Crown Prosecution Service

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think I am right in saying that this is the first time the noble Lord, Lord Bach, has been at the Dispatch Box in his new role as Shadow Attorney-General. I want to congratulate him on his appointment to that role. I share his view that the Crown Prosecution Service has performed exceptionally well and has been exceptionally well led in recent times. With regard to his specific question, he is absolutely right to say that there have been a number of large and complex cases, including historic child abuse, violence against women and terrorism matters. CPS officials are working closely with Her Majesty’s Treasury to analyse and manage the impact on the prosecution of the increasing number of large and complex cases to ensure that there are enough resources in place to tackle crime effectively and efficiently. The department will continue to assess and reprioritise resources where possible. Obviously, future funding will be determined as part of the spending review process in the normal way, informed by the analyses which are taking place.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, have the Government yet considered the recommendations of the recent Leveson review on efficiency in criminal proceedings, particularly concerning charging decisions, case ownership involving continuity of prosecution decision-makers and the early instruction of prosecuting counsel, and how these might help the CPS to increase efficiency within its budget? Have the Government also considered Leveson’s recommendation for 12 to 18 months of transitional funding to enable the CPS to implement the review’s proposals?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I think it is fair to say that the Crown Prosecution Service is already doing much to improve efficiency. Obviously, we are well aware of the review undertaken by Lord Justice Leveson. The CPS finds it a very constructive piece of work. I can assure my noble friend that it is being given active consideration by the CPS.

Succession to the Crown Act 2013

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 26th February 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, this issue was raised during our debates. It was indicated that numerous issues would arise with regard to hereditary titles which did specifically arise with regard to the succession to the Crown—and indeed I think my noble friend Lord Lucas has a Private Member’s Bill which has had one day in Committee, where there was an opportunity to debate that issue.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, with the birth of Prince George some of the urgency has gone out of the need to implement Section 1 of the Act. Does my noble and learned friend agree that it is still important, and indeed urgent, to bring Section 2 into force to start to implement the dismantling of the discrimination against Roman Catholics that has been embedded in our constitution and therefore in those of Her Majesty’s other realms for well over 300 years?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I entirely agree with my noble friend. He is right to say that the birth of Prince George has taken away the immediacy of that particular matter, but he is also right to point out that the Act also allows someone in the line of succession to become sovereign to marry a Roman Catholic. It also removes the requirement of the heirs of George II to seek Her Majesty’s approval before they can marry—it will now be confined to first six in line to the throne.

Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 5) Rules 2013

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Monday 29th July 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I fully respect the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, to scrutinise these rules, and I share his view that they are of considerable importance. However, while of course we all accept that these rules ought to be debated, I find this regret Motion and its terms somewhat puzzling.

Along with many others on these Benches, I spoke and voted during the passage of the Justice and Security Bill for amendments that implemented recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, many in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others. However, I also ultimately accepted that with the safeguards we secured, it was better to enable those few cases which otherwise could not be heard at all, because open hearings would jeopardise national security, to be determined using CMPs. Since then, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has pointed out and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, has amplified, we have had the Bank Mellat case with the trenchant criticisms by the Supreme Court that the application was made. However, those criticisms were applicable to the particular circumstances of that case. It is important and significant that the case nevertheless gave the Supreme Court the opportunity to spell out the principles that ought to be applied when the courts are considering closed material proceedings. I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, in welcoming those principles, and with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in seeking clarification that they still apply. For my part, it seems that they can and do apply under these rules. It was interesting to note that the first Section 6 declaration application has been a claimant’s application, thus vindicating in a startling way our important “equality of arms” amendment.

The reason I find the noble Lord’s regret Motion puzzling is that the rules as drafted contain nothing that we would not expect and omit nothing that we would expect, given the Act we passed and the safeguards we built in. I will briefly give one or two examples. The central point of Part 2 of the Act is to permit CMPs to enable security-sensitive material to be used in litigation without compromising national security. The rules provide for a modification of the overriding objective, as has been pointed out, to ensure that information,

“is not disclosed in a way which would be damaging to the interests of national security”.

The court must still deal with cases justly and in accordance with the overriding objective. I suggest that the modification is the minimum necessary to bring the overriding objective in line with the decision of Parliament to enact the legislation. Furthermore, the court is still specifically bound, as the Minister pointed out, by Section 14(2) of the Act to give effect to the fair trial requirements of Article 6.

Earlier today, Liberty circulated a briefing which suggested that the amendment of the overriding objective is,

“an attempt to undo the modest amendments made to section 6 of the Act as it passed through Parliament. Namely Parliament’s insistence that before an application for CMP can be granted, a court must be satisfied that ‘it is in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings to make a declaration’”.

That is simply wrong and I regret that I must disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Beecham. The rules are subordinate. They must be read subject to the statutory second condition which he quoted, that it must be,

“in the interests of the fair and effective administration of justice in the proceedings for a declaration to be made”.

That is a precondition.

Section 7 of the Act requires the court to keep any CMP declaration under Section 6 under review and permits the court to revoke it at any time, and requires it to do so following pre-trial disclosure if it no longer considers the fair and effective administration of justice test to be met. That is a very important safeguard which, as my noble and learned friend pointed out, was achieved in this House. The rules in Section 4 provide the mechanisms for those reviews and implement the safeguard fully and accurately.

Finally, the rules provide a comprehensive code for the involvement of special advocates. They give the court judicial control at every stage to ensure that a specially represented party’s interests are compromised as little as is consistent with national security. This was one of the cardinal demands of those of us who believed that it should be for the court to determine when CMPs should be permitted and how they should be regulated. In particular, a special advocate will be able to apply to the court for directions under Rule 82.11, enabling him to communicate with the specially represented party so far as national security allows.

It is a matter of record that the special advocates opposed this legislation. They did so understandably, because CMPs are contrary to the principles of open justice that lie at the heart of our common law system, in which we hear and test evidence made available to all parties in open court. No one disputed then or disputes now that CMPs represent a derogation from those principles. No one, I suggest, underestimated the significance of the decision we took. In passing the Act, Parliament acted on the basis that it was better for the few cases to which it applied to be determined with CMPs than for them never to be determined at all, which was the alternative.

My central point is that these draft rules do no more than fairly and comprehensively implement the will of Parliament. The special advocates have had an opportunity to comment on the draft rules since 3 June, but they have not done so. For those reasons, I cannot see that the noble Lord’s regret Motion is fair or justified, and I therefore oppose it.

[Lord Bew]

My Lords, I will speak only to the Northern Ireland section of the Motions before the House tonight. I will ask the Minister two questions in the spirit of the remarks that have been made, particularly by my noble friend Lord Pannick, not in opposition in principle to the Minister’s proposals this evening but with a sense that we ought to proceed with great care, caution and circumspection in what is undoubtedly a significant change.

The Minister, in his introductory remarks, referred to consultation between the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, and I was delighted to hear that. However, there is also a question in my mind as to whether there was any consultation with the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission, either by the Lord Chief Justice or through the Lord Chancellor’s office, and just how wide that consultation actually went in Northern Ireland.

My second question very specifically relates to the special advocates, and to vetting procedures for special advocates in Northern Ireland, where I think it is a more difficult matter perhaps than in the rest of the United Kingdom. When the Rules of the Supreme Court (Northern Ireland) (Amendment No. 3) came before this House at the end of January 2009, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Bach, who was then the Minister, about the vetting of special advocates in Northern Ireland. He replied that there was a high level of vetting. He referred to credit checks, checks on criminal convictions and so on—similar to those for a civil servant. The documents that I have received so far, either in that case or in the case of the Motions before the House tonight, refer not at all to the special advocates and the level of vetting. I just want reassurance that it is still regarded as a high level of vetting, given the sensitivity of the matters, which inevitably come under the purview of the special advocates, and I ask whether, in the difficult circumstances of Northern Ireland, that level of vetting is, in fact, sufficiently high.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord and I look forward to hearing further from him on some of the outstanding matters. He may well be right about Part 36 offers—well, of course, he must be right—and that the possible problem that might have existed in relation to costs of a Part 36 application is covered by Rule 36.14, as he says. But of course, that does not leave the party in any better position to assess whether to accept a Part 36 offer. There may not be a cost implication, but he is not in any position to assess the strength or otherwise of a Part 36 offer, which rather distinguishes it from the general case.

I am very grateful to noble Lords who have contributed to the debate, especially to the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Bew, to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, and to the noble Lord, Lord Phillips, who broadly expressed support for the Motion. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, affects not to understand the reason or terms of the amendment. It is really fairly straightforward, I would have thought. The thrust of the argument that I sought to make, in which I was in various ways supported, is that we are seeing the transposition of a set of rules applicable to immigration cases under SIAC to ordinary civil procedure, as I said in opening the debate. That is the thrust of the first part of the amendment.

The second part of the amendment refers to the points made by the special advocates, to which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, chose not to direct his mind at all. I cited a couple of their concerns, but there were others—and I shall quote them, as we are not holding up a debate on the Care Bill by so doing. For example, among the points that they make, they talked about the,

“inability effectively to challenge non-disclosure … The lack of any practical ability to call evidence … The lack of any formal rules of evidence, so allowing second or third hand hearsay to be admitted, or even more remote evidence; frequently with the primary source unattributed and unidentifiable, and invariably unavailable for their evidence to be tested, even in closed proceedings … A systemic problem with prejudicially late disclosure by the Government … the Government's approach of refusing to make such disclosure as is recognised would require to be given until being put to its election, and the practice of iterative disclosure … The increasing practice of serving redacted closed documents on the Special Advocates, and resisting requests by the SAs for production of documents to them … on the basis of the Government’s unilateral view of relevance”.

These were all matters that were raised, and none of them appears to have been dealt with—

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

Does the noble Lord accept the point that I was making, that the special advocates’ objections went to the legislation and were considered by Parliament during the passage of the legislation? The special advocates have not objected to these rules as implementing the legislation. If that is right, that is the query that I raise about the point of this regret Motion, which is directed to the rules in particular.

[Lord Beecham]

But the points that the special advocates have raised go to the process, which is the subject of these rules. The points that I have made could and should have been taken into account in the drafting of the rules to implement this procedure other than simply on the basis of applying to these circumstances of civil claims the rules that apply in entirely different and non-analogous circumstances of special immigration appeals.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 26th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, for the convenience of the House, I will speak also to the other amendments in this group. The Government have listened to concerns expressed in this House and elsewhere about transparency, particularly around the new closed material proceedings provisions. I know that several Members of your Lordships’ House expressed frustration at the lack of information available about how many CMPs take place.

The Government have accepted that the unusual nature of CMPs means that there would be significant public and parliamentary interest in more information about how the provisions in this Bill will operate. A strong view was expressed in this House, although no amendments to the Bill were passed, that reporting and review arrangements would be valuable safeguards.

The Government have brought forward amendments that address these concerns. We decided to adopt the expert view of the Constitution Committee by providing for annual reporting to Parliament and for a review of the CMP provisions under this Bill to be conducted five years after Royal Assent. The Joint Committee on Human Rights also made similar recommendations.

Given the often lengthy nature of litigation, with cases often lasting more than a year and sometimes several years, we believe that the frequency of review under these provisions allows for regular but meaningful reporting and for a review to be informed by enough cases to provide for substantiated conclusions and reasoned recommendations where necessary.

An annual report is the most proportionate approach. We expect that the CMP provisions in the Bill will be used rarely. More frequent reports may contain too few data to be meaningful. Annual reports will not, however, be the only way in which facts relating to cases involving CMPs will be made public during the reporting period. The Government made an amendment when the Bill was last considered by this House to ensure that where an application is made under Clause 6(2), that fact must be reported to the other parties in proceedings; and there are already existing mechanisms by which the courts publish their open judgments and the media report on cases of interest to the public.

The reports will focus on the volume of cases and applications. The amendment lists the matters of key concern to be included in the annual report as: the number of applications for a CMP declaration and by whom the applications are made; the number of declarations and revocations made by the court; and the number of judgments published, both open and closed, with respect to the determination of Section 6 proceedings—this would include judgments made on the substantive trial and judgments made regarding the outcome of the application for a CMP declaration. The reporting arrangements will also cover “deemed” Section 6 proceedings or those treated as Section 6 proceedings.

In addition to an annual reporting requirement, the Government have introduced provisions for a comprehensive review of the operation of the CMP provisions in this Bill after five years, conducted by an independent figure and with a report made to Parliament. We expect such a review to take into account the views of special advocates, among others; to consider efficiency, trends and types of case; and to analyse the numbers provided in the annual reports to reflect on how CMPs are being used. The reviewer will have to take care not to comment on judicial decisions or on how the judge has run particular cases.

In line with most other legislation, this clause provides for the appointment of the reviewer by the Secretary of State. Amendment 19A in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks would require consultation first with the Lord Chief Justices and the Lord President of the Court of Session. We do not believe that such consultation is necessary for a reviewer or commissioner to be independent or to be perceived as being independent, as has been repeatedly shown by the independence displayed by Mr David Anderson QC and other independent reviewers and commissioners. David Anderson has been clear about his views on this Bill, for example, and has been influential in persuading the Government to change their position on a number of issues. Such appointments are now subject to a statutory code for public appointments to ensure that they are undertaken transparently and on merit. This should provide reassurance that the person with the right skills and background will be appointed.

It has also been suggested that a review after a shorter period of time would be better. My noble friend’s Amendment 19B would reduce this period from five to four years, which I note seeks to ensure that the sunsetting provision follows consideration of the reviewer’s report. I believe that given how long litigation can take and the small number of cases expected, five years is the right period for there to be enough evidence for a review meaningfully to draw upon.

Amendment 19C would require a further review every five years. In its report, the Constitution Committee said the House may wish to consider the Bill being independently reviewed five years after it comes into force. We have followed that recommendation. Any reviews should be focused where there is proper justification for them, and they should be proportionate.

We should remember that judges have full discretion over whether to grant a CMP, whether to revoke it at any point in a case, whether they agree with the Secretary of State’s assessment of national security damage, how material should be treated within the CMP, effective management of the case, whether a CMP should continue, and in deciding the outcome. There have also been some suggestions that the unusual nature of the CMP provisions means that a sunset clause would be appropriate. This would allow Parliament the opportunity to revisit the need for the provisions in the Bill once they had been operating for a while. The Joint Committee on Human Rights recommended such a provision but the Constitution Committee did not.

Amendment 19D in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks and Amendment 19E, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, seek to introduce a sunset and renewal clause for the new CMP provisions, requiring renewal every five years. My noble friend’s amendment provides for a renewal order to follow completion of the reviewer’s report. His amendment makes it clear that the CMP provisions would cease to take effect except relating to proceedings where a declaration had already been made, thereby not interrupting ongoing cases.

I point out to noble Lords that the effect of this amendment would also be to disrupt the Norwich Pharmacal clauses in the Bill that are intended to bring clarity to the Norwich Pharmacal jurisdiction when sensitive information is involved and to provide reassurance to intelligence-sharing partners, a point that was made in the previous debate by the noble Lord, Lord Owen. Although such a clause would apply to the new CMP Clauses 6 to 10 of the Bill, it would also affect proceedings connected to Norwich Pharmacal, both those where the Secretary of State would need to apply for a CMP and the reviews of certificates issued by the Secretary of State under the Norwich Pharmacal clauses. These proceedings are deemed to be Section 6 proceedings because the case needs to be heard in a closed material procedure to ensure that the outcome of the proceedings is not prejudiced by having already publicly disclosed the very information with which the proceedings are concerned.

Such a sunset clause would undermine the purpose of the Bill and unnecessarily so. Both Houses have agreed that there is a gap in the law, that there are circumstances where a judge may decide that a CMP is preferable, that claimants’ cases must sometimes automatically fail without a CMP and that the judge should have a CMP in his toolkit. Given the wide discretion that we have given the judge about when the provisions should be used, I do not know why we would then want to remove CMPs from the judge’s toolkit.

As I have said, the Bill provides for the procedures of the court over which the judge has discretion and not the exercise of controls by the Executive. I reinforce the point, made in an earlier debate, that international partners have expressed concerns regarding the United Kingdom’s ability to protect sensitive information shared with the United Kingdom in cases where claimants are making allegations against the state and its defence rests on national security material. We risk further undermining the confidence that partners have to share information with us if they feel that we do not have secure processes in place to protect their material while defending government actions. We fear that a sunset clause would introduce unnecessary uncertainty.

As I indicated before, the Constitution Committee did not recommend a sunset clause. In its report it said that the House may wish to consider the Bill being independently reviewed, but not renewed, five years after it comes into force; or rather it did not recommend renewal. The Government have accepted the Constitution Committee’s recommendations, and believe that the report and review provisions are sufficient to provide reassurance about how CMPs are used. I therefore beg to move that the House agrees with the Commons in their amendments.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 19A to 19D in my name as amendments to Amendment 19, concerning review and renewal of the operation of CMPs in the legislation.

In the other place, as my noble and learned friend has explained, the Government conceded that the operation of Clauses 6 to 10 of the Bill should be the subject of a review after five years of the Bill’s operation. That is the effect of Amendment 19. As far as they go, the provisions of the amendment are welcome. They were introduced against the background of the recommendation of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in each of its two reports in November last year and February this year that the operation of Part 2 of the Bill should be subject to annual renewal. This amendment not only fails to meet that recommendation but, as it stands, has a number of significant weaknesses that make it frankly unfit for its purpose.

First, proposed new subsection (1) requires the Secretary of State on his or her own to appoint the reviewer. Yet one of the central complaints about the Bill, as my noble friend Lord Macdonald pointed out earlier, is that in practice it gives too much power to the state and to the Secretary of State in particular. The concerns focus not only on the degree to which the Bill sacrifices common-law principles of fairness and open justice but also on the relationship between the Secretary of State and the courts. That remains true notwithstanding the concessions, important though they are, that there have been on judicial discretion and equality of arms.

The Bill undoubtedly accords to the Secretary of State significant new power to influence how trials of some civil cases may be conducted. How the Secretary of State exercises that power and whether it is found in the light of experience to be either excessive or unnecessary will be fundamental questions for the reviewer to address.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

19B: Line 6, leave out “five” and insert “four”

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

I have not moved Amendment 19A, but Amendments 19B to 19D, as a suite, on the principle of renewal, are extremely important. In those circumstances, I do not accept the argument put by the noble Lord, Lord Butler. I cannot believe that it is beyond the wit of man to produce, in this legislation, a very clear signal that a review of certificates on Norwich Pharmacal proceedings can proceed without impairing the renewal amendment. In those circumstances, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Succession to the Crown Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 13th March 2013 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Guildford]

My Lords, my contribution to the debate on the amendment in the name of my good friend the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, will be somewhat technical, because I speak as one who has been much involved in the official Anglican-Roman Catholic dialogue since 1974. From time to time the Roman Catholic position on the children of so-called mixed marriages has arisen, and has been discussed in some detail, including the work of a special commission on that subject. I also declare an interest as a patron of the Association of Interchurch Families, and I have some modest understanding of both Anglican and Roman Catholic canon law.

The Government, through the Minister and in other ways, have very fairly, in my considered judgment, set out accurately the Roman Catholic position. We are also helped by the Archbishop of Westminster’s statement in this respect. According to Roman Catholic canon law, giving permission for a so-called mixed marriage is not a Vatican matter but one for what is called the local Ordinary: that is, the local bishop.

At the risk of a little canonical history, I must draw your Lordships’ attention to three documents and practice. In the old rules of the Roman Catholic Church on this subject, in the shape of the Code of Canon Law of 1917, the position was rigid and, I would say, harsh. This is no longer the case. The present code of 1983 speaks of “permission”, not “dispensation”. The old code also required the non-Catholic party in a marriage to promise that the children would be brought up as Roman Catholics. No such promise is required today. The Roman Catholic partner is asked to declare that they will do all in their power to ensure that any children are brought up as Roman Catholics, yet no sanction is applied to the canon, whereas the old code made the bishop’s dispensation for a mixed marriage dependent on the bishop’s moral certainty about the Catholic upbringing of the children. This is not the case now.

I will also touch briefly on practice in a more pragmatic way. Permissions for mixed marriages have been given even where it was foreseen that the promise could not be fulfilled in whole or in part. In making these points, I rely not only on my own past discussions of these questions over many years with officials, bishops, theologians and canonists of the Roman Catholic Church but on the authoritative interpretation of present Roman Catholic canon law offered in a magisterial commentary of no less that 1,952 pages published in 2000 by the Canon Law Society of America. It is the standard textbook in the English-speaking world.

Interestingly, on the question of the upbringing of children in these circumstances, the Roman Catholic canon lawyers quote the official Vatican ecumenical directory of 1993, which clearly indicates that the promise may not be expected to be completely fulfilled, or fulfilled at all, in every case. It states that a Roman Catholic partner can ecumenically fulfil their obligations as a faithful Catholic, short of insisting on the Roman Catholic formation of the children, because the unity of the marriage is more important. The Vatican document, quoted by the canon lawyers, speaks of the Catholic partner as,

“playing an active part in contributing to the Christian atmosphere of the home; doing all that is possible by word and example to enable the other members of the family to appreciate the specific values of the Catholic tradition; taking whatever steps are necessary to be informed about his own faith so as to be able to explain and discuss it with them”,

and–—this is the important bit ecumenically—

“praying with the family for the grace of Christian unity as the Lord wills it”.

In my judgment, this officially bears out the Government’s assurance that the Roman Catholic rules are not a block to the smooth functioning of the proposed succession rules.

I acknowledge that we are all conscious of the importance of avoiding all ambiguity for the future. I think that that ambiguity prompted a number of the amendments that we will debate today. Whether an assurance is given in the Bill, or whether it can be given now by the Minister or at a further stage of the Bill’s proceedings, I am sure that your Lordships’ House would wish all such possible ambiguity to be avoided for the future in the matter of the royal succession.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I oppose my noble friend’s amendment. I fully understand the Government’s decision not to use the Bill to remove the disqualification of a Catholic becoming the sovereign. However, I and others believe that the question should be revisited at some stage in the not too distant future because it is discriminatory and unnecessary. While I understand the arguments put by the noble Baroness, Lady Flather, that the Catholic Church needs further reformation in places, they do not justify a discriminatory provision. I say that even in the context of the established church, for the reasons so eloquently advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Deben, at earlier stages of the Bill.

It is my suggestion that the principle that we should adopt is that the discrimination involved in providing that the sovereign must be an Anglican should be restricted to the absolute minimum. That is why, on principle, I oppose the amendment. But quite apart from the principle, my noble friend’s amendment, and, I suggest, anything like it, would be quite unworkable. The present position is that marriage to a Catholic imposes a disqualification on an heir succeeding to the Crown. That is clear and simple. Clause 2 removes that disqualification entirely. Marriage to a Catholic does not disqualify anyone from succeeding to the Crown. An heir or a monarch can marry a Catholic without losing his right to the succession or to the Crown. That is clear and simple, again. But my noble friend’s amendment would import a proviso into that clear and simple proposal. There would be no disqualification, provided that the statutory requirement that any child of such a marriage is brought up as an Anglican was maintained.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Guildford explained that the statutory or canonical requirement is very much weaker in principle and in practice than my noble friend’s amendment suggests. Furthermore, the amendment poses another problem: how would it be determined that such a requirement, if indeed it were established, was being maintained? Who would decide whether that requirement was being maintained? When, at what point in time, would the requirement need to be maintained, and when would it cease to be maintained? Furthermore, what exactly is meant by being brought up as an Anglican? By what process would a disqualification be imposed on someone in line of succession to the Throne if it were felt that the proviso was not being fulfilled and a given child was ceasing to be brought up as an Anglican? To take an extreme example, what if the child of the heir to the Throne and his or her Catholic spouse, having been brought up as an Anglican, chose to espouse Buddhism while at school?

The problems are endless. I appreciate that my noble friend who moved the amendment did not suggest that it was this wording or nothing, but when you look for an alternative wording, the concepts are so fluid that they necessarily import an uncertainty and ambiguity that would be thoroughly undesirable. For that reason, I suggest that the Bill should remain unamended.

[Lord Fellowes]

My Lords, I find myself in something of a dilemma in speaking briefly to support this amendment. I support both the amendment as presently worded and the measures behind it. I still believe that the sooner that we have greater clarity and more explicit commitment from the Roman Catholic Church as to its determination to respect the rule governing the upbringing of the heir to the Throne, the better. That said, were this amendment to be pressed and passed it might well raise the spectre of the reopening of negotiations with the other 15 Governments of Her Majesty’s realms, and that I believe to be undesirable.

I prefer to regard this as a constructive and helpful probing amendment which makes explicit what is at present implicit in the Bill. As such, it sends the right message even if withdrawn. If it is not withdrawn and comes to a vote, I will support it, with some misgivings.

Succession to the Crown Bill

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Thursday 14th February 2013 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, may I say how much I welcome this Bill on behalf of these Benches and on my own behalf? Our present law, whereby an elder daughter is displaced as heir to the Throne by the birth of her younger brother is an affront to women throughout this nation and the Commonwealth. Of itself, it damages the identification between the monarchy and the people, particularly women, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, movingly pointed out. I am delighted that we are to change it. It is also a great tribute to the Commonwealth as an institution that we are legislating for this change in a co-ordinated way in all 16 of Her Majesty’s realms.

Perhaps I may address for a moment the important constitutional point made by the noble Lord, Lord James of Blackheath, who has explained why he believes that this Bill is a breach of Her Majesty’s coronation oath and therefore, for us, a breach of our oaths of allegiance. As I understand his argument, he believes that because the Declaration of Rights in 1688 obliges the monarch to reject Roman Catholicism, it follows that she would be in breach of her oath by assenting to this Bill. In my view, the noble Lord’s argument gives insufficient weight to the doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament and to the general rule that Parliament cannot bind its successors. The Declaration of Rights, made on the arrival of Prince William and Princess Mary in the kingdom, did not of itself have the force of law, as has been pointed out. It was enacted as an Act of Parliament as the Bill of Rights in 1689 and has been an important part of our constitutional settlement ever since. It is true that it was expressed as intended to remain the law of this realm for ever. However, the doctrine that Parliament cannot bind its successors was already well established by the late 17th century. In fact, the Bill of Rights has already been amended on a number of occasions. In the context of this Bill, the most notable amendment was made by the Act of Settlement 1700, just a decade or so after the Bill of Rights—

[Lord James of Blackheath]

My Lords, I had anticipated the argument concerning the alteration of the Declaration of Rights, but I think that the only occasion on which it has ever actually been amended was in 1825 when it was found that there were insufficient jurors available to fulfil the obligation to run the courts. On that occasion the threshold for serving on a jury was reduced to include £10 rental holders. Nothing else has been done.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I am afraid that I disagree with the noble Lord because the Act of Settlement expressly changed the line of succession by introducing the Electress of Hanover, who was a granddaughter of James I and the mother of George I, into the succession just 10 years or so after the Bill of Rights was passed. A further amendment to the Bill of Rights was unwittingly mentioned by the noble Lord in the form of the Accession Declaration Act 1910 which brought in the very declaration he has read out to noble Lords. It changed the coronation oath which had been prescribed by the Bill of Rights. The present declaration, which he read out, reflects the present position: the sovereign promises to uphold only the enactments that procure the Protestant succession to the Throne. There is nothing inconsistent in this Bill with that declaration, and I have absolutely no doubt that this Parliament is as entitled to enact this Bill now as was the Parliament convened in 1689 to enact the Bill of Rights.

Perhaps I may mention the arrangements made for succession in the other royal houses of Europe. The position is as follows. Belgium, Denmark, Luxembourg, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands all adhere to equal primogeniture, with no male preference. Indeed, in Sweden the heiress apparent is a woman, Crown Princess Victoria, who will become Queen of Sweden in due course. She was born in 1977 as the eldest child of King Carl Gustav. Her younger brother Carl was born in 1979, and Princess Victoria only became heiress apparent again in 1980 as the result of a similar change in the law to that which we are enacting now. I suggest that this demonstrates that it is plainly preferable to make such a change as this in advance, if we can.

Only Monaco and Spain have male-preference primogeniture as we do at present, although in Monaco the next in line is actually a woman, Prince Albert’s elder sister, because Prince Albert has, as yet, no legitimate children. Spain also plans to change its rules of succession in the same way as we are now. This will entail a constitutional amendment which needs to be passed by both Spanish Houses of Parliament with a two-thirds majority in each House, and then it would be put to a referendum. This has not happened yet, perhaps owing to the requirement in Spain that when a major constitutional change is passed, Parliament must be dissolved and new elections called. However, the proposed change in the law enjoys widespread public support in Spain, notwithstanding the difficulty caused by the fact that Juan Carlos’s two eldest children are women, and it is their younger brother who is currently his heir.

Without getting too technical, Liechtenstein has an old system of succession called agnatic primogeniture which completely excludes women from the order of succession. This was specifically criticised by a United Nations committee looking at gender equality in 2007. Luxembourg used the same system until June 2011, when equal primogeniture was introduced. As here, this change made no difference to the immediate order of succession, so Luxembourg is a good example of a country which has reformed its rules even more significantly than we are doing now. All this goes to show that the present succession arrangements for our monarchy and our Commonwealth are well behind the times.

I also welcome the end of the ban on the monarch and his or her heirs to the Throne marrying Roman Catholics. One can see that the monarch’s position as Supreme Governor of the Church of England suggests, even if it does not dictate, certainly for the time being, that he or she must be a Protestant. However, there can be no justification for any religious discrimination going beyond that requirement, and the Bill rightly gives effect to that principle. Clearly, marriage to a Catholic would present a monarch or an heir to the Throne with a stark choice, a difficulty even, in respect of the children. However, my view is that the approach of my noble friend Lord Lang of Monkton sacrifices the principles of tolerance and understanding that are enshrined in this Bill on the rather hard altar of certainty and stability, as he put it. For myself, I prefer the approach of the noble Lords, Lord Luce and Lord Janvrin, which I believe may in time lead to an accommodation being reached on this issue. I have to say that the intervention of my noble friend Lady Falkner on my noble friend Lord Lexden raised an interesting point. She pointed out that there is no bar to the monarch being married to a Muslim and that there are similar rules for Muslims on the upbringing of the children of such a marriage as there are for marriages between Protestants and Catholics. Exactly the same issues would arise with such a marriage as would arise with a marriage to a Catholic. That simply highlights the anomalies of the present rules, the fact that they are rooted in history, and the need for these changes to help our country to continue to evolve in a tolerant and non-discriminatory way.

Before I finish, perhaps I may also say what a pleasure it is for those of us who value the continuation of this United Kingdom to see such a distinguished Scottish law officer as my noble and learned friend the Lord Advocate steering this important constitutional measure through your Lordships’ House.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Wednesday 21st November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wigley]

I want to speak very briefly to Amendment 48, which has been grouped with these amendments. I do not accept that this tips the balance, as the noble Baroness suggested just a moment ago.

One of the most unsettling provisions of this Bill is contained in Clause 7, which provides that if a Closed Material Procedure is triggered, a court is not required to give the excluded party a summary of the closed material. Rather, the legislation, as drafted, requires only that the court should consider requiring such a summary to be given. In any case, Clause 7(1)(e) provides that the court must ensure that, where a summary is given, it does not contain material, the disclosure of which would be against the interests of national security.

If this clause goes through unamended, there will be no requirement to give excluded parties sufficient information about the case against them so that they can give instructions to their special advocate. Surely this is wrong, otherwise people could lose cases without being told any of the reasons why, which is an unacceptable situation in circumstances where the national security is not at stake.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, I start by paying tribute to the Joint Committee on Human Rights for the very important work it put into producing the thorough and excellent report that gave rise to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others.

The first question to be addressed in considering the introduction of CMPs to ordinary civil proceedings is whether the Government have in any way made out a case for their necessity. That is a matter upon which, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out, the Joint Committee found itself unpersuaded. However, if there are 20 such cases now, as figures recently released by my noble and learned friend the Advocate General for Scotland state, as well as the obvious prospect of an increasing number in the future, as the fact that the Government are a soft target for such cases becomes well known, that is a significant number, if a small one. In such cases, because the evidence has to be withheld altogether for the protection of national security—and it is worth reminding ourselves that that is what PII does—there can at present be no determination at all, and therefore no justice. That lack of justice has to be weighed against the damage that would be done to our civil justice system by the extension of CMPs to certain civil claims. CMPs are, as has been said, inherently unfair. They represent a serious departure from open justice, because the evidence cannot be tested by cross-examination in the ordinary way: by advocates acting on the instructions of their clients, who themselves have a full opportunity to know and meet the case against them. CMPs, therefore, represent a justice that is flawed. For my part, I think that to choose to have no determination at all in these cases, and to prefer no justice to flawed justice, would be the better choice, unless the safeguards for CMPs proposed by the Joint Committee are in place.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames Excerpts

Tuesday 6th November 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I certainly agree with the noble Lord that these proposals are controversial, difficult and complex. Indeed, they have already been the subject of much debate in your Lordships’ House. As I indicated, the Government believe that they are compatible with Article 6. Upon introduction of the Bill, I signed a statement that its provisions are compatible, and the Government have published their own summary of the human rights issues in the Bill, which we gave to the Joint Committee on Human Rights and which has been published. The definition of national security was debated in your Lordships’ House in Committee, and there are many reasons as to why national security is not defined in many statutes. The noble Lord asked if there will be a further opportunity for discussion. Indeed, there will be such an opportunity because the future business set down for the House indicates that the Report stage will be held on the 19th and 21st of this month. I anticipate some informed and robust discussions during those debates.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General will no doubt agree that the opinion of John Howell QC obtained by the commission needs to be taken seriously. Have the Government yet had time to consider how far amendment of the Bill might address the thrust of the criticisms he advances—in particular, by ensuring that its impact is strictly limited to material that would otherwise be subject to public interest immunity and to cases where otherwise no trial at all would be possible, and by giving claimants as well as the Government the right to have such material considered by a court, with the assistance of a special advocate?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I can certainly assure my noble friend that the Government give serious attention to representations from the Equality and Human Rights Commission and to this particular opinion, as I have indicated. There is a good response to the two key concerns that have been raised. It is the Secretary of State who applies for the CMP, but it is nevertheless the courts which decide whether to grant a declaration and, thereafter, which material will be heard in closed proceedings. With regard to criticism of the standard of gisting, we believe, as we said in Committee, that following the judgment in the Tariq case the Supreme Court found that the requirement of fairness can vary from case to case. The Bill states that closed material proceedings must comply with Article 6, when it applies, and we leave it to the courts to decide what Article 6 requires in any case. I am grateful for the constructive proposal of my noble friend. He will be aware that as well as considering seriously the opinion of the ECHRC, we will also consider the comments made in Committee, and I think we will receive before Report stage the report from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I certainly look forward to giving that the consideration it deserves.