Voting by Prisoners
Lord Lilley Excerpts(13 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Walter
I am not a lawyer and would defer to the Attorney-General for a legal answer. As was said earlier, “We are where we are”—I think we have to go from that particular point.
We need to put all this into perspective. Since the convention came into force, Russia has faced more than 1,000 adverse judgments; Turkey has had more than 2,000, 228 of which were in 2010 alone; Poland has had 761; Ukraine has had 709; and Romania has had just over 700. What if the UK defied the Court? Dissent is unacceptable, because we would be saying it was acceptable for countries that face thousands of charges, many on grave human rights abuses, to flout international law. That is clearly unacceptable.
How do we reconcile our opposition to the Court’s judgment?
Mr Walter
Sadly, I have only 30 seconds left, so I shall not.
The reform process that several hon. Members have mentioned is under way. It refers to subsidiarity and is very clear. The Interlaken process, which was started in Interlaken last year, will be continued in Izmir and I hope that the Government will support that when they take over the chairmanship of the Committee of Ministers.
Tom Brake
I am sure that my right hon. Friend and many others here have engaged with prisoners, and that he will have found, as I have, that there is a great degree of interest in what is happening outside the prison walls. It is therefore entirely appropriate that we should seek that engagement.
Tom Brake
I thank the right hon. Gentleman for that intervention, but that is a matter on which we will have to disagree.
Prison serves to protect and punish, but also to rehabilitate. Release from prison is not the point at which prisoners should re-engage with society. We should be encouraging prisoners to re-engage with society while they are still in prison. The way we treat victims says a lot about the society that we strive to be, but the way we treat prisoners also says a lot about the society that we strive to be. I do not want to shut the door on those prisoners who are ready and willing to re-engage with society and sign up to the tenets that underpin it. Anyone who has visited a prison will know that some prisoners are indeed seeking that engagement.
We have heard a lot said about public opinion and the views of constituents in this debate. The right hon. Member for Blackburn (Mr Straw) said in his article today that the “vast majority” of his constituents
“feel strongly about prisoners’ votes,”
and that in 32 years as an MP he had never had a letter from a prisoner seeking the right to vote. Can he recall whether he has ever had a letter from a constituent asking for the right to vote to be taken away from prisoners who already have it? I suspect that the answer would be that he has not.
I visited a group of year 11 pupils in a school yesterday. I started the question and answer session with the topic of the right of prisoners to vote. I expected the Q and A to turn quickly to the subject of tuition fees, but it did not. At the end of a full and frank debate, about 50% of the pupils supported the Government’s proposals, and only about a third thought that no prisoners should have the right to vote.
Mr Peter Lilley (Hitchin and Harpenden) (Con)
As I read the judgments in the cases of Hirst, and Greens and M.T., I was struck by the supreme irony of what the European Court of Human Rights was proposing. The judges in that Court clearly surpass even the Red Queen in “Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland” in their ability to believe two impossible things before breakfast. On the one hand, they say that the right to influence the laws under which we live by helping to choose the people who make those laws is so important that even criminals should retain it. On the other hand, they say that even the law-abiding people of this country have no right of last resort to decide the laws of their country if they are overridden by the decisions of the European Court of Human Rights. One can believe one or other of those views, but one cannot uphold both views consistently at the same time.
How did we get into this pickle? As we have heard, after the war Lord Kilmuir codified what were seen to be British liberties and rights in the presumption that two things would follow, the first being that enshrining them in the European convention on human rights would bring the advantage of British liberties to
“lesser breeds without the law”,
as Kipling had it. Secondly, it was assumed that the convention would have no effect on the people of this country because it enshrined the laws and liberties that we already had so there would be no need to change them. It was assumed that whereas the European Court could overrule courts in other countries with judiciaries who did not have experience in human rights or who were open to intimidation or bribery, we did not have that problem so there would never be any conflict between our courts or laws and the Court.
As we know, things have not worked out like that. In becoming a signatory to the convention, we did not just enshrine and encode the liberties that we had, we changed the way in which, and the basis on which, laws were made, and we changed the people who made them. British liberties evolved through Parliament making laws and the courts elaborating on and clarifying them, as well as through common law, but they were always subject to Parliament being able to have the last word and to make the law if it did not agree with what the courts had done. Our liberties did not result from giving courts the right to explicate an abstract list of rights. They were not given a right to strike down, invent or rewrite laws, but that is what we did, without realising it, when we signed up to the convention after the war—and that is what the European Court of Human Rights is empowered to do.
Rights are not absolute. One right must always be balanced against another. The rights to free speech and free expression must be balanced against the right to privacy or the right to our reputation under the laws of libel. That balance, reconciliation and limiting of extremes is essentially a political matter and it has always, in the last resort, been made by a political body—Parliament. We have done that reconciliation if it needed to be done, but it is no longer up to us—we are no longer allowed to do so. Instead, that power to make a political judgment rests with courts, which are not elected and which lack political skills or sensitivities. That is wrong, and that is why the long-term solution is for us to leave the treaty on the European Court, to entrench the convention rights in our law and to leave our courts to interpret them with Parliament having the ultimate right to disagree, as it does, if it wants to.
I have a question for Government Front Benchers. On what basis are we told that we have to sign up to the Court’s judgment in the short term because we will face a huge damages claim if we do not? In all the judgments I have read, the Court has explicitly refused to award damages. It has said that the ruling was sufficient justification in itself and that the prisoners did not need any damages. It considered whether exemplary and punitive damages should be imposed, not so much because the prisoners merited it but to force us to concede, and it concluded that it should not do so. The practice direction that goes to the Court says that it considers it
“inappropriate to accept claims for damages with labels such as”—
