enabling those who are incorrectly designated or who can provide evidence which refutes the reason for their designation to be removed from a listing by the Secretary of State with the minimum of delay. If the designation is upheld following the administrative reassessment, individuals can challenge that designation before the High Court on the principles of judicial review. This is the second means of challenge. Provision is included in the Bill to allow for classified evidence to be shared with the court where appropriate. For UN sanctions, which the UK has an obligation to implement under international law, an individual can make a request that the Secretary of State uses his best endeavours to remove that person’s name from the UN list. Were the Secretary of State to decide not to seek a delisting at the UN, the individual can challenge that decision before the High Court.

It is important that the Government review sanction regimes and listings to make sure they remain fit for purpose and up to date. Sanctions are not designed to be punitive or permanent. They are always intended as a temporary measure designed to prevent or change behaviour. Regimes must have a clear purpose. A regular review will ensure that remains the case. The Government will conduct an annual political review of each regime to check that it remains appropriate for its purpose. Every three years the Government will review all the designations under the regime to make sure they remain necessary and continue to meet the evidential threshold. As now, the Government will continue to be able to grant licences to allow activities that would otherwise be prohibited—for example, to allow individuals subject to an asset freeze to pay for their essential needs, such as food or legal fees.

We recognise that there have been criticisms of the current EU licensing system. This was highlighted to me last year when we had to ask the EU to amend the Syrian regime so that general licences could be granted permitting NGOs to provide humanitarian aid and associated support activities. This Bill will give the Government more flexibility to issue such general licences, which will provide more clarity to humanitarian organisations and reduce unnecessary bureaucracy.

I know that many noble Lords will be interested in what impact the new regime will have on business. We recognise that multiple divergent sanction regimes can raise compliance costs for business. This is already an issue on Iran, for example, where the EU and US apply different sanctions. As our impact assessment sets out, we expect the aggregate impact of the Bill on UK businesses to be less than £1 million. Most of these costs will relate to compliance as companies familiarise themselves with the UK regime and related guidance.

In designing and implementing future UK sanctions, we will, wherever possible, work closely with the EU, the United States and other international partners to ensure maximum alignment and to reduce the impact on business. We want to maintain close co-operation on sanctions with European and other international partners because, as I said earlier, they are most effective when delivered by a number of countries together. UN sanctions have global reach and are always our preferred option. Outside the UN, we expect to remain aligned with like-minded partners such as the EU and the US on many of the policy goals that drive sanctions.

For example, we continue to believe that sanctions on Russia must remain until the Minsk agreement has been fully implemented. It is too early to speculate on exactly what future co-operation with the EU will look like, and decisions in this regard will be taken at the appropriate time. As the Prime Minister has said, we are leaving the EU, not Europe. Our aspiration is to remain close to partners on foreign policy issues, as proposed in Foreign Policy, Defence and Development: A Future Partnership Paper, which was published by the Department for Exiting the European Union on 12 September. For now, we remain active in shaping and implementing sanctions within the EU.

In conclusion, this is an important Bill to ensure that a legislative framework is available to the Government to maintain and adjust sanctions and anti-money laundering measures once we have left the European Union. It will allow us to continue to fulfil our international obligations and to work with allies to protect and promote our shared values. I beg to move.

Russia

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Tuesday 31st January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, matters relating to state visits are decided by a committee whose members come from across Whitehall, including of course from No. 10 Downing Street. I am sure that all departments reflect on the success of every single state visit.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, does my noble friend agree that one of the things that international diplomacy should seek is common ground between all these countries? In the case of the United States and Russia—and of course us—one important bit of common ground is fighting ISIS. We can also bring in the other two permanent members of the Security Council, France and China, on that. But apart from the military aspect, the aim should be to ensure secular rather than theocratic Governments. That is the only long-term route to peace.

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, we of course work towards the principle that it is for the people of the country to decide the status of any Government in free and fair elections, which should include votes for every single person qualifying and involve no duress. I would not say that I would ban one particular type of democratic government, if properly chosen. With regard to the unity of the strongest powers in the world—as the P5 at the UN may be defined—it is essential that we find common ground to resolve conflicts. I am delighted that Russia, Turkey and Iran all recognised, at the Astana talks on Syria, the primacy of the UN in resolving those issues.

Turkey: Zaman Newspaper

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Wednesday 9th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Anderson of Swansea (Lab)]

My Lords—

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords—

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I am very sorry that the House requires me to take up valuable time to adjudicate. It is the turn of the Labour Benches and, therefore, of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson.

Daesh in Syria and Iraq

Lord Marlesford Excerpts

Wednesday 16th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

We continue to receive reports on the removal of chemical weapons. I answered a Question about this a little while ago and have also answered a Written Question. We continue to keep that under review, although I am concerned by reports that, in some circumstances, chemical weapons have been used in Syria. It is, therefore, even more important that we have regular inspections and reports. The specific stockpiles to which my noble friend referred have, we are told, been reduced.

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

Given the importance attached by the Government to the International Syria Support Group, which, according to the Foreign Secretary, comprises the major international players, I was rather surprised that there has been no reference to Egypt. Do the Government recognise that Egypt not only is the largest Arab country but has the largest Arab army? President al-Sisi is attempting to introduce into Egypt a secular Government, based on a path to democracy, which is exactly what we would like to see in Syria. What role do the Government see for Egypt in the resolution of these conflicts?

[Baroness Anelay of St Johns]

My Lords, when I met Foreign Minister Shoukry in New York earlier this autumn, my opening words to him were to describe Egypt as a major regional player. It is because of that that the Government take very seriously the importance of engaging with Egypt on how it can play its part in ensuring that Daesh is defeated. All those who take a stand against extremism, or against Daesh, need to work together and that is what we will do.