European Union Bill

Debate between Lord Liddle and Baroness Hayman

Tuesday 26th April 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle]

My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendment 16B. These are amendments to Clause 3 and their purpose is to allow Ministers pragmatic flexibility to act in the national interest in cases of urgency. The arguments I will make are very similar to those I will make for Amendments 17, 18 and 19, and I intend to move those formally when the time comes. Amendments 17, 18 and 19 are about extending the significance test that the Bill gives Ministers to a wider range of issues than currently listed in Clause 4(1).

It is important when debating these amendments to emphasise that we are not talking about treaties that are subject to the full ratification process. We have different views about whether those should be subject to referenda, but that is not the topic of the amendments. They are about the use of referenda in cases where, under Article 48(6) of the treaty, the simplified revision procedure is used. This procedure can be used only when it does not extend the European Union’s competencies. Its purpose is to give member states flexibility to meet new situations that the treaty drafters had not anticipated when they wrote the treaty. Any changes agreed under these provisions would of course be subject to full parliamentary ratification. On this side of the House, we are not disputing that requirement.

On the first day in Committee, we considered amendments by the noble Lords, Lord Hannay, Lord Dykes, Lord Tomlinson and Lord Richard, who argued that in such cases only parliamentary ratification should be necessary and that that should be the end of the matter. In reply, the noble Lord, Lord Howell, argued, on behalf of the Government, that this was simply not good enough to restore public trust in the European Union. However, I regret to say that, from our perspective, he was unable to give a satisfactory answer as to why this was not good enough, and he was unable to cite examples of where, in these special circumstances, referenda would be required in other member states. This set of amendments enables us to come back to the same issues of giving Ministers more flexibility of action in another way.

Clause 3(4) introduces the concept of significance into whether a referendum is required. We think that that is quite a sensible approach. The Minister should have the flexibility to decide what is significant and insignificant, and put that to Parliament. Unfortunately, the Bill restricts this ministerial discretion very narrowly indeed. The Minister can apply this test of significance only under Clause 4(1)(i) and (j). The noble Lord, Lord Howell, gave us an example of what that test might be—for instance, if the Government decide that the new reporting requirements they have to make to Eurostat, in order to comply with the new economic governance arrangements, are not a change of sufficient significance to require a referendum. I think we would all agree with that.

However, we are seeking, first in this set of amendments, a provision that no referendum should be required in urgent cases; and, in Amendments 17 to 19, that the significance test should apply to all those matters listed in Clause 4(1). Why does this make sense? It is for the obvious reason that what is being talked about is a requirement to put fairly minor changes through a double ratification process. The Lisbon treaty went through a thorough ratification process in this House and the other place, but this Bill states that, to use its provisions, we have to go through yet another ratification process—this time involving a referendum. This double ratification does not seem to make any sense, particularly when it is not on issues of major significance.

That is not to deny that on this side of the Chamber we of course accept that the European Union has a significant legitimacy problem, and I think we are all alarmed by the rise of populist parties in various member states. However, our analysis is that the root of the problem is not so much an accretion of power to Brussels as a failure of political leadership in Europe to use the powers that Europe has to address the economic problems, social malaise and environmental and political challenges facing the Union. I think that this affects Britain as much as any other member state. We all recognise—at least I hope that we do—that in this world of interdependence there are a lot of these challenges and they can be met only by our acting together.

No one on this side of the Chamber is arguing for a transfer of powers to Brussels simply for its own sake. However, the huge problem with the Bill is that it is designed not, as its promoters claim, to build support for Europe in Britain but rather to appease those who do not really want us to be members of the European Union at all. By introducing this new constitutional concept of perpetual referenda, the Bill rules out the pragmatic flexibility that we need within the European Union to pursue our national interests. It is ironic that as, next week, we approach the first nationwide referendum in 36 years in this country, we should be debating in this Bill the possibility of 56 different issues which could be subject to a referendum. That does not seem to make sense; it is a denial of the pragmatism for which the British are famed. I think that this is a very un-British piece of legislation, and it is very limiting. Who can tell what urgent situations might arise or what minor changes might be necessary to make the EU effective?

I dearly hope that later, either in Committee or on Report, we will be able to argue and persuade this House to accept amendments that will sunset the Bill and mean that it does not apply beyond the present Parliament. However, if that attempt fails, we need to find pragmatic solutions within the context of the Bill that will enable the UK to continue to play a leading role in the European Union. We have to strike a better balance than the Bill does at present between what we need to do in our national interest and what needs popular assent. Therefore, with these amendments we are arguing for an exemption from the referendum requirement in cases of genuine urgency and where the test of significance can be applied more widely.

The Government say that they are trying to institute a referendum lock on major decisions. I think that what we have here is referendum paralysis on lots of minor decisions. I believe that the amendments would help to make a bad Bill marginally less bad and increase Britain’s ability to negotiate from a position of strength in Europe.

[The Lord Speaker (Baroness Hayman)]

It may be for the convenience of the Committee if I report that my understanding is that, after the debate on this group of amendments, we will take the Statement on the Middle East and north Africa.