(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I suppose I ought to declare an interest in this debate in that I worked at No. 10 at the time of the Iraq war. Indeed, I sat opposite some of the foreign affairs private secretaries whose minutes are now to be found on the Chilcot inquiry website. I saw some of it pretty much at first hand, although I was not directly involved with Iraq. It was not a very easy period, I can tell your Lordships.
I do not think it is right for our debate tonight to get into the substance of the issues that the Chilcot inquiry is addressing. It has been an extremely good debate and the speeches, as usual for the House of Lords, have been of exceptionally high quality, and I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, who obviously put an awful lot of thought into what he had to say in opening the debate.
I will confine my remarks from these Benches to the question of delay and the view the Government take of that delay and of the questions relating to the disclosure that are at the heart of that delay. It is important to be clear: as I understand it, it is not that written evidence has been withheld from the inquiry; the inquiry has seen all the relevant papers. The issue at stake is how much of that evidence it can actually quote in its final report. So the question is: does the committee base its conclusions on the public taking it on trust that it has read the material and this is what it concludes, or is it able to quote from the documents?
Everyone will agree that the Chilcot process has been very thorough. If you look at that website, you will see that far more government papers are available than for any precedent that I can recall. The comparison with Suez, where no one was told about the secret deal that was done with the French and the Israelis, is very striking.
However, there are questions about the extent of disclosure. I want to see the Iraq question and as many of these issues as possible put to rest, but even then there are three areas in which questions of disclosure raise awkward issues. These are questions not just for civil servants, but for any responsible Government of any party acting in the national interest.
I think one of these questions has already been sorted out: the question about dealing with the use of intelligence, and the worries as to whether disclosure of anything to do with intelligence compromises sources. I should like the Government to confirm what I think to be the position: that in the case of Iraq those questions were sorted out in the Butler inquiry in 2004, and that there are no new intelligence issues arising in the case of Chilcot. These issues relate to national security. From our Benches, as my party leader said only yesterday, we support greater scrutiny of the way in which intelligence operates. There are obvious limits as well.
The second issue concerns relations with our allies. The committee wants to quote from private correspondence between the Prime Minister and the President of the United States. If we see ourselves as America’s closest ally there is a real question, not just of the past but for the future, as to the obligation that places on us to protect confidences in that relationship. On that point I am sure a lot of people would say, “Damn the Americans”. I do not take that view. If we are serious about our alliances—and the same would be true of our close partners in Europe in other situations—we do have obligations to our allies and partners. How do the Government see that question? Time makes a great difference, but we are talking about something that happened a little over 10 years ago. What view do the Government take of what is a reasonable time to disclose things that affect our closest allies?
Thirdly, there is the issue about freedom of information and what are called Cabinet-level discussions. Whatever decisions the Government make on disclosure as far as the Chilcot inquiry is concerned could have long-term implications for freedom of information more generally. This is a serious issue. My party introduced freedom of information in 1998. We are proud of that achievement, but there were always boundaries that had to be set. I have always thought of freedom of information, in simplistic terms, as meaning that expert advice should be open but confidential discussion should remain confidential. How do the Government see this question about disclosure of discussions right at the centre of government on the basis of papers provided? Much of the content is now available on the website, but how do the Government see this question of disclosure of Cabinet-level decisions? This will have an impact on all future Governments. This is not just about dealing with the Iraq issue. This is about whether disclosure is going to affect the relationship between Ministers and civil servants for decades ahead. We have to get that right.
Two points arise. First, if it be the case that information of a confidential nature between states is always to be kept in the background, that is an end to any question of transparency. Does the noble Lord accept first of all that many of the thousands of documents that have been disclosed to Chilcot on the basis that they are declassified and therefore open to publication come into that particular area that he mentions?
The other matter is that it appears—if the responsible press is to be believed—that Mr Brown, in so far as his position as Prime Minister or as Chancellor is concerned during the period from 2001 to 2009 that is covered by the inquiry, says that he has no objection to the disclosure of any of the three groups of documents that have been referred to.
I am arguing here that these are very difficult decisions and that we have to have a clear view for the future. I am not looking to the past; I am wondering what the impact of this will be on future relations between Ministers and between Ministers and civil servants. I would simply be grateful if the Minister was able to give us an answer.