Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord King of Bridgwater]

My Lords, as I consider our proceedings in this Committee stage of the Bill, I increasingly think that your Lordships’ House is providing a real service to the other place in the fact that this Bill has started here. It is quite clear that there are some drafting problems. The amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and, indeed, the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, are serious amendments that should be considered. I think that the Minister will be doing a great service to his colleagues in the department and may be able to clear up a number of issues. The drafting is not right. It could be cleared up now and the Bill will be much simpler and much more appropriate by the time it goes to another place.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I regret that I was not able to take part in the Second Reading of this Bill. I support Amendment 32 and suggest that in one very minor respect it may not go quite far enough. There used to be a body known as the Security Commission, on which I served for some years. I succeeded the noble and learned Lord, Lord Griffiths, as chairman of that body and was in due course succeeded by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Our main function was to investigate and report on cases of espionage—selling secrets to the Russians and things of that kind. We were appointed by the Prime Minister to investigate particular matters and, before we were appointed, we had to have the consent of the leader of the Opposition. The noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, will remember those days. I think that it can be said that we did the state some service. Since the end of the Cold War, espionage is no longer the problem that it was, certainly not in the same way. Therefore the Security Commission has not sat for some years.

I suggest that it is possible that such cases might arise again in the future. If they did, surely the new security committee would be the obvious body—the ideal body—to carry out such an investigation. That being so—if it is so—I am concerned that Clause 2, even with the amendment suggested by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, might not be quite right to enable that to happen. It might or might not be, strictly speaking, an operational matter of MI6.

My suggestion would be to add a very few words to Clause 2(4). After the word “functions”, one could add, “or the functions formerly performed by the Security Commission”. That would be in line 20. Future historians would no longer have to worry about whatever happened to the Security Commission and we would have given that body what one might call a decent burial. I had drafted an amendment to that effect, but I was too late to put it down this morning. I would be happy to move such an amendment on Report, if it were to find favour.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, this certainly seems a very sensible and practical group of amendments. Amendment 30 would remove the Prime Minister’s involvement in the assessment of whether a matter that the ISC wished to consider satisfied the criteria of being of significant national interest and not part of an ongoing operation. I fully support the extension of the ISC’s statutory remit to include particular operational matters; it is a function that the committee, in practice, already performs. We also understand the necessity of constraining this remit. I think that the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, in speaking to his amendment, made that point, too. It is necessary to ensure that the committee’s work is focused on areas of significant national interest and does not jeopardise ongoing operations. The determination of whether an operation is of significant national interest and whether it is not currently ongoing are objective judgments. One is a decision about what is of interest to the public, which the committee is surely best placed to judge, and the other is a statement of fact, which would simply involve consultation with the relevant government agencies. It is not a process of negotiation with the Prime Minister.

It is unclear to me why this assessment cannot be left to the discretion of the committee without needing the involvement of the Prime Minister. If the key point of the reforms in this legislation is to establish a clearer independence of the committee from the Prime Minister and a closer connection with Parliament, then requiring the ISC to seek the permission and the agreement of the Prime Minister before determining whether a specific operational matter lies in its remit sends a completely wrong signal about the independence of the ISC.

We also give full support to Amendment 32, which would provide important flexibility to the committee’s powers to view specific operational matters. We have consistently argued that the ISC should be given the power to review specific operational matters, such as control orders, while recognising that limitations may apply with respect to ongoing operations where the committee’s work may jeopardise the integrity of those operations. An absolute ban on considering any ongoing operational matters seems to us to be unnecessarily heavy-handed. It is easy to imagine particular cases of significant public interest, perhaps where the majority of the operation has been concluded but there is still some ongoing activity that cannot be reviewed by the committee, even if the Government agree that there is no risk. Amendment 32 would be a highly sensible alternative to the blanket ban by allowing the committee, with the agreement of the Secretary of State, to review certain ongoing operations. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord King of Bridgwater, that there seems to be a drafting deficiency. I hope that the Minister can give a more positive response to this group of amendments than he was able to for the last one.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Monday 28th May 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, my first impression on seeing this year’s helping from the Home Office is one of great relief because it is, at least by recent comparison, relatively short and uncontroversial. There is also relief because it contains only one new offence: driving with drugs in the bloodstream, whether or not your driving is impaired by the presence of drugs. That brings drugs into line with existing law on alcohol and is to be thoroughly welcomed.

I also welcome Clause 17, in so far as it favours the creation of a new, unified county court. Surely, the explanation for the name rests in the jurisdiction, not in the fact that the court will be based in individual counties. I hope that we will not lose the name “county court”, despite the unification of all county courts.

I was less certain, I am bound to say, about the family court, for a reason which I shall explain, but having listened to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, I find that I am completely convinced by her argument. Let me just explain the danger I foresee. That is that the unified family court may prove to be a step towards combining the High Court and the county court generally—in other words, a unified civil court. That has long been favoured in Whitehall, but it has long been resisted in the Strand—at least by some of us. Why? The reason is that it may tend eventually to diminish the role of the High Court judge. In my view, the High Court judge is the key to the whole judicial structure, and if he should come to be regarded as just another judge, as it were, just another rung on the judicial ladder—this is certainly how it looks from the list on page 115 of the Bill—the structure would indeed be threatened. It would be a step towards a career judiciary such as they have in France, which I would greatly regret. In the end, in my view, it would affect the quality of our highest judiciary. When the noble Lord replies, I hope that he will at least reassure me that there is no intention of creating a unified civil court, at the moment at any rate.

I come to Clause 18 on page 16 and Part 1 of Schedule 12 on page 167. Section 23(2) of the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 provides as follows:

“The Court consists of 12 judges appointed by Her Majesty”.

Nothing could be clearer than that. There is then a provision in subsection (3) for that number to be increased but not reduced. Now we are told that the court is to consist of,

“the persons appointed as its judges”.

If I may say so, that seems to me a masterly statement of the obvious. What else could the court consist of but its judges? As to the number of such judges, we are told that it is not to exceed 12 full-time equivalent judges. For the first time in our history we are going to have part-time judges sitting in our most senior court. There would seem to be no limit to the number of part-time judges who might be so appointed. We could have 24 half-time judges, or a mixture of full-time judges and part-time judges. I am bound to say that this is a development I would deeply regret. I wonder whether the interest in flexible-time working and so on justifies such a vital change in our most senior court.

Moreover, why is there a sudden need to provide for an overall reduction in the number of judges of the Supreme Court? Back in 2005 we chose the number 12 because that was the number of serving Law Lords. Is the suggestion that the current judges of the Supreme Court do not have enough to do and therefore the number should be reduced to 11 or 10? Surely anybody who looks at, or even glances at, the weekly law reports can see that they have more than enough to do—indeed, they are too busy rather than not busy enough—yet there is the suggestion that their number might be reduced.

Is the explanation, perhaps, that we do not have enough money to pay for 12 judges? That seems even more inconceivable, yet no other reason is given in the Explanatory Notes for the need now to reduce the number. Indeed, the extraordinary provision in Schedule 12 says that there is a problem about having “exactly 12” Supreme Court judges, almost as if we could afford 11 and a half judges but not 12. I am bewildered by the whole of this part of the Bill, and I hope that we will have an explanation and that it will be fully explored in Committee.

I turn to diversity, which is covered by Part 2 of Schedule 12. How we can get greater diversity among our judges, particularly in our higher courts, has been a problem for as long as I can remember. My recollection is that when we considered these matters in 2004 in the Select Committee, we spent more time on diversity than on any other single issue. Everybody agrees that we should have more diversity and that selection should be on merit. It is very easy to say that. Then along comes Sir Colin Campbell and others who, I remember, argued in 2004 that merit does not mean what one thinks—it is just a threshold. Once one passes the threshold you can take all these other matters into account, including diversity. One finds exactly the same argument advanced before the Constitution Committee by Professor Cheryl Thomas, at paragraph 95 of its report. In 2004, we rejected that argument out of hand. That is why one finds “solely on merit” in Section 63(2) of the existing Act, which entirely meets that argument whenever it is to be advanced. I find myself therefore entirely in agreement with paragraph 97 of the Constitution Committee report—I am glad that it said what is in that paragraph—which also said that “solely” should mean what it says.

However, the Government now come along with the bright idea that two candidates could be exactly equal in merit. What then? Does that give us a kind of loophole in which we can aim for diversity? I remember the noble Baroness, Lady Ashton, being asked in 2005 what would happen if two candidates for the High Court were of exactly equal merit. She laughed and simply brushed it aside, saying that if ever that time were to come at least she would not have to decide it. In truth, it is not a problem at all because, at any rate for the higher courts, it is not possible to imagine that two candidates in real life will be exactly equal. I therefore find myself in entire agreement with the views expressed in the Constitution Committee by the noble Baroness, Lady Neuberger, and by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Phillips and Lord Judge. It is simply not a way through; indeed, it is slightly worse than that. Suppose that one was a black judge who had been appointed to the Supreme Court—

[Lord Lea of Crondall]

I have been following the noble and learned Lord most carefully and apologise for intruding on this discussion among the experts in the field. I find the logic of what he has just said impeccable but is he happy that 80% of judges went to public schools, which represent 7% of the population of this country? He can fob it off on to somebody else but is he happy about that?

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Of course I am not happy. I am as unhappy as anybody in this Chamber at the existing situation but we are trying to find a solution. All I can say to the noble Lord is that things are slowly getting better. We have put in provisions saying that it should be the duty of the appointments commission to search out, by widening the pool in which it looks, to find candidates who would be the best. I entirely agree with the noble Lord but I fear it is simply a question of time until we get a reasonable number of black people and white ladies among the judges. What worries me is that the Government are finding some way of trying to satisfy public opinion by saying that, in these circumstances, they can choose to make the Supreme Court more diverse. In fact, it is not going to happen. It is simply wishing away the problem as if it did not exist. If I had to describe the answer which they have given, I would have to say that I find it thoroughly trite.

Justice: Evidence

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Thursday 15th December 2011 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government when they expect to receive a further report from the Privy Council review, led by Sir John Chilcot, on using intercept as evidence.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)]

My Lords, there have recently been changes to the membership of the Privy Council group. I look forward to it reconvening shortly to assess progress and, as appropriate, to offer advice.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, it is now nearly four years since the Chilcot committee was asked to find a way of making intercept evidence available in court. The preferred approach has always been by what has been called public interest immunity plus, which has many advantages. However, in December 2009, that approach was abandoned in the light of the decision of the fourth section of the European Court of Human Rights in a case from Finland. Since then, we have heard very little. Does the Minister recall that a month ago the Lord Chief Justice and the president of the Supreme Court gave evidence that the courts are following decisions of the European Court of Human Rights too strictly? If that is accepted, would he encourage the Chilcot committee to look again at PII+ and perhaps take further legal advice?

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

My Lords, I am sure that we are all grateful to the noble Lord for bringing forward his first three amendments. However, I want to raise a couple of points in relation to Amendment 4. Essentially, it is to put a straightforward question to the noble Lord as to whether the 42 days that his amendment would now give for the transition period is sufficient. I do so in view of reports today that senior police officers believe that they are not fully prepared for the introduction of the new law to replace control orders.

During the passage of this Bill, we have had quite a number of debates about the principle of control orders and I do not seek to open up that question, as the House’s view is very clear on that matter. I have always recognised that the use of control orders should be a last option because they impose intrusive restrictions on individuals who in most cases will not have been convicted of a terrorism offence. But the fact is that their use was endorsed by the senior police officer who gave evidence to the Public Bill Committee in the other place. Twice in the past few months the Home Secretary has argued, first in the case of CD and then in the case of BM, that the use of control orders, particularly the relocation measures, was necessary.

The Government are saying that we can move on from the use of these control orders because alternative measures that are either in the Bill or will be put in place alongside the Bill, including much greater surveillance, will provide the reassurance that is required. That is a big ask of the police and security services. It is surely significant that the senior representative of the Metropolitan Police, in evidence to the Public Bill Committee, said earlier this year:

“To get the resources that we anticipate we need will take more than a year, in terms of being able to get people trained and to get the right equipment”.—[Official Report, Commons, Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill Committee, 21/6/11; col. 9.]

It is fair to ask the Minister whether the police and security services are now completely satisfied that they are now able to provide the additional surveillance and other measures that would allow control orders, particularly the exclusion measures contained within the current legislation, to move into abeyance as a result of the Bill. The fact that the Minister is appearing before us today to increase the transition period from 28 days to 42 days is not without significance, and of course was done on the advice of the police and security forces.

The question before us and the Government is whether a two-week extension is sufficient. Given all the challenges that we face in the area of security and potential terrorism, and given the Olympic Games, I ask the Minister—I am sure that this will be raised in the other place when the Bill goes back there—whether, even at this late stage, we ought not to consider giving the police and security services some more time in order to ensure that sufficient resources, people and training are indeed in place.

The reports this morning appear to suggest that there are senior officers who do not believe that they are sufficiently ready. I ask the Minister to comment on that. Can he give me some assurance that the security of our country is not being put at risk? Again I ask: would the Government not be better advised, before the Bill goes back to the other place, to legislate for the option of keeping control orders until we are certain and confident that the surveillance measures are fully in place and that sufficient officers are appointed and trained to do the job that they will be required to do?

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I find myself unable to support the argument that has been put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt. Indeed, it seems to be very much a repetition, on a rather smaller scale, of an argument that we heard over and over again on Report, all based on the views of one particular senior police officer. I for my part am completely satisfied with the view that has been taken by the Government. My general view is that the sooner we get rid of the old legislation, the better.

I have one other problem, which I do not know whether the Minister will be able to answer. It turns on paragraph 2 of Schedule 8 combined with paragraph 7 of Schedule 8. As I understand it, paragraph 2 provides that the old law will continue to apply to those who are currently under control orders. Paragraph 8 says that that will be so even though the 2005 Act would have expired, quite apart from this Bill repealing it. Is that the position? If so, when do the new provisions begin to apply to those who are currently under control orders? Every controlee will ask himself, “Have I been affected by this Bill or not?”. In particular, he will ask himself when the two-year period under Clause 5 starts in his case. It seems that the control order will continue to apply, but it cannot be kept in place indefinitely under the provisions of an Act that we have repealed.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, like the noble and learned Lord, I have made it clear that the sooner control orders end the better. Will the Minister confirm that the extension to 42 days is not a matter of giving the police another two weeks to get their arrangements in order but because it became clear that the period of commencement would be within the Christmas and new year holiday period, which was not wholly convenient? Forty-two days would take the period into the new year as a matter of convenience. That is what I understood to be the explanation when we heard about this last week.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Tuesday 15th November 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

1: Clause 2, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “The court may on the application of”

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, we are all agreed that the measures which can be imposed by the Home Secretary under Clause 2 could place serious intrusions on personal freedom. On the second day in Committee the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, referred to the “profound impact” on the liberty of the individual of these exceptional measures. He was right. He might perhaps have added that these restrictions are by no means temporary. Of the 12 individuals currently subject to control orders, one is already in his fifth year of being subject to a control order and four have already been subject to control orders for between two and four years. It is my case that restrictions of that severity should not be imposed by the Home Secretary—more particularly when the individuals concerned have not been charged with or convicted of any offence—and it is right and proper that they should be imposed by the courts. That is the purpose of the first amendment. There are a number of subsequent amendments dealing with the same point, but this debate will turn on the first amendment, and the position is very simple.

The amendment has already received strong support from the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That report came too late to be considered in Committee by the noble Lord, Lord Henley, as fully as he would have wished. As the report presumably contains the Government’s best case for leaving Clause 2 as it stands, I shall deal with it in some detail. In their original response to the concerns of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Government relied upon,

“a well-established principle across our legal system of imposing”,

preventive restrictions,

“to protect the public from criminal behaviour”.

They cited numerous examples of such preventive orders: serious crime prevention orders, anti-social behaviour orders, risk of sexual harm orders and many others of the same kind. In every one of those instances, the order is made by the court, as it should be, and not by the Executive. That particular principle, although certainly well established, does not help the Government in any way in relation to Clause 2 and this amendment; indeed, it favours the amendment because it illustrates the way in which preventive orders are habitually made.

In their more recent response, the Government rely upon a different well established principle, that in national security cases it is the Home Secretary who makes the decision and not the court. What is the evidence of this other, and more restricted, principle? With one exception, which I will of course come to, the only example given by the Government in their response was the power of the Home Secretary to deport individuals on national security grounds. That was the power to which the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, referred in Committee. I am sorry not to see him in his place today. When I asked him whether he would accept that there is a distinction between deporting foreigners and deporting British citizens, he described the distinction I was seeking to make as “casuistic”, so I feel I had better make that distinction good.

The power to deport is contained in Section 3(5) of the Immigration Act 1971, an old and very familiar provision. It specifically excludes deportation of British subjects. One might ask: how could the Home Secretary claim the power to deport British subjects? Where would she deport them to? The same applies to the other example given by the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, that the Home Secretary has the power of deprivation of citizenship. That power, which is contained in Section 20 of the British Nationality Act 1948, applies only to those who have obtained British citizenship by fraud and other similar such cases. It has never applied—and could never have applied—to British citizens by birth. Therefore, we can forget about deportation orders and deprivation of citizenship orders made by the Home Secretary as being a valid precedent. I am somewhat surprised that that was even mentioned in the recent government response to the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That perhaps shows the extent to which the Government have had to scrape the barrel to find any precedent at all for Clause 2 of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

The noble Lord has been very clear. I fully understand—and that is exactly what is provided in a subsequent amendment. I think that it is Amendment 3. You have to read Amendment 1 with an amendment that strikes out the words,

“the Secretary of State reasonably believes”,

in Clause 3(1). So it does tie up.

[Lord Phillips of Sudbury]

I could not see the amendment that did that.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I think that it is Amendment 3.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, for those remarks, just as I thank my noble friend Lord Faulks for his remarks. I believe that we are not alone in objecting to the amendments put forward so ably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, for whom I have the utmost respect. We have been debating matters of this sort, sometimes on the same side, sometimes on different sides, for many years. I acknowledge his expertise, but I have to say that I do not agree with the gist behind this large group of amendments that he has tabled with support from my noble friend Lord Goodhart, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, and others.

Put simply, the key change under these amendments would be that TPIM notices would be imposed by a judge rather than by the Secretary of State. We have heard a great many legal arguments put forward by a great many extraordinary and eminent noble Lords—some learned, some not learned, but many are more learned than even the most learned of learned Lords. If we can take an Occam’s razor to this point, the question is: do we think that this it right for the Home Secretary to make this decision or should it be a matter for the courts? It is as simple as that.

It is no secret that the Government take a different approach to that proposed by the noble and learned Lord and other noble Lords, be they learned or not. It is no secret that we take a different approach from that recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights and others who have spoken in this debate. These are matters that we have debated in the House during the Bill’s passage and to which the Government have responded, in full, to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, including their response to the report of 19 October issued earlier this month.

The arguments are well rehearsed. I appreciate that noble Lords have again set out their views that such restrictions that may be imposed under this Bill—and which I emphasise are preventive, not necessarily punitive—should only ever be imposed by a judge. It is a respectful and principled decision. It has consistently been held by some in this House in relation to control orders in the past and now to TPIMs, but we cannot agree with it. We do not accept, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, would put it, that it is unprecedented for decisions of this sort, based on national security cases or on sensitive material, to be taken by the Executive. As he is aware, there are a number of occasions when executive decisions are made by the Home Secretary and others.

The noble and learned Lord was wrong to suggest that deprivation of British citizenship applies only to citizenship obtained by fraud. It can also be used on grounds of being conducive to the public good if the citizen is of dual nationality, which the noble and learned Lord did not mention in his response. He did mention that it can also be used under asset freezing, under the Terrorist Asset-Freezing etc. Act 2010. Again I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord did not accept that Bill, but it is now an Act. It can be used on financial restrictions under the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008. It can also be used—and has been very recently—regarding decisions to proscribe organisations that the Home Secretary believes are involved in terrorism. It is a well established principle that it is the relevant Secretary of State who can take such decisions in, for example, cases of asset freezing and others such as immigration cases with a national security dimension, with subsequent judicial oversight. That is the important point to remember. My right honourable friend the Home Secretary will make that decision. She is the right person to make it, but it will be reviewed by the courts in due course. I give way to the noble and learned Lord.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Does the noble Lord accept that the only precedents on which he relies, other than the very recent terrorist asset-freezing legislation, are immigration decisions which have nothing whatever to do with what is before us? They deal basically with foreigners, not with British-born subjects.

[Lord Henley]

It is still a matter of national security. That is why we believe that it is for the Home Secretary to make the appropriate decision and for that to be reviewed by the courts. The noble and learned Lord mentioned the 2010 Act, with which he did not agree and which he opposed. I mentioned that but I also mentioned the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008 and the financial restrictions under that. That is another example. I accept that the other matters concern immigration decisions but they are important. I also mentioned the fact that the Home Secretary has the power to proscribe organisations which she believes are involved in terrorism. Again, that matter can be reviewed by the courts, as can the one we are discussing. Therefore, it is irrelevant whether the earlier matters concerned only immigration, as the noble and learned Lord put it. These matters go beyond that. They involve national security. I will give way to the noble Baroness in a minute when I have finished this point. Therefore, I think it is right that my right honourable friend the Home Secretary should be involved in those decisions.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

Because my right honourable friend is responsible for security and, as I said, she is answerable to Parliament. We believe that she should make that initial decision and that later on it can be looked at by the courts. However, we think it right and proper that she should make it. That is the reason why, as I said, I am trying to strip this amendment down to its simplest point: do you want the decision made by my right honourable friend the Home Secretary or do you want it made by the courts? We believe it right that it should be made by my right honourable friend and then reviewed by the courts. For that reason I cannot support the amendment that the noble and learned Lord has moved.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

The Minister has not dealt at all with the point on Section 4 of the 2005 Act. There is a clear case, as I am sure he realises, where the initial order is made by the court and not by the Secretary of State. Why should that not apply here? It is not an answer to say that that is a derogation order—or if that is an answer, why is it an answer?

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, if I had wanted to use up a great deal of the House’s time, I could have answered a great many points, and indeed the House may wish me to answer them. I was trying to bring this matter down to a simple question for the House: who would be the appropriate person to make this decision?

Section 4 was raised. The Government’s counter-terrorism review looked at that but did not consider that derogating control orders provided an appropriate parallel. No derogating control orders have ever been made and the context here would be different. Derogating control orders would impose obligations so stringent that the Government would, as I understand it, need to derogate from Article 5—that is, the right to liberty—of the European Convention on Human Rights before such orders could be imposed. Non-derogating control orders—the only kind ever used—can, by definition, impose only less restrictive obligations, and Parliament agreed that these should be made by the Secretary of State.

I go back to the very simple point that I want the House to address in the noble and learned Lord’s amendment: who do you think is the right person to make this order? We believe that the right person is the Home Secretary because the Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament and is responsible for national security. That will then be looked at by the courts, but we do not believe that it should be the courts ab initio. For that reason, I cannot support the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I regret that I find the noble Lord’s reply to the debate pretty unsatisfactory. I have as great a respect for him as he says he has for me, and I just wish that he could have made a better case for the Government than he has. I think that the case is as weak as it could possibly be. I do not suppose that this amendment is likely to succeed, but it should and I therefore propose to divide the House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to have the opportunity to follow the noble Lord, Lord Bew, who has summed up the argument about prudence on this amendment. This is not a new power—it is making available during the Olympics year the existing powers. That is all that it does. It does not create a new power, despite what my noble friend Lord Judd has said. I am very conscious—and I do not think that the Minister answered this point on Second Reading or in Committee—that the power of relocation has been used in a very small number of cases, and it has been used by the present Home Secretary. This is not some hangover from the days of the previous Administration in terms of its use; it has been used by the present Government and the present Home Secretary.

I would like to be satisfied on why the Government think that a power that was used earlier this year, because the Home Secretary considered it necessary on the basis of the information that she had received is no longer necessary in the period during the Olympics when we know that the threat will be extremely difficult. That is extremely important.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Is not the possible answer to that question that, at that stage, the Home Secretary was not aware that she had sufficient resources by way of surveillance to do without relocation?

--- Later in debate ---

Tabled by

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

15: Clause 3, page 1, line 16, leave out “the Secretary of State reasonably believes that”

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Harris of Richmond)]

My Lords, I must tell the House that if Amendment 15 is agreed to I cannot call Amendment 16 by reason of pre-emption.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I support the amendment spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. It covers the same ground as my amendment, which would have amended Clause 6 by substituting civil standards of proof for “obviously flawed”. I agree with every word that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has said.

The great advantage of the balance of probabilities as a test is that it is flexible. At the more serious end, it approaches the criminal standard. There could hardly be a more serious finding to make against an individual, as has been said often today, than that he has been engaged in terrorist activity. Therefore, the burden of proof in these cases ought to approach the criminal standard. There is not the slightest justification for a burden of proof which is less than the civil standard.

With one exception there is no precedent that I can find in English law for a serious finding, such as is involved here, being made on the basis of reasonable belief. In the earlier debate I referred to many instances of prevention orders being made by the civil courts, some in serious cases such as sexual harm and so on, and in every case the burden of proof has been the balance of probabilities, and so it should be here.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven]

My Lords, Clause 4 of the Bill indicates that the finding which will be made in relation to a TPIM is that an individual has been involved in,

“the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism”;

or in,

“conduct which facilitates the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or which is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives encouragement to the commission, preparation or instigation of such acts, or is intended to do so”;

or in,

“conduct which gives support or assistance to individuals who are known or believed by the individual concerned to be involved in”,

such conduct.

This is a very grave finding. As I suggested earlier, it is a finding which justifies a standard of proof on the balance of probabilities rather than reasonable belief. I support the amendment for the reasons that have already been set out.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

My Lords, we have to bear in mind that as the Bill now stands, the initiator of this procedure is the Secretary of State with responsibility for national security. The Secretary of State has available to him or her all the information that the state can provide, including on a secrecy basis, on these matters.

When a court is deciding something, the balance of probabilities is a suitable standard because it is not expected to believe one thing or the other; it is to accept the balance of the evidence one way or the other. Requiring the Secretary of State to believe is a higher standard than the balance of probabilities. I cannot believe that the Secretary of State would be entitled, on a mere balance of probabilities, to come to the belief that this is what happened.

Of course, Secretaries of State might be rather special, and they might be able to come to a faith and belief without much in the way of evidence. However, that is taken care of by the language in the Bill as it stands, that the belief must be reasonable. So it is not only belief but a reasonable belief. In other words, the Secretary of State must have available to him or her information as a result of which he or she comes to be convinced that the person has engaged in the activities that the noble Lord kindly laid out for us. I agree that it is an extremely serious matter but the language in the Bill is suitable to a situation in which a decision has to be made, not by someone who has to review the evidence as an impartial judge but by someone who comes to the evidence with the executive responsibility to take the necessary action. In my view, this requirement that the Secretary of State should reasonably believe that the person in question has been involved in these activities, is a stronger and more reliable basis for going forward than a mere balance of probabilities. It is difficult to see how one could be convinced on the balance of probabilities alone.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

The noble and learned Lord refers to a “mere” balance of probabilities. He will of course be aware of the many cases decided in the highest courts where what he calls a “mere” balance of probabilities can approach the criminal standard, specifically in cases such as these.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I agree with that and am very much aware of it, but it is still a mere balance of probabilities. Although it can go very close to the criminal standard, it is still a balance of probabilities that is being used, and I would say that the criminal standard requires a jury in effect to believe—to be sure—that this is what happened. I regard “reasonable belief” as a very strong and appropriate phrase to use where the person initiating the procedure is the person with the responsibility to have before him or her all the necessary material.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

39: After Clause 9, insert the following new Clause—
“Time limit on measures under section 2
(1) Measures imposed under section 2 shall remain in force for the period of one year, or such lesser period as the court shall determine.
(2) Measures may be renewed for a further period of one year, and no more, on a further application to the court if the court is satisfied on the civil burden of proof that the individual has been involved in terrorist related activity since the imposition of the original measures.”

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, very briefly, Clause 5 enables the Secretary of State to renew measures for a further year if conditions A, C and D are satisfied. He does not need to be satisfied of condition B, that there has been fresh terrorist activity during the first year. Amendment 39 has two separate purposes. First, it requires the Secretary of State to be satisfied of fresh terrorist activity during the first year before he automatically renews for the second year. Secondly, it places an absolute limit on renewal of two years. It cannot go beyond that.

Curiously enough, this amendment might have received some support from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile of Berriew. If I remember correctly, it was his view that somebody who had been subject to a control order for two years would have little further potential use as a terrorist. He was rather minded to pose—or had some sympathy with posing—a limit of two years on the extent to which these measures can be renewed.

The Minister said at an earlier stage that it is not the Government’s intention to use measures of this kind to warehouse individuals who are suspected of being terrorists. Yet, as we know, they have been warehoused—if that is the right word—for periods of three, four and five years without ever having been charged or tried. That is happening now. The purpose of this amendment is to ensure that that does not happen in future. There should be a final limit of two years. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, very briefly, this amendment seems to provide for a TPIM to remain in force for no more than a year or a lesser period determined by the court. It also provides that the measures may be renewed for a period of no more than one further year if, on application to the court, the court is satisfied on the civil burden of proof that the individual has been involved in terrorist-related activity since the imposition of the original measures. If that is correct, our view is that those considered to be engaged in serious terrorist activity are not often likely to have so changed their intentions within a period of 12 months. For that reason, it would not be appropriate to end the order. The amendment suggests that it would be, unless there was evidence of further terrorist-related activity. If we understand the amendment correctly, our view is that it would detract from the ability to protect the public. We are not inclined to support it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I get the impression that the House wishes to move on. I never understand these things—I do not know whether the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, wishes to go out for dinner or whatever—but I will endeavour to be relatively brief.

I was amused for the second consecutive amendment as first the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and then the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd, cited my absent noble friend Lord Carlile as being a likely supporter of their amendments. It is easier to make these assertions in his absence. We will invite my noble friend to look at Hansard in due course and decide whether he necessarily agreed with the noble Lord or the noble and learned Lord. I just say that in passing.

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his explanation, which would obviously change the provisions relating to the period for which a TPIM notice can have effect. I will set out our thinking on this issue. In his model, there would be a requirement for new terrorism-related activity to have taken place while a TPIM notice is in force, in order to allow that TPIM notice to be extended into a second year. Again I must dare to use the word “balance”. We do not think that this strikes the right balance in the context of preventive orders of this kind. Indeed it would undermine the ability of the Government to protect the people of this country from a risk of terrorism.

The counterterrorism review carefully considered the issue of time limits and how long restrictions such as these should remain in force on the basis of the same evidence. It concluded that extension of a TPIM notice for a further year should only be allowed on one occasion if the notice continues to be necessary in order to protect the public. After that one extension—up to two years—new evidence would be required to impose a new TPIM notice. That is a significant move away from the position in control orders, which can potentially be renewed indefinitely on the basis of the same evidence where the control order remains necessary.

We are of the view that the ongoing necessity for the notice can be made out for a second year on the basis of the original terrorism-related activity. This is particularly so where that activity is very serious, suggesting that the individual’s mindset and intentions, perhaps to do serious harm, will not have changed after just one year subject to restrictive measures. Indeed, there are many court judgments in the control order context confirming that, for the purposes of public protection, ongoing necessity is not dependent on new terrorism-related activity since the imposition of the control order. We do not believe that the new terrorism-related activity should be required in order to extend the original TPIM notice for that one year.

While the Government’s view is that TPIM notices should not be used to warehouse people, and should not be imposed indefinitely on the basis of the same evidence—as can happen under control orders if the statutory test continues to be met—a notice that can only last one year without evidence of new activity undertaken while subject to the measures will not be sufficient to disrupt the threat posed by the individuals concerned in many cases.

Again I come back to the question of balance. We believe that the balance is about right in what we propose—that is, one year with the ability to extend it for another year. If there is to be any extension beyond that, we need new evidence of terrorist-related activity of one sort of another, as set out in the Bill. The limits proposed by the noble and learned Lord’s amendment shift the balance too far the other. I hope that he will be happy to withdraw his amendment on the basis of that explanation of balance.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I am sad, but nevertheless I withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 39 withdrawn.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Tuesday 1st November 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, the purpose of this amendment is to ensure that the Bill and the TPIMs that it sets up require annual renewal, as is the case with the present control order legislation. That legislation is clear in its temporary nature and it has a sunset clause, which requires an annual vote in Parliament to consider whether the powers are still required. The Bill before us makes no provision for a yearly sunset clause but provides for a five-year limit, not requiring a first vote until the end of 2016 or early 2017 if its operative provisions are to continue and not expire.

Both your Lordships’ Constitution Committee and the Joint Committee on Human Rights have queried this provision in the Bill. The Constitution Committee questioned whether it was constitutionally appropriate for the extraordinary executive powers involved in TPIMs to remain in being for a lengthy period of time. The Joint Committee on Human Rights said that it was disappointed by the Government’s reluctance to expose their proposed replacement regime for control orders to the rigours of formal and post-legislative scrutiny, which annual renewal would entail. The Joint Committee was of the view that the TPIMs regime was less severe than the control orders regime but still felt that TPIMs remain,

“an extraordinary departure from ordinary principles of criminal due process”.

The Joint Committee also noted that the UN special rapporteur on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, in a recent report to the UN Human Rights Council, had observed:

“Regular review and the use of sunset clauses are best practices helping to ensure that special powers relating to the countering of terrorism are effective and continue to be required, and to help avoid the ‘Normalisation’ or de facto permanent existence of extraordinary measures”.

The Joint Committee recommended that the Bill should also,

“require annual renewal and so ensure that there is an annual opportunity for Parliament to scrutinise and debate the continued necessity for such exceptional measures and the way in which they are working in practice”.

In a recent letter responding to your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, the Minister in the other place claimed that five-yearly rather than annual renewal would allow the system to operate in a stable and considered way and would allow proper and detailed consideration to take place on whether the legislation was still required. Annual renewal also allows for proper and detailed consideration, and rather more frequently than once every five years. As for the assertion that five-yearly renewal will allow the system to operate in a stable and considered way, that rather suggests that the Government see TPIMs as not far short of a permanent arrangement, despite the exceptional executive powers, including the profound impact they can have on the liberty of some individuals. That is a key reason why annual renewal is necessary—precisely to ensure that these are regarded as temporary and not permanent measures.

We agree with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. Annual renewal is required for the current control order regime because of the considerable and exceptional executive power that it confers, most of which remains in the current Bill in respect of TPIMs. In addition, we now have the draft enhanced terrorism prevention and investigation measures Bill, which could be brought into being at short notice and which provides further extraordinary executive powers.

This Bill, like the control orders legislation, covers difficult issues relating to the rule of law. It provides powers to act in cases where prosecution is not possible but where, nevertheless, security concerns about the activities of a small number of individuals are such that it is felt that executive action has to be taken, which considerably restricts liberty through control orders, or in future through TPIMs, when the Secretary of State reasonably believes that the individual is or has been involved in terrorism-related activity. Whatever one’s views on the need for control orders or TPIMs, these are considerable and exceptional measures, and for that reason alone it is surely only right and appropriate that Parliament should have the opportunity and the duty to decide each year whether or not the situation remains such that these measures and the associated powers should continue in being or, instead, be allowed to expire. It is surely not appropriate, in view of the profound impact on the liberty of individuals of these exceptional measures and powers—the Minister accepted on Second Reading that they were exceptional—that an important check by Parliament on the exercise of those executive powers, and the continuing necessity for them, should be almost eliminated by permitting Parliament that opportunity to decide whether the situation remains such that they should continue, or be allowed to expire, only once every five years. I beg to move.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I support the amendment, but I do not hold out much hope that it will do any good. It was different six years ago when the Conservative Party, and Lord Kingsland in particular, were in favour of relaxing, rather than strengthening, the 2005 Bill. Despite that, we argued the toss on renewal every year for six years and achieved precisely nothing. Now the Official Opposition are in favour of strengthening the Bill, and I see no reason to suppose that the Government will themselves be of that view—I hope not. I, therefore, suspect that in debating this matter every year for the next five years we will largely be wasting our breath, though I support the amendment for its symbolic value.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Wednesday 19th October 2011 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

1: Clause 2, page 1, line 6, at beginning insert “The court may on the application of”

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, these amendments fall into two main groups. The first includes Amendments 1 to 3, 7, 8, 25, 27, 29, 36, 37, 40 and 41. I start by referring to the restrictions set out in Schedule 1 to the Bill, which were so well described by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, at Second Reading. It is wrong in principle for punitive restrictions of the kind set out there to be imposed on a British subject by a member of the Executive in time of peace. It is as simple as that. The Minister’s predecessors on both sides of the House have previously argued that such restrictions are not punitive—they are preventive. I suggest that that is playing with words. Looking at Schedule 1, any ordinary reader would say that these restrictions, whatever their purpose, are punitive in effect.

In her response to the excellent report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Secretary argued that prevention orders are now a common feature of our legal system. She cited anti-social behaviour orders, football banning orders, serious crime prevention orders, violent offender orders and so on. However, in all these cases the order is made by the court—either the High Court or the magistrates’ court—as it should be. Therefore, the purpose of the first group of amendments is simply to bring the Bill into line with the precedents on which the Home Secretary herself relies. In other words, it is for the Home Secretary to make the application for an order, but for the order to be made by the High Court.

It may be said that we are dealing here not with ordinary crime but with terrorism, and, where the safety of the public is at issue, it is the Home Secretary who should make the order because it is the Home Secretary who is answerable to Parliament. There are two answers to that argument. One need look no further than Section 4 of the Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005—the very that Act that we are repealing. It provides that, in the case of derogating control orders, it is the High Court that makes the order, not the Home Secretary. That surely puts paid to the argument that in terrorist cases it is for the Home Secretary to make the order because it is she who is answerable to Parliament.

There is a second answer. Clause 9 provides that the court must review the case as soon as practicable after notice has been served. The crucial question of fact on that review will be whether the individual is or has been involved in terrorist activity. In the leading case of the Secretary of State for the Home Department v MB—2007, Queen’s Bench, at page 415—the Court of Appeal held that, in considering that crucial question, the court must reach its own conclusion on the facts. If it disagrees with the Home Secretary, it must say so and quash the notice. It is the court’s decision on the facts which will prevail, not that of the Home Secretary. The Government have accepted that that should be so. However, if that is to be so, it is difficult to see what, if anything, is left of the argument that it is the Home Secretary who should make the order because the Home Secretary is answerable to Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

I do not know whether the noble Lord has studied the effect of the case of AF (No. 3), but if he were so to do, he would find that there is a requirement for the court. Successive Home Secretaries, close to whose department I have worked, have always been assiduous to ensure that there was sufficient material—particularly since AF (No. 3)—so that the individual concerned knew the case he had to meet, at least in gisting terms. I urge the noble Lord to read the Green Paper published today by the Ministry of Justice, Justice and Security, which deals in part with these matters.

I would like to move on to the substance of these amendments. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, called into his argument the requirement for a court to approve a derogating control order under the 2005 Act. In deploying that argument, surely we should remember that, first, there have been no derogating control orders under the 2005 Act; and secondly, had there been a derogating control order, it would have been so dramatic that we would have had to derogate from part of the European Convention on Human Rights. This would have required, in effect, a change to our constitution which plainly ought to be passed through the courts at the earliest possible phase. I am afraid that, with real respect, I reject that argument.

In dismissing deportation applications and deportation decisions that are made daily by Home Secretaries, the noble and learned Lord said that they are made against foreigners so it is less significant, but if he thinks back to the Belmarsh case that was decided at the end of 2004, he will recall that the Judicial Committee of this House, of which he was a most distinguished member at one time, held that discriminating in that way against foreigners was unlawful. Indeed, the so-called Belmarsh provisions were struck down because they were disproportionate and discriminated against foreigners by treating them differently from United Kingdom citizens.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords—

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

Perhaps I might finish this point before, predictably, the noble and learned Lord stands up. I do understand the distinction he is making. It seems to me, with great respect, somewhat casuistic.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Surely the noble Lord must accept and understand the difference between deporting a British subject and deporting an immigrant. It is obvious.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

What I understand is that a deportation decision can be made by the Home Secretary. The administrative court is considering these cases hour by hour, let alone day by day, often as matters of great urgency. It is considering cases in which people have been imprisoned. Sometimes, very young people are imprisoned in unpleasant circumstances in this country. I do not hear the noble and learned Lord saying that this is an act that should be the subject of approval by a judge. In any event, it would be a practical impossibility because the Upper Tribunal and the administrative court are swamped by more than 10,000 of these cases at present.

I also reflect on much simpler situations. It is suggested that taking a citizen’s freedom away is something that should be determined by a judge in every circumstance. But we even let police constables do it every day of the week. When a police constable arrests a citizen for something as “minor” as, for example, shoplifting, the person may be taken into custody on the fiat of a police constable. When people are charged with serious offences and not bailed, although they are brought before a judge quickly, as is envisaged in this Bill, they are taken off to such unpleasant places as Strangeways or Belmarsh and find themselves in custody until they are brought up fairly summarily before a judge. Although it goes without saying that judges in every instance are very careful in considering such cases, the care they take does not bear comparison with the care that High Court judges give to controlees in control order cases.

We have already mentioned deportation cases. Organisations are proscribed by the Secretary of State, taking the precious freedom of association and membership of groups away from citizens of this country and foreigners without discriminating between them. Decisions are made to invade people’s privacy in what may be an outrageous way by warrants to intercept their telephones as a result of administrative acts. They are not brought before a court. Certainly, retired judges are involved in these decisions but these are not transparent hearings with evidence and tribunals. The subject does not even know that it is happening. In addition, covert surveillance, which can be an appalling invasion of people’s privacy, is performed as an executive act.

It seems to me that there is some confusion here among my noble friends and other noble Lords in their analysis of the roles of different parts of the state apparatus in the conduct of state business. In my judgment, for what little it is worth, the act of making a TPIM or a control order has exactly the character of ministerial responsibility that successive Home Secretaries, some of whom are noted Members of your Lordships’ House, are able to carry out. What follows has exactly the character of judicial scrutiny which judges are extremely well able to carry out and are experienced in carrying out. It seems to me to be a clear part of our constitutional settlement and to fit within it very clearly.

The standard of proof is not an easy question and I do not pretend that there is a perfect answer to it. If one reads through the open judgments in control order cases, one sees that the reasoning of judges in those cases has been very strong. In almost every case, I would venture that in reality the judgment has been made on the balance of probabilities and I would not have a particular difficulty if that was the standard set.

However, there is a danger of underestimating the difference between reasonable grounds to suspect and reasonable grounds to believe. As a judge on the Judicial Committee of this House put it on one occasion: “Reasonable grounds to suspect means I suspect that it may be so, while reasonable grounds to believe means I believe that it is so”. It seems to me that the executive act of a Minister asking the question “Do I believe it to be so?” is a proper standard to set and can be scrutinised carefully by the courts. If the proof of the pudding is ever in the eating in court, that is what has happened with control orders.

So far as a one-year TPIM with a two-year limit is concerned, when I was the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation I always supported a two-year limit, and I still do. I see no reason why there should not be a one-year limit with an extension available. That seems to accord with the purpose of control orders or TPIMs. One can reasonably expect that during a one or two-year period, the potential of the individual concerned to be a terrorist is much reduced as a result of the order. However, I do have to say to noble Lords that there are cases where that has not been so, and there would have to be some exceptional provision so that those who, despite a TPIM, continue to be active in terrorism should be subject to a new order if the evidence is available at the end of a two-year period.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for his careful response to this large group of amendments. I shall read what he says in Hansard. Indeed, I shall scrutinise, if that is the right word, what he says with care. He referred to the decision in MB as in some way supporting his view that it should be for the Secretary of State, rather than for the judge, to make the order. However, I do not agree with that reading of the case. As I read it, MB requires the court to make a full merits review at the Clause 9 stage. That is a matter we shall discuss again, just as we shall discuss again the Minister’s reasons for preferring reasonable belief to a balance of probabilities.

With two exceptions, all noble Lords who have spoken have supported these amendments. I am particularly grateful to the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Eames, and to the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald. We shall definitely return to all these matters on Report, and in the mean time I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Wednesday 5th October 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

The noble Lord is, of course, perfectly entitled to criticise particular provisions in the Bill. What I am saying is that those provisions should be dealt with on their merits. It really should be no part of the argument that the Bill in its present form should be regarded as inferior or unsatisfactory because it is the outcome of the processes that took place within the coalition. As to the emergency provisions to which the noble Lord referred, an emergency gives rise to special needs and special circumstances, and it does not seem entirely unreasonable that the Bill should provide for those circumstances in the way in which it does.

I believe that on balance, and with one important reservation that may give some comfort to the noble Lord, the Government have got the Bill right and have struck the right balance between the various competing needs that have to be considered.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

Is the noble Lord aware of any other country in the world which has control orders or anything like them? He referred to Guantanamo Bay, but that, of course, is not part of the United States.

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

Of course it is technically not part of the United States, and that is why it can exist as it does, but it is a product of the Government of the United States. It is the Government of the United States who have put in place the regime which exists in Guantanamo Bay, and I do not imagine for one moment that the noble and learned Lord would suggest that we should establish a regime similar to that in Guantanamo Bay in place of the measures contained in the Bill. The trouble is that you have to have something. It is true that every country proposes different ways to deal with the matter, but I do not think that ours is in any way the most draconian.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, some noble Lords will remember, as I certainly do, when control orders were first introduced as an emergency measure in March 2005 after an all-night sitting. It was an emergency measure because the suspects then being detained in Belmarsh prison were due to be released within a few days as a result of a decision of the House of Lords in December 2004. The powers granted to the Home Secretary in 2005 were considered to be so extraordinary at the time that the Conservative opposition and the Liberal Democrats insisted on a sunset clause, and they carried the day in that respect. Six years later, those powers are to become in effect a permanent part of our constitution.

I had hoped that when the coalition Government took over, there would be an end to control orders. The coalition agreement promised to reverse the substantial erosion of civil liberties that had taken place under the previous Government and there was to be an extensive review of anti-terrorism measures. These were all good signs. I have not seen the evidence submitted to the review by the security services or the police, but I have seen the rest of the evidence, and I can say that with one exception, all the evidence in relation to control orders was in favour of abolition. Yet, once again, the Government have drawn back.

We are getting rid of relocation, and I am glad of that. Perhaps I may say to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, that of course relocation is the most effective measure available, but in my view it is also the most inhumane. So there are improvements in the Bill which I welcome. But the fundamental objection is the same as it has always been: British subjects have been placed under severe restrictions so well described by the noble Baroness, Lady Stern, for lengthy periods by order of the Home Secretary, who is a member of the Executive, without ever having been convicted of an offence or, until recently, even being told what they were supposed to have done. Such powers are common enough in police states and, as the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, explained, they may be acceptable in Pakistan and India, but I never expected to see those powers exercised in England, save in time of war when the life of the nation is at stake.

[Lord Carlile of Berriew]

My Lords, with great respect to the noble and learned Lord, I really do not think he should be allowed to get away with that. The implication of what he has just said in what I take to be a rhetorical flourish is that what happens in Pakistan, for example, or what has happened in Sri Lanka, is to be equated with what has happened here. Does he not think that our judges, of whom he was one of the most distinguished in this country, have played an extremely sound and controlling role over the exercise of this jurisdiction and have ensured that in fact and in law, it was ECHR compatible?

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I am very glad to hear what the noble Lord has said and I am happy to withdraw any implication that I may have made against what is done in Pakistan and India. However, I never expected to see these powers exercised here. The Secretary of State defends them on the ground that there is no alternative, but there is an alternative. There is another solution and the problem is not almost insoluble, as the right reverend Prelate suggested. The solution lies in covert surveillance. To my knowledge, it is the solution that has been adopted in Germany, for example, and has not been found wanting. Indeed, I believe it to have been adopted in every other western country and it has proved to be successful; control orders have not been relied on. Why should covert surveillance not prove equally successful here?

It may be said that surveillance is more expensive than control orders, and I expect that that is the case. But at least we would have saved the £10 million the Government have spent so far on defending control orders in the courts. In any event, cost should surely not be a consideration when it is the freedom of British subjects which is in issue. It is not as though very large numbers are involved. So far as I know, there have not been more than 12 in any year, as few as eight recently, and not more than 48 in all. Surely we could have found the money, and could still find the money if further resources are going to be made available, to solve this undoubted problem in the way that other countries have solved it; namely, through covert surveillance.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way. As someone who has tried to understand the civil liberties arguments about this, perhaps I will be forgiven for asking him to explain to the House why the level of intrusive covert surveillance that would be necessary to provide the reassurance we all seek is somehow a less severe intrusion into someone’s civil liberties than control orders, TPIMs or whatever it might be, where the ground rules are set, explicit and subject to judicial review?

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I would have thought that the answer to that question is obvious: under a surveillance regime, a person can live a perfectly ordinary life; under a control order, he cannot. That is the difference.

I have opposed control orders since they were first introduced in 2005 and every year since, and I would certainly oppose them now if I could. But I realise that I would get nowhere. The Official Opposition, which I had hoped might at least still be open to persuasion on this, has said that not only do they support the Bill, but they also actually regard it as being too weak.

[Lord Hunt of Kings Heath]

I do not support the Bill at all. I think that it is a complete nonsense. What is emerging is an inadequate piece of legislation, something which the Government themselves acknowledge because they are also publishing draft emergency legislation. We have a bizarre situation where twice this year the Home Secretary has argued that control orders are needed. We have yet to get an answer from the Government about how circumstances have changed in the past five months to suggest that the control orders which were used and needed five months ago will, under this Bill, no longer be available. I do not like this Bill at all.

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

That is the point that the noble Lord has already made on many occasions during the course of the debate. I fully accept that he opposes the Bill because he would make it stronger. I oppose the Bill because I think that it is already too strong, so obviously I have no hope there.

I will use my remaining minutes to say how the Bill could be improved. That is not difficult to do. The Bill currently provides for an order to be made by the Home Secretary but only after permission by the court and subject to review by the court as soon as is practicable after the order has been served. This is a most unusual and cumbersome procedure. It would surely be better and simpler for the Home Secretary to apply for the order and for the court to make the order in the normal way.

In her response to the excellent 16th report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, the Home Secretary said that prevention orders of the kind we have before us in the Bill have become an established principle in our legal system. She cites anti-social behaviour orders, serious crime prevention orders and so on as examples. If serious crime prevention orders are to be the model, why does the Home Secretary not follow it through? Under the Serious Crime Act 2007, the Crown makes the application and the High Court or Crown Court makes the order. The same is true of anti-social behaviour orders except that the magistrate makes the order. I know of no case, and the Home Secretary cites none, where the order has been made by the Executive.

The noble Lord may argue that terrorism is different and that in terrorist cases the Home Secretary is in a better position to form a judgment than a court. That argument will not run as the courts have already held, in a case called Home Secretary v MB, that it is for the court to form its own view on the facts whether the individual has been involved in terrorism activity. If the court disagrees with the Home Secretary then it is the duty of the court to quash the order. The Government have accepted that that decision will apply when a review takes place, very shortly after a notice has been served under Clause 9. That being so, and it being accepted that it is the court’s decision that will prevail, what on earth is the point of the Home Secretary making the order in the first place?

In answer to the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, again—I hope to have better luck this time—there is no need to consult the judiciary about that proposal because the judges are already involved as the control order is currently administered at this stage of reviewing the orders made by the Home Secretary. There is nothing new for the judges in this. The sensible, logical order is for the Home Secretary to make the application—in that sense there will be a role for the Home Secretary—but for the court to make the order.

There is one other point, briefly. Why has the Home Secretary watered down the burden of proof? I agree on this with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Under the Serious Crime Act, which is apparently to be the model, the judge makes the order on the balance of probabilities—which is the normal standard of proof in civil cases. If the Serious Crime Act is the model, why should the same standard of proof not apply here? Once again, the noble Lord may argue that terrorism is in some way different. Once again, that argument will not run. If we want a precedent for the balance of probabilities being the appropriate standard of proof in terrorist cases, one need only look at Section 4 of the very Act that we are now being asked to repeal. In derogation cases, it is the court that makes the order on the application of the Home Secretary. The court decides the matter on the ordinary civil standard of proof. Why has that model not been adopted here?

One gets the same from Section 26 of the Act, which has been referred to, where the test is the balance of probabilities rather than the reasonable belief of the Home Secretary. What is the logic of having one test in Clause 3 and a different test in Section 26? I shall in due course propose amendments very simply to the effect—incidentally, they are quite simple to draft—that the order should be imposed by the court on the application of the Home Secretary and that the decision of the court should, as in all other cases, be the balance of probabilities.

Equality Act 2010 (Specific Duties) Regulations 2011

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Tuesday 6th September 2011 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Verma]

My Lords, my noble friend asks a question that I may not be able to respond to straight away. I assume that it would be up to the school and the school’s policy to inform parents of what they are doing in activities including school meals.

The noble Lord, Lord Low, has pressed the Government to replace these regulations with the draft published in January. I must stress from the outset that I wholly share the noble Lord’s wish that the equality duty should produce tangible, positive equality improvements for people who experience discrimination and disadvantage. His record on pressing for such improvements for disabled people is to be respected and admired, and I can assure him that we seek to achieve the same ends. We differ only on the best means of achieving them.

As I explained at the beginning of this debate, the equality duty set out in the Equality Act 2010 is a stronger and broader duty than the previous equality duties on race, disability and gender. By providing a clear explanation of what it means to have due regard to the need to advance equality of opportunity and foster good relations, the new equality duty is designed to focus the attention of public bodies on the aims they need to consider when carrying out all their functions.

In addition, in respect of disability, the equality duty also makes clear that consideration of the need to advance equality of opportunity for disabled people includes considering the need to take steps to account for their disabilities. This important and helpful clarification was the result of an amendment put forward by the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell. Noble Lords should be assured that the equality duty will be an effective lever for delivering equality improvements for those who still regrettably experience discrimination and disadvantage.

On the detail of the concerns that the noble Lord expressed, the January draft regulations were not implemented so we cannot know exactly what effect they would have had. The regulations that the Government now propose are the right approach and will help public bodies perform the equality duty better. There was a full public consultation on an earlier draft of the specific duties last year and a further public engagement exercise on them earlier this year. The Government are grateful for the many responses they received and have carefully considered them. Plainly the regulations—

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

I am very grateful to the noble Baroness. Was not the simple point made by my noble friend Lord Low that, in relation to disability—which he took simply as an example—the regulations that are now proposed go less far than the existing specific duties which, he says, are working well? He says that is the evidence. Is that not a good reason to vote for his motion?

Sex Offenders Register

Lord Lloyd of Berwick Excerpts

Thursday 17th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lloyd of Berwick]

My Lords, it is always a pleasure for us on the Cross Benches when the pot calls the kettle black. No doubt the Minister will recall that it was a Labour Home Secretary, Mr Blunkett, who wrote in the Evening Standard that he would not give in to the judges. Would the Minister therefore suggest to her right honourable friend that she would do better to follow the line taken by another Labour Home Secretary, Alan Johnson, who, when asked to comment on an adverse court decision, of which there were a great many, would only ever say that he was disappointed?

[Baroness Neville-Jones]

My Lords, it is not a question of giving in to the courts; it is undoubtedly a question of the proper implementation of court judgments and the role of Parliament in making legislation.