EU: Future Relationship

Lord Lilley Excerpts

Wednesday 23rd September 2020 Grand Committee

[Lord Lilley (Con)]

My Lords, ever since the referendum, my advice to businesses has been “prepare for no deal”. It has always been far more likely than is generally assumed. However, partly because of the controversial internal market Bill, I am inclined to think that the chances of a deal have now risen. I will explain why.

There are two unusual features about the negotiations between Britain and the EU. One makes them simpler than other free trade negotiations; the other makes them harder. They are simpler because we start where most free trade agreements and negotiations end up after years of haggling. We have zero tariffs and we want zero tariffs; it cannot take more than 10 minutes to negotiate. We have identical or equivalent rules and regulations, and we need to agree only a divergence mechanism: what happens when one side or the other changes their rules from the starting point. Such arrangements exist in most free trade deals and are comparatively straightforward to negotiate.

Why, then, are these negotiations harder than normal free trade agreements? Normal agreements and negotiations are win-win affairs: each side tries to offer concessions that cost it the least but will be of greatest value to the other side. Therefore, a mutually beneficial win-win outcome usually emerges. However, the European Union has an overriding political imperative, which is to discourage other member states from following our example. The EU believes that this means that Britain must be seen to get a bad outcome even if that means that the EU gets a less good result, economically, than was possible.

When one side is more interested in the other side losing than itself gaining, that creates a very unstable negotiating dynamic, which is why no deal has always been a significant possibility and even been used as a threat. However, as we have approached the endgame, it has become clearer to both sides that, although no deal would be a suboptimal outcome, it would not be as painful to the UK as the EU and many in the UK—and, indeed, in this debate—have supposed and that it would be more painful to the EU itself than they or others had initially assumed.

If there is no deal, each side will apply its tariffs to the other. That will cost British exporters to the EU about £5 billion a year. That is half the £10 billion saving from not making a net contribution to the EU any more. Therefore, UK plc will be a net £5 billion better off: small beer, but not negative. By contrast, losing tariff-free entry to the UK market would cost EU exporters £13 billion a year and, of course, the EU will also lose the £10 billion a year that we pay it. Therefore, the EU will be a net £23 billion worse off; again, that is not huge compared with the size of the European economy, but it is more difficult to cope with in these difficult times.

Why do EU exporters stand to lose nearly three times as much from tariffs as British exporters to the EU? It is partly because the EU exports far more to us than we do to it, but the main reason is that the goods that it exports to us are highly protected goods, which it can sell to us only because we are currently prevented by the EU external tariff from buying them more cheaply elsewhere. Therefore, it is the realisation on both sides that no deal, though not the best outcome, is not a disaster for the UK but would be a problem—or a cost—for the EU that has made the latter look to the Northern Ireland protocol for other negotiating levers.

The withdrawal agreement has even more loose ends and internal contradictions than most international agreements. That is not surprising, given that Boris was given only 100 days to renegotiate it, during which Parliament did its best to shackle his negotiating powers, but we signed it and accepted it because it has a mechanism to resolve those internal contradictions: the joint committee, within which both sides are treaty-bound to negotiate in good faith to resolve outstanding problems by the end of the transition period.

However, recently the EU has been pointing out—doubtless as a negotiating lever—that if it simply refuses to reach agreement in the Joint Committee then, arguably, all goods going from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will have to pay the EU tariff, and all goods coming from Northern Ireland to Britain will have to fill in EU export declarations, and if the EU refuses to list the UK as a third country from which it will accept food imports, not only will we be unable to export food to the continent, but it would be illegal, as the EU has threatened, to take a single kilo of butter from Great Britain to Northern Ireland. As far as I am aware, the EU has not seriously denied making those implicit threats.

Those outcomes would be economically damaging to Northern Ireland, flagrantly in conflict with the Belfast agreement and contrary to the Acts of Union with Ireland and Scotland. They would inflame unionist opinion, demonstrate manifest bad faith and breach the clear intention of the withdrawal agreement itself, so the UK Government had no option but to introduce legislation enabling them to override those potential interpretations of the withdrawal agreement, should they emerge.

In doing so, the UK Government adopted the EU’s own approach to international law, clearly set out by the Advocate-General in the European Court of Justice in the Kadi case. He said that

“it would be wrong to conclude that, once the Community is bound by a rule of international law, the Community Courts must bow to that rule with complete acquiescence and apply it unconditionally in the Community legal order. The relationship between international law and the Community legal order is governed by the Community legal order itself, and international law can permeate that legal order only under the conditions set by the constitutional principles of the Community.”

I cannot see that we are doing anything different from what the EU would, very sensibly, do if there were a conflict between international law and its internal legal order. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, as the last remainer of note due to speak in this debate, to be as critical of the EU doctrine as I have no doubt she will be of the Government’s behaviour. However, because we have effectively called the EU’s bluff, there is every reason to suppose that it will in practice resume negotiating sensibly and help us to resolve those issues, and there will be an agreement at the end of the day.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Fookes) (Con)]

My understanding is that the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is not participating in the debate this afternoon, so I now call the Minister to reply.