Civil Servants: Reduction of Numbers

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Thursday 24th March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I reject the first part of the question. I am absolutely delighted that my right honourable friend is bringing his insight to the Cabinet Office and I look forward to working with him. As far as consultants are concerned, yes, the Government are seeking to reduce consultancy spend. Central government and arm’s-length bodies spent approximately £1.5 billion on consultancy in 2021; that is why the consulting hub was set up last year to lead the consultancy reform programme. I can certainly assure the noble Lord and others that much attention will be given to that.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, if the Government wish the central Civil Service to be as effective as possible, whatever size it is, might they give a higher priority to reducing churn through appointments and postings, perhaps leading to greater stability, a retention of expertise and a greater and more effective corporate memory?

[Lord True (Con)]

I think the noble Lord makes a very important point. There is a great deal of churn in the Civil Service and that reflects one of the things that the Government wish to address in order to give greater job satisfaction, to invest in quality training and to enable civil servants to deliver a modern work programme. One of the reasons to seek to squeeze out efficiencies is to enable us to invest in more front-line service and in exactly the kind of support referred to by the noble Lord.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I had added my name to Amendment 2 in the name of noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, but unfortunately it has not made it on to the Marshalled List that I have. I hope that is not an expression of editorial disapproval.

I congratulate the noble Lord on his ingenuity in bringing Prorogation within the scope of our discussions. As the Minister will know, I was a little sceptical about the view that Prorogation was outside the scope or relevance of the Bill. That was on two grounds. First, it was said that Section 6 of the 2011 Act excluded Prorogation. Of course, it may have excluded it, but what is excluded can be added by amendment.

The second ground of my scepticism was the intimate relationship between Dissolution and Prorogation. It is by no means unknown for Parliament to be dissolved while prorogued; I have not looked at the figures, but this may be the majority of cases in recent decades. Even if we go back to the relatively short period—the business period, as it were—of Prorogation after wash-up, there will be a period of time when the House of Commons cannot take a decision of the sort envisaged by my noble and learned friend in his Amendment 3. So I suggest that, although this may not be crucial, it is probably a useful procedural mechanism or precaution.

Legislation: Skeleton Bills and Delegated Powers

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Thursday 6th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on securing this debate, her excellent article in the Financial Times and her outstanding speech to move the Motion. I speak as a former member of the Delegated Powers Committee and as a current member of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. I think, as has been generally agreed this afternoon, both committees have done an excellent job in highlighting this—not to mince words—blight upon the legislative process.

Of course, skeleton Bills, although a baneful phenomenon, are only part of the problem. It has for some time been routine for Bills of every sort to contain wide ministerial powers, subject to minimal parliamentary control and scrutiny. The Delegated Powers Committee does an excellent job, but it cannot hold back the tide. Understandably, we see these problems through the lens of the relationship between the Executive and Parliament, and the leaching of power away from Parliament by these means should be a matter of wide constitutional concern.

The Government’s own definition of “good law” is law that is

“necessary, effective, clear, coherent and accessible.”

We are dealing here with law that fails the “accessible” criterion, because when Parliament deals with the parent legislation it is so often not clear how delegated powers will be used—as they are too often for matters of principle and policy that should be in primary legislation.

The real losers are our citizens. We in this House may not represent them, but we can act in their best interests. They and business, industry, our national institutions and civil society need to know how the law will be changed, to have the opportunity to comment and make representations, and to know how it will end up applying to them. It is all the more surprising that the House that is elected seems to engage so little with these issues. At the very least, there is the powerful argument, which has already been mentioned, that an Administration of a different party will happily use extensive delegated powers that the party presently in power thought would be for its especial convenience.

Four minutes is not long enough to have a really satisfactory rant, although the present state of affairs certainly deserves it. We are agreed that things have come to a pretty pass, but, as noble Lords have said this afternoon, the real question is: what do we do about it? Most of the sophisticated suggestions about new procedures would probably require extensive amendment of the Statutory Instruments Act, passed in 1946—only yesterday, I should say to my noble friend—when secondary legislation was concerned only with detail and the Donoughmore principles were observed.

The Delegated Powers Committee could routinely report on Bills starting in the Commons when they are introduced there, as it did very successfully with some Brexit legislation. That is taking its recommendation in paragraph 154 a little further. We might have a Joint Committee on delegated powers, but that would depend on a greater degree of interest and enthusiasm at the other end of the building. We could simply vote down draft affirmatives that should have been in primary legislation, although we would then be operating on what I term the “Strathclyde caution”, despite the splendidly fierce words of the noble Baroness, Lady Andrews, a little earlier.

I have heard noble Lords say that there should be no more than two rounds of ping-pong and that there is some sort of convention to that effect. It is not so. For example, the Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill, which I remember very well, had 10 exchanges—five on each side. So perhaps we should set ourselves the task of making the securing of improper delegated powers really inconvenient, even to the edge of double insistence—not over the edge, but within shouting distance. That might concentrate ministerial minds powerfully.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 30th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord McLoughlin, on his chairing of the Joint Committee and the magisterial report that it produced. It was a pleasure to give oral evidence to that committee, and also, with my noble friend Lord Butler of Brockwell, to the Constitution Committee and the Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee in the House of Commons.

The Bill now before us lays the FTPA to an unregretted rest. It also seeks to restore the status quo ante by what might be called a willing suspension of disbelief—whether that will be successful is another issue. But I suggest that, in its short life, the FTPA may have damaged constitutional expectations in a way that may not be easy to repair. This was explored in some detail in the excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth.

The expectation of what might be a matter of confidence used to be fairly wide: a Government that lost the Queen’s Speech in the Commons, or lost on an amendment central to the Speech or a Second Reading of a Finance Bill, would either have to secure a demonstrative vote of confidence or ask Her Majesty for a Dissolution—and of course the official Opposition could of course take the initiative. But under the FTPA, the agreement by two-thirds that there should be an early general election immediately relegated the big confidence issues to the second division. A Government could suffer a severe defeat, but unless the FTPA was engaged, or they lost the formal Motion of confidence envisaged in the Act, they could shake the defeat off.

My concern is that the FTPA has reset expectations on what is a matter of confidence in a way that cannot now be fully restored. The Minister said in opening the debate that of course a Prime Minister can designate an issue as being a matter of confidence, and Mr Gove said something similar in the Second Reading debate in the House of Commons, but it is not quite the same thing.

I have no doubt that the applicability of the Lascelles principles will figure in Committee, and indeed we have heard something of those this afternoon. Those who are uneasy about replacing the Commons’ statutory power under the FTPA with a purported revival of prerogative power will no doubt argue for a Dissolution to be triggered only by a vote in the House of Commons —with, no doubt, a simple majority, rather than the baneful two-thirds majority. Without, at this stage, expressing a view, might I offer a word of caution? If your Lordships decide that the decision should rest with the House of Commons rather than with the monarch upon an unconstrained request from the Prime Minister, it will be essential to specify the words to which the Commons must agree.

When in my former life I saw an early draft of the Bill for the FTPA, I was horrified. It said that only defeat on a Motion of confidence should be the electoral trigger. But how was a Motion of confidence to be defined? If it carried conditions, would it still be a Motion of confidence? I could see no more certain way of inviting judicial interpretation of whether a statutory requirement had been fulfilled, Article 9 or no Article 9. For that to happen in the charged circumstances of a looming general election would be disastrous.

I am glad to say that that problem was cured during the passage of the Bill, but it follows that, should your Lordships see fit to put the finger of the House of Commons on the trigger, there must be an explicit form of words in the Bill, with nothing left to interpretation. If your Lordships do wish to empower the House of Commons in that way, I suggest that the provision must be capable of doing two things: first, a check on a Prime Minister who is inappropriately seeking a Dissolution; and, secondly, a means of getting Parliament out of a situation where the Government of the day are simply treading water.

There is widespread unease about Clause 3 of the Bill, in respect not only of its intent but whether, as a matter of law, it can achieve exactly what it says. I do not see how a resilient argument can be made that a prerogative power, removed by statute and then restored by statute, can be a prerogative power of exactly the same character as the abolished power. I will study my noble and learned friend’s views on that very closely indeed.

It seems from proceedings in the House of Commons that the parliamentary authorities have taken the view that the matter of Prorogation is outside the scope of the Bill. That view was expressed by the Deputy Speaker in the chair on 13 September last year, and it meant that Mr Chris Bryant had to move for an instruction to the Committee of the whole House in order to discuss a new clause on that subject—on which proposal he was unsuccessful.

Having spent a while as one of those authorities, I was a little surprised at that view. Scope, or relevance, as noble Lords will know, does not depend on the Long Title of a Bill; it depends on what is in the Bill and what is very closely associated with what is in the Bill. I make no criticism whatever of the learned minds who came to that view—it is always tiresome to have the old and bold trying to second-guess you—but it seems to me that there are two factors that bring Prorogation very close to this Bill. The first is that in the FTPA, which of course was an Act about Dissolution, it was nevertheless thought necessary to include in Section 6(1) a saving for Prorogation. If the Bill now before us is resetting the clock, for Prorogation to be out of scope may thus be thought curious. I should say to noble Lords that I have no cunning plan for Committee or Report on how Prorogation might be covered by the Bill, but it seems to me that this is something which needs exploring a little further.

The second factor is that in normal times—if any of us now has a clear recollection of what normal times were like—it was not unusual to prorogue Parliament and then dissolve during the period of Prorogation, so the two processes were intimately related. This may indeed be something to explore further, and I much look forward to Committee on the Bill.

Brexit: Stability of the Union

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Thursday 17th January 2019 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lisvane]

That this House takes note of the possible effects of Brexit on the stability of the Union of the parts of the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Stedman-Scott (Con)]

My Lords, the business we are about to begin is very important and there is a real desire to hear from every contributor. However, time is tight so, in the nicest way possible, I ask noble Lords to adhere to the time allocated to them. When the Clock reaches five minutes, I will stand up to maintain order in the debate.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, I begin with a word of thanks to those Cross-Bench colleagues who voted for the Motion to be debated. I am delighted that the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, is to reply to the debate for the Government. In view of our happy co-operation in former lives, I hope that I may refer to him as my noble friend on this occasion. I see from the speakers’ list that I am allotted 15 minutes in moving the Motion. That is an unimaginable luxury but, in view of the long list of speakers, I shall try not to use all that time and so perhaps offer a little elbow room to other noble Lords. I am extremely grateful to the Government Chief Whip for the half-hour extension to the debate.

The Motion is couched specifically in terms of the hazards to the union posed by Brexit, but the seeds were sown long before. We have a worrying habit in this country of doing constitutional change in bits, as the occasion serves, but with little overall intent or co-ordination. I have seen the process at close quarters for 46 years, so I entirely understand how this has come about. The Government, often incoming, have their priorities and wish to demonstrate their authority. The business managers wish to make rapid progress with focused proposals. They do not much like Parliament going into what might be called seminar mode. And of course, there is the ever-looming phenomenon of “Events, dear boy, events”.

The result over several Parliaments is that we are left with a patchwork. Nowhere is this clearer than in the devolution of powers to different parts of the United Kingdom. Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland have different models of devolved government. They have developed independently and subject to the successive pressures of the moment; no one, I think, would regard any of them as wholly successful. Moreover, they are characterised by a sort of imperial condescension from the centre—from Westminster and Whitehall, but especially from the latter—and they are inconsistent. As a Welshman by birth and title, I think I may ask why Scotland and Northern Ireland can set their own rates of air passenger duty but Wales cannot. Indeed, why are justice and policing devolved in Scotland and Northern Ireland but not in Wales? I am glad that my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd is addressing that question through the work of his commission. England, the largest part of the UK, accounts for some 85% of United Kingdom GVA and a little more in terms of population and GDP, yet, with the exception of London and a few city mayors, it has been largely omitted from these changes. Of course, that poses a pressing but ever more intractable “English question”.

I have described an unsatisfactory and probably unstable system that has come about through a variety of political pressures and aspirations, often worthy in themselves but with unco-ordinated and piecemeal results. Were we not now set to leave the European Union, in any event, significant centrifugal forces in the years ahead would put the integrity and stability of the UK’s devolution settlement at risk. The profound Brexit changes now in contemplation will, I suggest, only increase that risk. I am sure that noble Lords taking part in the debate will have many expert perceptions of how the months ahead may put further strain on the union. I note that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee has described our territorial constitution as “in flux” and our European Union Committee has said that,

“the European Union has been, in effect, part of the glue holding the United Kingdom together”.

What are the main hazards? The first is the Brexit process itself, bearing in mind that in the referendum, two of the constituent parts of the UK voted differently from the other two and differently from the overall result. Secondly, the repatriation of powers will be contentious. Central government will want to protect the UK-wide single market by retaining substantial powers in London, but Edinburgh, Cardiff and Belfast will not see it like that. Also, the repatriation process will, I think, take longer than anyone at the moment predicts, which is not going to help. The complex exchanges over the Scottish and Welsh continuity Bills and the referral of the Scottish Bill to the Supreme Court demonstrate that there are serious unresolved tensions. The Scottish constitutional relations Secretary has referred to “constitutional vandalism” and has said that he,

“could not conceive of circumstances”,

in which the Scottish Parliament would give its consent to further UK Brexit-related legislation.

Our departure from the EU will intensify debate about the fair funding of the different parts of the UK. It is a commonplace to say that we must move on from the Barnett formula, but it is not yet clear how we should do so. In Northern Ireland, the issues of borders and backstops are already causing great concern and contention, and lurking behind those issues is the aspiration of some for reunification. There is also the risk, identified by the Scottish Government, that future customs arrangements might give Northern Ireland a competitive advantage among the parts of the United Kingdom.

In Scotland, a significant proportion of those who supported independence in 2014 did so on the basis that an independent Scotland would or could become a member state of the EU. The UK having left the European Union would, in the case of Scotland, remove the long-standing unwillingness of the EU to countenance subnational aspirations, as would still be the case with Lombardy, Catalunya, Flanders and so on. This might be a seductive prospect in the context of any indyref2.

Intergovernmental relations within the United Kingdom are the concern of the Joint Ministerial Committee, which has now been in existence for 20 years—20 years this year, actually. This should be the key forum for the discussion of developing relations, but both the Scottish and the Welsh Governments have expressed dismay at the way it is operated. Her Majesty’s Government have the opportunity to make this a much more effective mechanism to support the Brexit process. I trust that this is something that will receive close attention, as recommended by our EU and Constitution Committees and the equivalent committees in Scotland and Wales. I hope that in his reply to the debate, the noble Lord will be able to tell us the Government’s current thinking on how the JMC might be overhauled.

The House of Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee has suggested that separate English representation on the JMC would be a way of addressing the English question, although how this would be achieved in practice is not entirely clear. It is a pleasure to pay tribute to the work of the Interparliamentary Forum on Brexit, which brings together the chairs and convenors of the committees scrutinising Brexit at Westminster, Edinburgh and Cardiff with, understandably in the current circumstances, the participation of officials from Belfast as observers. The forum, which happens to be meeting at Westminster today, offers a mutually supportive and constructive approach which so far has not, I think, quite been replicated in the JMC, which the forum has described as “not fit for purpose”.

Noble Lords may be chafing slightly at my listing a litany of problems without any suggestion of how they might be cured. In the excellent debate in your Lordships’ House before Christmas, there were calls for a constitutional convention or commission. In replying to that debate, the noble Lord who is now on the Front Bench said that the wide-ranging nature of the issues raised meant that any convention looking into them would take years to do them justice. I have a lot of sympathy with his point of view. It would be hard to argue that such a convention should be anything other than comprehensive, which might further reduce the likely glacial pace of such an initiative. Time is not on our side.

I do not suggest that the Act of Union Bill, which I introduced in October, has all the answers, but at least it seeks to address the problems in an holistic way. I must be careful not to offend against anticipation—this is a debate on the Motion before us, not on the Second Reading of the Bill—but perhaps, with your Lordships’ permission, I may say a few words about it.

The Bill is the result of the work of the Constitution Reform Group, which consists of members of all the major parties, including the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, both of whom are in their place. The group is convened and chaired by Lord Salisbury, a former distinguished Member and indeed Leader of your Lordships’ House, and the Bill has been drafted by the outstanding parliamentary draftsman Daniel Greenberg. It seeks to replace the present top-down method of devolution with a bottom-up method, in which the constituent parts of the United Kingdom—and perhaps the regional parts of England—would decide which powers they wished to pool for greater solidarity and effectiveness. It would replace the central imperial condescension, to which I referred earlier, with a devolution settlement properly owned by its participants. It would also include something perhaps missing from the present arrangements: the R word—respect.

The Bill is comprehensive but it does not attempt to provide a full written constitution. It does not, for example, touch those parts that work perfectly well, such as the courts and the judiciary. But it does seek to address the areas of difficulty, some of which I have outlined. It would not try to bind a subsequent Parliament—no Bill can do that—but it offers an overarching settlement with an indication of how primary legislation of, as it were, the second tier could fill in some of the detail. And there is a lot of detail to be filled in. In a sentence, it aspires to be a plan B. As each day passes, I become more and more convinced that we need a plan B.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lisvane]

My Lords, I will not attempt to respond to or summarise the debate in any way, as that role has been so admirably performed by the Minister. I will just say two things. First, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in what has been an excellent debate. Secondly, I say to the noble Lord, Lord Griffiths of Burry Port, that I think the hostelry in Lisvane he has in mind is the Black Griffin. I should be very happy to join him there. We might even persuade the Minister to join us for an extremely convivial discussion of the Act of Union Bill.

Motion agreed.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Tuesday 30th January 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, it is no exaggeration to say that if the Bill before us is enacted without significant amendment, it will represent the largest single peacetime transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive. By comparison, the 1972 Act was a model of restraint.

This is not what we were led to believe in the referendum campaign by the use of phrases such as “parliamentary sovereignty” coupled with “taking back control”. The leave/remain and soft/hard/no deal debate no doubt continues unabated, but that is not where criticism of the Bill should lie. The Constitution Committee has done an excellent job on the Bill. In passing, I gently observe, in the distinguished presence of the chairman of the committee, that some of its recommendations are a little less exacting than those of the Delegated Powers Committee, of which I am a member and which I expect to produce another report in time for the start of Committee.

The issue here is parliamentary sovereignty in the making of law, which the Bill challenges and will constrain—and, not least in the power to make tertiary legislation, not only constrain but extinguish. No one doubts that flexibility and speed will be needed to adapt our legal order to life after Brexit, but it cannot be at the expense of the power of Parliament to scrutinise and decide.

As one or two noble Lords have alluded to, it is worth remembering that once extensive ministerial powers are on the statute book, they can be used by any Minister of the Crown. Her Majesty’s present Ministers may not welcome the thought, but were the powers they now propose to be in the hands of an Administration of a different political colour, I fancy there would be a great deal of traffic down the legislative road to Damascus. It is important to keep in mind that assurances about how powers are intended to be used are of limited value. The only thing that matters is what is on the statute book.

The Bill will, no doubt, be heavily amended by your Lordships’ House. Issues of real concern include the looming presence of a largely unconstrained Henry VIII. Although Henry VIII has become a convenient shorthand for the exercise of ministerial powers which erode parliamentary sovereignty, the dangers of the other delegated powers in the Bill are just as serious. I pay tribute to the speech of my noble friend Lord Wilson of Dinton. There is the Bill’s substitution of ministerial judgment of what is “appropriate” for what is “necessary”, allowing major changes of policy to be made under a power intended, we are told, to make purely technical adjustments to the repatriated legal order.

There is the ability of Ministers to confer on bodies and even individuals the power to make law—tertiary legislation—without the approval of Parliament or even the requirement to publish that law. There is the fact that the superficially reassuring sunsetting provisions do not apply to substantial areas of ministerial power. There is the ability of Ministers, not Parliament, to decide the level of parliamentary approval required for the exercise of many of their delegated powers. There is the ability to impose taxation by statutory instrument, not primary legislation.

The mechanics of approving a final deal will no doubt be an issue, despite the extreme difficulties of timing involved, alluded to by the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton of Epsom. In a parliamentary system of government, I am no friend of referendums, and I recall Attlee’s excoriating criticism of them, which was quoted by Margaret Thatcher, as the noble Lord, Lord Patten of Barnes, recalled. I am genuinely torn. I have sympathy with the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, in not understanding why, when it is all right to ask the people once, it is not all right to ask them again—not the same question, of course, but to see whether they are content with what has been achieved in their name.

Indulge me for a moment, my Lords. It is as though I have three elderly and extremely nervous aunts of whom I am very fond. I decide to give them a treat and ask them to discuss what they would like to do. They have a discussion and arrive at a democratic solution, which is that they would like to go to the cinema tomorrow. I look in the local paper and discover that the only films on offer are “Reservoir Dogs” and “The Texas Chainsaw Massacre”. What am I going to say to my highly nervous—indeed, squeamish—but much-loved aunts: “You must stick with your democratic decision”? Or do I say, “Now you know what’s on offer, what do you think?”?

Of course, on all these matters, in the end, the elected House must have its way. That is a given, but I would not be surprised, especially in the context of the numbers in the Commons, to see extended exchanges between the two Houses. After all, it was not that long ago that the then Corporate Manslaughter and Corporate Homicide Bill went back and forth between the two Houses seven times. That was an important issue, but it was nothing like as important as the issues now before us. Some argue against any criticism or amendment of this Bill on the grounds that if the Bill were not enacted there would be legal chaos. That is a naive and slightly condescending argument. We all know there need to be mechanisms to move us towards a post-Brexit legal order and, suitably amended, this Bill would provide those mechanisms, but without doing profound damage to the authority of Parliament and its duty to act as a check on the Executive. Of course, there are those who see such criticism or amendment as an attempt to stop Brexit. It is not. It is about what we have after Brexit; it is about parliamentary sovereignty and the long-term constitutional settlement.

Parliamentary Proceedings: Statistics

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Wednesday 18th January 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, my noble friend’s excellent Question is narrow, but its implications are wide. The rule of law is central to any civilised society. The quality of law is a determining factor in the respect in which the law is held, so it is central to the rule of law. The other side of the equation is just as important: how well does the legislature scrutinise the legislative proposals of the Executive?

One of my learned predecessors as Clerk of the House of Commons, Sir Thomas Erskine May, said in the first edition of the great work which still bears his name that there are no limits to the legislative authority of Parliament other than,

“the willingness of the people to obey, or their power to resist”.

So that legislative authority should be exercised with great care. Alas, I do not think we can make the claim that it is. The legislative process may not quite be broken, but it is certainly not working very well. The approach of Brexit legislation makes the need for improvement ever more urgent.

Despite words of comfort from the Government, too much of significance is still put into delegated legislation, with no firm and observed principles as to where the boundaries should be set. There is extensive quasi-legislation, such as codes and guidance, which have the force of law but are largely left to Ministers to make up their minds about after the event. Powers delegated to Ministers, including Henry VIII powers, are often much more extensive than they need to be, and generally with insufficient parliamentary scrutiny; for example, in the previous Session there were 14 government Bills, containing a total of 41 Henry VIII provisions.

When I was invited by the Statute Law Society to give its annual lecture in a few weeks’ time, I had no difficulty in choosing the title of my lecture. If noble Lords will forgive a moment of advertisement, it is: Why is there so much bad law? “Bad”, of course, refers both to the end product and the way in which it gets on to the statute book. In my previous life, I used to say to audiences outside Westminster, “Don’t for a moment run away with the idea that a Bill is draft legislation; it is not. It is, word for word, what the Government of the day want to see on the statute book”. The corollary of that, of course, is that Ministers, of whatever party, have a collective allergy to amendments. In a way, that is understandable. If a department has been thrashing out the contents of a Bill, clearing it with other departments and the devolved Administrations, dealing with potential difficulties within the party of government, getting it through the business managers and PBL, there may be a feeling, when the Bill is finally ready for introduction, that the job is done. But of course that is when the real job has to start, and that is where both Parliament and Government need to up their game.

My noble friend referred to draft Bills. I realise that Her Majesty’s Ministers have quite a lot on their plate for the foreseeable future, but I have been very disappointed that draft Bills appear to have become an endangered species. In this Session, only the ombudsman Bill was published in draft. In the Queen’s Speech, another was promised but it has so far failed to appear. Draft Bills can of course be heavy on drafting resources, because parliamentary counsel are involved with both the draft Bill and then the Bill as it is to be introduced. But they offer a real increase in the quality of legislative scrutiny, with a consensual approach, evidentially based amendment and public access to the legislative process—much greater access, and much more effective, than the evidence-taking phase of Commons Public Bill Committees.

Draft Bills should commend themselves to business managers because consideration by a Joint Committee should avoid double handling in the two Houses and make the passage of the Bill as introduced much smoother. If only the Higher Education and Research Bill had started life as a draft Bill. I remember from our enjoyable association in the House of Commons that the Minister used to think that draft Bills were really quite a good idea. I hope that he still does so and that he will be able to offer us some comfort and cause for hope this evening.

Queen’s Speech

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Tuesday 24th May 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Richard, and my noble and learned friend Lord Judge both raised issues of financial privilege, often seen perhaps as something of a minority sport. I think procedures have moved on a little since I was directly involved, but I agree that it is an issue that would benefit from greater clarity, as urged by my noble and learned friend Lord Judge, and the development of perhaps greater joint understanding, as urged by the noble Lord, Lord Richard.

As a fellow member, along with the noble Lords, Lord Hain and Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, of the constitution reform group that was convened by the noble Marquess, Lord Salisbury, I endorse what the noble Lord, Lord Hain, said in his excellent speech. However, I will not follow him all the way down the track of possible elections to your Lordships’ House. The constitution reform group was created exactly to address the sort of patchwork that was identified by the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth.

The reference in the gracious Speech to the primacy of the House of Commons has generally been taken, I think correctly, to be a shot across the bows of your Lordships’ House. Perhaps at this stage there is merit in a shot across the bows rather than one into the wheelhouse, but there is a certain irony in this, because I am sure that the primacy of the House of Commons as the elected House is something that your Lordships would agree on as one, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, pointed out earlier. There is a further irony in that part of the gracious Speech, because the reference to the primacy of the House of Commons is preceded by another ministerial undertaking: to uphold the sovereignty of Parliament—Parliament and not the Executive. With a respectful nod to my noble friend Lord Butler of Brockwell, I think it is increasingly common ground that the issues raised by the Strathclyde report are not issues between this House and the House of Commons but between Parliament and the Executive, with each House doing its distinct job of scrutiny and challenge on behalf of all our citizens. It is good to know from the gracious Speech that Ministers are ranged firmly on the side of Parliament, although that may not be quite the sense that was intended by the drafters.

Just as there is broadening agreement that these issues are about parliamentary control of the Executive, there is, I am glad to say, increasing agreement that Strathclyde option 3 is not the way to address any perceived difficulty—although with six defeats of subordinate legislation in your Lordships’ House over about half a century, I suggest that the onus of describing the difficulty rests with those who wish to perceive it. In this, I may be diverging from the view of the noble Lord, Lord Wakeham, and that is, to some extent a first. On parliamentary matters, I have been cordially agreeing with him now for about 44 years.

Increasing agreement about the unwisdom of legislating, with all the risks of collateral damage that might come with it, is demonstrated not only by three reports from committees of this House but also by the report from the Commons Public Administration and Constitutional Affairs Committee, which has criticised Strathclyde option 3 in terms just as uncompromising as those used by the committees of this House. It said that,

“legislation would be an overreaction and entirely disproportionate to the House of Lords’ … exercise of a power that even Lord Strathclyde has admitted is rarely used”.

Then the Commons committee comes to the nub of the matter:

“The Government’s time would be better spent in rethinking the way it relies on secondary legislation for implementing its policy objectives”.

So in the very limited time that I have left, I ask, at the beginning of this legislative Session, what are the chances of a sea change in the quality of legislation? Have government departments been told to ensure that in the instructions to parliamentary counsel, matters of policy and principle are for primary and not secondary legislation? Has PBL, the Parliamentary Business and Legislation Committee of the Cabinet, set itself an objective for the rest of this Parliament that Bills will be properly ready for introduction, unlike the then Housing and Planning Bill, and will set out clearly what is to be achieved, unlike the then Childcare Bill? Have the Government heeded the wise words of my noble and learned friend Lord Judge on Henry VIII clauses, which allow Ministers to amend or even repeal primary legislation in a potentially highly undemocratic way? The Cabinet Office guide to making legislation instructs Bill teams to pay “particular attention” to Henry VIII powers—a slight ambiguity there—but does that mean that there will be fewer of them?

I do not expect the Minister who winds up to give me the answers to all these questions, although it would be jolly nice if he could, but I would be grateful if he could answer this final point. Unusually, there is no explicit mention in the gracious Speech of any draft Bill, although one has been subject to pre-legislative scrutiny and another is to be “proposals”. Now that we are in the second Session of Parliament and the first-Session difficulties of producing Bills in draft are reducing, how many draft Bills may we expect? If the Government are serious about improving the quality of legislation and the legislative process, draft Bills would be one very good measure.

Housing and Planning Bill

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Monday 25th April 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Lisvane]

132: Clause 190, page 100, line 15, at end insert —
“( ) regulations under section 67(1) that contain more than one determination or a determination that relates to more than one local housing authority,( ) regulations under section 67(8),”

[Lord Lisvane]

My Lords, this amendment is consequential upon Amendment 53, which was agreed on 13 April. I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, Amendment 132, which has been tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane, Lord Kerslake and Lord Beecham, would make regulations on the definition of higher value and on determinations subject to the affirmative procedure. As I have made clear, we have listened to the House and agree that the regulations defining higher value should be made through the affirmative process. We will table an additional amendment in relation to this to ensure that no hybridity issues arise in respect of those regulations. We do not agree that the determination should be put into regulations and that those regulations should be subject to the affirmative procedure. However, I recognise that the House voted to accept Amendment 53, which put the determination into regulations, and that agreement has been reached that Amendment 132 will be accepted by the will of the House. It is important that I am clear to noble Lords that the Government are concerned that putting the determination into regulations will add more complexity and delay to the process and that we intend to return to this issue in the Commons.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lisvane]

138: Clause 192, page 101, line 9, leave out paragraph (b)

[Lord Lisvane]

My Lords, as we embark on the last group in five heavy days of this Bill on Report, I am under no illusions at all about your Lordships’ wish to have a lengthy debate. However, it is perhaps appropriate that the issues raised by this last group reflect concerns raised at Second Reading, in Committee and on Report: what is good legislation and how do you go about it?

Amendment 138 is simply a paver for Amendment 140, in that it would remove the immediate commencement date from the provisions on vacant high-value housing, which Amendment 140 seeks to delay. Amendments 139, 140 and 141 in my name and that of the noble Lords, Lord Kerslake, Lord Kennedy of Southwark and Lord Foster of Bath, are sunrise amendments. They would delay the coming into force of provisions on, respectively, rents for high-income social tenants, vacant high-value housing and starter homes, until the key regulations in each case had been laid before Parliament. It is fair to say that the period of delay might be much too long in practice, but of course its purpose is demonstrative.

The aim of the amendments is to reverse the default setting with which we have become perhaps almost too familiar in considering the Bill: first, that a great deal—too much, in the minds of many—is left to secondary legislation; secondly, that the level of parliamentary control is too low, although I am glad to say that some welcome steps have been taken in this respect on Report; and, lastly, that too much depends on consultation that should have taken place before the Bill was ever introduced and whose outcome, even at this stage, we have to take on trust.

Over many years in this building I have become familiar—even wearily so—with the special difficulties of a first Session of a Parliament, particularly when there has been a change of Administration at the previous general election. However, I do not think that that entirely justifies the position in which we have been put. Sometimes one must accept delay in order to get things right. Getting things right means following the logical process of formulating policy, consulting upon it, finalising it and then putting it into draft legislation, with all the key areas of policy being in the Bill.

In what seems now the dim and distant past, there used to be such things as Green Papers. Not only did they allow consultation on proposals; they also allowed legislative intent to be stress-tested before proposals came formally before Parliament. I attach no blame at all to the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, and her noble friends on the Front Bench. She has constantly sought to be helpful, as have her officials and the Housing Minister, Brandon Lewis. Like, no doubt, other noble Lords around the House, I am very grateful for that but from time to time, Ministers have reminded me of anguished travellers on a runaway train. They have been prisoners of a legislative culture in the Executive. I do not single out the present Administration in this respect; it has been going on for a long time, perhaps too long. That culture militates against real parliamentary scrutiny.

In passing, I note that Clause 189(2), which is outside the scope of these amendments but close by, is a hefty Henry VIII power of the sort against which my noble and learned friend Lord Judge warned us in his masterly King’s College lecture a fortnight ago.

The message of Amendments 139, 140 and 141 is really that, had this measure come before Parliament in the form of a draft Bill, it would have resulted in better legislation. I know well why that was not the option the Government found attractive, but I hope that this Parliament will see a dramatic increase in the number of draft Bills, and that we may hear of a reassuring number in the gracious Speech in just over three weeks’ time. I beg to move.

[Lord Foster of Bath (LD)]

My Lords, I shall briefly follow the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane. At Second Reading, I and many other people acknowledged that there were some very good bits in the Bill before us at that time. However, we pointed out that there were also many bits about which we had considerable concern. There are at least some areas where deliberation in your Lordships’ House has brought about improvements to those areas where we had concern. I, too, pay tribute to the Minister and her colleagues on the Front Bench for the way in which they have been willing to listen and bring forward amendments in the light of our deliberations.

However, none of that can take away from the fact that the Bill has been presented, not only in another place but more recently to your Lordships’ House, in a pretty poor state. Because I am relatively new to your Lordships’ House, I turned to my elders and betters to see what they have thought about it. As we come to the end of the deliberations on this legislation, it is worth reflecting what your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has had to say about the Bill—not only when it first received it but subsequently, after various deliberations had taken place.

I note that, in its 27th report, the committee says:

“This Bill has given rise to a particularly large number of comments and recommendations … It is also disappointing that we have felt it necessary to comment adversely on aspects of the delegated powers memoranda provided by the department”.

It described those memoranda as “variable in quality” and pointed out that in relation to some parts of the Bill,

“no delegated powers memorandum was provided at all”.

When the Government responded to the committee’s initial findings, the committee then had to point out that:

“It is a matter of regret that the Government’s response to this Bill … gives us cause for continued concern in that a number of our recommendations received no comment at all”.

The committee made the point that many Members of your Lordships’ House have made many times over many weeks, when it said that,

“we would observe again that these provisions are being presented to the House before the underlying policy is sufficiently developed to afford Members a clear basis for discussing it”.

In its 28th report, the committee amplified that in saying:

“Inadequate and incomplete provisions of … primary legislation cannot be excused on the basis that consultation has not taken place or that the Government wish to retain ‘flexibility to set out differing timeframes as they apply in different contexts’”.

The committee concludes:

“The policy should have been finalised following appropriate consultation before, not after, the Bill was introduced”.

One can read so many other comments from the report:

“We draw this apparent ambiguity to the attention of the House … We draw this lack of clarity to the attention of the House … That seems to us to be a very unusual requirement, and we draw it to the attention of the House”,

and so on. It is “not persuaded”, it does not regard this as being remotely persuasive, and so the report goes on.

It is perfectly reasonable for people to propose a sunrise clause as a way of simply putting off legislation with which they disagree, and we on these Benches disagree with bits of this legislation. However, the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, has made a much more fundamental point about why there should be a sunrise clause, which is simply that the work has not yet been done. Until the work has been done and draft regulations are put before the House and we have an opportunity to know that that consultation has taken place and to understand what the Government mean by some of the definitions we have not yet heard, it seems perfectly reasonable to propose, as the noble Lord and others have done, that we have a sunrise clause to put off the introduction of this legislation until the Government have done the work that they should have done before presenting the Bill to this House.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, we end Report as we began, discussing the principle of many of the policies within the Bill. The evening is drawing on—it is now quarter to 11—so noble Lords will forgive me if I do not restate all the arguments for all the policies.

However, I will say this. Later this week, we will pass to the other place a Bill which contains a number of distinct manifesto policies and which implements a number of measures set out in the Government’s Budget or productivity plan. The Government’s intention is quite clear. We all agree that this country, and in particular our young people, need more homes to be built. That is a key theme for this Government, and changes to the planning system and building new homes take time.

I understand the concerns raised by noble Lords, particularly the noble Baroness, Lady Hollis, about the availability of detail on some of the policies in the Bill, but this set of amendments would place delay upon delay on the building of new homes. This is extra time that we simply do not have. It would mean a delay to the sale of high-value assets, meaning delays to building two more affordable homes in London for every one expected to be sold, and a delay to the commencement of starter homes, meaning fewer built for young families looking for somewhere to call their own.

I have heard the arguments raised time and again—that noble Lords feel that the detail of our policies should be available for scrutiny before work is done to legislate for them—and I understand the points that have been made. I am very keen to see consensus where possible and to continue to engage with noble Lords across the House as we go forward in developing regulations after the Bill has completed its passage. That is why I have made a number of changes to enhance the role of Parliament in scrutinising our plans. Several regulations will now not come into force without the detail being agreed by both Houses. I believe that this is a good compromise, and it is the result of noble Lords’ passionate arguments and skill in refining the Bill to the point at which we are today.

Amendments 138 and 140, tabled by the noble Lords, Lords Lisvane, Lord Kerslake, Lord Beecham and Lord Foster, would delay the sale of high-value assets and the delivery of new homes which that would unlock. Furthermore, the sale of assets to pay for the voluntary right-to-buy agreement is a manifesto commitment, and people want to exercise their right to buy as soon as possible. Already more than 25,000 housing association tenants have registered their interest in taking up this option, with 1,000 registering their interest each week. Our current arrangements will allow Parliament to scrutinise the detail first, and I hope that that will satisfy noble Lords. However, at this point I must make it clear that I will not bring back this amendment at Third Reading. Therefore, if the noble Lord is not content with my response, he should test the opinion of the House this evening.

Likewise, the affirmative regulations effected by Amendment 141, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Kerslake, would prevent the starter home provisions in the Bill coming into force until a year after regulations are laid in both Houses. I say again that the Government’s manifesto commitment was to deliver 200,000 starter homes, and we will be expected to deliver on our commitment. Our current arrangements allow Parliament to scrutinise the detail first.

I hear noble Lords’ arguments clearly, however, and local planning authorities need time to consider new measures. That is why we are consulting on the provision of transitional arrangements in our technical consultation. We have asked an open question to understand the views of the sector on this important matter.

The regulations will not act retrospectively on existing planning consents. It is also our intention that they will not apply to any application already submitted to a local planning authority. I am sure noble Lords do not want to delay housebuilding because their amendment stops development for a year, and that would be its impact.

Turning now to Amendment 138C, which is from the noble Lords, Lord Krebs and Lord Kennedy, and deals with flooding, I acknowledge that where we do build we need to do so in a way that ensures that the flood risk is managed effectively and so that new development does not add to the flood risk. Our planning policies are designed to do just that. I am glad to acknowledge the important work which the noble Lord, Lord Krebs, has led with the adaptation sub-committee of the Committee on Climate Change on this matter. We understand and appreciate the intention of the noble Lord to find further ways to ensure that new development is not built in areas of high flood risk. His proposal raises some complex issues, not least the interaction with insurance arrangements and the operation of the existing warranty schemes for new homes. We all want to avoid a situation where there is any confusion about liabilities and responsibilities between housebuilders, insurance companies and warranty scheme operators. The Housing and Planning Minister, Brandon Lewis, wrote to the noble Lord offering further discussions between officials on this matter, including with colleagues from Defra. I am very happy to repeat that offer this evening. I can confirm that I will write to the noble Lord with details of those planned discussions. I hope he will accept that as a positive way forward.

I know that some of us are not going to agree on policies linking social rents more closely to income, despite the progress that we have made. I have listened to the debate with care, but my response may not come as a surprise. Amendment 139 would delay payment of a fairer rent by those who can afford it, and the money raised through the policy has been identified as a contribution to deficit reduction. Delaying the implementation of the policy in this way would reduce the Government’s ability to use that money for this important purpose. I have previously announced a significant package of measures aimed at ensuring that the policy is applied fairly, including the use of a taper and exemptions for people on certain benefits. We are carefully considering the amendments made by noble Lords to the policy on Report before we return to this discussion in the Commons. We will give tenants time to prepare for the introduction of the policy by working with local authorities now to ensure that they are fully aware of the need to put preparations in place to deliver measured and tapered rent increases in April 2017. My officials and I have had constructive conversations with the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, about how we can implement the Bill as practically as possible.

As I said earlier, I hope I have been clear in what I said: if the noble Lord is not happy with my response, he should test the opinion of the House.

[Lord Lisvane]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, especially for her undertaking to seek consensus as the details have developed—that is extremely helpful. I know that she has taken my criticisms in good part. In practice, these amendments raise issues that are lessons for the future, rather than an occasion for a final skirmish on Report. Accordingly, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 138 and will not move the subsequent amendments.

Amendment 138 withdrawn.

Security: State Procession

Lord Lisvane Excerpts

Thursday 9th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

I am sorry that noble Lords shake their heads but, as my right honourable friend the Chancellor pointed out yesterday, we need to do it. Since 2010 the Government have generated £1.4 billion in land and building sales while the running costs of the estate have fallen by £647 million compared with 2009-10. Moreover we have done that while ensuring that security is upheld, as I have explained to the noble Lord.

[Lord Lisvane (CB)]

My Lords, as someone who sought to buy the Curtis Green building for parliamentary use rather than as a luxury hotel, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, for raising this issue. It is extremely important that a full formal CPNI security assessment is given to Ministers in the case of each building. I ask the Minister to bear in mind that many of these buildings are connected underground. I also ask him to ignore the siren voices which suggest that security can be assured simply by sealing tunnels. It cannot; ask anybody in Hatton Garden.

[Lord Bridges of Headley]

There are service ducts under many buildings for electricity, telecommunications and other services, and any security risks in relation to them, as with any other part of the buildings, have been assessed and taken into account in the sale of the leases. I need to repeat that the security agencies are involved in all disposals of government property and their advice is always taken into account.