Criminal Justice and Courts Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateLord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
Main Page: Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (Liberal Democrat - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(9 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 6 is an extremely modest amendment. Your Lordships will appreciate that Clause 7(3) permits the Secretary of State to make electronic monitoring conditions compulsory. I spoke on this issue in Committee, arguing that the imposition of an electronic monitoring condition should remain a matter for the court. I argued that the power to impose such a condition on a prisoner’s release on licence was, indeed, a desirable and sensible power, and that such a condition should be imposed where appropriate. However, I also argued that there may be circumstances in which it would be impractical or unnecessary to impose such a condition, for example where an offender was disabled or was to be hospitalised upon release.
In response to my amendment, my noble friend Lord Ahmad said that he was aware of the concerns that physical or mental health issues or possible practical problems might make compulsory electronic monitoring conditions unsuitable. My noble friend also gave, as an example of impracticality, a case where arrangements could not be made for recharging the battery in the tag—he was right to do so and there may be many other examples of impracticality. However, my noble friend contended that there was flexibility in the order-making power under the subsection that would enable these cases to be taken into account. I am concerned about that. My noble friend said that the Secretary of State would be able to,
“provide for cases in which the compulsory condition should not apply”.—[Official Report, 14/7/14; col. 402.]
I regret that I do not read the clause in that way. While there would, under subsection (3)(3)(b), be power to make provision in relation to persons selected on the basis of criteria specified in the order or on a sampling basis, that is not the same as enabling cases to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis.
The amendment would, quite simply, enable the Secretary of State to incorporate into the order a small element of judicial discretion, whereby, in a given case, a court could decline to make an electronic monitoring condition if it considered it would be unjust, unnecessary or impractical to do so. It would be for the Secretary of State to decide whether to incorporate such provision as I suggest in the order he makes. For that reason, I reiterate that my amendment is modest and limited. It is intended to be helpful. I beg to move.
My Lords, I want to speak in favour of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, but to slightly widen the point that he made. It is my understanding that if one gives a suspended sentence when sentencing and includes, as a part of that, a curfew, then the court is obliged to provide that the curfew is tagged. Very often that is appropriate, but not always. I have certainly dealt with cases where it was totally unnecessary to tag the offenders concerned and it just added to the cost of the whole sentence. There should be judicial discretion when giving tagged curfews in suspended sentences.
I hope to come to that in a moment.
As was explained in Committee, the code will not only encourage the use and enforcement of contractual provisions to ensure that current FoI obligations about information held on a contracting authority’s behalf are met but will promote the voluntary provision of other information where this would help to provide a more meaningful response to requests. The success of this approach will, as was also made clear in Committee, be monitored by both the Government and the Information Commissioner. If it does not achieve sufficient transparency, we will consider what other steps, including the possible formal extension of FoI to contractors, are required. Once the code of practice is issued, it is important that we give it the opportunity to prove its worth before deciding whether further measures are necessary. I therefore invite noble Lords not to press Amendments 7 and 120.
We also debated Amendment 8 in Committee, and I sought then to explain why it is not appropriate. We agree that the code of practice is a necessary and important document. It is intended to make sure that the necessary safeguards are in place for the proper management of the data gathered by electronic monitoring conditions. It will, of course, comply with the Data Protection Act. However, it is for operational purposes and will not introduce any new legal requirements. That is why we do not propose to agree its content through parliamentary procedure.
I should remind the House that it passed the provisions in the Crime and Courts Act 2013 that inserted new Section 215A into the Criminal Justice Act 2003. This also provides for a code of practice relating to the processing of data from electronic monitoring and is linked to provisions allowing location monitoring of offenders as a community requirement. This provision was approved by Parliament with no requirement for the code to be subject to affirmative secondary legislation. The amendment would, therefore, be inconsistent with the provisions already approved for a code of practice.
I should perhaps add a little more about the scrutiny that has been undertaken in relation to electronic monitoring and the approach to contract management that has informed the new contracts. Within the MoJ, and specific to electronic monitoring, this has meant the new contracts being drafted and let with key elements such as open-book accounting being critical. Accountability for contract management will be much clearer, with contract owners called regularly to account for their detailed knowledge of the contracts and their operational assurance that services are properly assured and audited.
On the amendment, I can only reiterate the assurances that I have given previously. We have committed to consultation on the code of practice, which will include consulting the Information Commissioner. I also confirm that the code of practice will be published. I do not have, at the moment, a specific date for publication of the code of practice but we hope to issue guidance to the standard contract clause by the end of 2014. If I receive further information on the probable date for the code of practice, I of course undertake to inform the House, and certainly the noble Lord, Lord Beecham.
I hope that I have satisfied the House on these issues of concern. Electronic monitoring would naturally be a matter of concern, but it is also a valuable tool in the detection and prevention of crime. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, in relation to Amendment 6, I accept my noble friend’s point that it is for the Secretary of State rather than the court to deal with electronic monitoring conditions. He is right about that. He was also right to recognise the concerns as to whether such conditions could be imposed inappropriately or where unnecessary, unjust or impractical.
I understand him to have given an assurance that he understands that the power to make an order which makes,
“provision by reference to whether a person specified in the order is satisfied of a matter”,
enables the order to ensure that the person is satisfied that it would not be impractical to impose such an electronic monitoring condition. On that basis, I join in his observation that it is not entirely clear, even though it may be clear from the Explanatory Notes, which of course form no part of the statute. Those who are left with the difficult task of unravelling this arcane piece of drafting will no doubt be able to read the report of that assurance. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
My Lords, our amendments in this group on Clause 27 regarding compulsory custodial sentences for second offences of possession of a knife would have three effects. The first, and by far the most important, would be to exclude 16 and 17 year-olds from the ambit of the compulsory custodial sentences proposed in the clause. The second would be to ensure that the circumstances the court might take into account in deciding not to impose a custodial sentence would include the likely impact of the sentence on the offender. The third would be to ensure that those circumstances would include not only the circumstances of the offence for which the offender was being sentenced at the time he came before the court, but also the circumstances of the previous conviction that brought him or her within ambit of the clause in the first place.
I turn first to the amendments excluding 16 and 17 year-olds from the operation of the compulsory sentence regime. Your Lordships will no doubt remember that in Committee this House declined to remove the whole of this clause under my stand part debate, but by a fairly narrow margin, considering that the Conservative and Labour parties whipped their Back-Benchers in favour of the retention of the clause, notwithstanding that the Government Front Bench abstained. It was nevertheless abundantly clear from the debate that there was a very strong feeling in this House that compulsory sentences for children were undesirable and damaging to the children concerned.
I should remind your Lordships that this clause was not and is not government policy. It was introduced in the House of Commons by the Conservative Back-Bencher my honourable friend Mr Nick de Bois, and carried in that House. That is how it came to be included in this Bill, notwithstanding the opposition of the Liberal Democrat Benches.
On Report, the House has before it in the next group amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Browning and Lady Berridge, which would oblige courts to have regard to their duty under Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 when implementing this clause. That would mean that a court would have to have regard in every case to,
“the welfare of the child or young person”,
and would be required “in a proper case” to,
“take steps for removing him from undesirable surroundings and for securing that proper provision is made for his education and training”.
My Lords, I shall speak briefly on the amendment proposed by my noble friend Lord Marks. First, on a point of agreement, he will have seen that under Amendment 65 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Browning it would of course be possible for the court to take into account the circumstances of the previous offence that was what I will call the “trigger” for this provision. Those circumstances could be taken into account.
With regard to the second point, we outlined in Committee that under new Section (6B) in Clause 27(4) there is a judicial discretion not to impose a mandatory sentence unless there are particular circumstances that relate to the offence, the offender or the previous offence and it would be unjust to do so in the circumstances. I would be interested to know the Minister’s opinion on whether the likely impact on the child of the offence would be included in the consideration of the welfare of the child, which is part of the other amendments that my noble friend and I have tabled.
In relation to a third point, the imposition of a mandatory requirement on young people aged 16 and 17—
Before my noble friend gets on to her third point regarding 16 and 17 year-olds, may I just ask her whether she was saying in her previous remarks that if it is the case that the likely impact of the offence is not caught within the phrase,
“the circumstances of the offender”,
she will therefore support that amendment of mine?
No. In relation to the likely impact, my point was whether that is considered under the requirement in the Children and Young Persons Act to take into account the welfare of the child.
With regard to 16 and 17 year-olds, it is already the position that they are covered under the mandatory sentencing provisions if they are convicted twice of the offence of threatening with a knife, so it would be inconsistent not to include 16 and 17 year-olds under these provisions where there will be mandatory provisions when you are twice convicted of the offence of the possession of a knife.
I understand that there is not a clear age of majority in this country, but when you can marry and join the Army at age 16, if you have been found in possession of a knife and convicted of that offence and then been found in possession of a knife again by the time you are 17, I do not think it is unduly harsh to say to those young people that a prison sentence is to be imposed unless the provisions of proposed new Section (6B) are found to apply by the judge.
Finally, in relation to the disproportionality issue for black and ethnic minority young people which I have mentioned previously in your Lordships’ House, it is clear that it is also the case that those young people are disproportionately the victims of knife crime. If one is going to plead disproportionality, one has to look not only at offenders but also at victims. The use of knives on young black people—particularly men—is an issue of grave concern in that community, so one has to look at both sides of that issue and not just at the disproportionality of offenders.
As noble Lords will be aware from previous discussion on this matter in Committee, this clause was added to the Bill by a Back-Bench amendment in the other place and the principle agreed by your Lordships’ House. Noble Lords will also be aware that agreement has not been reached on the policy underlying this clause within the Government, so I hope that noble Lords will understand why I cannot speak to the detail of these clauses, much though I would like, for example, to have risen to the challenge posed by my noble friend Lord Carlile.
The only thing I can say is simply to assist the House in answer to a technical query about Section 44 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 and the welfare of the child and the young person. That is not—and I do not think my noble friend Lord Marks suggested it was—an impediment to actually passing a sentence of this sort. Otherwise, a child might not ever be sent into the secure children’s estate.
I hesitate to interrupt. My noble friend knows full well that that section merely requires the court to have regard to the welfare of the child and therefore is not an impediment to imposing the compulsory sentence. My point is that the circumstances that the court may take into account in declining to impose the mandatory sentence are so circumscribed that that runs counter to the spirit of the provision mentioned.
I assumed I was interrupting, but perhaps that is not the case and my noble friend has finished. I do not propose at this late hour to press these amendments to a vote because I do not suppose they would produce a conclusive result in favour of the amendment, although those in my party feel extremely strongly about this. We deeply regret that the Labour Party has decided not to support our position on 16 and 17 year-olds in particular, and the reason for that regret is that in the lead-up to this debate, and indeed in the lead-up to the debate in Committee, I saw not one shred of evidence from any professional body supporting the imposition of compulsory custodial sentences for 16 and 17 year-olds in these circumstances. We on these Benches believe that maintaining judicial discretion is vital to the administration of justice and we are deeply concerned by its reduction in this and other sections of this Bill. I beg leave to withdraw this amendment.
The amendment has already been moved and the Minister has responded, so it is for the noble Baroness now to decide what she wishes to do with the amendment.
My Lords, before my noble friend formally concludes speaking to the amendment in response to the Minister, perhaps I might indicate that in our view it is unsatisfactory that an amendment is reaching the statute book with very detailed amendments proposed by the noble Baronesses, Lady Berridge and Lady Browning, without the Government having expressed any view as to the degree to which they work. If what I suspect is now going to happen does happen, these amendments will be carried and this is the way that the Bill will go on to the statute book. We regard that as unsatisfactory. Perhaps consideration should be given to procedure on a Bill of this sort in future.
The Government’s position has not changed. Parliamentary counsel assisted the noble Baroness in making sure that the necessary amendments were properly and accurately drafted. I hope that that assists the noble Lord.
My Lords, Amendment 98 stands in my name and in the names of my noble friends Lady Grender, Lady Brinton and Lady Barker. I shall address the entire group of amendments, in particular the amendments tabled by my noble friend Lord Faulks.
Your Lordships may remember that in Committee I and colleagues on these Benches moved an amendment to criminalise the practice of posting so-called “revenge porn” on the internet. This thoroughly nasty behaviour, where the perpetrators post sexual images of former lovers after the breakdown of their relationships in order to hurt their victims, has become all too common. There are a number of sites with names like “MyEx.com” where such images abound.
Unsurprisingly, the publication of such images causes untold distress, embarrassment and humiliation. Such publication has the potential to create havoc with victims’ mental and physical health, their happiness and self-esteem, their future trust in others, their ability to form relationships and their present and future relationships—social, within their families and at work. Publication by a former lover in these circumstances is a gross breach of trust. The images are taken in the privacy and trust of an intimate relationship, with the consent of the victim. They are then deliberately and callously displayed to the world without their consent, in a malicious attempt to cause distress.
The Government’s response to our amendment in Committee was to promise to consider the issues that we raised. I have been delighted by the way that such consideration has led to the tabling of the Government’s amendments in this group. They start with Amendment 103, which would establish the offence of, “Disclosing private sexual photographs and films”, widely defined, “with intent to cause distress”. I am aware that at the early stages of the Government’s consideration there was a view within the Ministry of Justice that no new offence was needed, on the basis that existing offences largely covered the evil with which we were concerned. However, further consideration has led the department to the conclusion that a new offence is indeed needed. That recognition is right and I commend and thank my noble friend, and all those who have worked with him on this within his department, for the extremely hard work that they have undertaken in the short time since Committee to develop these proposals.
The three essential elements of the new offence will be, first, that the image must be,
“a private sexual photograph or film”,
widely defined; secondly, that it must be published “without the consent of” the victim and, thirdly, that “the intention of” the publisher must be to cause the victim “distress”. Those elements largely mirror those of the offence mentioned in our amendment and we are content that the government amendments represent an effective way of dealing with this despicable behaviour.
We have had one concern as to the definition of sexual, which our amendment left undefined. The Government have sought to define it in Amendment 105. Subsection (3)(a) of their proposed new clause is clear, referring precisely to,
“an individual’s exposed genitals or pubic area”.
Paragraphs (b) and (c) of that subsection go wider. They refer to an image being sexual if, in paragraph (b),
“it shows something that a reasonable person would consider to be sexual because of its nature”,
and, in paragraph (c), if,
“its content, taken as a whole, is such that a reasonable person would consider it to be sexual”.
My noble friend and officials within his department helpfully held a meeting with us, at which they explained the difficulties that they faced in defining a sexual image. Colleagues were concerned that a topless photograph should be capable of being within the definition of “sexual”, in appropriate circumstances, and particularly where photographs of younger women were concerned. On consideration, we have come to the conclusion that paragraphs (b) and (c) enable the contents of such an image to be considered widely and that a successful balance is struck by the proposed wording. However, I should be grateful if my noble friend would confirm that he considers that paragraphs (b) and (c) considerably widen the ambit of paragraph (a).
I conclude by paying tribute to all those colleagues who have campaigned for the criminalisation of revenge porn. I particularly mention in this context my honourable friend Julian Huppert MP, who raised this issue in the other place and has worked hard on it. In view of the commendable position taken by the Government, we will not be pressing Amendment 98.
My Lords, I, too, have my name to Amendment 98 and wish to echo the points made by my noble friend Lord Marks on government Amendments 103, 104 and 105. I also support his comments about the definitions of private and sexual, and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
In recent years, a new series of unpleasant crimes relating to technology have developed. Cyberstalking, cyberbullying, sexting and now revenge porn are all about abuse of power and spreading information widely on the net. I shall focus on the devastating effects of the circulation of these images, and why the three criteria outlined in the government amendments are inextricably linked and why the presence of all three demonstrates the state of mind of the perpetrator. The proposed offence is vile. It is not just blackmail, although it has been used by some for that effect. It is not just the betrayal of trust and confidence of a former partner, but about the long-term damage on the partner who has been exposed. It is an abuse of power designed to cause distress, and with the nature of social media today, the perpetrator can hand it on and on to others, including professional revenge porn sites whose participants often then choose to troll the original victim, their family and their work colleagues.
Many victims of revenge porn are too scared and humiliated to speak out but a few brave individuals do. Hannah Thompson has and is now a leading campaigner for the new law. Here is what she had to say about why she thinks the law needs to change:
“For those who don’t know, revenge porn is non-consensual pornography. It’s where a person uploads an explicit image of somebody without their permission. Often the victim’s name and contact details are attached. Not only is it humiliating but it has the potential to reach out of the screen and destroy people’s lives … Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong with sharing private images of yourself but you do so with a reasonable expectation of privacy. There is, however, something intrinsically wrong with using explicit images as a tool to harass and humiliate someone. As a victim of revenge porn, I can’t even begin to explain how relieved it makes me to think that Parliament is seriously considering these proposals. Most victims of revenge porn are shamed and forced into silence for fear that more people will find their images. They’re made to tolerate the abuse and forced to suffer through tedious copyright claims because it’s the closest they can get to having something done. I’ve spoken to victims who were suicidal, whose images were taken on a Polaroid camera before they had any concept of the Internet, who have lost their careers and whose relationships have been ruined. All the while, those who have published the images are free to sit back and revel in the pain they’ve caused to someone whose only crime was to trust them”.
Celebrities have been caught too. Photos of Jennifer Lawrence were found by a hacker, and Rihanna and Tulisa Contostavlos have had private nude photos released by former partners. But we do not know the size of the problem because only eight out of 43 police forces collect data. The Huffington Post said:
“The data that was available suggests revenge porn is on the rise: there were 35 reported incidents in 2012, jumping to 58 in 2013, and there have been 53 in the first half of this year alone”.
Tonight, Hannah and the other victims are in the public gallery watching our proceedings. Their bravery in fighting for revenge porn to be made a criminal offence would also mean that our police forces will start to catalogue this offence more carefully. Most of all, it will send a message to former partners who commit this appalling act that the effect it has on the victims is not one that our wider society is prepared to accept.
My Lords, in withdrawing Amendment 98, I simply say that I am grateful for my noble friend’s clarification that he agrees with our view that proposed new subsections (3)(b) and (3)(c) in Amendment 105 do indeed add to the rather definite description of “sexual” in subsection (3)(a).
At the meeting that we have mentioned, we discussed whether we should include a non-exhaustive list of factors that might be taken into consideration when coming to a conclusion as to whether an image is sexual. I have reached the clear view that the Minister and his officials are right to conclude that such a list would not be helpful; indeed, it might have the effect of limiting the ambit of the offence. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
My Lords, this group comprises Amendments 106A to 106D and 181A and is the last group at the end of a long day.
Amendments 106A to 106C would introduce new defences to criminal offences under three statutes, the Computer Misuse Act 1990, the Bribery Act 2010 and the Data Protection Act 1998.
I turn to Amendment 106A. Section 1 of the Computer Misuse Act creates an offence effectively of using a computer to secure unauthorised access to data or to a program—in other words, what is conventionally called hacking into other people’s computers. The amendment would create a public interest defence to that offence. The defence proposed is directly in line with a defence that already exists under Section 55(2) of the Data Protection Act 1998, to which I will return in respect of Amendments 106C and 106D.
The amendment would place the onus squarely on the defence, stating:
“Subsection (1) does not apply to a person who shows”.
The defences are that the conduct which would be an offence was necessary for the purpose of preventing or detecting crime or was required or authorised by or under any enactment, a rule of law or by order of a court; or that the defendant acted in the reasonable belief that he had the right to carry out that conduct; or that he acted in the reasonable belief that he had relevant authority; or that he reasonably believed that the conduct was justified as being in the public interest; or that in the particular circumstances the conduct was justified as being in the public interest.
My Lords, I say at the outset that I entirely accept the point made by both the Minister and the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, so elegantly and in such a restrained fashion, about the lateness of these amendments. I entirely accept that the complexity of these amendments, and the fact that the Government and the Opposition have had so little time to consider them, means that it would be wrong of me to press them to the vote today.
Nevertheless, in encouraging my noble friend and his department to give further consideration to the points raised by the amendments, I will deal briefly with some of his points. He mentioned the need for consultation under Section 77 of the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act, affecting Section 55 of the Data Protection Act—as it would be with the amendment—and he deduced from that that it would be wrong to proceed without consultation. The fact is that there have been two consultations on this issue by the previous Government, and furthermore we now have the clear recommendations of the Leveson report that both of these provisions should now be implemented. In those circumstances I find it hard to understand why he expresses the view so clearly that all Leveson’s proposed changes on data protection have to be understood together. The proposals on the new defence are not subject to a consultation requirement; that refers only to the new penalties, for which there is a crying need.
I will also deal with what my noble friend said about the existing defences, particularly his reference to the Bribery Act. He mentioned that there are defences under the Bribery Act which cover conduct by the intelligence services or the Armed Forces on active service. That may be right, but it is hardly relevant to the question of whether responsible journalism should give rise to an entirely separate defence. He also mentioned the Computer Misuse Act including a saving provision for law enforcement—again, hardly relevant to whether a public interest defence should be allowed in respect of that Act.
My noble friend is right to say the purpose of these amendments is to provide a defence for journalists acting in the public interest. It is always an important issue for the public to be protected. I suggest that the balance that needs to be struck, between journalists being able to carry out investigative work for a genuine public reason and the need to protect the public from computer misuse and unlawful conduct offering financial advantage, is one which needs a great deal of attention. He is of course right that the Crown Prosecution Service has to take the public interest into account. However, the fact that it has to consider whether a couple of further defences would succeed before making its decision is not a reason for the Government not to take these amendments forward at a later stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.