European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
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My Lords, I will first take up the point that the noble Baroness has just mentioned about the judgment of the Supreme Court. Naturally, I have studied it with a certain amount of care. Both sides, the Government and the applicant, agreed with the basis that they should treat the Article 50 notification as irrevocable. Lord Justice Reed pointed out clearly that that had not been the subject of a decision by the court but that, from the point of view of the judgment, it did not matter so long as it was possible that it was irrevocable. If that was the case, the danger to Acts of Parliament existed even if it turned out that it might be revocable. If it was possible that it was irrevocable, once it was triggered, these Acts of Parliament came into danger. It was as simple as that. I think we must assume—I am prepared to anyway—that the government lawyers took the view that Article 50 notification was irrevocable because they took the case on that basis. Of course, some doubt about that might have helped them if they thought there was a real argument that it was revocable—the bullet and all the rest of it that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, talked about in the decision would maybe not have occurred. The Government’s lawyers definitely took the view that it was irrevocable.

The point tonight is different. The Prime Minister and the Minister in the Commons both gave an undertaking that a Motion would be put before both Houses of Parliament for approval of the final deal and for the way in which we might leave the European Union. They both gave that undertaking but they did not say that the Prime Minister would necessarily be bound by the decision of both Houses.

The difficulty in this amendment is that it formally requires the approval of both Houses. There is no question—it is as clear as can be. I do not claim to be a prophet, so exactly what will happen after two years I do not know, but I feel absolutely certain that the negotiations will be difficult and that it will be very difficult at this stage to tell what sort of outcome we may get. If we can get such an agreement in relation to economics as the Prime Minister indicated in her speech, that might be very good. On the other hand, some people who know more about it than I do think that may not be likely.

As I said, I do not know what will happen. The Prime Minister and the Minister have agreed that both Houses of Parliament should have a Motion put before them for approval, but neither said—I believe that may be why they phrased it as they did—that the approval of both Houses would be necessary.

I want to point out the danger of not getting this right. I see no reason why it should not be put right, if people agree that it is not quite right. The House of Commons should be the prime source of authority on this matter. Your Lordships will remember, if you read the newspapers—I am sure most of us do, although perhaps selectively—the suggestion that this was all a scheme for this House to try to defeat the Brexit vote. I do not want it to be said unnecessarily, in any circumstances, that we give colour to that, because I feel certain that nobody in this House wants to engineer a blockage of the Brexit vote as the Prime Minister goes ahead. I feel sure of that, and I think I am right. Somebody this morning mentioned the word “tribal”. I do not feel myself part of any particular tribe, but I want the matter to be right. If the amendment is sent back to the Commons, I would like it to be correct, so that nobody could suggest that we were trying to create a scheme that might block Brexit, because we refuse our approval and the House of Commons approves it.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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As I understand the noble and learned Lord’s speech, he is saying that, provided the primacy of the House of Commons is made clear, he would support the amendment. Is that right?

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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I am saying that I think it would then simply incorporate the Prime Minister’s and the Minister’s undertaking.

Children and Social Work Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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I am very grateful. I gather that the reason for my mistake is that version that we now have does not have the compatibility statement, but I think that the original version did. I am grateful.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
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My Lords, I wonder how the Government’s amendment can be carried out without giving effect to the other amendments in this group. Amendment 1 has the effect of requiring that in carrying out its functions, a local authority must,

“have regard to the need … to act in the best interests, and promote the physical and mental health and well-being, of those children and young people”.

How one could promote their health without knowing what they may need in the way of health I cannot understand. Therefore I assume that these amendments are all covered by the generality of the words in Clause 1(1)(a) as amended.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Monday 27th October 2014

(9 years, 5 months ago)

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Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
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My Lords, those of your Lordships who were present in Committee will remember that I read out a substantial section of a book by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, in which he described what I understood to be the use of judicial review as a means of frustrating a government policy that had been passed by Parliament. I shall not repeat the detail now; it is in the book and I have put it on the record here. The problem on which the noble Lord focuses in that passage is that the arrangements made for pursuing this policy involved looking round for somebody who could be a legally aided litigant, and would therefore be provided with legal aid and also protected against costs in the event of his losing. The full detail is given in those passages.

It seems to me that some mechanism is required to enable the judges to deal with such points as part of the decision on whether permission will be granted to a particular individual to proceed. So far as I am concerned, judicial discretion in this area would be perfectly reasonable and, as has been said earlier, rules of court would be required to deal with it. There is definitely a problem here that needs to be dealt with at the opening stage of the proceedings in order that justice may be done in relation to that kind of campaign, which I have no reason to doubt is accurately described by the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, whom I am sure your Lordships know and respect.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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My Lords, my experience of protective costs orders arises from the Corner House case. Corner House was a tiny NGO with almost no money and it was challenging the lack of proper consultation when the export credit guarantee issues arose in relation to possible corruption. My recollection is that the Court of Appeal developed at common law the idea of a protective costs order, but it was extremely careful to limit that so that anyone with real funds would have to account at the earlier stage before such an order would be made.

I have not been aware, in subsequent case law since the decision of the Court of Appeal in the Corner House case, of protective costs orders being abused. My impression is that the courts have been strict, disciplined and very jealous of the need to avoid any waste of public money. Therefore, although I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that there may be some scope for rule-making, I do not believe that there is any need for a statutory requirement such as the one we are now considering.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Monday 8th July 2013

(10 years, 8 months ago)

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Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, I am obliged to all those who have taken part in this debate, whether supporting or opposing my amendment. It is interesting to hear what people have to say. I quite understand that the noble Lord, Lord Alli, does not like the brackets, but they have been put in by Government in the Bill’s Title. I thought, what else can I do but accept the Government’s guidance on the matter? However, I think perhaps that that is not the noble Lord’s most important point.

My noble friend Lord Deben, in a characteristic speech, said that the distinction between the two types of marriage was universally recognised, so why should it be recognised in the Bill? If it is universally recognised, surely it would be right to recognise it in the Bill because it is founded on the absolute fact of what occurs. The two are distinct. I do not try to separate them; I just distinguish because they are distinct in fact, and nobody can alter that. The idea that I am trying to wreck the Bill is not correct, I am sorry to say—well, perhaps I am not sorry; I should be glad to say that it is certainly not correct. I want to recognise in the Bill a distinction which, according to my noble friend Lord Deben—and who higher an authority?—is universally recognised. It damages the Bill in the eyes of ordinary people when it is not seen that that is recognised.

My noble friend said that I went on at length about children. I am sorry if I went on too long, but it is a very important factor. Children are very much at the centre of the institution of marriage as it was—and is until the Bill is passed. They are very much at the centre, and indeed, as your Lordships know, in relation to divorce and all that, elaborate provisions were made for children. Children are very important to marriage. There is a statement about children in the Bill which I regard as very important. Paragraph 2(1) of Part 2 of Schedule 4 states:

“Section 11 does not extend the common law presumption that a child born to a woman during her marriage is also the child of her husband … Accordingly, where a child is born to a woman during her marriage to another woman, that presumption is of no relevance to the question of who the child’s parents are”.

Therefore, the situation is that when two women are married under the Bill, and one of them has a child, that child has the same status as if the woman were single. If that is not a distinction—it should be recognised at some point, whether in brackets or otherwise—I do not know what an important distinction can be. If the Government want to improve on the brackets, I shall be happy that they should do so, but I believe that there is a universally recognised distinction between the marriage of two men or two women on the one hand and the marriage of a man and a woman on the other. These are facts that depend on something outside, and impossible to move, or remove by this legislation. The Bill would be improved by people realising what it does and recognising this universally understood distinction.

My noble friend Lord Lester quoted from the dissenting judgment of one of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States. He distinguished between the two types of marriage: the one slightly older and the more recent one. I want to include in the Bill recognition of that distinction. The quotation of the noble Lord, Lord Lester, seemed to imply the necessity for some form of sexual relationship in both types of marriage. I pointed out, and I think it has been accepted so far, that same-sex marriage is not gay marriage—it is quite wrong to describe it thus. It includes gay marriage, of course, but it is wider because it involves same-sex couples, whether gay or not. Platonic relationships are perfectly possible under the Bill.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord. The reason I was quoting Justice Alito was simply to say, as he did, that the choice is for the legislature, and that we have in the Bill protected both kinds of marriage. That is why I did so.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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Exactly, the choice exists. We have chosen—I want to make it clear that we have chosen—to embrace both in our definition of marriage because that is what I am doing. The idea that my noble friend Lord Lester suggested, that I preferred one to the other or said that one was superior to the other, is quite unfounded so far as these amendments are concerned. There are later amendments that may go further, but this amendment strikes me as the absolute minimum to recognise the distinction that exists in fact. I moved the amendment and I would like to seek the opinion of the House.

Marriage (Same Sex Couples) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Monday 24th June 2013

(10 years, 9 months ago)

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Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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My Lords, I shall not detain the Committee by repeating what I said nine years ago when we debated this issue, and the controversy between those who focused on sexual relations and those who focused on tax and inheritance tax.

I have two points to make. Clause 14 seems to me not to require any amendment because it states:

“The Secretary of State must arrange … for the operation and future of the Civil Partnership Act 2004 in England and Wales to be reviewed, and … for a report on the outcome of the review to be produced and published”.

The clause goes on to say that that,

“does not prevent the review from also dealing with other matters relating to civil partnership”.

One of the other matters relating to civil partnership that has been mentioned by my noble friend Lord Marks, in particular, was referred to by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in paragraph 95 of our report. We said:

“We are not convinced by the Government’s reasons not to extend civil partnerships to opposite sex couples, and we welcome the Government’s announcement that it will review this matter. In doing so, the Government should take into account the potential discrimination that may arise between cohabiting opposite sex couples and civil partners”.

I very much welcome the fact that the Government have made it clear that there will be a review of the operation of the Civil Partnership Act to look at that aspect of the existing discrimination. That point has already been made by several noble Lords and it is important to deal with it. I have always disagreed with the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, as she knows, because I am strongly in favour of cohabitation rights for unmarried opposite-sex couples, and she is firmly opposed to that. That will clearly be a matter that the review will need to take into account to see whether the Government decide to give some protection to so-called common law marriages or not.

I continue to believe in that, as I did nine years ago. I am delighted by the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, because she has taught me aspects of social security and welfare that I was not aware of. For all the reasons given, I do not think that one should now fetter Clause 14 by requiring that the review should deal with matters that are truly beyond the scope of the Bill and ought not to be part of the review.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, I think that I should indicate that some aspects of this discussion will arise under my Amendment 55. It is important to remember that this Bill is not about gay marriage but same-sex marriage. As I pointed out, and I invited correction—so far I have not been corrected—it includes platonic relations between people of the same sex. Therefore, the idea that sexual relationships are fundamental to it is a mistake. That may or may not matter to this issue, but it matters considerably to the issue that I shall raise under Amendment 55.

Defamation Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Tuesday 23rd April 2013

(10 years, 11 months ago)

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Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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My Lords, first I would say that we often refer to Fox’s Libel Act. I hope that when this Bill becomes law it will be referred to as Lord McNally’s Libel Act, because he above all has had the energy to drive it forward. He said at one stage that he would not allow the Bill to be overwhelmed by what he called the tsunami of Leveson. The reason why I strongly support Motion A is because it provides a way of avoiding being overwhelmed by the tsunami of Leveson. It removes what I consider to be unnecessary hostage-taking in some amendments to the Defamation Bill. It has now been freed in the Commons, and therefore I strongly support it. I have some difficulty with the reason, in a sense, because it says that,

“the draft Royal Charter … and … the Crime and Courts Bill and the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Bill will be sufficient to implement the recommendations in Lord Justice Leveson’s report”.

I think that is completely true. Whether Lord Justice Leveson’s report will eventually pass muster is quite another question, but that is not to be debated now.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, I am delighted to welcome this situation, and to see the Defamation Bill back on its ordinary course. I do not entirely agree with all that the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, has said about the amendments that were passed by this House, but now they are certainly unnecessary and I am delighted that the Defamation Bill can proceed.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Tuesday 13th March 2012

(12 years ago)

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Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, in my view, the Human Rights Act applies already to the matters raised in this amendment. The reason for that is fairly straightforward. As your Lordships know, when the Human Rights Act was passed, many functions previously exercised by public authorities were by that time exercised by private individuals and companies. Therefore, the Human Rights Act contained the provision that public authorities should include those in respect of whom certain of their functions are functions of a public nature. That was deliberately adopted to deal with the situation where the public service was in fact given by a private individual or a private company that was not itself a public authority. For the purpose of enforcing the Human Rights Act, bodies that had as any of their functions a public function were responsible in respect of it as if they were a public body.

The case of YL has been referred to. That was not a health case but a case under the National Assistance Act where the local authority had put the lady into a private home. A majority of the House of Lords held that that was not a public function in respect of the private home. It was of course a public function in respect of the local authority, Birmingham City Council, but not in respect of the private home. The Government of the day decided to reverse that decision, not because they thought that the principles of the Human Rights Act should be altered but because they believed that the outcome in that case was wrong. That is what has happened in relation to that type of case, leaving untouched the general principles settled in the Human Rights Act itself.

At the time, the then Government decided to have a consultation on whether the Human Rights Act needed to be amended in some way to deal with these situations. The result of that consultation, so far as I understand, was that nothing needed to be done. The Government put forward an amendment in respect of the YL decision, whose introduction in this House was, I think, in the hands of the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton. In accordance with what the Government thought about the matter she said:

“Therefore, it remains the Government’s view that, in general, the provision of publicly arranged health and social care should be considered a function of a public nature. The Government will therefore continue to treat those exercising such functions as being subject to the Human Rights Act”—

and ever since that has been the position. She went on:

“I reiterate one important point from the letters. It remains the Government’s firm view that independent providers of NHS care under the National Health Service Act are, as the law currently stands, exercising a function of a public nature”.—[Official Report, 22/05/08; col. GC 632.]

That is to say that independent providers operating under the health service were carrying out a function of a public nature, and therefore the protection of the Human Rights Act applied.

In YL, Lord Bingham of Cornhill, who was one of the minority, expressed the matter in this way: he thought the answer to the question in that case was clear. Unfortunately, not everybody sitting in the case thought the same, but that was his answer. He said:

“When the 1998 Act was passed, it was very well known that a number of functions formerly carried out by public authorities were now carried out by private bodies. Section 6(3)(b) of the 1998 Act was clearly drafted with this well-known fact in mind. The performance by private body A by arrangement with public body B, and perhaps at the expense of B, of what would undoubtedly be a public function if carried out by B is, in my opinion, precisely the case”,

which here is covered,

“by Section 6(3)(b)”.

In his opinion, that was the case in YL. Parliament has gone along with that in the amendment and has said that the minority in the YL case were correct. In particular, it has been affirmed that this applies to the Public Health Act.

Some of the situations that have been mentioned by those who support the amendment have occurred in private residential homes. That does not mean that the Act does not apply; it means that for some reason the Act was not observed in these homes. Sadly, that can happen anywhere in relation to the Human Rights Act. It does not mean that it does not apply; it just means that it has not been carried out.

This amendment is supposed to clarify the law. Your Lordships will notice that its heading states that it applies to certain parts of the health service: it is not in any way a universal provision. The heading states:

“Human Rights Act 1998: provision of certain personal care and health care services to be public function”.

It refers to certain services, not all. I submit that that applies to all in the light of the statute as I have explained it.

As I say, the amendment seeks to clarify the law and close a loophole. Unfortunately, when you start to investigate particular cases of this kind, you are apt to get into areas of risk. What happens if a lady who is getting personal care is staying with her daughter and is not in her own private home? This amendment would not apply to that situation. This is a very difficult area. Those who originally framed the Human Rights Act bore that in mind, and the Act was very carefully framed by the Labour Government of that day. My noble and learned friend Lord Irvine of Lairg was extremely careful in selecting the language that was used. As I said, in 2008, when the amendment was made in respect of the National Assistance Act, the position in relation to the health service was very clearly restated. I submit that this amendment is unnecessary, undesirable and risks not covering the whole of the National Health Service provision, as, indeed, it does not attempt to do.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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My Lords, it is a privilege to act as junior counsel to a leader as distinguished as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. His speech makes it unnecessary for me to speak for long. I respectfully agree with everything that he has said but wish to add a few further points. I am very sorry to disappoint so many of my friends from civil society and their representatives whose eloquent speeches we have heard today. However, I do not think that there is a loophole and, if there were, I do not think that this amendment would remove uncertainty; it would, in fact, increase it.

I am particularly glad to say this in the presence of the noble Lord, Lord Wills. He will remember that he was Minister when I was trying, as a GOAT in the Brown Government—noble Lords will know what that means—to persuade his colleagues that we should do something about the YL problem by way of further legislation. Unfortunately, the previous Government were unable to muster support for that and the present coalition Government have given that general problem to the Commission on a Bill of Rights, on which I serve, as one of the issues to consider in the context of whether there should be a Bill of Rights for the United Kingdom. Therefore, the general problem is on the agenda of that commission. When it reports by the end of this year, the Government can then take stock of what to do about it.

As the noble Lord, Lord Low, indicated in his completely accurate account of some of the background, the origin of the problem lies in the majority decision of the Law Lords in the YL case. I believe that the majority in that case asked themselves the wrong question. Instead of asking how to apply the test in Section 6 of the Human Rights Act to cover private care homes, they said to themselves—and made clear—that it was somehow unfair to place greater obligations upon public sector bodies than private sector bodies. I think that was completely the wrong question and they were very bold in deciding not to follow Lord Bingham and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, whose speeches I found completely convincing in logic but also, more importantly, completely in harmony with the intentions of the legislation when it was enacted in 1998.

Marriages and Civil Partnerships (Approved Premises) (Amendment) Regulations 2011

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Thursday 15th December 2011

(12 years, 3 months ago)

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Lord Mackay of Clashfern: My Lords, it is absolutely plain that the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and those who supported him in the amendment moved in the debates on the Equality Act 2010—Section 202—were clearly of the view that no obligation should be placed upon any religious body to host a civil partnership if they did not wish to do so. That is absolutely plain. What is more, they were prepared to put into the amendment a statutory provision that declared that nothing in this Act would place an obligation on religious organisations to do so.

That amendment was made by the Equality Act 2010, but it was made to Section 6A of the Civil Partnership Act 2004. If you go along to the Printed Paper Office and ask for a copy of the 2004 Act, you will discover that it contains no Section 6A. That is because Section 6A was put into the Act by a regulation in 2005. That regulation was made under a provision in the Civil Partnership Act allowing statutory amendments to be made in respect of the Acts that were passed before the end of the Session in which the 2004 Act was passed. Therefore, any enactment contained in an Act passed before the end of 2004 can be amended by statutory regulation, using the affirmative procedure.

The point that arises in this case is a short one and I am not going to go into the opinions of the QCs. Noble Lords have had the great advantage of hearing another QC giving an opposite opinion—and it is not infrequent that that happens. I am going to give no opinion at all about the correctness or otherwise of the provision. They are practising QCs. They have signed their opinions, they are genuinely held and they illustrate a doubt—that is all—about the effect of the Equality Act on these regulations.

My point is that the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Alli, and his colleagues put forward, which was accepted on a free vote in this House and the House of Commons, refers to nothing in this Act, but only to provisions in the 2004 Act. The opinion of these Silks is that the risk arises not from the provisions of the 2004 Act but from the provisions of the Equality Act 2010. To my mind, this issue can be completely set to rest by a simple amendment. Instead of saying “nothing in this Act shall”, the provision would say “nothing in this or any other Act shall”. The Government could do that without difficulty because I am sure we are all agreed that we mean to exclude any attack on the basis of the Equality Act.
Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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Leaving aside altogether the argument about the declaratory provision, does the noble and learned Lord accept the opinion given, for example, by the Church of England's lawyers, with which I fully agree, that in any event, under the Equality Act, there could not conceivably be unlawful discrimination in the provision of goods, services and facilities, nor could there be a breach of a public sector duty because no public function is exercised by religious organisations? Therefore, quite apart from the belt-and-braces declaratory provision, there would be no conceivable case of unlawful discrimination.

--- Later in debate ---
Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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If there is vexatious litigation, it should be struck out by the court as vexatious and nothing more should be done about it. What I am endeavouring to say—I am not doing very well because I am quoting from a detailed opinion, but I thought the House deserved to have that opinion before it because of the authority that it gives—is that the clarity provision was not necessary because a proper construction of the provisions of the Equality Act makes it absolutely clear that any discrimination claim, either about the provision of services or about the public sector duty, would be doomed to failure.

There is one further point. In the case of Pepper v Hart, the House of Lords in its judicial capacity held that, were there any ambiguity in legislation, one could have regard to the parliamentary record to resolve the ambiguity. Quite apart from Section 13 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to, I have no doubt that, were there any ambiguity—in my view, there is none whatever—then the Supreme Court and the lower courts would have regard to statements made by the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, when she was leading for the previous Government, to the assurances given by the former Solicitor-General Vera Baird QC and to the statements that will be given shortly by my noble friend the Minister today. Those statements will all be one way. They will all indicate the true intention of the legislation. Therefore, were there to be any ambiguity, it would be resolved, if it had to be, judicially.

In my view, which is the same as that of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, others who have spoken, the Church of England’s legal advisers and others, there is no conceivable doubt that a challenge would be hopeless. If, as a discrimination lawyer with 40 years’ experience, I were asked what my views would be about this, I would say, “You have not got a snowball’s chance in hell”.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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The noble Lord mentioned the case coming to the Supreme Court. That would cost the church a penny or two.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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No respectable member of the Bar, properly informed and reading the statute as a whole, if asked whether there was a reasonable chance of success, would be likely to say that there were. Anyone who brought such a challenge would have to find public funds or their own funds to do so and they would fail at first instance, in the Court of Appeal and in the Supreme Court.

European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Wednesday 13th July 2011

(12 years, 8 months ago)

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Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, as the one who took the main argument on Clause 18 on Report with an amendment which was carried by quite a reasonable majority in your Lordships’ House, I am happy to assure your Lordships that this debate need not be anything like as long as the previous one because I am entirely happy with the proposed amendments and the resulting Clause 18.

The amendments restrict the matter to directly applicable and directly effective EU law. We are not concerned with other Acts which introduce EU law directly—for example, where it uses a particular provision of EU law to make law in this country. We do not need to concern ourselves with that. Originally, in an attempt to meet with the Government, I drafted an amendment which covered that as well as this. But I understand that it is now agreed that we just need to deal with directly effective and directly applicable EU law.

I am not 110 per cent convinced that there are other Acts which do this but, using the suggestion of my noble friend Lord Flight of the belt and braces, there is no harm in adding this because the 1972 Act is now specifically referred to. There is no doubt in my mind that it is the key to this aspect of EU law in this country. I hope that your Lordships will accept these amendments and my gratitude to the Government for their acceptance of the principle of the amendment which was accepted here, and for defending me from various allegations that were made in the other place about my motivation.

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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My Lords, in respect of the amendment that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, successfully passed in this House, I agree with him that the clause now before your Lordships is entirely satisfactory. I just want to say a few things about it. First, I do not think that Clause 18 was ever necessary, except in a political sense. Secondly, I do not think that the law was ever unclear. Thirdly, it is one of the comical aspects of our unwritten constitution that if you ask a group of lawyers or law students the origin of the doctrine of parliamentary sovereignty, they never know the answer. The answer of course is that it comes from the common law. That answer is most unwelcome to a certain kind of thinker, who thinks, “Oh dear, if it comes from the common law, the courts might take it away again”. We do not have to go into that today.

This amendment states the position as has always been made clear in the case law and therefore does no harm. I only wish that it had not been necessary in the first place. I also wish that the original Explanatory Notes that the Government introduced had not been maintained instead of being withdrawn for political reasons for another set of Explanatory Notes, all of which shows the unfortunate aspects of a Bill which is a politically cosmetic exercise in this respect.

Public Bodies Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Monday 4th April 2011

(12 years, 11 months ago)

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Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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I am in more of a muddle now than I thought I was. Clause 11(1) proceeds on the basis that,

“the Minister considers it appropriate to proceed with the making of an order under sections 1 to 6”.

That is the premise. If that is the premise, surely the Minister will have to lay a draft order and an explanatory document. If that is the position and there is no scope for discretion at that stage—because he or she has already made the determination that it is appropriate to proceed—I do not understand why it does not say “shall” or “must”. It says “must” elsewhere and it seems to me that it is a situation where it is a “must” and not a “may”. Maybe I have got it wrong.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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My Lords, the point that is covered by “may” rather than “must” is that, in the light of the consultation, even if the Minister wants to make an order, he may well think it is right to do something else first; for example, have further consultations and make modified proposals before he proceeds with the order. That is why, in this context, the word “may” is often used when many of us might have thought it was going to happen anyway. That is the reason and I believe it is a good reason.

Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Lester of Herne Hill
Monday 25th October 2010

(13 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord Lester of Herne Hill Portrait Lord Lester of Herne Hill
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I spent much time on Bills seeking to persuade the previous Administration that the statute book should state the law as clearly as possible. I remember most recently, on the Equality Bill, that I managed to persuade the previous Government—with the help, as I recall, of my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness—that statutes ought to say what the law is. The summary of the position by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is absolutely accurate. There are problems in administrative law over the circumstances in which compensation or damages are payable. The Bill, at present, does not explain those.

Presumably the Minister will remind the House that we are dealing with Article 1 of Protocol 1; we are dealing with circumstances in which property has been taken away from somebody. In an appeal, I suppose it would be said that that was an interference that should give rise to compensation. In other words, the European convention and, I suppose, the Human Rights Act—which require this legislation to be read, if possible, compatibly with the convention rights—would give rise to a right to compensation or damages in appropriate circumstances. However, it is not satisfactory to leave this to a Pepper v Hart statement by the Minister, rather than to have some appropriate language—whether that of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, or something else—so that the individual does not have to go to lawyers to discover what the situation is, but can tell from the statute itself what the law is.

Even if the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is not accepted by the Government, I hope that by Third Reading some appropriate language will be inserted so that the Bill will state the law as it is intended to be, rather than relying on Pepper v Hart. In that case I had the good fortune to appear on behalf of the successful party, with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, dissenting. I sometimes wonder, with respect, whether he was right in his dissent. The case gave rise to the possibility that Hansard will always be used to make good what the statute does not properly state itself. Although I hope I was right and the House was correct in the outcome of Pepper v Hart, it could set a bad example to Ministers if they did not amend Bills to state the law correctly.

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Portrait Lord Mackay of Clashfern
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Noble Lords can hardly expect me to remain silent while that remark is made. I support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. So far as I can judge, it seems to be appropriate in its wording. If the Government were willing to accept the principle, they might wish to consider the precise words. There is also the question of whether the same principle should not apply in relation to Clause 27, where a judicial review provision is in question. The remarks of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, apply as much to judicial review as to any other form of order in administrative law. Therefore, it is worth considering—if the Government decide to accept this amendment or something like it—whether something of the same kind should go into Clause 27 as well. It is obvious that if the Government think this is something that should happen, it is unwise to leave it on Pepper v Hart. However good the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, thinks that decision is, it would be rather better to put it in express provision, which in any event saves a certain amount of litigation.