Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Lord Roborough

Report stage
Tuesday 5th November 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interests in the register as an owner of fishing rights and president of South West Rivers Association. I will also speak briefly, as the arguments have been well made by many noble Lords.

We have heard from noble Lords around the House that this is an important amendment that strikes at the heart of our care for the environment and animal welfare. It imposes reasonable obligations on the Crown Estate to take responsibility for environmental damage caused by salmon farming on its property, and for the welfare of the fish being farmed. As I understand it, there is only one salmon farm in our waters, off the coast of Northern Ireland, although there are 210 in Scottish waters. But this amendment will ensure that any future salmon farms are developed with those obligations in place.

In Committee, the Minister highlighted existing legislation and regulations that cover the salmon farming industry. However, given that the wild Atlantic salmon in our country is now on the IUCN red list, and given the sometimes dire conditions that farmed salmon are kept in, it is hardly surprising that my noble friend Lord Forsyth of Drumlean continues to press this amendment. We are disappointed that the Government have so far failed to see its merits, and we hope for a more constructive reaction from the Minister today. We on these Benches will support my noble friend if he decides to test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their points. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, would require the Crown Estate commissioners to assess the environmental impact and animal welfare standards of salmon farms on the Crown Estate on an ongoing basis. Where that assessment determines that a salmon farm is causing environmental damage or has significant animal welfare issues, the Crown Estate would be required to revoke the relevant licence. The commissioners would also be required to make the same assessment of any applications for new licences for salmon farms and, where the commissioners determine that an application may cause environmental damage or raises significant animal welfare concerns, the Crown Estate must refuse the application.

The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, again made a powerful speech on his amendment. As I noted in Committee and can repeat today, I wholeheartedly support the objectives behind it but I regret that the Government are unable to support it. I recognise that this is not what the House wants to hear, but it remains the Government’s position that this amendment would duplicate protections that already exist in legislation or that are required by regulators as part of the licensing process for aquaculture. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Douglas-Miller, that, like the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, I have had no contact with the industry. I may have written to the noble Viscount, Lord Trenchard, following Committee, but, if not, I will absolutely ensure that I do.

All salmon farming in England is regulated with the intention to ensure that it is carried out in a responsible manner that respects the environment and protects consumer health and animal welfare. As noble Lords know and some have observed, the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland is a devolved matter. My officials have been in contact on this matter with the Scottish Government, who have said that it is their view that salmon farming is strictly regulated to ensure that the environment on which the aquaculture sector and others rely is protected for future generations. They have also stated that Crown Estate Scotland works to ensure responsible use of Scotland’s seas through leasing the seabed. However, as is proper, it is the role of local authorities and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency to conduct a thorough assessment of development proposals, including environmental impact assessments and habitats regulations appraisals, with advice from statutory and other consultees.

I am aware of the strength of feeling on this matter, and I recognise that many noble Lords will not agree with the case I have set out. However, I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, to withdraw his amendment.

Crown Estate Bill [HL]

Debate between Lord Livermore and Lord Roborough

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd October 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am afraid that I may not entirely agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on this. I agree with the intention of this amendment from the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. While we also acknowledge that the Crown Estate in Scotland is devolved, the entity remains closely aligned in its nature and the objectives sought from it, with considerable overlap in the kind of assets that are owned and managed. The Bill before us creates considerable new powers for the Crown Estate of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. First among those is the power to borrow, with the benefits to investment and flexibility that that allows. It also creates new obligations—hopefully, to include taking full responsibility for the environmental impact of offshore energy and fish farming. Those are not present in the devolved Crown Estate of Scotland. As noble Lords have described, it may well be helpful if the Minister committed to providing clear information on those differences once the Act has been implemented in order to allow both entities to learn what is best practice. Oversight and transparency are desirable in all areas of government, and I am most interested to hear the Minister’s response to this amendment and debate.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendment 37D, tabled by the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, would require the Secretary of State to lay a report before Parliament within 12 months of the day this Act is passed that assesses any differences between the provisions made by this Act for the management of the Crown Estate in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and equivalent provisions for the management of the Crown Estate in Scotland.

It is possible now to provide such an assessment, and I am happy to set that out. Section 36 of the Scotland Act 2016 inserted a new Section 90B into the Scotland Act 1998. Subject to certain exceptions, Section 90B provided for the devolution in relation to Scotland of the commissioners’ management functions relating to property, rights or interests in land in Scotland and rights in relation to the Scottish zone.

Devolution occurred on 1 April 2017 under, and in accordance with, the Crown Estate Transfer Scheme 2017. The relevant property, rights and interests are now managed separately by Crown Estate Scotland under the Crown Estate Scotland (Interim Management) Order 2017 and the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019, as enacted by the Scottish Parliament. They do not form part of the Crown Estate as currently managed by the Crown Estate commissioners.

The relationship between Crown Estate Scotland and the Scottish Government is governed by a public framework document which sets out a broad framework within which Crown Estate Scotland operates, and certain financial aspects. Any changes to that framework document or the wider legislation that underpins it are a matter for the Scottish Government.

I turn to the principal differences and similarities. The Bill grants the commissioners of the Crown Estate a power to borrow with Treasury consent and provides the Treasury with the power to issue loans and financial assistance to the commissioners, including out of the National Loans Fund. The Bill also specifies that the Treasury may determine the rate of interest on any loan and requires the Treasury to pay any sums received in respect of the loan into the National Loans Fund.

In comparison, Part 2, Section 1.1 of the framework document for Crown Estate Scotland explains that

“Scottish Ministers may make grants and loans to Crown Estate Scotland”

and such grants and loans are

“subject to such conditions (including conditions as to repayment) as the Scottish Ministers may determine”.

Part 2, Section 2.1 requires that:

“All borrowing by Crown Estate Scotland … shall be from the Scottish Ministers in accordance with guidance in the Borrowing, Lending & Investment section of the”


Scottish Public Finance Manual.

On investment, this Bill clarifies the commissioners’ existing ability to invest by inserting into the 1961 Act that:

“The powers exercisable by the Commissioners in the discharge of their functions under this Act include powers to do anything which is calculated to facilitate, or is conducive or incidental to, the discharge of those functions”.

It also omits subsection (4) from Section 3 of the 1961 Act, which will broaden the commissioner’s investment powers.

In comparison, Part 1, Section 3.2 of the framework document for Crown Estate Scotland explains that Scottish Ministers are responsible for

“approving Crown Estate Scotland’s Corporate Plan”,

which includes their investment strategy. Part 2, Section 7.3 requires Crown Estate Scotland to

“undertake investment in line with its legislative duties”,

which are set out in the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019, principally in Part 3, across Sections 7 to 21.

On the constitution of the commissioners, the Bill increases the maximum number of commissioners from eight to 12 and omits the requirement that the second Crown Estate commissioner, if any, be deputy chairman. It also simplifies the legislative process by which commissioners are paid, such that the commissioners’ salaries and expenses are paid directly out of the income of the Crown Estate, rather than out of money provided by Parliament, which comes from the return made by the commissioners to the Government each year.

In comparison, under Part 1, Section 3.5 of the frame- work document for Crown Estate Scotland, the board membership is limited to nine members, including the chair. On remuneration, Section 7 of the Crown Estate Scotland (Interim Management) Order 2017 makes it clear that

“Crown Estate Scotland … must pay each member such remuneration and allowances (including expenses) as the Scottish Ministers may determine”.


The differences between these two organisations reflect the fact that the organisations have formed in different ways. The 1961 Act, which, as I have set out, is the legislative basis of the Crown Estate in its current form, was fulfilling a recommendation of the government Committee on Crown Lands—as set out in its report presented to Parliament in June 1955—to appoint an independent board of commissioners to manage the Crown Estate, with provisions designed to enable Parliament and the Treasury to know how it is discharging its responsibilities. To briefly quote from the 1955 report:

“The board should be a public authority, but not a government department in the sense of an organ of executive government. … We do however respectfully advise that the board should be more, not less, independent than the present Commissioners and that they should be given defined powers and duties as trustees and allowed to work them out with the minimum of direction and control.”


In comparison, Crown Estate Scotland was created by the Scottish Crown Estate Act 2019, which makes specific provisions about the management of the Scottish Crown Estate and followed on from a process of devolution established by the Scotland Act 2016. Crown Estate Scotland is specifically required to align its aims and objectives with the Scottish Government’s published programme for government, and Scotland’s economic strategy and national performance framework.

I hope this assessment was helpful and that I have provided some clarity on the points raised.

Securitisation (Amendment) Regulations 2024

Debate between Lord Livermore and Lord Roborough

Monday 20th May 2024 Grand Committee

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for introducing this SI and setting out its purpose. I welcome him to his place.

As the noble Lord noted in his opening remarks, this statutory instrument forms part of a wider programme to deliver a smarter regulatory framework for financial services. We support this SI as it closes a potential gap in regulation. We believe that it is part of an important package of reform aimed at developing in our country a securitisation market that contributes to growth in the real economy.

I have just two questions. First, I understand that the FCA and the PRA expect to consult on further changes to their securitisation rules in Q4 2024 and Q1 2025. Is the Minister confident that those timelines will be met? Secondly, in the event of a Dissolution of Parliament, will the regulators be under any rule-making restrictions during the regulated period? Does the Treasury have a clear schedule of SIs that require consideration by Parliament in the remainder of the current Session? I thank the noble Lord in advance for his answers.

[Lord Roborough (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this short debate. I will try to answer some of the detailed questions that were asked as well as I can but I will have to write on some of them, I am afraid.

Let me first respond to some of the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. On timing, we expect that commencing the regulations on 1 November will give the industry time to prepare for the PRA’s and the FCA’s new rules, which regulators will consult on. There will be no further legislation. The regulators are consulting on rules to complement the securitisation SIs.

This will not specifically answer the question on risk retention but the UK’s approach currently aligns with the recommendations from the International Organization of Securities Commissions on; we therefore consider this to be best practice internationally at the moment. However, I understand that the noble Lord’s question went further than that, so I will address that.

This SI represents an important step in finalising the UK’s new financial services framework for securitisation. It complements the Securitisation Regulations 2024 by ensuring consistency on due diligence requirements for all firms participating in the securitisation market. It restates an important prohibition on securitisations in high-risk jurisdictions. The SI was scrutinised by the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, which made no comment on it and did not draw it to the special attention of the House. A de minimis impact assessment was published alongside this SI; it indicates that, on an ongoing basis, the SI should reduce occupational pension schemes’ compliance costs by making the rules more proportionate.

I will need to reply to the noble Lords, Lord Livermore and Lord Sharkey, on some of their detailed questions but I thank both of them for contributing to this debate, which I hope the Committee has found informative. I hope that the Committee will join me in supporting the regulations.