Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Monday 13th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord McNally]

I suspect that my noble friend is right.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, is it correct that the Bill proceeds on the basis that those that have a franchise in general elections would have a franchise under the referendum Bill, and that if the legislation covering general elections is altered in the mean time, this would apply automatically to the referendum if it comes after that amendment has taken place?

[Lord McNally]

I suspect that there is indisputable logic in what my noble and learned friend says.

Queen's Speech

Lord Mackay of Clashfern Excerpts

Thursday 27th May 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, I consider it a great privilege to follow the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Leicester, and I agree with many of the things that he said, particularly about the idea of having a large number of additional Members of your Lordships’ House. I do not know to what extent that is more than speculation, but I certainly hope that what he and others have said will be taken into careful consideration.

I begin by thanking the Labour Ministers for their kindness to me during their term of office. Unfortunately they did not always agree with me, but I hope that the voice of individual conscience will continue to be respected in our country, as it was in the past.

I particularly congratulate the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on his appointment as Advocate-General for Scotland. I am glad that the Government have recognised the importance of having Law Officers who have a deep understanding of the political considerations and yet who at the same time are able to give independent and reliable legal advice.

My noble and learned friend is unique in a number of ways. I think that he is the only person to have served in a Scottish Administration and now serve in the Government of the United Kingdom. He is unique in another respect. As a Member of the Scottish Parliament, he formed with his colleagues a coalition with the Labour Party in Scotland. Now, of course, he has taken part in a coalition with the Conservatives here. That shows that a person of fundamentally Liberal Democratic principle can work well and in coalition with those who are willing to work with him. His career also underlines the danger of the advice that was given by one Cabinet Minister in the election campaign, that people should vote tactically. Another Cabinet Minister, more patronisingly, referred to the same idea as “intelligent” voting. I am glad to say that that principled Scot, the then Prime Minister, said that he wanted people to vote for what they believed in.

The principal thing I want to speak about is the proposal for fixed-term Parliaments. A fixed term for Parliament undoubtedly has the advantage of removing a great deal of opportunity for speculation. It also has the advantage of removing from a Prime Minister the temptation to go for an election when the party that he leads happens to be high in the opinion polls—or, occasionally, when he feels that there is a disaster around the corner and is anxious that the election take place before it comes. A fixed-term Parliament has an advantage in that respect. It also has the advantage of eliminating the situation already referred to when the Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, appeared to stimulate speculation that an election would be held shortly after he took office but it then did not happen. I gather from the newspapers—although I have no other way of knowing—that one result of that was abortive expenditure of fairly high sums by the Labour Party, which I am sure that it would like to have avoided.

Five years has been selected. I can see arguments for different lengths, but I can see a great deal of argument in favour of having fixed-term Parliaments. A matter that has attracted a lot of attention is the proposal for 55 per cent. As I understand it, because there is only a shorthand statement of it in the coalition agreement, the proposal is in no way to interfere with the rule that a Government lose their mandate to govern if they lose a no-confidence Motion in the House of Commons by 50 per cent plus one—of those voting, to go back to the point raised this morning. Fifty per cent of those voting plus one brings down the Government.

[Lord Hughes of Woodside]

It is not 50 per cent plus one; it is a majority of one.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

That seems to me to be much the same thing. I am perfectly happy to accept that formulation: a majority plus one—a majority of one. A majority is a majority of one; in other words, 50 per cent of the votes cast plus one. That is the way that I have understood it; I may be corrected if I have got it wrong.

If the Government in office lose the confidence of the House of Commons, it does not necessarily follow that Parliament should be dissolved, even under our present system where there is no fixed-Parliament rule. But if you have a fixed-Parliament rule, you must have some protection against easy and arbitrary dissolution. As I understand it, the proposal for a requirement of 55 per cent has been formulated for that.

In Scotland, when the Labour Government introduced the Scotland Act, they produced a requirement for a two-thirds majority for a vote for dissolution. Fifty-five per cent seems rather reasonable in comparison with that. It has been suggested in some quarters that that is because of proportional representation in Scotland, but the only effect of proportional representation is to make a minority government more likely than it is under a first-past-the-post system. The voting in the Parliament is one Member, one vote, so, in my judgment, the analogy with Scotland is important.

That is a separate question altogether from the collapse of or loss of confidence in the Government. If the Government lose a vote of no-confidence on the basis that we have discussed—I will not repeat it again—the result is that the Government are out of office, and the question is whether someone else could form a Government. Your Lordships will remember that at one point in the transition Mr Gordon Brown mentioned the possibility of an alternative coalition in the present House of Commons, so the idea of there being more than one person capable of forming a Government in that situation is perfectly reasonable.

We look forward to the legislation in detail, and I hope that, in framing it, those responsible will look closely at the detail of the Scotland Act, which I do not want to go into at present but which includes a safeguard in relation to the time: if no view can be taken by a time limit, dissolution arises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Rennard]

Given the public commitments by both coalition parties, that clearly would not happen. The noble and learned Lord makes a good point, however. When we consider this fully and properly in due course and learn the lessons over this parliament, perhaps the 55 per cent measure will be seen as an insufficient trigger. Perhaps his Government acted sensibly and wisely in the Scotland Act in ensuring that in Scotland, as in Wales and in Northern Ireland, a two-thirds majority is required. For this parliament, though, 55 per cent provides stability.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Before the noble Lord goes on, is it not implicit in what is proposed in the coalition agreement that there should be a lost vote of confidence before there is a Dissolution?

[Lord Rennard]

It is probably logically necessary that there would have to be a vote of no confidence in the Government. If it were impossible to form a new Government, I have no doubt that Members in another place would vote for Dissolution by more than 55 per cent. That is what happens in the Scottish Parliament, for example: if the First Minister resigns and they are unable to elect a new First Minister, an election is triggered.

I draw the attention of noble Lords opposite to the manifesto on which they fought just three weeks ago. It pledged, and I quote it precisely, that Labour would provide legislation,

“to ensure Parliaments sit for a fixed term”.

Please note carefully the word “ensure”. Those who fought the election on the basis of “ensuring” that Parliament sat for a fixed term have some obligations to say how they would ensure that.