Judicial Review and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is always a great pleasure to follow the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. He told me yesterday that he would speak briefly, but he says in a brief moment what most of us would take a great deal longer to say. It has been a fascinating debate, enlivened by the returning maiden speech of the noble Lord, Lord Hacking —at once entertaining and instructive—as well as by the powerful speeches of the many noble Lords who have spoken. However, I believe that the significance of this important Bill has been underplayed by the Government. The Minister described the provisions in Part 1 as just sensible tidying-up measures; additions to the judicial toolbox, as he put it. It is on those that I will concentrate.
It is not always easy to express concerns that reflect not only what a Bill actually says but, just as much, what it might lead to—its direction of travel. However, we on these Benches have always been concerned that the Government do not like JR, that they see it as an unwarranted interference with the Government’s right to govern, and that they resent the courts stepping in to constrain government action on grounds of unlawfulness. We saw that in the two Miller cases, over triggering Article 50 without parliamentary authority and the unlawful prorogation—the latter mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and both objected to in round terms by the noble Lord, Lord Howard.
For us, the rule of law is paramount and, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Howard, that generally means the law as passed by Parliament. When the Administration exceed their powers and get it wrong, the citizen is entitled to have the error put right, and, most importantly, so are others who have in the past been affected by the same error. We saw considerable risk in the Conservative manifesto commitment to ensure
“that judicial review is available to protect the rights of individuals against an overbearing state, while ensuring that it is not abused to conduct politics by another means or to create needless delays.”
It was that commitment that led to the Faulks review, specifically tasked to consider what powers should or should not be justiciable. To the credit of the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, who has spoken eloquently today, he and his panel produced a careful and well-balanced report, which effectively gave judicial review a clean bill of health, but recommended that the court should have the power to suspend the operation of quashing orders and the ending of Cart JRs—hence Part 1 of this Bill.
The Clause 1 power should be limited to suspending the operation of quashing orders to enable the Government or other authority to put defective decisions right before a quashing order takes effect. The argument goes that it is unnecessary and sometimes unjust for the court to have to resort to the somewhat blunt instrument of a quashing order when the authority could, and should, instead be given the opportunity to put right its flawed decision first.
Along with the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, we would not in principle oppose that possibility. There is nothing wrong in principle with the High Court, on judicial review and on finding that an authority has acted unlawfully, having the power to give that authority an opportunity to correct the unlawfulness rather than quashing the decision altogether. But the power of suspension in the Bill is more extensive than that, as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, pointed out.
Clause 1 goes much further. It is entirely retrograde to propose that a quashing order may remove or limit the retrospective effect of a quashing, and it is not just an option, as my noble friend Lord Beith and others pointed out. New subsection (9) imposes an obligation on the court to suspend a quashing order and remove or limit its retrospective effect if the modified order offers what the Bill styles “adequate redress”. The court must then exercise its powers to suspend and remove or limit retrospective effect. Yes, there is a qualifier, in the words,
“unless it sees good reason not to do so”,
but that does not relieve the court of its proposed primary obligation—a point made by numbers of noble Lords. As the noble Baroness, Lady Whitaker, argued, the Bill fetters judicial discretion. I fear that the agnosticism of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, on this wording is overoptimistic.
I see the danger that the effect of a JR may, in time, come to be limited to the immediate complainant, and that others affected by past unlawful action will not be able to bring cases arising out of their unlawful treatment. They will be too late to bring JR proceedings of their own, but it may become too easy for Governments to say: “It’s too late to change it now. It’s water under the bridge. There are too many people potentially affected. It would be too expensive to give them all relief”. Let us consider a small unlawful charge levied by a department which may affect a wide class of people, most of whom will have no idea of the unlawfulness. How far would the court, now or in the future, decline to make a quashing order retrospective in those circumstances—a point persuasively made by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford? The concern is that this legislation could be—or could become—a dangerous shield for unlawful action. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, expressed similar concerns about the future.
Turning to Clause 2, the proposal to do away with Cart JRs, the Government’s argument is that a JR by a divisional court of the High Court to set aside a decision of the Upper Tribunal, generally also presided over by a High Court judge, is irrational, unnecessary and also wasteful of resources, because it is, or should be, a last resort and rarely ever used successfully—a success rate of 0.22% was originally quoted, now revised to 3%-plus.
As against the Government’s argument, the overwhelming majority of Cart JRs—some 92%—are immigration and asylum cases. The stakes are often very high: deportation is frequently involved, often to very hostile countries where there is a serious risk of torture or maltreatment, as mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Hacking. There is no exception in the Bill for such cases, and the cases that give rise to Cart JRs are often paradigms of circumstances that affect hundreds of other cases, so a low number of successful JRs may have a disproportionately broad effect.
The low success rate of Cart JRs is unsurprising, but the overwhelming majority of cases are weeded out as hopeless at the permission stage on the papers. Large numbers of others are either settled by the Government or reheard by the Upper Tribunal by agreement. The proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, to limit the process deserves serious consideration, but with this provision and its dangers, as so often, the sting is in the drafting. My noble friend Lord Thomas mentioned new subsection (2), which states:
“The decision is final, and not liable to be questioned or set aside in any other court.”
New subsection (3) says:
“In particular … the Upper Tribunal is not to be regarded as having exceeded its powers by reason of any error made in reaching the decision”—
any error. The exceptions in new subsection (4) cover a tribunal acting “in bad faith” or
“in such a procedurally defective way as amounts to a fundamental breach of … natural justice.”
But what is fundamental in this context, and does the exception cover a tribunal acting in a way which is tainted by apparent bias—that is, where although not actually biased, a fair-minded and informed observer might well believe that the decision was influenced by bias?
I believe this is an ouster clause, pure and simple—the effect of which, bluntly, is to put government above the law. In that, I disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst. I say that in particular because of the precedent it sets. I suggest to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, who made some very powerful points, that we should avoid complacency about the puniness of the Bill.
In a Cart JR, the impugned decision is that of an Upper Tribunal chairman, often a High Court judge, and the abolition of review of such a decision may be of restricted effect. But the danger is far wider. As my noble friend Lord Beith pointed out, the Government’s press release stated, chillingly, that
“the legal text that removes the Cart judgment will serve as a framework that can be replicated in other legislation.”
In other words, the Government intend to use the wording in subsections (2) and (3) as a template to outlaw judicial review in other legislation when they do not want the courts to interfere with their legislative purpose. That is a threat of a direct and permanent attack on the rule of law. It was not foreshadowed, still less sanctioned, by the report of the Faulks review. It should be a cause of grave concern to this House.
I have spent some time on JR, and I will not spend time considering the other parts of the Bill. We broadly support the modernisation proposals in it. We are determined to see that the move to greater use of online procedures maintains protection of those who are digitally excluded for whatever reason, be that lack of equipment, of broadband or of digital skills. We appreciate the Minister’s assurances in that regard given today, and to me in a meeting the other day, for which I was grateful.
My noble friend Lord Beith has voiced concern about the proposals for coroners’ proceedings. We have other concerns about a number of other details in the Bill, but I look forward to coming to those in Committee.