Schools Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Report stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak in a moment to Amendments 4, 7 and 9, but can I go back to the discussion that happened a few moments ago and the concern of the noble Lord, Lord Grocott? I will again read paragraph 8.132 of the Companion: “Other bills”,

so one that has not been referred to a Select Committee or Joint Committee,

“may, on motion (which is debatable and of which notice is required)”—

that means assuming the usual channels cannot resolve the problem in a way that is satisfactory to the House—be

“moved at any time between committee and third reading”.

We are still on Report and will be at the end of today, so we will not have reached Third Reading. Although I do not claim to be an expert, I think it is open to the House to consider the remedy available at paragraph 8.132 of the Companion. That is what I would like the House to do and what I expect the usual channels will do. I should assert that, as Convenor of the Cross Benches, I am not a usual channel for these purposes because I do not have a party.

Now to the Bill. Of course, we are grateful to the Minister. I feel very concerned that somehow people may think the anxiety of the House is a reflection on her. I can do nothing except on behalf of myself thank her for the way in which she has listened. I have an awful suspicion—and she cannot confirm or deny this—that, if she had her way when she was in the department, we would not have ended up with the Bill in this absurd situation.

The provision in Clauses 1, 3 and 4 is extraordinary. I will go through what I said again when we were speaking about this last. The two words “Academy standards” are a clear misrepresentation of what Clause 1 is about. It is simply a skeleton provision from which the Secretary of State can pick whichever particular provisions he wishes to invent for himself; he is not bound by any of them, and he or she can write them for himself or herself.

Clause 3 is Henry VIII. The House has listened to me on Henry VIII a number of times so I will not go on about it, but I hope noble Lords have all noticed that the Bill has a particular quality, in that it has two Henry VIII clauses: Clause 3 and Clause 66. Removing Clause 3 simply removes something that is completely unnecessary. Clause 66 will no doubt continue because the departmental computer will just produce one at some stage in the Bill. I have never before come across two Henry VIII clauses in the same legislation—so we have Henry XVI, and the Bill has a particular record apart from all its other flaws.

It also has a provision in Clause 4 which is a shameful, pernicious new way for central government to obtain power: the issuing of guidance. When the Government and department of the day issue guidance, those to whom it is sent answer to it. In the Bill, there is a provision that enables the Secretary of State to issue a compliance direction anyway. So we have a new form of acquisition of central power, ultimately in No. 10 Downing Street, which we have shamed the country with by passing and enacting the Elections Act. It is exactly the same provision.

Any one of those three would be great from the point of view of central government, but we have all three together. It is a rather poisonous cocktail from all our points of view. It is like supping Irn-Bru, only on stilts. It is the most amazing combination of powers. That is why these clauses should fail.

I am concerned, as has been expressed by others, but not about the way in which the Conservative Party is going to sort itself out. I am concerned about that for the sake of the nation, but not for the sake of the Bill, because, as has been arranged so far, when the clauses go back in whatever form they are amended to the Commons—there will be new clauses—there will be no Second Reading or Committee here. We must therefore look at the provision of paragraph 8.132.

Something else worries me even more. The Bill started here, and this Minister was sitting here and able to hear observations from all sides of the House about the absurdity and the rather alarming features that discolour Clauses 1, 3 and 4. We have got where we have got to, and these amendments will pass in due course. But the chilling feature is that, if the Bill had happened to start in the House of Commons, I have no reasonable doubt that those provisions would have come to us as drafted, after peremptory debate. The Minister would then have had no option but to say, “Well, it’s gone through the Commons. What are you doing interfering with its wishes?” Of course, we would have gone on, but there comes a time when the Commons has to win.

It is pure luck that the power grab in these clauses has come before this House and that we have had this Minister here to lead her department to the obvious and sensible conclusion. But our present constitutional arrangements mean that only the coincidence that the Bill happened to start here gives us relief. If it had started in the other place, I have not the slightest doubt that this is the Bill that we would have had to consider. I find that chilling, because we all know that the opportunities for this House to change legislation that passed through the House of Commons are very limited. That is the state that our constitution has got to in 2022, and it is the most alarming feature of these clauses.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, it is time that we made some progress. The noble Lord, Lord Knight, proposed that the Bill should go forward on Report, and the Labour Chief Whip agreed. But we are getting into doing that without having passed a Motion, so I would like it to be made clear that we will now consider the Bill on Report and deal with whatever difficulties there are as that goes on.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 15th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I apologise to the Committee that I was not here for the first 90 seconds of what the noble Lord, Lord Hodgson, had to say, but I came puffing in as quickly as I could.

In our discussions so far, which I entirely understand and support, one feature has not yet been mentioned: the advantage of the PPO in the process from the point of view of the unfortunate man or woman who has suffered serious or catastrophic injuries. Both at the Bar and as a judge, one thing that you have to look at is how long the unfortunate individual concerned will actually live. I am sorry to say so, but when you talk to your client and say, “We have to discuss how long you will live”, or to the parents of a child who has suffered catastrophic injuries, “We are discussing how long your little boy or your little girl will live”, you are treading on what is obviously deeply sensitive ground. The answer is that it has to be discussed if you are proceeding by way of lump sum, because the calculation of damages depends significantly on whatever the medical experts say the life expectation of the man, the woman, the little boy or the little girl is likely to be.

The medical experts I dealt with were men and women of the utmost integrity. They would do their best. They would say, “Well, the best I can do is X”, or Y or Z. What you discovered after a little while doing these sorts of cases was that, actually, what they were doing—and who can blame them?—was taking an average: “We have had so many patients aged between 21 and 25 who have suffered these sorts of injuries, and they have lived for so long and then they have died”. So in addition to the sensitivities that go into a discussion of how long will the victim—the plaintiff, as they used to be in those days—suffer, be alive, and how long will the damages have to cater for his or her interests, there is also the uncertainty of the medical evidence, because no doctor can tell you.

I still remember a very distinguished surgeon from Stoke Mandeville, who, when I asked him this question in a conference just before I became a judge, said, “Well, we are asked the most ridiculous questions. We do our best. We offer you the best. The truth is that we do not know when this man or this woman’s will to live will go. When the will to live goes, that is when they will die. Some will wish to live and will have the will to live for longer than others, so what we are offering you is the best we can do”. He did not say, and it would not be fair to say, that it is speculative: it is the best they can do but, inevitably, it is almost certainly not going to be right. The end result is that the damages will be too much or too little. The great advantage of the PPO system is that it caters for however long this unfortunate injured person actually lives. I support the idea behind this amendment.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I am very interested and concerned in this matter because I was very concerned about it a long time ago. The problem, I think, is to know what you should say in the rules of court, assuming you are making new rules, about this. How do you commend the PPO, because, as has just been said, a PPO is more suitable in some cases than others? I would like to hear in due course what help we can get in that respect. How do you distinguish between the cases in which PPOs are going to be good and cases in which they are not? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, has just said, the difficulty of estimating life expectancy is extremely high; it is a very difficult thing to do. In a sense, whether or not a PPO is a good thing depends to a certain extent on how secure that estimate is. How you measure that is quite difficult.

As has been said, actuaries proceed on an average. The Ogden tables we used to have long ago were primarily actuarial tables which depend on averages. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, the one thing you can almost be certain about is that the particular case will not be average: it will either be less or more. How you determine that, unless you are a very shrewd prophet, is quite a difficult question. That is the difficulty that faces judges in these cases every day, particularly where the likelihood is that the injury will continue to have effects long into the future.

Not only do you have to consider the injuries and the effects of the injuries, but you also have to think a bit about what the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, pointed out, which is that what inflation is going to do to the costs of care may vary very considerably. So I appreciate the need to do what we can to encourage PPOs; on the other hand, I appreciate the difficulty of formulating the help that judges need.

Of course, ultimately this point will be determined by the judge in charge of the case, not by any rules that may be laid down in order to provide guidance. I am not very keen, I must say, on the Executive giving guidance to the judiciary. I honestly think that that is a dangerous line. I was not very keen on doing it for the magistrates. The Home Office tried to develop some way of doing that, which I did my best to discourage because I do not believe that it is for the Executive to give guidance to the judiciary. Their roles are completely different from and independent of one another. Let the Executive get on with their work, but let the judiciary alone get on with its work.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 25th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, I want to add my voice and underline, if I may, how serious the issue arising under subsections (3) to (7) is. There are many executives that would be desperately pleased to have provisions such as these in primary legislation. There is no reason whatever why Parliament should not be able to deal with any issue arising in the context of sentient animals—there is no exclusion about that. However, to exclude the possibility of somebody seeking a remedy before the court would be an astonishingly dangerous principle to put into any legislation. The fact that it arises in this very sensitive issue relating to animals is one thing, but a lot of citizens, and individuals who happen to live in this country, rely on the possibility of taking the Government or the local authority to court to make them account for the exercise of, or failure to exercise, their powers. This would set an alarming precedent.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the subject of animals is an extremely important one and I have great sympathy with the spirit behind both the amendments in this group. However, this subject needs to be properly dealt with in a statute of the United Kingdom. I know that criticism has been made of the attempts so far, but there is always room for improvement, and constructive suggestions have been liberally made in the consultations. As far as I am concerned, it would be much better to have a good United Kingdom statute for these animals than to try to do it through adapting part of an EU treaty.

The technical question of judicial review is quite difficult. I am not sure just how crucial it is to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Trees, but, years back, skilful Lords of Appeal—Lord Reid, a Scottish judge, and Lord Wilberforce from this jurisdiction—developed a theory that makes it next to impossible to prevent judicial review in an Act of Parliament. They did so by saying that what Parliament has protected is the judgment that is supposed to be come to, but, if the judgment that is come to has been falsified by some mistake or lack of proper process, then it is not a judgment protected by these provisions—Anisminic was the case. As was said by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope and Lord Judge, at the end of a long process, the attempt to restrict judicial review was eventually torpedoed by these judges, with support of course. It is for that reason that the Government decided some considerable time ago not to put such protected clauses into legislation, because it is apt to mislead the public—they think that these clauses are, at face value, worth while, but when Lord Reid and Lord Wilberforce got on to them, they were not worth the paper they were written on.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Committee: 6th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge]

My Lords, my name is to Amendment 126. I do not want to say very much. I can think of another word to add to that great list and I could give my view of the history of how taxation became the weapon for democracy, ultimately. Taxation is the ultimate control that the Commons has over the Executive. Just reflect on the set-to in the United States of America a few weeks ago: Senate and President at odds over money. These issues must be resolved at parliamentary level and House of Commons level—not by regulation.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The general principle referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Turnbull, which has been very clearly enunciated by the courts, is that no public authority, including local authorities, has the power or statutory authority to exact money that exceeds the amount that the local authority—or other person making the imposition—sets. The charge the person is required to pay must be just equal to the amount that will be needed to carry out the service, or other thing. If it does exceed it, it is taxation and that covers all forms; it does not matter whether it is a payment, charge, fee or anything else. That is a general principle. Therefore, the provision in Clause 7(7), preventing the regulations imposing or increasing taxation, prevents any local authority or other power having the power to make any such imposition.

On the amendment proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, I wonder whether the first part of the clause —Clause 8(1), I think—is the subject of Amendment 126. My noble friend Lord Deben wondered why we were talking about this in a withdrawal Bill, but the clause says that we may have an international obligation that is breached by withdrawal; it therefore seems reasonable to deal with that in the withdrawal Bill because it is a consequence of withdrawal. That amendment implies that this power cannot be used to make any financial settlement that would cause a cost to the United Kingdom because, if it did, it would inevitably require taxation—presumably, whoever makes the settlement does not intend to defray the cost out of his or her own pocket. It is a fundamental restriction on the way in which these matters of international obligation may be resolved. I think I am right in that, but no doubt the noble Lord will tell us its effect on the amendment in due course.

Criminal Finances Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 25th April 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I support these amendments. I first came across unexplained wealth orders in Inland Revenue fraud proceedings where people had been accused of not paying their income tax. One of the methods of revealing that is by demonstrating that they suddenly have more wealth than their Revenue account suggests. Therefore, there is a question about whether the assets came from taxable income. That was the presumption at that time. That was before the terrific expansion of other forms of unexplained wealth that could arise. The explanation that someone had done something unlawful would not be a particularly good answer to a tax inquiry but perhaps that was not thought of. Certainly, that was a very useful tool in the armoury of the Inland Revenue in days past and is still so today. It is a very valuable method of dealing with this trouble. I find it very hard, however, to understand what is meant by purported compliance. As has just been said, it seems to me that you either comply or you do not. I must say that the explanation given in the draft practice system does not enlighten me any further. It suggests, indeed, that purported compliance covers certain aspects of non-compliance. It is a difficult definition to put in. I would have thought the measure would be better without it.

I raise questions with regard to the register. It is required to be done within six months of the passing of the Act. However, the commencement provisions of the Act allow the Act to come into force in accordance with regulations or orders made by the Secretary of State. I assume that the passing of the Act in this amendment is intended to refer to its getting Royal Assent. Strictly speaking, however, the Act comes into force only in accordance with orders made by the Secretary of State under the commencement provisions except in relation to certain aspects of that.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

I wish to add a few words of my own on purported compliance. I am not quite sure what we are supposed to cover. Obviously, there will be the individual who is potentially made subject to this order who will try his or her best to produce the necessary information. That may not be good enough, in which case the court will allow an adjournment so that a genuine attempt to produce the information can be made. That will then be compliance. On the other hand, some people will obfuscate and deliberately make life difficult to avoid the true facts coming to light. They will say, “That is purported compliance”, but it will not be—it will be a failure. Therefore, the words “purported compliance” simply do not apply and will not help.

Policing and Crime Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Report: 3rd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 12th December 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, the issues raised by these amendments are extremely difficult. First, in view of all that has been said, it is difficult to distinguish, from this aspect, between sexual offences and other offences. There is much to be said for the view that if pre-charge publicity is to be outlawed, it should be so for all offences.

My second point relates to the safeguard, embodied in the amendment tabled by my noble friend Lord Marlesford and the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, of application to a magistrates’ court for an order. I think I am right in saying that in respect of both Lord Bramall and Sir Cliff Richard there must have been a warrant to search their homes. A warrant of that kind must have been based on some sort of evidence that was accepted by, I assume, a magistrate. There is, therefore, a question about whether it is a sufficient safeguard for a magistrate to give the order. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said, if a judge has said that there is enough to go forward, there is a slight difficulty in the clear way to a trial because a judge has already come to some point of view. However, that point of view is not that the accused is guilty; it is that there is sufficient difficulty in the evidence that in that judge’s judgment it would be right, in the interest of justice to all parties, for publicity to be allowed. There is a lot to be said for the view that publicity, up to the moment of charge, should not generally be allowed for sexual offences or others.

I have not found it easy to come to a conclusion about this and I have thought about it a fair amount. I have come to the conclusion that Amendment 182 is better but I would like to see a possible modification, in the light of what I have said, of the responsibility for allowing the matter. As I said, I think there were magistrates’ warrants for search in the two cases I mentioned: they turned out not to be particularly satisfactory.

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I have been quoted on both sides, so I want to say something for myself. The most shocking aspect, to me, of the issues we are discussing was the BBC helicopter flying overhead while Sir Cliff Richard’s home was searched. There are many different aspects. Many of your Lordships have spoken today of your concerns about individuals you have known or individuals about whom you have known, who have been, in effect, traduced and brought low by publicity in the way in which we have been discussing. I do not support any such publicity, but I respectfully wonder whether we are addressing the wrong remedy in the wrong Act. For example, what is there to prevent a simple Act of Parliament that makes it a criminal offence for a police officer to disclose the name of any individual who is suspected of a crime, before he has been arrested? It should not be too difficult.

I do not want to repeat what I said last time, but the problem I invite noble Lords to consider is this. An arrest has to be justified. An arrest that is not based on reasonable grounds for suspicion is unlawful. Notice that I pick the moment of arrest—I am not talking about the allegation or the police officer telephoning the local press to say, “We are about to arrest the local schoolmaster”, or whatever it may be; nor am I addressing the issue in the context of sexual offences. The same story should apply to all offences.

An arrest must be lawful. Please can we bear in mind what the consequences of a lawful arrest are? You are detained. You are removed from your home, if that is where you are on arrest, or the street, the town or the city, or your office, or even when you are out having a drink with your friends. You are removed and you are not a volunteer: you have to go. If you resist arrest, you are committing an offence, and down to the police station you go, if that is where they take you. But you are completely in the hands of the arresting officer, and you go through a process. You remain detained, either while further investigations are made or until such time as further evidence emerges or it is decided that, after all, you can be allowed to go, for now, on bail. This is a process that nobody goes into voluntarily. Please can we remember that it is the first stage in the operation of the criminal justice process—and often, of course, culminates in a trial, conviction and sentence.

My concern about both these amendments is that they fail to address the problem that arrest is part of the criminal justice process. If they are adopted or if either one is adopted, we end up not with a situation that is incommunicado, if I may say so to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. We end up with a veil being drawn against any reporting of the fact that one of our fellow citizens has been arrested. I find that troublesome.

The idea of criminal justice being secret is abhorrent to all of us in this country; we do not want formal trials to be conducted in secret. This part of the process, I suggest, should not be seen as a private matter. The exercise of the power to arrest and the consequences of it are public matters. There are many hard cases we have heard about and there has been much abuse of the process, but these issues should be addressed in a different form of legislation.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Judge

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, I endorse, from the point of view of England and Wales, what my noble and learned friend Lord Carswell said about his experience at first instance and in the Court of Appeal in Northern Ireland. On one view of the clause, the Supreme Court is being discriminated in favour of. The Supreme Court consists of five, seven or nine of the brightest legal minds in the country—in the whole country. One judge sitting alone at first instance, or three judges sitting in the Court of Appeal, do not have that same intellectual power. It is immensely helpful to the judge or to the Court of Appeal to have an intervention, leave for it having been granted by somebody who knows something about issues which might have been overlooked.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, so far all noble Lords have spoken in the one sense in relation to this clause. Obviously, in the interests of balance, it is important to consider whether there is anything to be said in favour of the clause. So far as I am concerned, there has been a considerable growth in the number of interventions over recent years. I would like the Government to indicate to us—at some later point if they do not have the information now—exactly how many interventions there have been in the supreme courts. I use that term in its old form, because I think it is extraordinary that we now have senior courts and the Supreme Court. It is high time that the Supreme Court was regarded as the supreme court of the United Kingdom, while the High Court of Justice, the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal were the supreme courts of England and Wales. I hope that, after September, all being well, that may be corrected.

I am not aware that judgments have considerably improved in quality in recent years as a result of interventions, although there may be some way of estimating that. It is always a little difficult, but somebody may be able to do that for us and show the tremendous amount that the interventions have done. I know that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, for whom I have the highest possible regard for a number of reasons, has said that they are often helpful. I am sure that that is true. Everybody wants help; at least most people with any degree of humility are glad to get help, from whatever quarter it comes.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to an aspect of this which I think has to be taken into account. Some of the interveners are campaigning organisations, which are campaigning for a particular result. You may take it that they had a good shot at trying to persuade Parliament to go along with them and that, having failed at that, the campaign is continued once the law is passed. These are not conclusive arguments one way or the other, but I personally find this clause too prescriptive in any event. If there is a real point to be considered, the clause needs some revamping, possibly in the light of the amendments that have been proposed. At the moment, I am anxious to see just why there has been a huge increase—as I think there has been—in the number of interventions in recent years. The first intervention that really came to my notice to any substantial extent was an intervention in this House in a case that became rather important for a number of reasons.