Divorce, Dissolution and Separation Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 3rd March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

The provisions of Amendments 7 and 17A clearly relate to an important aspect of matrimonial proceedings; namely, the financial settlement. The amendments seek to ensure that there are no discussions about such financial settlements for 20 weeks unless both parties agree. However, does this not illustrate the need for legal advice to be available to the parties, or at any rate to at least one of the parties, in the situation of a divorce? I understand that attempts were made to amend the Bill in that respect, but it was ruled that it was not possible to do so. However, will the Minister undertake to look again, or to persuade his colleagues in the Government to do so, at the issue of providing legal aid for matrimonial matters, particularly of this kind, where one party may well have insufficient resources to procure the necessary advice in this important area of the consequences of a divorce?

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I very much support Amendment 20, which the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, spoke to. Not very long ago, I got a fairly impassioned letter from a gentleman I knew who had recently been involved in a divorce. He said that one of the great difficulties in approaching that, which he found by no means easy, was that it was not easy to find out what was likely to happen in relation to finance, and that it was extremely difficult to guess. The reason for that primarily is that the present structure involves a very large amount of judicial discretion. Those of your Lordships who have had the experience of prophesying how a judge will react will understand the difficulty that you encounter with that kind of thing.

Discretion, as I think Lord Bingham said, is a departure from the rule of law, because the discretion becomes the rule not of law but of the judge’s wisdom or lack of it. I remember the old judge in the Court of Session when I first went there: Lord Carmont. He used to say that if you give a thing to a man’s discretion —he was not thinking of women at that time—you commit it also to his indiscretion. The limit of discretion is quite wide.

I thought about trying to do something about this in 1996, but I concluded that it was too difficult to try to mould it to what I was trying to do then. It is probably right that it should not be attempted as part of this Bill. On the other hand, it is mightily necessary to get on with it and get a framework that can be used in the majority of cases. It is true that some discretion may be required—you do not want the framework to be too rigid—but you want it to be fairly clear that this is the way the thing will work unless there are special reasons requiring the exercise of judicial discretion.

Civil Liability Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 10th May 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

There surely has to be a medical definition—and where better to get it from? The medical profession deals with injuries that are labelled “whiplash injuries”. There may be some argument about the definition, but surely it can be decided only on the basis of medical skills.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, I thoroughly agree with the proposition that is highly desirable for the definition used as the basis for later provisions in this part of the Bill to be on the face of the Bill. The difficulty I have had so far is in identifying what we want to do. It is the area of exaggerated claims, or something of that sort, that underlies the Government’s proposals. I agree that it must be, ultimately, a medical definition, because a medical report saying that you have this injury is an essential requirement for you to come under this part of the Bill.

The difficulty, however, is that the doctors have to know where these exaggerations take place. I have been instructed by people who suggest that if you go for the back, and the rest, you are extending the thing beyond the real position. I have, therefore, some sympathy with the amendment restricting that, which I think is to be moved or spoken to later. I do not, however, profess to know exactly what the problem is, in the sense of the area of medical expertise that is being used by the claimant industry to exaggerate claims. That is their idea: to exaggerate these claims and ask for more than they are worth. As I said at Second Reading, I have some experience long past of the difficulty of actually quantifying the correct amount for these injuries, particularly if they are serious—and they can be quite serious, I think. This is my problem and I would be glad of help when the Minister comes to speak.

Housing and Planning Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Monday 11th April 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, this amendment deals with property guardianship schemes, a term with which I was entirely unfamiliar until I read about them in, appropriately enough, the Guardian last December. The situation originally arose when the owners of properties—often commercial properties—who were unable to sell or improve them for the time being wanted them protected. The owners allowed people to go in unlicensed to live there on moderate terms until such time as they could proceed with redevelopment, demolition or whatever.

As a concept it was workable and satisfactory to many people. But latterly it has changed. It has now become a commercial enterprise in which, I have to say, a number of ruthless owners are exploiting people who are not tenants—they have no rights; they are merely licensees—charging quite considerable sums of money for them to live in places that are, very often, unsatisfactory from the point of view of the conditions in which they have to live, with absolutely no security of tenure of any kind.

This prompted me to put down an amendment in Committee, where I quoted the experience of some people who had been through this system. One guardian described rooms that were “like chicken coops” in a place in Kennington offered by a guardian company—that is the euphemistic phrase—for £500 a month. It was a single space with rows of plyboard walls and no natural light or ventilation. In another place, carpets had been worn and stained by thousands of shoes that had crossed the floor of what was a council’s now defunct one-stop shop. Office furniture was piled high next to windows caked with soot, letting in the gloom from Commercial Road. The toilet light did not work. To wash, the guardian had to descend two flights of stairs to a dirty, windowless room, where the guardian company had installed a temporary shower. Other people in the property also used it. The Government should—this amendment seeks to compel them to—apply the same terms as to fitness for human habitation and repairing obligations that apply to proper tenancies under the Landlord and Tenant Act to these guardianship scheme contracts.

The Minister who is to reply to this debate is a different Minister from before. The buck has been passed and I sympathise with the Minister who is replying to this debate. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, and I had an exchange of views—our usual civilised correspondence—in which she acknowledged that,

“property guardianship schemes have a range of drawbacks. The properties that are used are frequently derelict commercial or industrial buildings that were never intended to be used as accommodation and may be in an unsafe condition with inadequate physical security. Occupiers pay a fee to occupy part of the building, are responsible for securing it and preventing damage. However, they are not tenants and do not therefore have the right to exclusive possession of any part of the building. In addition, they can be required to leave at very short notice. The Government does not encourage such schemes but I do recognise that recent media reports suggest they are becoming more widespread. It is very important that anyone considering living in such a building clearly understands the limitations of these schemes and that they will have very limited rights. My department will therefore publish a short factsheet on its website which highlights the fact that the Government does not endorse these schemes, explains that buildings may frequently be unsuitable to be used as accommodation and that an occupier of such buildings has very limited rights”.

With all due respect to the Minister and perhaps those in the department who produced this response, it is very unsatisfactory given the kinds of conditions that I briefly described by quoting just a couple of examples.

That follows a rather difficult exchange with the noble Baroness, Lady Williams, in Committee where she made much the same points about being sympathetic and concerned. She said then:

“The Government do not support the schemes, as the guardians can be asked to live in conditions which do not meet the standards expected in residential properties”.

However, the reason given for not doing anything was that she did not believe—or, in all fairness, the Government did not believe—

“that it would be appropriate to require that Sections 8 to 17 of the Landlord and Tenant Act should apply to guardianship agreements”.

I found that entirely puzzling. If the Government are sympathetic to the plight of the people in these places, applying Sections 8 to 17 would not convert them to the status of tenants but would simply apply to those people conditions which apply to the tenants of residential properties. When I challenged her on this, the Minister said,

“if the noble Lord is talking about the property guardianship schemes, it is because they are arrangements between a building owner and one or more individuals, and the arrangement is temporary. They are not intended to provide stable alternative accommodation”.

However, that does not exempt the Government from protecting people in that position. I find it inexplicable that the Minister was falling back on her brief, which she is entitled to do, but that the brief in turn simply asserted that as there is no tenancy agreement, the Government did,

“not think that the Landlord and Tenant Act actually applies”.—[Official Report, 9/2/16; col. 2223.]

Well, it does not and would not without the Government legislating for that purpose. That is the point of the amendment. As the Government are so clearly aware of this growing problem—there are now reckoned to be more than 4,000 people living in these dreadful conditions—I cannot think why they cannot simply accept that these people should benefit from the limited but essential requirements of the relevant parts of the Landlord and Tenant Act which would be applied specifically by legislation for this purpose. I cannot think why the Government have so far declined to do that.

Unless there is an assurance from the Minister that she will take this issue back and return to it at Third Reading, I will seek to test the opinion of the House. I hope that we can make progress on this issue. It is not a party or divisive point. It is a simple enough matter which the Government should respond to more constructively and helpfully than they have done hitherto. I do not blame Ministers for that. I suspect that someone in the department has not grasped the reality of the situation. I beg to move.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

This is an extremely worrying situation, as the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, explained it. I am not at all clear about the fact that this provision appears to apply the tenancy provisions that are applicable to all guardianship contracts. The noble Lord has already explained clearly that these are not all residential properties; some are commercial. I wonder whether the guardianship arrangements are suitable for people who live in the accommodation, which cannot be of a very high standard to come under the guardianship scheme. Therefore, I wonder whether it is possible to build something satisfactory on a foundation so unsatisfactory as a guardianship scheme for residential property.

Criminal Cases Review Commission (Information) Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Friday 11th March 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)]

My Lords, obviously, this amendment raises matters of considerable interest. I should have thought that proposed new subsection (8)(a) to (c) would inevitably be either part of the new rules or considered already part of the existing system. I find difficulty with proposed new paragraph (d), because it seems that if proposed new paragraphs (a) to (c) are satisfied, that should be sufficient to allow the matter to proceed. It is also very important, as the noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, said, to recall that, as far as I know, no complaints about the procedures of the CCRC have been made since it was set up, when I had some responsibility in this area. So I think we can safely leave these issues to be determined in terms of the criminal rules if necessary, while realising that we appreciate the importance of these issues subject to the omission of proposed new paragraph (d) in the amendment.

[Lord Beecham (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by echoing the remarks of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer in congratulating the noble Lord on bringing the Bill forward. I also congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and the Justice Select Committee on their work, which has informed this process.

At Second Reading, the noble Lord, Lord Black, touched on the concerns which are now reflected in the amendment. I do not often support policies or philosophies advanced by those closely associated with the Telegraph but on this occasion I have every sympathy with them. My initial reaction was to believe that it would be sensible to pass the amendment. However, having heard from the noble Lords who have addressed the Committee today, I am persuaded that it is unnecessary to write the rules for the commission when it is clear from its track record that it is in any event very likely to incorporate them. I am sure that the commission will look carefully at the tenor of today’s debate and the Second Reading debate before finalising its ultimate response, assuming that the Bill secures its enactment with the approval of the House of Commons.

I certainly bear in mind the time constraints and perhaps the undesirability of adding material which may in any way impede the progress of the Bill when it is considered in the Commons. In the circumstances, therefore, I certainly join others in respectfully advising the noble Lord not to press his amendment. However, I hope that the Minister will clearly put on the record support for what lies behind the amendment, as I think that will assist in securing the positive response from the commission that all of us wish to see.

Criminal Justice and Courts Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Wednesday 30th July 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

The noble Lord asked whether the examples I gave were both real. One, which I have dealt with in detail before, is an actual example, and the other was simply to illustrate what could happen under the case put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.

[Lord Beecham]

Of course the noble and learned Lord is right. I should simply have referred the Islington matter to him as a substantive one. As I said, that is unlikely to be replicated in that particular borough in any event, but that is by the way.

The Minister has signally failed to answer other questions, particularly what is meant by availability and the likelihood of availability. That question has been left in the air, which is not at all satisfactory. We have debated legal aid in this House before, as we have the problems that applicants and their legal advisers will face in dealing with matters up to the stage when permission is granted. There is a real risk that costs up to that point will not be covered by legal aid. There are other areas that will potentially be governed by other proposals, for example concerning a residence test, which currently is under appeal. We will come on to those later.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, so far all noble Lords have spoken in the one sense in relation to this clause. Obviously, in the interests of balance, it is important to consider whether there is anything to be said in favour of the clause. So far as I am concerned, there has been a considerable growth in the number of interventions over recent years. I would like the Government to indicate to us—at some later point if they do not have the information now—exactly how many interventions there have been in the supreme courts. I use that term in its old form, because I think it is extraordinary that we now have senior courts and the Supreme Court. It is high time that the Supreme Court was regarded as the supreme court of the United Kingdom, while the High Court of Justice, the Crown Court and the Court of Appeal were the supreme courts of England and Wales. I hope that, after September, all being well, that may be corrected.

I am not aware that judgments have considerably improved in quality in recent years as a result of interventions, although there may be some way of estimating that. It is always a little difficult, but somebody may be able to do that for us and show the tremendous amount that the interventions have done. I know that the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, for whom I have the highest possible regard for a number of reasons, has said that they are often helpful. I am sure that that is true. Everybody wants help; at least most people with any degree of humility are glad to get help, from whatever quarter it comes.

The noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to an aspect of this which I think has to be taken into account. Some of the interveners are campaigning organisations, which are campaigning for a particular result. You may take it that they had a good shot at trying to persuade Parliament to go along with them and that, having failed at that, the campaign is continued once the law is passed. These are not conclusive arguments one way or the other, but I personally find this clause too prescriptive in any event. If there is a real point to be considered, the clause needs some revamping, possibly in the light of the amendments that have been proposed. At the moment, I am anxious to see just why there has been a huge increase—as I think there has been—in the number of interventions in recent years. The first intervention that really came to my notice to any substantial extent was an intervention in this House in a case that became rather important for a number of reasons.

[Lord Beecham]

I am sure that when it comes to interventions, the Minister is extremely grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, because I suspect that no other intervention has offered him any assistance. The noble and learned Lord might recall that there have been, I think, 50 cases in the last 13 years in which bodies of the kind that he referred to, such as charitable organisations, have intervened. That is not, on the face of it, an inordinate number, just as the total number of judicial review cases—other than immigration cases which are no longer dealt with in the courts—is fairly modest.

Moreover, interventions take place only with the leave of the court. If there were a right to intervene that would perhaps give some force to the noble and learned Lord’s misgivings, but it is for the court to determine whether interveners should be allowed. That point has been made clearly today and on other occasions. It seems to me that the Bill’s provisions in relation to interveners are based on either a misunderstanding of their role or a misrepresentation—deliberate or otherwise—of how it works in the real world, rather than the world the Minister of Justice appears to imagine exists. As we have heard, the role of interveners is to assist the deliberations of the court, not to meddle. Of course, no intervention can be made without the court’s consent.

We have heard powerful speeches from the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell, and the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who have direct experience of the role of intervention on—almost—different sides. Clause 67 seems to me to be a full-frontal assault on the principle of intervention. As has been stressed today, in earlier debates and in many of the briefings that we have received, this clause is clearly designed to deter contributions to the determination of judicial review applications. Again, leave for contributions must be obtained from the court and, as we have heard exemplified today, such contributions are very often most helpful to the court.

I shall speak to Amendments 74A, 74B, 74E to 74G, 74J and 74L. These amendments broadly follow the theme of preserving the court’s discretion in these matters where the Bill would fetter it, usually for the benefit of the respondent and often, therefore, of the Government. Clause 67(2) illustrates perfectly the Government’s attitude to the principle of equality of arms. It prohibits any order for costs in favour of an intervener. This provision is clearly aimed at charities and voluntary organisations, as opposed to commercial or statutory organisations which are well able to afford the costs of intervention, and it is heedless of the likelihood of thereby discouraging helpful interventions. Amendment 74A would therefore allow the court to make an order for a relevant party to pay the intervener’s costs. Amendment 74B would emphasise the discretionary nature of such an order by adding,

“if the court considers it appropriate to do so”.

Amendments 74E and 74F would remove Clause 67(4), (5) and (6), which require the court to make a costs order against an intervener in respect of costs deemed to have been incurred by a party as a result of the intervention, save in exceptional circumstances, the latter to be judged in the light of criteria, once again to be specified in rules of court, and again, therefore, effectively determined by the Lord Chancellor.

Amendment 74F would allow the court to make an order against an intervener where it considers it just to do so, and provided that exceptional circumstances apply. This would be defined by a new Clause 67(6) as where the intervener has in substance acted as if he were the principal applicant, appellant or respondent. If an intervener takes on that kind of role then he could be ordered to pay costs if the court so determines, as he could if he were a party. As an alternative, Amendment 74G, which is very much by way of a fall-back provision, would at least change the requirement in Clause 67(4) to make an order against an intervener from being mandatory to discretionary, which Amendment 74J would complement by adding,

“if the court considers it appropriate to do so”.

Noble Lords, in particular the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who are highly experienced in these matters, have expressed profound concerns about the nature of the Bill’s proposals. We have had indications from the Minister in the past that the Government are perhaps open to argument and persuasion about this. I very much hope that we can hear from him confirmation of that. I hope that some move will be made in the direction of allowing this process—which is of great service to the administration of justice—to continue without the threat which would impede and deter potential helpful interventions from those in the best position to advise the court, which after all retains the ultimate decision.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Tuesday 4th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I had some experience of trying to push this agenda forward rather a long time ago but I wonder about, for example, creating a duty on the present Lord Chancellor to do this. What does this amount to? I have a feeling that the argument that has been presented suggests that you should make the duty incumbent on all the judiciary at all levels, so that they welcome diversity. That is my answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws. There is a limit to what the Lord Chancellor can do to change the culture now, with his present powers. There is also some question as to what the Lord Chief Justice can do, though he can be welcoming and so on. The logic of it is for the whole judiciary to be required to welcome diversity and all the benefits that it brings.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I am fascinated, not to say a little distracted, by the zoological references to pregnant snails. I am not quite sure how one could tell, unless one was another snail. Perhaps I ought to address myself to the amendments rather than to this curious analogy.

I certainly support the thrust of the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. Amendment 86DA, which is in my name, sets out a process; I should indicate to the noble Lord that perhaps the drafting is not quite as it should be. However, subsection (4) in my proposed new section 64A, which states:

“These duties shall continue for five years, but may be extended for five year terms by order”,

relates to its subsection (3) on the question of annual reports, rather than the principal objectives of that amendment, which are set out in subsections (1) and (2).

Several of your Lordships have pointed out the importance of making progress in this critical area. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, suggests that the duty should be spread wider, but it is difficult to envisage a duty on the holder of a judicial office to promote diversity in that capacity. It is surely a matter for those with greater responsibility at the top of the pyramid, both politically and judicially—the Lord Chancellor and the Lord Chief Justice, in addition to the commission—to have that duty. It is presumably easier to hold them to account in a less informal way than it would be to hold the whole judiciary to account.

I hope that the Government will accede to the arguments made by noble Lords and noble Baronesses. This is not a dramatic amendment, but it underpins the process that your Lordships have clearly adopted and wish to see implemented. It is a matter on which I should have thought the Government could concede without any kind of embarrassment because it carries out effectively the thrust of the policy on which the majority of the House are clearly agreed. I therefore hope that the Minister can agree to that or, at the very least, give it some further thought and come back at Third Reading. It would be better not to have to vote on this matter, given that there is a great deal of common ground. I am looking to the noble Lord to be as co- operative on this occasion as I was on a previous occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I wonder whether it is worth mentioning that, of course, the Supreme Court is of interest in jurisdictions other than those in which the Lord Chancellor has authority now, and there may be a question about the balance of that. Admittedly, other jurisdictions have representation on the selection committee, but it may be worth while keeping in place that balance.

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I endorse everything that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, as a surrogate for my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. Had he been here I am sure that he would have enthusiastically congratulated the Government on their change of heart. Again, I rather tiresomely congratulate the Minister on accepting the wisdom of the House as previously expressed. We welcome this change and reversion to what is essentially the current situation. We look forward to more of the same as we go through the Bill.

Civil Legal Aid (Merits Criteria) Regulations 2012

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Monday 3rd December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My noble friend is to be congratulated not only on bringing this amendment to the House but also on being elected Peer of the Year. At this rate he may turn into the Hilary Mantel of your Lordships’ House; she of course has won her second Man Booker prize, and it may be that next year my noble friend is awarded with his accolade again. I will speak briefly to his amendment before turning to that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

The Opposition entirely support the case made by my noble friend, particularly because, embedded in the Government’s approach and reflected to some degree in today’s debate, there is some confusion between points of law and errors of law for the purpose of these regulations. The Citizens Advice briefing helpfully makes this distinction clear. It says:

“Furthermore in devising this whole policy Government appears to be confusing ‘points of law’ with ‘errors of law’. Whilst the majority of first tier welfare benefit appeals turn on ‘points of fact’ such as financial and other circumstances … many cases do raise significant legal issues over statutory interpretation (ie social security regulations), legal tests for disability”—

as referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey—

“or disputed application of … precedents etc. The tribunal making an error of law which may be subject to a right of appeal is a much narrower concept”.

We have to bear that distinction in mind when weighing the strength of the case made by my noble friend. It will be the very exceptional case, as the noble Baroness pointed out, that may qualify for that description of an error in law, which of course has to be self-certified by the tribunal itself—a peculiar process, one might think. We are certainly not in the position that the Minister mentioned in the debate in the House of Commons when he talked about 440,000 cases. That number is inconceivably large and, in my view, can be dismissed. Certainly, though, probably a good deal more than 650 cases could potentially arise if the definition were to deal with points of law. I hope that, bearing in mind the assurances given on the earlier occasion by the former Lord Chancellor, the House will support my noble friend’s amendment.

I also support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, as I understand him. Indeed, there is a peculiar relationship between Regulation 53 and Regulation 39, but in my view it goes somewhat beyond the matter identified by the noble and learned Lord. In addition to the potential clash with Regulation 39(d), it strikes me that problems arise in relation to two earlier parts of that regulation, paragraphs (a) and (b). I remind noble Lords that all these matters have to be borne in mind when dealing with Regulation 53. Under Regulation 39(a) the director has to be,

“satisfied that the following criteria are met … the individual does not have access to other potential sources of funding (other than a conditional fee agreement) from which it would be reasonable to fund the case”.

That is a fairly open-ended requirement. Regulation 39(b) says that the director has to be satisfied that,

“the case is unsuitable for a conditional fee agreement”.

Suppose, though, that it was suitable for a conditional fee agreement; that of course does not necessarily mean that a conditional fee agreement is available. Suitability and availability are not the same thing. That reinforces the noble and learned Lord’s point that there is an inconsistency between Regulation 39 taken as a whole, not just in relation to Regulation 39(d), and Regulation 53. I hope that noble Lords will be convinced by that element.

There is a further matter that I need to touch on. The thrust of the Government’s proposals is to reduce the reliance on judicial review. We have to be concerned about this in view of recent pronouncements about the Government’s desire to reduce substantially the number of cases that can be advanced by that method, which is of course a principal method of holding the Executive to account. This is just one potential example, but I think that noble Lords will want to pay particular attention to it, having regard to the category of people who will be most affected by it. We should not lose sight of the fact that this may be part of a process of restricting access to judicial review that will go well beyond this particular category. In my submission, that is an additional reason for noble Lords to support the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, am I right or wrong in thinking that any appellant who is unhappy with the decision of the First-tier Tribunal can ask it to review the decision?

[Lord Beecham]

Assuming that the appellant has the knowledge of that procedure, he might ask it to review its decision, but the review will amount to nothing unless the tribunal convicts itself, as it were, of an error in law. If it makes that mea culpa then under the Government’s amendment there is a potential for legal aid to be granted, but not otherwise.

Local Government Finance Bill

Debate between Lord Mackay of Clashfern and Lord Beecham

Monday 22nd October 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Beecham]

My Lords, I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, in endorsing the thrust of the amendment moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and I respectfully adopt his formulation, which I think meets the drafting point. In any event, I have an inherent aversion to the creation of absolute offences, which is what new Section 14B does. It is not appropriate to criminalise behaviour which could be dealt with in the way of a civil liability, particularly when there is not a necessary element of dishonesty. I hope that, when the legislation goes back to the House of Commons, the Minister will look sympathetically with her colleagues in government at whether the provision could be improved.

However, in addition to the matters which the noble Baroness’s amendments address, I am concerned about some further provisions in the proposed new section. New Section 14B(4) states that regulations under subsections which refer to false statements and the like—that is, subsection (1)(d), (e) and (f),

“that create an offence that may only be committed by a person acting dishonestly … must provide for the offence to be triable summarily or on indictment”.

I have no objection to that, but new subsection (6) states that regulations under those provisions which,

“create an offence that may be committed by a person acting otherwise than dishonestly”,

would incur a lesser sentence. So there is still a provision within the new provision to allow for somebody not acting dishonestly to be brought before the criminal courts under the provisions of new subsection (1)(d), (e) and(f). That is another example of stretching the creation of an absolute offence.

It is clear that people who deliberately fail should be dealt with but, in my view, not necessarily by the criminal courts. It is equally clear that those who may fail inadvertently or for the reasons advanced by the noble Baroness should not be treated as criminals, although there may be and perhaps should still be a procedure for them to suffer some penalty as an inducement to provide information. That point may be more debatable. I join with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord in thinking that those provisions go too far to criminalise behaviour—particularly, as the noble Baroness said, as that may well affect vulnerable people, for whom a criminal sanction is simply inappropriate.

Without the Minister committing herself today, I hope that she will at least agree to discuss this further with colleagues to see whether a less draconian process could be used.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I assume that the prosecuting authority would have some regard to the circumstances of any suggested offence under the regulations, but it is very important that the regulations should not include people as potentially liable for criminal sanctions who have not been dishonest in some way or other. The noble Baroness has given examples of people who might find it very difficult to comply with regulations within 21 days in some circumstances. I hope that my noble friend, with her colleagues, may find it possible to modify the statutory language to eliminate the risk of people being faced with criminal charges who are not deliberately doing wrong but who find themselves in difficulties of one kind or another.

I have sympathy with the view that the regulations which deal with council tax are extremely complicated and that it would be easy for someone to fall into a mistake without any deliberation. The last thing that we would want is to criminalise people who make honest mistakes; otherwise, most of us would have some difficulty avoiding the criminal law at some stage, and possibly at more than one stage, of our careers.