European Union: Negotiations (European Union Committee Report)

Lord Liddle Excerpts

Monday 16th March 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Liddle (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise to the House for not being present for what I am sure were excellent speeches at the start of the debate; I was on the HS2 committee, under the chairmanship of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and in order for it to be quorate, I had to stay. I asked our Whips to put me down for the end of the debate. The trouble is that an excellent debate such as this leaves you with very little new to say. I will try not to repeat what others have said, even if it means jumping about in the speech I prepared.

I did not hear the previous speeches, but the report before us is absolutely admirable, in the great traditions of the EU Select Committee. To my mind, it demonstrates beyond all doubt that the Government are now pursuing not just a much harder Brexit than Mrs May tried to achieve but a harder Brexit than was outlined in the political declaration, which the Prime Minister signed in October and which was ratified as part of an international treaty at the end of January. That was the basis on which he fought the election. As the noble Lord, Lord Barwell, said, he solemnly promised that he had this oven-ready deal, and it is now clear that he is going for something different.

I want to make clear that I fought Brexit very hard. I think that it is absolutely the wrong direction for the country. However, I now accept that it is done. Having said that, that does not mean that those of us on these Benches have to accept that the only option is the hardest Brexit imaginable. We in the Labour Party have a responsibility to vigorously oppose what the Government is now trying to do. Plenty of changes could be sought. If they are not, Labour should go into the next election saying that it wants to achieve a closer relationship with the EU.

On the question of a hard Brexit, many noble Lords have drawn attention to the retreat from the paragraph of the political declaration that made it clear that there is a difference between the United Kingdom’s position and other nations’ positions on concluding a free trade agreement. Because of our geographical proximity and economic interdependence, these are the words—I say to the noble Lord, Lord Hamilton—that the Prime Minister signed up to. The noble Lord has to accept that.

[Lord Hamilton of Epsom]

I thank the noble Lord for giving way. The issue that I was raising was why this was not considered in the report. It first came to light on 18 February and the report went to bed and to the printers on 3 March. There was plenty of time to consider these issues. It is remiss of the report that it did not consider whether our closeness to the EU and the size of the trade that we were doing were material issues.

[Lord Liddle]

I take the point—but at least the committee has drawn this crucial point to our attention. If we had not had this Select Committee report, what kind of debates would we have had, either here or in the other place, on the Government’s new policy? The fact is that we had nothing. There was no explanation of how what the Government were proposing was different from what they had previously proposed. Mr Johnson was going for a sleight of hand in going for this hard Brexit, and it was right that our committee should have exposed it.

The shift in our position on this particular point about the level playing field for open and fair competition will undermine confidence in our good faith. That will have very practical and real consequences for jobs and livelihoods in Britain. Even if we reach a trade agreement, I think that it is now likely that the EU will say that, if we make any move that it interprets as a move away from a level playing field, it will have a legal right to impose trade defence instruments in short order and we will not be able to stop them. These could be very damaging to sectors of our economy such as the car industry, where the non-existence of tariffs is of crucial importance.

We have already damaged ourselves very considerably. We will end up with a treaty that will not provide a stable investment climate for companies in Britain because they will always be under the threat of EU sanctions being imposed because of our attempts to break the rules.

However, that is not the only issue on which the position has changed. It is scandalous that we have thrown away just like that our participation in the European arrest warrant. Where has the big debate about that and what it means for our security been? Where has the Home Office statement been—the explanation by the Minister of what alternatives will be put in place that will be as effective in defending our interests? I feel that something fundamental such as this should not have been done in the way that it has.

As for the rest of the security agenda, the Government say that they are aiming for what they call “pragmatic co-operation”, but then go on to say:

“The agreement must not constrain the autonomy of the UK’s legal system in any way.”


So they will not sign up for our continued participation in not just the European Court of Justice but the European Convention on Human Rights. It is incredible that a Government believe that our European friends will agree to some system of administrative co-operation between the police and intelligence agencies without there being in place a binding framework of legal oversight that both parties judge to be acceptable. That has to be that, or co-operation will not work.

My third point relates to co-operation on foreign policy. The Government dismiss the prospect of a joint institutional framework; all they promise is friendly dialogue and co-operation and they do not want an agreement about this. Yet anyone who knows anything about how relations between countries work knows that institutions are incredibly important. One of the lessons I took away from my time in Brussels was that the framework it provided for regular meetings and policy discussions between senior officials, day by day and week by week, is absolutely fundamental to trying to create a convergence of approach between countries. If we say we do not want any of that kind of institutional co-operation on foreign affairs and defence, it will put us in a much weaker position.

I also think it is wrong for the Government’s new policy to reject the possibility of an overarching framework for the EU-UK relationship that was held open in the political declaration. What has happened to the deep and special partnership that Mrs May used to talk about? Do we no longer believe in that? Without such an overarching partnership, our relationship with Europe runs the risk of being characterised, and indeed poisoned, by interminable trade disputes when these are in fact of secondary importance. What matters is that we should work with our European friends to promote our shared values of democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Without that overarching partnership, I think we will lose that.

I have come to the regrettable conclusion—and I do regret it—that this Government do not really want a close relationship with our European friends. The thing that convinces me of that is the attempt that I think is being planned to rewrite the Northern Ireland protocol, which the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, explained to us in great detail. If that is what happens, the relationship is going to be one of betrayal and resentment, and I think it is an absolute tragedy that that is the route down which we are going.

Somebody referred to Philip Stephens’ article in the Financial Times last week. Many of us, probably including myself, in the next few days are going to go into self-isolation because we want to survive. Well, a lot of us will survive but I do not think that the policy of the country should be one of self-isolation—but that is what we are getting with this Government.