Immigration Bill

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 12th May 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister, Lord Taylor, to the Immigration Minister, James Brokenshire, and to the Bill team, who have devoted an enormous amount of time to this difficult issue and have held meetings with noble Lords who are concerned about it. For reasons that I will seek to explain, I think that the Government have made a very substantial concession on this issue in Amendment 18A, following the success of the amendment that I moved on Report.

Before briefly explaining the reasons for taking that view, perhaps I may mention that the original unacceptable clause—it was unacceptable—has been improved only because of a coalition, if that is not now an unacceptable political term, of the Opposition, led by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, who has worked tirelessly and skilfully on this issue throughout the passage of the Bill through this House, with considerable support from the Cross Benches and a very substantial Liberal Democrat rebellion on Report. I would add that there was support from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Howe of Aberavon, who also voted for the amendment. As a result of that voting decision, the new paragraph added in the House of Commons very substantially reduces the risk of leaving an individual stateless, although I recognise that such an event is still possible if the Secretary of State’s assessment, although reasonable, turns out to be inaccurate for whatever reason.

I have written to the Minister giving him notice of a number of assurances that I seek and which I consider are important to the understanding of the protections which are contained in the new paragraph. The first is this. I understand that the reasonableness of the Secretary of State’s conclusion that another nationality is open to the individual will be open to challenge in the Special Immigration Appeals Commission, and that SIAC will have the power to determine whether the Secretary of State does have reasonable grounds for her belief that the individual is able to become a national of another country. I understand from the Minister’s opening remarks that he agrees with that.

The second assurance I seek is this. Does the Minister agree that the material which is relevant to the Secretary of State’s decision on this point—that is, the ability to acquire another nationality—would be very unlikely to be secret? The material would be provided to the applicant’s lawyers so that it could be fully debated in any appeal to SIAC. I would be grateful if he could confirm that.

Thirdly, am I correct in my understanding that the new provision means that the Secretary of State has no power to take away British citizenship if the matter depends on a discretionary judgment by the foreign state? I think that the words in the new paragraph, “able to become”, must mean that the matter is in the hands of the individual, who needs only to apply to the foreign state, pay the relevant fee, provide the relevant documents and show their entitlement. The paragraph does not say “able to apply”. There is good reason to interpret this provision narrowly: namely, to prevent deprivation of British citizenship where it would leave people in limbo, with the risk of statelessness if the foreign country decides not to exercise any discretion in favour of the applicant. I therefore think that this provision means that at the time of deprivation of British citizenship, the individual must have a right to citizenship under the law of the foreign country. Does the Minister agree?

I seek reassurance on a fourth point. I think that the word “able”, which is the word in the new paragraph, must mean that there is no practical impediment to obtaining the foreign citizenship. For example, if there is reason to think that the foreign state will not apply its own laws, or will not do so within a reasonable time, the Secretary of State simply could not remove British citizenship. Does the Minister agree?

Fifthly, the word “able”, as well as general principles of public law must mean that the Secretary of State could not exercise this new power to take away British citizenship where, although the person is entitled to acquire the foreign citizenship, there is good reason for their being unwilling to do so. An obvious example is where the individual is a member of a group that is persecuted in the country concerned. Does the Minister agree that it would be wholly wrong and unlawful for the Secretary of State, if she accepts that those are the facts, nevertheless to go ahead and deprive that person of British citizenship?

Sixthly and finally, I think that the word “able” and the general requirement that the Minister must exercise her power in a reasonable manner must mean that the courts would apply a “reasonable link” test. By that, I mean that the clause could not be applied by reference to an individual’s rights to acquire citizenship in a country with which he or she has no close link other than an entitlement to nationality. For example, surely the Secretary of State could not rely on the entitlement of a Jewish man or woman to citizenship of the state of Israel under the law of return if the individual has no other link with the state of Israel; or rely on a wife’s right to acquire the citizenship of her husband in a country that she has never visited. I have not thought up these examples. I take them from the judgment of Lord Wilson for the Supreme Court in the Al-Jedda case last October, at paragraph 23. Therefore, the sixth question is: does the Minister agree in principle that there must be a “reasonable link” test implicit in this paragraph, so that the clause could not be used in circumstances that would, in the absence of a reasonable link, be wholly unreasonable?

On the basis of my understanding of this clause, this is a substantial and welcome concession by the Government. I hope that the Minister can reassure the House that my views are consistent with the Government’s interpretation, because it is what the Minister says that the courts may look at in future.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and I should declare an interest because, like the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am a member of Blackstone Chambers, the same chambers as Professor Goodwin-Gill. As the House will understand, barristers are not like solicitors: we are not in a firm and are perfectly capable of taking completely different views from some of our colleagues. I have of course read Guy Goodwin-Gill’s opinion and his supplementary opinions but I do not think that they focus on the particular issues, practical and otherwise, with which we are concerned in this debate.

As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, indicated, the Joint Committee on Human Rights welcomes the concession that has been made. I was one of the rebels—in the words of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—and am personally satisfied, for the reasons that the noble Lord gave, that the concessions obtained in the other House ought to be acceptable and are in accordance both with international law and with the principles of our own constitutional system of government and law. However, I also agree with the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that the questions that he has raised are the right ones, and my support for the Government’s position is dependent on satisfactory assurances being given. It is very important that they are given, because one of the advantages of the Pepper v Hart doctrine is that what is said by the Minister in reply will give guidance about how this important provision is to be interpreted.

I very much welcome the shift that has occurred and the fact that it has occurred because of pressure from across the whole House and not simply from one party. I do not agree with the position now being taken by Her Majesty’s Opposition—unless it is a probing position. If they were to press their difference of opinion to a vote, I would support the Government.

[Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)]

My Lords, on Report, I added my name to those of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, in proposing what is now Amendment 18. I did so because, consistently with what I had previously said in Committee, I was so strongly opposed to the United Kingdom lending itself to what has been called the evil of statelessness, with all the reputational damage which that would have occasioned to this country. It seemed to me at that stage imperative that there should be pre-legislative scrutiny, as Amendment 18 essentially proposes, before any such extreme position should be adopted.

On Report, I recognised that amending the legislation, short of leaving people stateless, could indeed well be justified. I will quote just a sentence from what I said at that point:

“By all means, let the Government reverse the decision last year of the Supreme Court in Al-Jedda and legislate, as Lord Wilson in his judgment there implicitly suggested, to allow us to deprive someone of their British citizenship, provided that they can then immediately acquire the nationality of another state, as, indeed, it was assumed in the course of the litigation in that case that Mr Al-Jedda himself could have done”.—[Official Report, 7/4/14; col. 1174.]

Noble Lords should remember that this power is to be available only in the case of someone who has gained his British citizenship by naturalisation and who then betrays the trust that we as a nation put in him and acts in a way which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of this country. Provided that that person can then become a national of another country so as not to be rendered stateless, as was assumed in Mr Al-Jedda’s case, I see no real objection to our depriving him of the protection that we ourselves earlier conferred upon him. The Government’s very welcome amendments seem to limit the power precisely to these circumstances. My understanding of the new paragraph that it is proposed be inserted into the nationality Act under Amendment 18A is that it is precisely the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. I will not go into all the points again, but it is plain that it refers to a present entitlement and not simply to a right to apply. The language is “to become” a national of another country, not “to seek to become”. Provided that that is so and provided that the Minister gives—as I fully expect him to—all the assurances that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, has invited him to give, the Government have properly given way on this critical issue and, if the matter is put to the vote, I shall support the Government.

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[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for the time he has taken and the effort he has made to address the points that have been raised in the debate. I concur entirely with his remarks about internal and international security. Obviously, the first duty of any Government is to keep their citizens safe and secure at all times. There has to be consideration of those issues when they are brought before your Lordships’ House. I can assure him that our consideration of these issues has at its heart the security of this nation and our international obligations to tackle terrorism. As the noble Lord said, I am grateful to all those who have spoken in this debate. We have benefited from substantial legal expertise. I am grateful to my noble friend Lady Lister for confessing that, like the Minister and me, she is not a lawyer. It is significant that even with the legal expertise in your Lordships’ House there is no complete agreement among lawyers, either. We made that point earlier.

I welcome the fact that the Government have moved away from the position that they took previously when the issue was debated in Committee and on Report. I welcome the answers given by the Minister. A lot of the debate hinges on one particular issue. I am grateful for the advice given to me by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, in the conversations we have had. One of his questions summed up clearly the issue of the power to take away British citizenship if it relies on a discretionary power of another state. The noble Lord was very honest in his response to that. We have no power to know what another state will do. Other states have discretionary powers on whether to make people citizens.

The Government’s Motion rests on whether somebody is able to obtain citizenship. It hangs on the interpretation of that. We have concerns in that we want to avoid at all costs somebody becoming stateless—the evil of statelessness via the Supreme Court—and the dangers that that would bring to citizens of this country and abroad. I mentioned that James Brokenshire, the Minister in the other place, gave three different interpretations of what being able to obtain other citizenship could mean. If somebody is unable to obtain another citizenship and they remain stateless, at what point would the Home Secretary have to say, “We have a problem; this person does not have citizenship of any country”? There is a danger in leaving somebody abroad who we think is a danger to this country and involved in terrorism, who is stateless in another country or who remains in this country and cannot travel.

The noble Lord, Lord Lester, said that the intention was that those who are dangerous should leave—but they cannot do so if they have not got citizenship of any other country. The noble Lord also made the point that our position has changed. I can assure him that our position has not changed. These are the very same issues we raised in Committee and on Report, and we wanted to consider them in the light of the changes that the Government have made.

We have to consider the practical and diplomatic implications here. I know the Minister says that there is no need to discuss this issue with other countries, but he was not even able to confirm to your Lordships’ House that, if we remove citizenship from an individual who we suspect of being involved in terrorist activity while they are in another country, we would notify the Government of that country that we were doing so. That seems to be a rather irresponsible attitude and I worry that we will be passing the problems of terrorism on to other countries when international co-operation is so essential.

I do not wish to detain the House. We have had an interesting and worthy debate on this issue. What the Government have not been able to do, however, is rule out the possibility that we will make people who could be highly dangerous stateless. All it requires is that the Home Secretary must have reasonable grounds for believing that an individual can obtain other citizenship—but if those grounds are wrong and the individual cannot do so, we do not know what will happen to that individual.

The point was made when we debated this previously that we are not saying to the Government, “No, this must not happen”, but that there are still a number of questions which remain unanswered even at this late stage. They include the issue of what happens to someone when they have been rendered stateless and what the implications are for our relationships with other countries. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, gave examples, and I am not sure that the Minister’s answer was that someone could not be made stateless.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am most grateful to the noble Baroness. To be clear, what I said about the Opposition was not that they have not changed, but that they have not changed in the light of the changed circumstances of this concession.

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

The Minister cheers the noble Lord on, but no one else is doing so. I said in response to the Government’s changes to their Motion that they do not remove the danger of statelessness. The noble Lord referred to the Pepper v Hart ruling, and he is absolutely right. What the Minister here and the Minister in the other place say is very important, but we have now had many interpretations from Ministers of what the amendment actually means.

Again, this has been a useful and interesting debate which I value, but we are seeking certainty on a number of issues, and that has not been forthcoming today. I believe that this matter would benefit from further consideration. It does not have to delay business. We are at the end of this Session, but it could be brought back quickly at the start of the next Session. It is important that we understand the implications for the security of this country and for individuals living in it. Accordingly, I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Immigration Bill

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 7th April 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

I am very sorry to be adding to the questions, but can the Minister explain how the trial is going to help the Government to decide whether the scheme should be statutory? What is the problem about deciding that question now and telling the House that it will be made statutory in the other Bill?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I think I gave an answer to that, did I not? It may not be necessary. It is not in Scotland, where it works well enough, so why should the Bill make it statutory in England if it does not need to be? These are the sorts of considerations that Parliament is there to decide. Now, if the noble Lord feels that we should decide it today and include a statutory provision within the Bill, so be it. I am just asking: why do that when you cannot be certain of the terms of the statutory obligations that you want to have in place? I am explaining to noble Lords that the whole purpose of the trial is to examine those. I was asked by the noble Earl, Lord Sandwich, about that. If the evaluation of the trial gives the evidence that we are looking for, we will indeed bring forward an amendment to the modern slavery Bill to deal with it.

The noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, quite rightly asked who is going to pay for this. For the purposes of the trial, the Home Office is funding the provision of advocates and, were this to be rolled out nationally, the Government would need to consider where the budget would be drawn from. That is why we need the opportunity to evaluate the role. If we want this to be worth while, where is the money, how are we going to pay for it and what elements do we have to consider as a priority? As part of this Government’s work to eradicate modern-day slavery, the Home Office has funded this trial of independent specialist advocates. The amendments before us do not make clear on whom the duty to appoint and therefore fund the child trafficking obligations will fall. Is it children’s social care or the Secretary of State? That is not clear within these amendments.

My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked about the statutory guidance. She is quite right that statutory guidance will be important. She asked whether the independent child trafficking advocate is the same as the independent advocate referred to in the draft DfE statutory guidance. No, the advocates that we are trialling will be specialist, dedicated advocates working only with victims of child trafficking. They will have a broader role to support them in relation to children’s social care, immigration and the criminal courts. They will be a constant point of contact, so it is a broader remit than would be provided for under this Immigration Bill.

It is critical to ensure that we have the best arrangements in place to protect and support these vulnerable children. Before we make any changes to our existing safeguarding arrangements, for there are safeguarding arrangements already in place, Parliament must be confident of the outcome of these changes. That is why I am at this point asking my noble friends to be patient and await the robust, independent evaluation of this important trial. It will be independent.

I say to my noble friend Lady Hamwee that I will write later this week to noble Lords to explain the updates which are consistent with this week’s announcement. I will include the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, in my correspondence—I promise her that. I will then keep noble Lords posted throughout the passage of the modern slavery Bill, and indeed the process of the trial, so that when that Bill comes before Parliament they are in a position to consider the amendments that this Government will make. I urge the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, to withdraw her amendment on the grounds that I have assured her in this way.

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[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

Does that mean the Minister will accept that the word “independent” should be in his own amendment? It is in the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, but it is not in his.

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[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I have made a number of speeches on this subject at different stages of the Bill and I do not want to take too much of the House’s time. I welcome the idea of an independent reviewer being involved, but I say to the Minister that it is not enough. As he will see, my name is on a number of the amendments that were referred to by my noble friend Lady Lister. I, too, am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is really the course that I would urge this House to take.

The whole idea of making people stateless is unsupportable as a measure, but that fact does not place barriers in the way of the Government in their efforts to deal with terrorism. Terrorism is a serious threat nationally and internationally, and the Government must act in the interests of our safety. Opponents of this move, of whom I am one, are not objecting to removing citizenship from people who have two passports. If someone already has dual nationality—and not just the possibility of being able to get it from somewhere else because they have a father or grandfather who is of a different nationality—then on the right evidence and with due process there is no reason why citizenship cannot be removed from someone whose conduct has been shown to be a threat to our national security. The Supreme Court recently did precisely that in relation to a Pakistani-British family living mainly in Pakistan.

However, I want to remind this House why the idea of rendering someone stateless is so repugnant. After the horrors of the Second World War, the international community had the opportunity of reflecting on the whole notion of the Wandering Jew—as though “wandering” was a voluntary condition—and the idea of what it meant to have no secure home and of living with the mental torture of insecurity. The international community was conscious of the many other people forced to live lives of uncertainty—because it is a weapon used by tyrants and dictators—knowing that they could be ousted at any moment because of the instability of their status. We were all alert to how such persons lacked full rights if they were rendered stateless, and that was why the convention to end statelessness came into being. Britain was one of the countries at the forefront of such moves, which is why we have been a beacon in relation to this issue.

It is interesting that Germany, reviewing its own conduct in relation to statelessness after the Second World War, has made it part of its constitutional obligations that it will never remove citizenship once it is granted. The United States, too—which, of course, became a haven for those seeking sanctuary—never removes citizenship once it is granted and believes strongly that people should not be rendered stateless.

Of course, if you are not a citizen of anywhere, you cannot have the rights that citizenships confers on you—the very right to have rights, as has been mentioned already. The presumption should always be that if you commit crime you should be tried and jailed, and that there are steps that can be taken to deal with criminality and behaviour that is a threat to states. But there is also a presumption that if something happens to you abroad you can insist on contact being made with your embassy or consulate so that your rights can be asserted. It is not just about providing protection, it is about seeking to make everyone subject to the rule of law—the thing that Britain is renowned for. The presumption should always be that law is involved in these processes.

I have repeatedly told the story of Mahdi Hashi, who had his citizenship removed while in Somalia. Two other persons from whom Britain had removed citizenship were droned—killed by the use of drones—in Somalia. We should reflect on that; it was evidence given to the Joint Committee on Human Rights by the UN rapporteur on counterterrorism only a week or so ago. Mahdi Hashi was advised through his parents of having lost his citizenship and that he had a month to appeal. Somalia has no British embassy. He travelled to Djibouti, where he was picked up by the secret police. On saying that he was British, he was told that inquiries had been made and that Britain was denying any obligations towards him. We washed our hands of him—Pontius Pilate lives on.

Mahdi Hashi was interrogated at length—no lawyers, no court processes. He was then handed over to the CIA and further interrogated—no lawyers, no court processes. He had a hood put on his head and was transported to the United States of America—no extradition processes. This was essentially another rendition. But Britain can now claim that we were not complicit because he was not our citizen. Is that the purpose of this change of law, that we might be able to do things that make people vulnerable and deny them their rights, creating yet more black holes where no law obtains but where we cannot be accused of complicity?

We in Britain have always claimed our commitment to the rule of law; indeed, we like to think of ourselves as having parented its existence. You might ask: is this man, who is now sitting in a jail in New York, a bad guy? I cannot tell you. No evidence is in the public domain. But it matters not whether he is a bad guy—that is the important thing to have in mind. We are supposed to believe in due process, the rule of law and international human rights. By making him stateless, we stripped him of the safeguards that any human being should expect. That is not how we normally behave. That is not an acceptable way for a civilised nation to behave.

This is an issue of profound principle and much more care needs to be taken than we currently see in considering the implications of this in terms of what message we are sending to the world, what the position is with regard to international law, what it means to make someone stateless, and what other states, where such persons end up, might feel about our having made such persons stateless. All those matters should persuade us that there should be a committee set up and that this needs much further reflection, because there are principles involved that should be seriously considered by us all because it matters about the nation that we live in.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I was not able to speak in Committee but, briefly, I will make a point that I think has not yet been made.

My noble friend the Minister reminded us, rightly, of the fundamental importance of national security and of combating the evil of terrorism by all effective means. I do not think that I needed to be reminded of that but he was right to remind us all the same. Equally, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, reminded us of another fundamental matter, which is the parliamentary scrutiny of draconian powers before they enter the statute book.

If I were persuaded, as the Minister has suggested, that this debate and previous debates are adequate as a substitute for effective pre-legislative scrutiny, I would not support the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, but I am not persuaded of that. The issues are extremely complicated and even though I think that I am some kind of international lawyer, I am certainly not going to analyse what Professor Guy Goodwin-Gill has said, even though I agree with him, or bore the House, as lawyers frequently could do, by going into a lot of technical detail.

What I want to do, and which gives rise to a question, is to deal with a point that the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, raised in our report and the way that the Government responded to it. In our report, we drew attention to the relevance of the European Convention on Human Rights and its various provisions, and we disagreed with the Government, whose position was that the European Convention on Human Rights had nothing to do with the issue. We went into the matter in paragraphs 45 and 46 of our report. In footnote 25 we referred to a case in which I was counsel for the applicants in the great case of the east African Asians against the United Kingdom.

That was a case which involved not national security but racism. It was a case where, to their shame, the then Labour Government persuaded both Houses of Parliament in emergency debates over three days and nights to take away from 200,000 British Asians, who were citizens of the United Kingdom and colonies, their right to enter and live in their only country of citizenship. By doing that, Parliament made 200,000 British citizens de facto stateless, even though a promise had been given to them by the previous Conservative Government that if they did not become local African citizens, they would be given the right to settle in this country. That promise was broken because of an extremely effective racist campaign mounted by Enoch Powell and Duncan Sandys, which led the Labour Government, with the support of both Houses, to pass that obnoxious legislation.

When we challenged that successfully before the European Commission of Human Rights, we relied upon two American cases. One was called Trop v Dulles. That was a case where under United States law somebody had been deprived of his American citizenship by Mr Dulles. The US Supreme Court said that under the American constitution, that was impermissible. The European Commission of Human Rights was impressed by that and it held that our Parliament had subjected British citizens to treatment that was racist and degrading.

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[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I will be happy to do that. However, I am conscious that noble Lords have been asking for answers today and to give what my noble friend has asked for would probably take the rest of the evening. I do not intend to do that, but I will do it in writing and lodge a copy in the Library.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am sorry, but a few minutes ago the Minister said something about obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. Am I right that the Government still take the view that the convention has no application extra-territorially if the Minister takes away someone’s citizenship when they are outside the country?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I was coming to this. I have been asked a lot of questions and I intend to answer them. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, asked whether this would affect the UK’s contribution. It may be useful to point out that the UK is not alone in proposing this approach. Belgium and Ireland, among others, provide for the prospect of making a person stateless in circumstances analogous to what we are proposing. The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, and the noble Lord, Lord Lester, asked about the JCHR. Last year, in S1 and others v the Secretary of State, SIAC rejected the idea that Articles 2 or 3 would be engaged extraterritorially. Even if Article 8 were engaged extraterritorially, the interference would be lawful if it was necessary and proportionate. The high threshold set out in Clause 64 means that interference would be proportionate so I regard this as a rather academic point. I hope my noble friend, who does not lack academic credentials, is prepared to accept this. This was decided in 1973. This was like the case of the people in east Africa, to which my noble friend referred.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, made a passionate speech on the evils of statelessness after the Second World War. The UN Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness was agreed in 1961. The view of the United Nations was that, in extreme circumstances, people could be left stateless, as the JCHR accepted. This proposal is compatible with that UN convention. My noble friend Lady Hamwee asked what would happen to people in the UK who were made destitute. The UK would continue to have human rights obligations towards those in the UK and could not allow them to become destitute as a result of its actions. She asked whether these individuals were exempt from leave under the immigration laws and what would happen to family members. Family members would still be able to apply for leave within the rules, including the statelessness provisions, and would not be subject to restrictions unless their conduct justified it. My noble friend Lord Paddick, in a brave and thoughtful speech, said that legal aid is allowed for the appeal process. My noble friend Lady Berridge asked whether other countries will render people stateless in the UK on a tit-for-tat basis. Other countries can already do this and those affected would be subject to our immigration rules for stateless people. This clause will not provoke extra cases because, as we have stated, it will be used only for a few extreme cases. In any event, we believe that many will go on to acquire another nationality.

Alexander Litvinenko

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 24th March 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, the Government have sought justice in this case ever since Mr Litvinenko died in 2006. That remains the position. This crime took place in this country and involved a British citizen. We want to see those whose arrests were sought by the Crown Prosecution Service—Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun—brought to and put on trial in the UK. Meanwhile, the noble Lord has emphasised why it is important that the Home Secretary gives proper consideration to the need for an inquiry.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, the judgment of this very powerful three-judge court emphasised that the case for setting up an immediate statutory inquiry, as requested by the coroner, Sir Robert Owen, is plainly a strong one. As has just been said, the judges rejected all the reasons given by the Home Secretary for not doing so, and then said that there needed to be,

“fresh consideration to the exercise of her discretion”.

That was said in a judgment on 11 February. In the intervening weeks, has the Home Secretary given fresh consideration and can the Minister now tell the House what her reasons are for accepting or rejecting the idea of an inquiry?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

The noble Lord is quite right. The judgment was a firm one. None the less, the decision to order an inquiry requires proper consideration. There is no deadline for this consideration but, clearly, the Home Secretary will seek to come to a conclusion as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the arrest of those whom we wish to see tried for this offence remains our priority.

Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 20th January 2014 Lords Chamber

[Lord Pannick (CB)]

My Lords, Amendments 93A to 93D are in my name and the names of the noble Lord, Lord Lester of Herne Hill, the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy of The Shaws, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead. They concern the power to detain people at ports and airports and the power to copy and retain their personal electronic data, and propose that these powers should be exercisable only if the officer reasonably suspects that the person concerned is involved or has been involved in acts of terrorism. Your Lordships will know that the application of the existing powers is currently the subject of litigation in the David Miranda case concerning the detention of the partner of a journalist on the Guardian newspaper, but I do not want to address the circumstances of that case. I want to focus on the principles.

I have no quarrel with the Bill recognising that the power to stop, question and search at a port or airport should be exercisable whether or not there is any reasonable suspicion. However, I believe that the more intrusive powers of detention of persons and retention of their electronic data must be subject to greater safeguards. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has so recommended in its very helpful reports, most recently in its ninth report, published on 6 January. The Terrorism Act 2000, which Schedule 8 to this Bill would amend, allows for detention without any need for the officer to have any suspicion, reasonable or otherwise. The Bill would allow for detention for questioning for up to six hours—a very substantial interference, on any view, with individual liberty.

The independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, Mr David Anderson QC, has stated that there should be greater protection for individuals before they are detained or their electronic data are copied. In his evidence to the Joint Committee, at paragraph 28 of the ninth report, Mr Anderson said:

“It is hard to think of any other circumstances in which such a strong power may be exercised on a no-suspicion basis”.

Indeed, the Joint Committee noted that the Government were unable to give any other examples of such intrusive powers being exercisable without a requirement of some kind for suspicion.

Mr Anderson concluded that the threshold should be subjective suspicion on the part of a senior officer. The Government have not brought forward an amendment to introduce even that limited test, but, in any event, I do not think that such a control would be adequate in the context of the detention of persons and the copying and retention of personal electronic data. As the Joint Committee concluded, a subjective suspicion threshold is no safeguard whatever. Simply to require that an officer in fact suspects provides no independent scrutiny of the officer’s reasoning. The development of administrative law over the past 40 years confirms that subjectively worded powers are simply incompatible with effective legal control.

It is true that Mr Anderson was not persuaded that an objective test of reasonable suspicion was appropriate in this context. Mr Anderson’s concern is that this would impose too great an interference with policing powers, especially having regard to the difficulty in identifying wrongdoers and the appalling devastation that terrorists can cause. Despite the genuine respect which I have for Mr Anderson, I think his conclusions on this subject are wrong. The concerns to which Mr Anderson rightly draws attention—the difficulties of detection and appalling consequences of failing to identify wrongdoers—are well understood by the courts. Such factors would inevitably and properly be given great weight by the courts when deciding whether there was reasonable suspicion to justify the detention.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, spoke for the Appellate Committee of this House in addressing what a reasonable suspicion test means in the case of O’Hara v the Chief Constable of the RUC, 1997 Appeal Cases at 286. That was a case concerned with the police power to arrest a person who the officer has reasonable grounds for suspecting to be a terrorist. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, emphasised that such a test required the court only to assess the information in the mind of the arresting officer at the time, whether based on his own observations or what he had been told by others, and whether or not the information he had in his mind at the time later turned out to be false.

If it is truly the case that the detention is not reasonable on the basis of what was known to the officer at the time of the detention, having regard to the difficulties in identifying terrorism and the appalling consequences of letting a terrorist go through, then detention should simply not occur.

When this matter was discussed in Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, speaking from the Opposition Front Bench, referred to the difficulty in finding an appropriate balance in this context. I recognise the difficulty, but the House needs to confront it. Without a reasonable suspicion test the powers conferred by the Bill involve no balance at all. The powers provide inadequate protection for the citizen, inadequate encouragement to officers to maintain high standards and inadequate assurance to the public to promote the support on which effective policing depends, especially when we all know that these powers are used against black and ethnic minority individuals to a disproportionate extent compared with their numbers in the population.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords, when I was young at the Bar, there was a High Court judge who used to make a habit when he was giving judgment of simply saying, “I agree”. Having heard the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, I am tempted just to say, “I agree”. However, I wish to add a few points which he has not made and which it may be appropriate for me to make at this stage.

First, perhaps I may record, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, our misfortune at having lost the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, as a recent powerful and distinguished member, and the good fortune of the Government in having him—now in a sedentary position, unfortunately—on the Front Bench.

Secondly, the Joint Committee on Human Rights recorded in its earlier report its welcome of the government amendments that the Minister has described. I simply echo our appreciation of the amendments that are before us now.

Thirdly, I do not wish to say anything about the pending Miranda case but I do not see that its outcome will in any way affect the Government’s decision on whether to accept this amendment as it is not the function of the court in that case to decide on a future scheme that better protects liberty.

Fourthly, there is another case pending in the European Court of Human Rights—the case of Malik—to which the Joint Committee referred in paragraph 108 of its fourth report. What we are now saying today will be read by the Strasbourg court in disposing of that case. One of the reasons I am adding to the speech of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is that I hope that the way in which the Government and the Official Opposition reply to this will be helpful to the Strasbourg court.

In the Malik case, there is a root and branch attack on the compatibility of the schedule with the European Convention on Human Rights. The Joint Committee on Human Rights has said that it has little doubt that that challenge will fail. There is nothing inherently incompatible between the schedule and the European Convention on Human Rights. However, as many lawyers will remember, there have been a whole series of cases in Strasbourg with names such as Klass against Germany and Malone against the United Kingdom where the Strasbourg court has said that it is necessary that there are adequate safeguards against the abuse of powers, including police powers. This amendment addresses the need for more adequate safeguards.

My view is the same as that of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—indeed, I look forward to the speeches of the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—and probably all of us agree that there is a need for more effective safeguards against the possibility of abuse. An objective, reasonable standard seems to be the minimum that is now required. The Joint Committee has considered this twice—once in its original report and once in its most recent report—and came to the firm view that these safeguards are necessary. If the Government were to reject that opinion today, all I can say is that if I were in Strasbourg arguing for the Crown I would find myself in some difficulty because I am convinced that the Strasbourg court will scrutinise the reasons the Minister will give in deciding whether there are adequate safeguards. In other words, I think Mr Malik will lose but it would be a pyrrhic victory for the Government unless they were able to convince that court that there were adequate safeguards. I would rather avoid that today by putting the adequate safeguards into the Bill instead of waiting for another defeat in Strasbourg, in effect, and having to do it on a further occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, as always on such issues, these are interesting debates, and I always note that I am one of the few non-lawyers to speak in them. Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, I put on record my thanks to the Government for their letter of 15 January in which the Minister explained the changes that were being made to the Bill—it should be understood that your Lordships’ House welcomes those. We concur with the Minister’s judgment about the David Miranda case and we, too, await the judicial review and any report from David Anderson. It may be helpful if we have a discussion once we have received that report.

The amendments before us today highlight issues of concern not just in the law but in the way in which the law may be implemented. However, as I said in Committee, we also take note of the comments of David Anderson as independent reviewer and we are not persuaded to support these amendments tonight. We would support further consideration of Amendment 93B if there were any further incidences of improper detention of citizens from Northern Ireland, but that consideration needs to take the form of a proper consultation involving the Department of Justice for Northern Ireland, the Irish Government as well as the Police Service of Northern Ireland. The PSNI has the unique task of policing a land border with the Republic of Ireland and it rightly requires additional powers to enable it to reduce border crime and prevent dissident attacks. We therefore cannot support Amendment 93B.

There is more work to be done on some of these issues. We certainly want to return to the Miranda judgment when it comes out.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

The noble Baroness has explained that the Opposition are not able to support the amendments, but she has not explained why. Could she tell the House why the Opposition do not consider that a standard of reasonableness, in view of the severity of the sanctions, is appropriate?

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, we have two reasons. First if the noble reads my comments in Committee, he will see that we gave further information on that. Secondly, we take the view as outlined by David Anderson in his report, and we think that was a reasonable position to take.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Wednesday 12th December 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, I am most grateful to the Government for considering the matters raised in my Amendments 148B and 148D in Committee, and for coming up with this new clause which addresses them—as the Minister has explained—in subsections (1) and (2). It appears that subsection (3) of the new clause deals with the problems identified by the Upper Tribunal in the case of Ahmadi, as my noble friend the Minister said, and also that of Adamally and Jaferi. In Ahmadi, Upper Tribunal judge Mr Lane said:

“It would clearly be possible for Parliament to amend s.47 of the 2006 Act, so as to enable the respondent to make simultaneous decisions ... Unless and until that is done ... In practice ... the present usefulness of s.47 is highly questionable”.

This is, I suggest, a good example of the complexity of our immigration law, and the risks incurred by getting the language wrong. If the original Section 47(1) of the Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006 is being amended, it has taken senior judges and Parliament six years to remedy the flaws that made this particular section unworkable so that it was impossible to remove the persons concerned who had no right to remain in the UK.

We do not even know whether it is indeed the original Section 47(1) that we are amending because the website that is intended to provide your Lordships with the text of Acts as amended carries the warning message:

“There are outstanding changes not yet made by the legislation.gov.uk editorial team to Immigration, Asylum and Nationality Act 2006”.

This is an unsatisfactory situation, which does not apply only in this instance, and I hope that my noble friend might say something about the steps being taken to ensure that legislation.gov.uk is brought up to date, so that your Lordships and another place know what they are being asked to amend.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, perhaps I may add to what my noble friend has just said. My wife is an immigration and asylum judge and from time to time she and her colleagues are sent for training in order to try to understand what the Home Office is producing. I hope that she does not mind my mentioning this, but she and her colleagues find themselves in a quite terrible situation in trying to understand the Kafkaesque material that flows out of the Home Office. There are two people in the Chamber who will understand these amendments—one is the Minister and the other is my noble friend Lord Avebury. I do not understand them. For me to understand them I would have to read the three different Acts of Parliament, all of which are put in play in these amendments, and I would have to listen to and read again what has been said by the Minister. The net result would be that we will continue to have a network of regulations that it is quite impossible for ordinary men and women, including Members of this House, to understand unless and until the Home Office does what we have repeatedly asked it to do for the past many years—to consolidate the legislation into a single measure that can be understood by users, whether they be would-be immigrants, refugees or asylum seekers, or lawyers, NGOs or the public. At the moment it is almost incomprehensible and lacks, therefore, legal clarity. I very much hope that, when I do understand these amendments, what I have just said may be listened to by the Home Secretary and other Ministers who will instruct their officials, please, to come up with consolidating legislation that we can understand.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I would like to comment on that because one of my responsibilities within the Home Office is regulatory reform. I agree with my noble friend that no area is more complex than the whole business of the Immigration Rules and the procedures surrounding them. The noble Lord, Lord Curry of Kirkharle, is aware of my involvement in this—indeed, the Better Regulation Executive is seeking to support the Home Office in this endeavour. I will bear in mind the comments of my noble friends because I am a great believer in the law being as simple and as clear as possible so that people can understand and operate it in the most effective way. I note very much what my noble friend has said. I hope he will understand that these amendments are designed to achieve the purpose of clarifying the law in areas of ambiguity.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Avebury]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness. A great many of the refusals of applications for leave to enter have been due to misunderstandings about what information is required, and there ought to be a simple procedure for rectifying elementary omissions. I think that I recognise the particular case that she mentioned, because that person has already been in touch with me as well. He made every effort by sending numerous e-mails to the people dealing with the case to try to find out exactly what omission he was guilty of, but was never successful in establishing what further information he needed to provide.

Clause 26 removes the right of appeal against the refusal of a visa to visit family members, except where the appeal is brought on racial discrimination or human rights grounds. I had hoped that in the five months since we considered this matter in Committee, and in the light of the arguments that we advanced then, the Government would have had second thoughts about this clause. It is disappointing to see no sign of that on the Marshalled List.

I shall explain why we felt the need to return to this matter. The Government’s hostility to the right to family life is exemplified by the making of new Immigration Rules making it far more difficult and expensive for spouses and elderly dependent relatives to join heads of households in the UK, reducing the number by an expected 35%, over which the Immigration Minister is already crowing. Clause 26 turns the screw further by preventing appeals that would have been successful under the law as it now stands. I pointed out in Committee that if the argument for Clause 26 was that the number of appeals had risen to far greater levels than were expected when the right of appeal was restored in 2000, as was argued before the Home Affairs Select Committee, the obvious remedy was to get UKBA’s decisions right in the first place. Almost one-third of them are overturned, according to my noble kinsman Lord Henley in Committee, involving the taxpayer in a great deal of unnecessary expense. My noble kinsman said that taking away the right of appeal would lift the burden of processing 50,000 appeals from visa staff, but that was based on the assumption that officials would continue to reject bona fide applications at the same rate as they have in the past. We are told constantly that UKBA is undergoing processes of reform, which will enable them to be more accurate in the first decisions that they make.

After the case of Alvi, which your Lordships have discussed, the information required to be submitted with the visa application is now set out in detail in the rules themselves, so that in theory, there should be fewer cases where an applicant has omitted a particular document. However, considering the volume and complexity of the rules, which was mentioned by my noble friend Lord Lester on the previous amendment, it is inevitable that some applications will be refused for that reason. The Government suggest that persons who have omitted a document should put in a new application rectifying the omission at a cost of £78. That may be a trivial sum to my noble friends on the Front Bench, but it is a lot of money to a poor farmer in Gujarat or Sylhet.

I take the point that a new application is less expensive and faster than an appeal; but where the decision-makers have made an obvious mistake, I do not accept that a genuine family visitor should have to pay twice, and suffer the complications affecting future travel, because the refusal has to be declared not only in the UK but to any other intended destinations to which the applicant may travel. Therefore, it is a blot on the person’s copybook that he will want and need to remove if he is to go anywhere without hindrance.

If a person wins the appeal, it is likely that the tribunal will make a costs order against the Secretary of State, so that the appeal will be free in the end. Moreover, if the refusal was due to disbelief that the applicant would return home at the end of the visit, it is only too probable that a fresh application would yield the same result. Only by appealing can the person attack the errors that led to the original refusal, and it was for that reason that I advised Mrs N from Beirut—whom I think was the person that the noble Baroness was talking about a few minutes ago and whose case I mentioned in Committee—to appeal as well as to ask for the original decision to be reviewed.

Therefore, I am afraid that the reasons that were given by my noble kinsman for thinking that an appeal may not be the best remedy for an unjustified refusal do not hold water. I hope that in the light of that consideration, there should be a simple process that would enable the applicant to lodge supplementary evidence supporting the validity of any document or statement which is challenged, rather than having to start again from scratch.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, many years ago, in 1967, I did the first case in Strasbourg against the United Kingdom: a case called Mohamed Alam & Mohamed Khan. Sir Roy Wilson had produced his report advocating an appeal system. It was as a result of the Strasbourg case and Sir Roy Wilson’s report that the immigration appeals system was first introduced —a system which has gone on until now. I strongly support the explanations and powerful speeches given by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and my noble friend Lord Avebury.

What is the situation at the moment? Instead of there being a proper process at first instance before there is an appeal—a process of proper decision-taking based upon the kind of common-sense approach that the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is advocating—mistakes are made quite frequently. When the appeal comes to someone who is an immigration and asylum judge, often no presenting officer is produced by the Home Office to present the government case or there is no one to represent the applicant. My wife will come home at the end of the day and say, “I have now for the first time to take a proper decision myself as though I were doing it at first instance because I have nobody to help me on either side and I find that the initial decision is defective. I now, on appeal at great public expense, have to correct mistakes which should not have been made in the first place at first instance. The only way in which those mistakes can be corrected is by having an appeal system. It is the only safeguard”.

The system now resembles the fairy story, The Little Prince, which noble Lords may remember, in which the boa constrictor swallows a sheep. One sees the lump of the sheep passing along the boa constrictor. The sheep is the process of taking decisions in this area. Instead of the process being properly determined at first instance and making the need for appeals rare, a great lump, the creature, passes along the snake, which leads to a first-instance appeal, an upper-tier appeal and judicial review.

The remedy is simply the common-sense one. One has at first level as much information as possible for a well informed decision. The advantage of the amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, is that it would at least enable proper communication between the officer and the applicant or the applicant’s representative. I can see no argument against that, especially if we were to abolish appeals, which I very much hope will not be the case.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, I will address Amendment 118ZA in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. Before I do so, perhaps I may say that I understand that the contributions made by the noble Baroness and my noble friends Lord Avebury and Lord Lester are designed to build a more efficient system. In my response, I hope that I can demonstrate that that also is the Government’s intention.

The UK Border Agency publishes supporting documents guidance specifically for family visitors. It provides extensive guidance in several languages on the type of documents that customers should consider submitting. Perhaps I may elaborate on that. The UKBA provides guidance on how to fill in the visa application form. It is translated into six languages—Arabic, Chinese, Hindi, Russian, Thai and Turkish. Improvements are also being made to the online visa application process, which will be completed in May 2013. All that is available on UKBA’s website for those wishing to make applications. I should also tell noble Lords that if a refused application is received, the UKBA writes to the refusee to tell them what is missing from their documentation. I believe that this is a valuable way to make sure that the process is as user friendly as possible.

If the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, was successful it would put a significant resource burden on entry clearance officers to make inquiries with the minority of applicants—it is a minority of applicants—who do not provide sufficient information with their application. The Government have not been persuaded by the noble Baroness that this is right. Of course there is work to do on continuing to improve the application process. However, the onus must be on applicants to satisfy visa officers that they meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules and to ensure that they have prepared the application properly before submitting it.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Smith of Basildon]

My Lords, when the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, raised this issue in Committee, I raised with the Minister some questions about the process that the Government were seeking to introduce. Like the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, I was not entirely satisfied with the replies I received. In fact, I did not receive responses to some of the questions that I raised. I hope that in the time that has expired since 4 July this year the Home Office has been able to provide some answers to those questions.

The point was raised about someone’s leave to remain being cancelled while they were out of the country. I am still unclear—because I have not had a satisfactory response—about the criteria for cancelling someone’s leave to remain while they are out of the country. Is it a purely administrative decision because the decision-making time has come up for that person—they were going to be denied leave to remain and they happened to be out of the country—or is it the case, as the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Avebury, suggested, that the Home Secretary will lie in wait for somebody to leave the country, possibly on compassionate grounds, whereupon their leave to remain will be cancelled? It would be helpful to know what the criteria will be and how the decision will be made.

It would also be useful to have information on what proportion of cancelled leave to remain is cancelled when the subject is outside the country as opposed to when the subject is in the country. I asked that in July in Committee and did not receive an answer. There has been some time since July to get that information; I hope that the noble Lord will have it available.

Another issue is the definition of “public good”. The legislation refers to a decision on removing the right to remain as being taken,

“wholly or partly on the ground that it is no longer conducive to the public good for the person to have leave to … remain”.

Is there a definition of when the public good is no longer there, or when it should be decided that there is no public good and that leave to remain should be withdrawn? The Government need to answer questions on this. I was disappointed not to get responses from the previous Minister—I am not suggesting that the present Minister did not answer me in July—and I hope to get some responses today.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, the noble Baroness described me as “noble and learned”. I should not be described in that way because I am not a former law officer or Law Lord—and I am not sure about being noble. However, it is true that I look at matters as a lawyer. I cannot help that; it is a problem that comes with 40 years of doing it.

I am interested to know what the Minister’s response would be to the remark made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, when he described this as “arbitrary”. That seems to be a correct way of describing it. Can the Minister explain why, if the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Avebury, were rejected, the Government would not be highly vulnerable to a legal challenge in our courts or, I dare say, the European Court of Human Rights?

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

My Lords, we set out in Committee the reasons for Clause 27. It demonstrates a current anomaly in legislation that allows high-harm individuals to return here to appeal the decision to cancel leave, despite being excluded from the United Kingdom by the Secretary of State.

Exclusion from the United Kingdom is a key tool in tackling those who seek to cause harm to the United Kingdom. Exclusion is used to tackle a range of conduct including terrorist-related activity, serious criminality and engagement in unacceptable behaviours. The exclusion power is used sparingly and is reserved for those who are considered to be the highest-harm cases. It is therefore crucial that once the Secretary of State makes such a decision, it is given full and immediate effect. It should not be undermined by a separate immigration decision, taken only to give effect to the exclusion, and the accompanying rights of appeal.

Of course any such decision by the Secretary of State should be open to challenge and review by the courts. No one is denying that. However, the Government believe that, given the nature of these cases, it is wholly reasonable that judicial scrutiny of the facts should be carried out while the individual remains outside the United Kingdom. When noble Lords consider the type of conduct that has led to these decisions by the Secretary of State, it seems to be an entirely reasonable and proportionate proposition.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am sorry to interrupt the Minister but I am now genuinely bemused. We know from the Chahal case that the Special Immigration Appeals Commission was set up so that appeals could be dealt with through closed material proceedings, protecting national security and the interests of justice. I welcomed that because I care about national security as well as justice, and that scheme had to be introduced because the European court said so. Now we are in a position where the Government concede that, if the high-harm person is within this country, they should have the necessary right of appeal. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, made the point that if the high-harm person happens to be abroad for compassionate reasons, it is arbitrary and irrational that that person should not be in as good a position as if he were in this country. Simply using the Home Secretary’s power to say that someone’s presence is not conducive to the public good, which is what happened in Chahal, is arbitrary. That is what is bewildering us. We cannot understand why the interests of national security should not, at this point, understand the needs of the rule of law.

[Lord Taylor of Holbeach]

I am not a lawyer but I am, I hope, filled with common sense. It strikes me as being quite nonsensical to allow an individual back into this country to pursue an appeal against exclusion. The exclusion decision, if I may say so, is taken on grounds that the noble Lord has admitted may well include protecting national security. Indeed, criminality and protecting national security are the only grounds on which high-harm individuals may be pursued. Their right of appeal is not removed. The question is whether they should be readmitted to this country to pursue that appeal. I suggest that is nonsensical and I cannot accept the noble Lord’s position on the matter.

I was explaining that for many of these cases the primary objective is to protect the public from individuals where credible evidence suggests involvement in terrorist-related activity or serious criminality. In other cases, it is to protect the public from individuals intent on inciting others to commit crime or on creating divisions between communities. Therefore, the legislative proposal is designed to target the highest-harm cases, and it is proportionate, for the protection of the public, to ensure that any appeal for which a full-merits appeal right still exists is from outside the United Kingdom.

Amendment 118C would potentially provide every individual refused under this provision with an in-country right of appeal as they would simply need to raise human rights or asylum grounds in their appeal. That cannot be right and for that reason we are unable to support the amendment. I hope that, in the light of my remarks, my noble friend Lord Avebury will understand the drivers behind this clause and why the Government have to ask him to withdraw his amendment.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have Amendment 25 in this group but I had not given much thought to sub-paragraph (b), the subject of Amendment 24, other than to note it in general terms. A question occurs to me, however, as it is being discussed, as to whether it is normal—perhaps I should not say “appropriate” as I do not want to be judgmental—for primary legislation to refer to a procedural matter in this way and incorporate it into primary legislation. I will leave that there.

My Amendment 25 proposes an exclusion if we are to have decisions by Ministers as to what should not be disclosed. My noble friend Lord Thomas put his name to the amendment without realising, as he has just now prompted me, that my drafting is sloppy and it should have started “or (c)” and not just “(c)”. I apologise to the Committee for that. The information which could not be disclosed would be information relating to conduct which might be a,

“breach of UK or international law”.

I refer specifically to,

“the European Convention on Human Rights, the United Nations Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment”.

The wording is not original to me. It was suggested by Amnesty International. It was a good suggestion. I know that there are other noble Lords in the Chamber who have far more experience of these issues than I do. It occurred to me that the Minister might say that any such breach should not be dealt with in this way and if there was a claim by an individual about a breach that would be a matter for the court. Perhaps this amendment needs further thought. I would be concerned to be sure that the Government did not withhold such information. This at any rate might be a start and we will get the Minister’s comments.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I rise as probably the least knowledgeable and competent person to say much about this but I do so because of my experience as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. I am glad that the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, has raised the issue. I do not expect an answer to my question this evening but it would be helpful if before Report stage what I am about to ask could be answered.

I am mystified about the principles that should apply not to the ISC but to parliamentary Select Committees generally. When we come to consider the Norwich Pharmacal matter, we will be considering the extent to which courts should not be able to order the disclosure of documents that might show serious wrongdoing of the kind indicated in the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee because of the harm to national security or international relations. To that extent, the Executive would be less accountable to the courts than at present. The question then arises of the extent to which the Executive should be accountable to Parliament and especially to parliamentary committees. I understand why the committee we are concerned with should be treated differently from the ordinary parliamentary Select Committee for very good reasons to do with Clause 2 of the Bill. My question is: what ought to be the position with other parliamentary Select Committees? The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, has tabled an amendment dealing with that general issue.

It would be very desirable if there were a practice direction of some kind, whether in the Ministerial Code or elsewhere, that indicated what needs to be done when a Select Committee seeks evidence of a non-sensitive kind and a security service gives an informed view not about policy but about other matters to the committee. I do not understand whether any practice is laid down on how that should be done and what the limits are when a Select Committee seeks such evidence.

Under the previous Government, when Andrew Dismore was chairman of the committee, we dealt with administrative detention without trial. We tried to get help from the security services. We were helped to some extent by the police service and we took evidence in camera from the police on some matters to do with counterterrorism. However, we were told that we could not do that with the intelligence and security services.

As I said, I do not expect an answer now, but it would be helpful if, between now and Report, we could be informed by letter of what the Government consider to be the general position on those issues. Certainly, if there is wrongdoing of a serious kind involving the sorts of issues covered by the amendment of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, and if that sort of material is not to be shown either to this or any other parliamentary committee, and is to be barred from, or limited in, legal proceedings, I am troubled by the lack of accountability of the Executive to the judicial branch of government as well as to Parliament itself.

[Lord Thomas of Gresford]

My Lords, my question to the Minister is: what is meant by “proper” in paragraph 3(3)(b) of Schedule 1? One has to postulate a situation where a Select Committee, for example on health, asks for disclosure from a Minister, who says, “I would love to give you the information but it would not be proper—it would be contrary to propriety”. What does the word mean? Proper in what sense? Would it be immoral or illegal? What is the word supposed to convey? I simply do not understand and would be grateful if the Minister would help me.

--- Later in debate ---

The ISC’s oversight role is not designed to supplant the role of the courts.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I understand all of that in the context of sub-paragraph (3)(a), which is carefully drafted and limited. However, I do not understand how it applies to the sub-paragraph that has been questioned by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, because that does not deal with sensitive information as defined in sub-paragraph (4) but simply states that,

“it is information of such a nature that, if the Minister were requested to produce it before a … Committee … the Minister would consider (on grounds which were not limited to national security) it proper not to do so”.

Unless I am completely wrong, that seems entirely subjective. It certainly would not be subject to judicial review. It is a Humpty Dumpty: when I use a word it means whatever I say it means, nothing more. To use an example from Ring Lardner: “‘Shut up’, he explained”. It is standardless and would cover anything the Minister thought about propriety. Surely that cannot be a proportionate way of having a safeguard.

[Lord Henley]

I do not think that the noble Lord, dare I say it, listened to what I was saying earlier about this amendment. It may be that we need to look at the drafting. I have given a commitment to the Committee that we will deal with that in due course and look to see whether we have got it right. As I explained—I have to go back into my speech—I think that that is probably the right way to proceed. If the noble Lord is accusing me of taking a Humpty-Dumpty approach, well, Humpty Dumpty was not always that wrong with some of these things; certainty in terms of when one is speaking at the Dispatch Box and defining what words mean. Anyway, if I say it means that, that is what it does mean—that, I think, is what the Humpty-Dumpty approach is.

I do not think that I can add much more to my response to the noble Lord and other noble Lords. I appreciate the intention behind Amendment 25. I appreciate what my noble friend is doing but I hope that the noble Lord will feel able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Monday 9th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Rosser]

My Lords, I shall be brief, as much of the subject matter has been covered already. I wish to speak to Amendments 21 and 23. The purpose of those two amendments is to ensure that the power to veto disclosure of departmental information can be exercised only by the Secretary of State and not by a Minister of the Crown. Paragraph 3(1)(b) of Schedule 1 requires that only the Secretary of State can decide that information required by the Intelligence and Security Committee can be withheld by the agencies. Moving down to paragraph 3(2)(b), in relation to other government departments, it appears that the Minister of the Crown can make that decision, which would appear to indicate, subject to the Minister’s response, that such a key decision can or would be made at a more junior level than Secretary of State in relation to disclosure of information in respect of a government department. If that is the case, no indication is given about a reason for that decision. Bearing in mind that withholding required information could thwart the Intelligence and Security Committee in its work to meet its statutory remit of strength and oversight of the intelligence and security activities of the Government, such a decision should be taken only at the highest ministerial and accountable level within the department concerned, namely, the Secretary of State. These amendments provide for that.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, perhaps I could briefly explain the problem that arises with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. It is very important that parliamentary committees are well informed. From time to time, under the previous Government and under the present one, the committee has considered inviting someone from the intelligence and security service to provide it with a proper context when it is considering something such as detention without trial for a long period or, for example, the Justice and Security Bill. Under the previous Government, when we tried, we were told that it would not be possible and, therefore, we were not given the benefit of that material. Therefore, we have not tried in relation to the Justice and Security Bill because we are certain that we would find the same refusal.

It seems to me that it ought to be possible for the intelligence and security service to assist a parliamentary committee, on whatever terms are needed, to protect its own position, whether giving evidence in private or in some other way because it is a real handicap. It means that when we produce reports, for example, on this Bill, we are deprived of information that would be very helpful. It makes us look as though we are looking at problems through one eye instead of both. I do not think that we should be put in blinkers. I mention this because it seems to be something that extends to committees other than the one that we are now considering.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

Could I ask the noble Lord to attend the debate on one of my later amendments, which deals precisely with that matter?

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I will be here.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Lester, is waiting for some later amendments beyond Part 1, so I am sure that he will be here for the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours. I can advise the noble Lord, Lord Lester, that Amendment 37 is the one that he should stay for.

We have eight amendments in this group, which all deal with the power of Ministers to withhold information from the ISC. It might be helpful if I start by going back to where we are now. Currently, the agency heads can make a decision not to disclose information to the ISC on the basis that it is sensitive information which they consider it would be unsafe to disclose to the ISC. Information which agency heads consider should be withheld on this basis must, none the less, be disclosed if the Secretary of State considers disclosure to be desirable in the public interest. It is a matter for the agency heads, but the Secretary of State can order the disclosure if she thinks it is in the public interest.

The Justice and Security Bill removes the ability not to disclose from the agency heads; this will now rest solely with the appropriate Secretary of State according to specific conditions. Where the information in question is held by a government department, as opposed to the agencies, a Minister of the Crown—rather than a Secretary of State—will be able to withhold information on the same specific grounds applied to agency material. In other words, the Bill makes the decision on withholding information from the ISC one exclusively for democratically accountable representatives.

In passing, I shall deal with the question about Ministers of the Crown, rather than Secretaries of State, being referred to in paragraph 3. This is purely to deal with the question of the Cabinet Office, which noble Lords will be aware does not have a Secretary of State. Therefore, it would be down to one of two Ministers in the Cabinet Office to make that decision. If noble Lords look at paragraph 3(5), they will see that the,

“‘relevant Minister of the Crown’”,

will, in due course, be,

“identified, for the purposes of requests of that description, in a memorandum of understanding under section 2”.

We discussed the memorandum of understanding at Second Reading and noble Lords will be aware that we hope that that, or a draft of it, will be available at a later stage.

I now turn to Amendment 18. It is appropriate to go through the amendments in slightly more detail. This will have the effect that if any of the three heads of the intelligence and security agencies are asked by the ISC to disclose any information then, as to the whole or any part of the information, that person may arrange for it to be made available to a security-cleared adviser to the ISC who may then provide advice to the ISC on the information, including written material in redacted form. It is worth stressing the importance of the provisions in the Bill governing when information may be withheld from the ISC. These powers will be used sparingly only in very exceptional circumstances. It is important that we retain those safeguards. The ISC routinely sees very sensitive information, including that at the highest levels of classification. It would not be able to fulfil its oversight role if it did not. It is not clear from the amendment to whom the noble Baroness intends the term “advisers to the ISC” to apply. Does she have in mind the current staffing of the ISC or perhaps a completely new role? The type of material that a Secretary of State may decide cannot be shared with the ISC—a good example would be the names of agents—is likely to be of such a sensitive nature that, if the Secretary of State has made a judgment that it cannot be shared with the ISC, then it would not be possible to share it with “advisers to the ISC” either.

We should also think about the practical difficulties posed by an amendment of this nature. That is Amendment 18. The amendment is likely to lead to circumstances where an adviser to the ISC has access to information which he or she cannot share with the ISC. This could place the adviser concerned in an impossible position of conflict of interest. When next called on to advise the ISC, that person may know information relevant to the advice that he or she is being asked to give, which, because they cannot share it with the ISC, they have to try to put out of their mind. If harm to national security can be avoided by providing information requested in a redacted form, then the existing provisions of the Bill oblige the agencies to provide it in that form; that is the effect of including the words,

“or any part of the information”,

in paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 1. I hope that describing the way in which the ISC and its secretariat presently operate assists the Committee and explains why the Government resist Amendment 18. In short, the amendment seems to contemplate an intermediate level between disclosure to the ISC and non-disclosure, which I hope I have shown, in practice, does not usefully exist.

The effect of Amendments 19 and 20 would be that the Government would never be able to withhold information from the ISC, whether it is held by the agencies or a government department. As I have already said, the powers to withhold information in the Intelligence Services Act 1994 have been used very rarely in the past, and we would expect the equivalent powers in the Bill also to be used sparingly, and only in exceptional circumstances. However it is important that those safeguards are retained. In particular, although the ISC will clearly be a body that sees a great deal of very sensitive material, there will be circumstances in which it is not appropriate for even the ISC to see that information on the grounds of national security. For example, there may sometimes be information that is so sensitive that national security demands that it be shared only with a small number of people within the agencies, let alone with the ISC. This is why the sensitive information ground for withholding information is expressed in the Bill in the way it is. It is not enough that the information is sensitive; it must be in the interests of national security for that sensitive information not to be disclosed to the ISC.

Crime and Courts Bill [HL]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Wednesday 4th July 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Henley]

The noble Baroness knows that my legal knowledge is equally limited but my understanding also is that this is a relatively simple tidying-up amendment, and I congratulate my noble kinsman on doing it. If I have understood him properly, he is trying to clarify that certifying a decision under Section 96 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 has no effect on any pending appeal. If that is correct, we would want to look at it. If he is willing to withdraw his amendment I am more than happy to consider the matter further and to report back to him in advance of the next stage. Because of the timing of this Bill we are in the very happy position of having some months, even with party conferences, between this stage and the next stage of the Bill—although, sadly, some of us might miss our own party conference because of the date of the next day in Committee on the Bill. We will look at this and if my noble kinsman is prepared to withdraw it, I will get back to him and see what we can do.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Perhaps I may ask the noble Lord a question. I have been following these debates as best I can. I have been at the Bar for a very long time. My wife is an immigration and asylum judge. I note that the Court of Appeal has begged the Government to codify and simplify the morass of unintelligible legislation which only my noble friend Lord Avebury truly understands. Is there any hope that once this Bill becomes law the Government will heed the court’s plea—to which I would add people such as my wife who, as a judge, has to interpret and apply this law—so that even if ordinary men and women cannot understand it, at least ordinary lawyers may be able to do so?

Justice and Security Bill [HL]

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 19th June 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Strasburger]

My Lords, I am in a small but growing minority in this debate in that I am neither a distinguished lawyer nor a member, not even a former member, of the ISC.

When compared with many other countries, it is remarkable how much the British people hold the courts in high regard and respect their decisions. This is partly because our judges are seen as incorruptible, independent and wise, but the main reason is that court decisions are the result of a process that is fair and transparent. By “fair” I mean that the court will give no privileges to either side, even when one side is the state. This principle is known in European jurisprudence as “equality of arms” and is a very British concept. An important aspect of equality of arms is that each side has an opportunity to see the other side’s evidence, to challenge it and test it, and to call evidence of their own to rebut it. The decision that is made after that process has been respected as one that we have good reason to respect.

What does transparency mean in this context? The principle of transparency entails that proceedings should be open to the public unless there is a very good reason why not. The court should make plain the reason for its decision. No matter how high our regard for the judge, it is very hard to trust his or her decision if you do not know how and why it has been reached.

Closed material proceedings are a big departure from the principles of transparency and fairness. The Government are proposing that, in civil cases where they are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing, they should be able to stack the proceedings in their favour on what is probably the deciding issue in the case. CMP is not just a secret hearing with the press excluded; the litigants and their lawyer are also locked out. The Government’s lawyer would have a private meeting with the judge who will decide the case and give him or her so-called evidence that their opponent cannot see. I say “so-called evidence” because it will simply be assertions that have not been tested or challenged. It may be mistaken or could even be complete fiction. Even so, the Bill requires the judge to take this highly dubious information into account when reaching a verdict—a very one-sided arrangement that cannot in any way be described as fair.

What led to the creation of CMPs in the first place? They were introduced for Special Immigration Appeals Commission hearings involving foreigners for whom a national security deportation was being considered. Previously such appeals were held in total secrecy and, by comparison, CMPs were a bit less bad. We are now being invited to extend CMPs from this highly specialised application to civil cases, where the Government are the defendant and are being accused of wrongdoing.

However, that is not the end of this mission creep. Buried in the Bill, in Clause 11(2), is the power for the Secretary of State to amend the definition of “relevant civil proceedings” by statutory order, into who knows what areas of our justice system.

Of course, we have a good idea of how far the Government would really like to go in extending the scope of CMPs. The Green Paper sought to apply CMPs to all civil proceedings involving the Executive. Secret and unfair hearings, therefore, could have been invoked by a hospital trust fighting a medical negligence claim, or a local authority defending itself against a claim for maladministration. For now, the Lord Chancellor has rowed back on that ambition in the face of a mountain of protest, but he has shown us the ominous and dangerous road that he wants to take us down.

What of the safeguards that the Government have trumpeted? We are told that the case judge will decide whether CMPs will be invoked, not the Minister. However, there is a disconnect between what the Government are saying on this and what is actually on the Bill. According to the Bill at present, judges will have their hands tied, with no discretion to consider the competing interests of disclosure in the interests of justice and national security. This, therefore, will effectively be a ministerial decision, with no effective judicial oversight.

What, then, is the problem that this Bill seeks to solve? The current system of PII certificates works well. It allows a balance to be struck between the requirements of justice and national security. If a Minister believes that disclosure could harm the public interest, he or she signs a certificate to that effect. The court then considers the issue, and the judge has a number of ways to handle the information in question. He can withhold it, release it, redact it before he releases it, protect the identity of the witness, and he has a number of other nuanced solutions. The PII system works well, and the Government have failed to bring forward a single example of where the PII system has led to a disclosure that has been damaging to our national security.

In fact, the Bill requires a Minister to “consider” the PII route before applying for a CMP, but the wording of this provision is so weak and easy to evade that, in effect, Ministers can and will demand CMPs without giving any serious consideration to the much fairer PII route. If this Bill is to proceed, before the Minister can ask for a CMP he should have to demonstrate to the court that for some reason a PII certificate will not do the job.

What do others think of this Bill? The House could do worse than listen to the views of the special advocates, specially vetted lawyers who are appointed to serve the court in CMPs. If anyone knows about the grimy details of this part of the justice system, they do. In a memorandum signed by 50 special advisers—which is basically all of them—they say that,

“CMPs are inherently unfair and contrary to the common law tradition … the Government would have to show the most compelling reasons to justify their introduction … no such reasons have been advanced … in our view, none exist”.

There you have it from the horse’s mouth. No reason has been advanced and none exists for making part of our civil justice system inherently unfair. That is the opinion of the specialist lawyers with deep knowledge of this type of proceedings and with no axe to grind at all.

What, then, is behind this solution without a problem? Over the past few months we have been offered a series of spurious justifications for this draconian Bill, all of them without any evidence to support them that stands up to scrutiny. I put it to the House that this Bill has nothing to do with protecting national security or preventing the CIA from withholding intelligence from our agencies because they do not trust our courts, or with saving the Government from having to settle civil cases for large sums because they cannot use sensitive data to defend themselves. All these reasons and others have been advanced at various times with little or no evidence to support them.

I put it to noble Lords that the real problem that this Bill is designed to solve is the justified embarrassment that the security agencies suffered when a recent civil case exposed their involvement in rendition and torture. In that case, the previous Government sought to conceal from the courts seven paragraphs that admitted what the Americans did to the litigant while he was in their custody.

The judge’s view was that:

“Of itself, the treatment to which”,

the litigant,

“was subjected could never properly be described in a democracy as ‘a secret’ or an ‘intelligence secret’ or a ‘summary of classified intelligence’”.

This Bill might have prevented the exposure of this wrongdoing and it may do so in the future if we pass it without major amendments.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am sorry to interrupt my noble friend but that is not quite right. The previous Government attempted to provide that information to the United States Military Commissions, but were thwarted from doing so by the American intelligence authorities. What the British Government sought to do was entirely honourable and they did not seek to conceal it from our own court. I thought I should just place that on the record.

[Lord Strasburger]

I thank my noble friend for that. The Lord Chancellor has indulged in plenty of comforting rhetoric in an attempt to assuage the serious concerns that many people wiser than I have about this Bill. The problem is that there is a yawning chasm between his words and those in the Bill. For example, he assures us that the judge will decide whether CMP will be used but the Bill as currently worded makes clear that the judge’s hands will be tied and will have little option but to grant the Minister’s request for CMP, even if he or she believes that the case could best be tried using PII rules. The judge will not be able to adjudicate between the competing arguments of justice and national security.

As it currently stands, this Bill is a toolkit for cover-ups. As such it is a threat to our democracy and we have a lot of work to do to fix its serious shortcomings. I hope that my noble and learned friend the Minister will listen to the strong misgivings about this Bill around the House, among civil liberties campaigners and, particularly, the special advocates who have a much more balanced and independent view of these matters than the politicians and the security agencies.

I will listen carefully to the Minister’s response today and in Committee. I hope that he is able to give me comfort to support a much-improved version of the Bill in the future but there is a long way to go.

[Lord Faulks]

My Lords, this Bill was always likely to be controversial and contributions so far have shown that that is the case. Part 2 has been a particular focus of attention. It is concerned with restricting the disclosure of sensitive material in court proceedings. A number of noble Lords have spoken who are not lawyers, and I entirely agree that the issues that this Bill throws up are not solely the possession of lawyers. I am, however, an advocate and as such am instinctively opposed to any erosion of the principle of natural or open justice. Evidence should be heard and read by litigants and their representatives, and their comments and reactions to it are a fundamental part of what we recognise to be a fair trial, whether that trial is in criminal or civil proceedings.

The Bill involves the extension of CMPs to include civil proceedings. It should be emphasised that CMPs are not of themselves a novelty and exist in a number of different contexts, as the Minister has described. The extension was presaged by the Green Paper, and the Government’s proposals have been much commented on in the media and by various interested parties. The Government have acknowledged the contribution of those who commented on the proposals, not least the JCHR, of which I am now a member, although I claim no credit for that contribution as I was not a member at the material time. I am conscious of some of my distinguished predecessors on that committee. Contributors to the debate even included the Daily Mail, a newspaper that normally causes the party opposite to reach for their collective smelling salts.

In response to representations, the Government have made some important modifications to their original proposals. The most important seems to be that the CMPs will be appropriate only in the disclosure of evidence that would be,

“damaging to the interests of national security”,

rather than in criminal proceedings or disclosure that might damage international relations. I share with the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian, some little confusion as to why inquests fall into a separate category. As the noble Lord, Lord Lester, has said, this may be to do with the jurisprudence in Strasbourg about Article 2 and its expanded approach. The questioning in inquests may be rather different than in civil proceedings or judicial review proceedings, or the Government, as a reasonable matter of political expediency, may have responded to public disquiet.

Be that as it may, there appear to me to be certain relevant questions about what remains of CMPs. Have the Government made their case for an extension of CMPs, and if so are there sufficient safeguards in the Bill to minimise any risk to justice? The problem with the current system is that the Government are between a rock and a hard place. They may take the view that in disclosing material that will damage the interests of national security, but using PII if the application is successful, they may not be able to defend proceedings without what may be crucial evidence in their favour. The result may be that there is an inappropriate compromise of a civil claim.

The noble Lord, Lord Thomas, says that the Government are apparently in favour of the settlement of proceedings. This is not what I detect from the anxiety behind this Bill; they are in fact against inappropriate settlements where evidence has not been adduced. On the other hand, if the PII application is unsuccessful and the judge in performing the relevant balancing exercise decides to order the disclosure of material, the Government, consistent with their assessment of the potential damage in disclosure, will be placed in a position where they may have to settle a claim, to which there is if not an actual then at least a potential answer. This cannot be satisfactory and is of itself damaging to the interests of justice. The Government are entitled to justice, too.

The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, says quite rightly that in the course of looking at the doctrine of PII, judges have developed a range of responses to mitigate the stark choice that is sometimes presented to the Government. The ingenuity of judges includes the redaction of material and anonymisation and other procedures, but sometimes—this has been the case in the past and will be so again—the Government are left with that stark choice, which I understand is the philosophy behind this part of the Bill.

I am naturally concerned by the comments about CMPs that have been made by the special advocates, some of whom I know well. Many of their points seem valid; in particular, I am unsure how a satisfactory assessment of prospects of success can be made in the absence of critical evidence. How, too, can cases settle on the basis of a proper assessment of likely outcome—and here I acknowledge the point made appropriately by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas? How is Part 36 of the Civil Procedure Rules to operate? I am also very sympathetic to their very understandable regard for their clients’ interests, which they feel may be compromised by the lack of a free flow of communication between the special advocates and open advocates and by the risk that some relevant piece of information may remain unchallenged because of this lack of communication.

I am much less convinced, however, by the suggestion that PII is working well. I am entirely sure, as the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, pointed out, that judges are performing the balancing exercises wisely, but for the reasons I have given the operation of PII may on occasion simply fail to deliver a just decision.

The use of CMPs will inevitably be what has been described by the independent reviewer as a second-best solution. However, it is significant that David Anderson QC, in the course of his providing memoranda to the JCHR, was convinced that there was a need to have a CMP available as an option in civil cases, albeit that it might not need to be exercised anything other than very occasionally, and I agree.

Special advocates, whatever their reservations about these procedures, are known to be tenacious in the defence of their clients and in challenging evidence adduced in CMPs. It must be recorded that a number of distinguished judges, not least the noble and learned Lord, Lord Woolf, who is not in his place, have said that CMPs are capable of producing justice and are consistent with it. Other judges, such as the much quoted noble and learned Lord, Lord Kerr, have observed that the lack of informed challenge, based on instructions, may leave the judge with a significant disadvantage in assessing the cogency of relevant evidence.

While in theory that is undoubtedly right, experience of our judiciary tells me that if evidence is adduced under CMPs, judges are likely to be particular rigorous in assessing its value. For example, if what is adduced amounts to double hearsay from a dubious source, that evidence, which could be unchallenged, is unlikely to be of much persuasive value. I simply do not recognise the scenario described by the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger, whereby little bits and fragments of assertion are put forward and expected to be relied upon by judges. It seems to me that if the Secretary of State elects to invoke CMPs, he or she is likely to do so only when the evidence is of real cogency. Let us not forget that the Government have lost cases after CMPs.

It is also worth observing that the extension of CMPs relates to civil proceedings involving claims for damages or judicial review, rather than to criminal proceedings, as we were reminded by the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell. While all cases should be subject to a full and preferably open hearing, the extension provided by this legislation is not concerned with criminal charges with a potential for loss of liberty.

The relative roles of the judge and the Secretary of State were much discussed in the responses to the Green Paper. It is for the Secretary of State to make the application, and the court must then make an appropriate declaration. However, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, that under Clause 6(2) one would expect the judge to try and devise strategies and to be interventionist in order to have a mode of trial that can, if possible, avoid CMPs, which are perhaps a last resort—but a necessary last resort.

It is said that Clause 6(5), which provides that the Secretary of State must first consider making a claim for PII, is of very little force. However, I would expect the Secretary of State to need to satisfy a judge that there had been at least consideration of such an option, and an explanation provided as to why PII was not used. The rules of court that are to be made pursuant to Clause 7 require a judge to consider providing a summary or gist of the material that is not damaging, within the definition of the Bill. Presumably, it would enable the claimant to provide some comments on the relevant evidence. This would need to be carefully done, but it would provide a potentially important safeguard.

The role of the Human Rights Act is also of importance. Article 6—the right to a fair trial—is specifically referred to in the Bill and provides another safeguard. In fact, we had well established principles of fair and open justice long before the Human Rights Act came into force. However, if one is to view these provisions in Human Rights Act terms, it should be remembered that Article 2 of the convention places an obligation on the Government, as a public authority, to protect the life of their citizens. In focusing on litigants, we should not forget the rest of the population, whose well-being may well be jeopardised by the disclosure of sensitive material.

Such concerns also colour my approach to the removal of the Norwich Pharmacal remedy in relation to sensitive material. It is vital that we protect the sources of our intelligence and that we maintain the confidence of our allies who provide us with that intelligence. If there was any doubt about that, it was confirmed by the noble Lord, Lord Butler, and the noble Marquess, Lord Lothian. This remedy is concerned with cases in which foreign litigants want to see material that we hold innocently and does not affect cases where the Government are alleged to have been involved in wrongdoing, although I do not particularly like the expression “legal tourism” in this context. While I understand why the Government have chosen a wide definition of sensitive material, I invite the Minister to explain why the definition needs to be quite as wide as it is in the Bill. I do not suppose that it is intended to deny access to what most people might regard as non-sensitive material, but the Bill at least has the potential to allow such an approach.

We have heard a lucid analysis of the Binyam Mohamed case by the noble Lord, Lord Lester; and other noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred to it. It can be seen from an examination of that case law that the courts in fact showed a considerable degree of deference to the security services, and some of the concerns expressed by other countries may be rather lacking in justification. However, it has to be remembered that the Norwich Pharmacal power is unqualified. The Government do not have the choice that they have in relation to the CMPs, and if ordered to produce this material they have to comply with the order.

Whether or not the fears of the United States and other countries are unfounded, it is critical for the safety of our country in these dangerous times that we do not jeopardise that relationship. I appreciate that the Government are placed in a very delicate dilemma, and it seems that we should have profound sympathy with their response, albeit that modifications may be made in the rigour of that test, which will more satisfactorily balance the respective interests.

This Bill will be thoroughly scrutinised by your Lordships’ House—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My noble friend may not be aware of the fact that in the Binyam Mohamed case, after the Norwich Pharmacal order was made, the court reserved the question of public interest immunity, but it never had to be decided because he was then released. It would not have been all or nothing. It is quite clear from the judgments that there would have been something. The courts, having decided Norwich Pharmacal, could then have decided on PII. I am not sure whether that is appreciated.

[Lord Faulks]

I entirely appreciate that. It is one reason why I suggest that there may be some modification to the test that we may ultimately arrive at, after having considered this matter in Committee. This Bill will be thoroughly scrutinised in Committee by your Lordships’ House, and it is clearly right that it should be. I hope and trust that we can avoid hackneyed references to Kafka and the Star Chamber. I am sorry that in an otherwise lucid speech by the noble Lord, Lord Beecham, he did not resist that temptation. The Government have a duty to protect us. This Bill is situated at the junction between that duty and the need to protect civil liberties and the integrity of the trial process. Please let us not forget the people of this country and those in the security services who labour silently on our behalf to protect them, in the course of our zeal to trumpet our commitment to the rights of litigants.

Protection of Freedoms Bill

Lord Lester of Herne Hill Excerpts

Tuesday 24th April 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Butler of Brockwell]

My Lords, I, too, rise to support the amendment. I do it on the basis of practical experience. I do the Government the credit of saying that their heart is in the right place on this. Indeed, on all sides of the House, it would be agreed that powers of entry without permission or warrant should be kept to a minimum. However, as the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, said, the crux is where the initiative for reviewing these regulations should lie.

Here, I speak on the basis of long experience in the Cabinet Office and successive initiatives to reduce regulation in government. Those who have been Ministers will be familiar with this. In this matter, the Cabinet Office was on the side of the angels. It wanted to see —indeed, it was a duty imposed on it by Governments—that regulations were reduced. There were successive deregulation bodies. The Minister in another place, Mr Francis Maude, led one of them. The experience of asking departments to make the case for the existence of regulations showed that doing it that way round was not successful because they could always make a case that the regulation might at some time be necessary or useful. For that reason, I was always in favour of having a sunset clause on regulations, a provision that from time to time a department that wanted to maintain regulations should have to make the case for them again. That is what, in effect, the amendment proposed by the noble Lord does. If the Government want to make progress in this, the onus should be on departments to make the case for the power to be renewed. Otherwise, the power should lapse. I am quite sure that if the onus is left as it is and the regulations are reviewed by the departments, very little progress will be made.

I support the noble Lord’s amendment particularly because, as he has said previously, this is a historic opportunity for the Government to set a sunset clause on these powers and oblige departments to make the case anew. I am not sure whether the noble Lord’s amendment is technically correct, but it would be wise for the Government, whose heart, I believe, is in the right place, to think about this again. I hope that they will do so. I am afraid that if they do not, the objectives that they seek to achieve will not be effectively achieved.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

My Lords, I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights that reported on this matter. In paragraph 116 of our report, we welcomed,

“the recognition in the Bill that powers of entry should be strictly limited to those circumstances in which such a power is justified, necessary and accompanied by appropriate safeguards”.

I would be grateful for acknowledgement by my noble friend the Minister that it is common ground that these powers should be in existence and exercised only where the power is,

“justified, necessary and accompanied by appropriate safeguards”.

When this matter was raised previously by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, I spoke critically of his amendment and what he was seeking to do on the grounds that the matter was already covered by the European Convention on Human Rights and the Human Rights Act. On reflection, not only having listened to the debate so far but having looked at the Commons Reason for disagreeing, I am now tending to be much more supportive of this amendment. With respect, I cannot understand how the other place can disagree, in considering that,

“the imposition of general restrictions of this nature on the exercise of powers of entry could undermine actions to protect public safety”.

That seems an extraordinary statement.

The purpose of the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is to write into this important Bill a constitutional safeguard, which, for example, in the American Bill of Rights, is contained in the Fourth Amendment: the prohibition on unreasonable search and seizure. Within the past three months, the American Supreme Court gave a judgment on that guarantee, referring to English doctrine against unreasonable search and seizure, which, of course, we in this country trace back in common law to the great case of Entick v Carrington. The noble Lord, Lord Marlesford, is seeking to use not just the European Convention or the Human Rights Act but the statute itself to contain a general restriction against the abuse of powers of entry by the retention of unnecessary powers.

I perfectly appreciate that the Government have undertaken to carry out a two-year review of the detail, and that is highly desirable and has been welcomed by the Joint Committee on Human Rights. However, I cannot see any objection to a general constitutional restriction against the retention or use of unnecessary powers of search or seizure. I shall listen carefully to how this is dealt with in reply, but at the moment, like others who have spoken so far, I have become much more sympathetic to this than I was on the previous occasion.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start by saying to my noble friend Lord Marlesford and other noble Lords that I am grateful for the fact that he acknowledges that we are at least on the same side in that we seek to reduce the number of powers of entry and make sure that existing powers of entry have the appropriate safeguards where necessary.

I begin with a very brief history lesson. At the time when the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was Secretary to the Cabinet, I can remind him and the House that we had something of the order of 500 or 600 powers of entry. As my noble friend Lord Selsdon said, it was difficult to know exactly how many there were. Over the years, mainly after the noble Lord ceased to be Secretary to the Cabinet, we saw a rather dramatic growth in the number of powers of entry. Something of the order of about 700 new powers of entry crept in between 1997 and 2010. I am sure that there were very good reasons for many of them and that all of them went through both Houses of Parliament, because all of them would have needed primary legislation in one form or another to get them.

It might be that Parliament nodded in its duty and did not provide the appropriate safeguards and checks and balances when considering all those powers of entry. Because of the dramatic growth that we saw over those 13 years, the new coalition Government in 2010 made a commitment that we would review all existing powers of entry and do what we could to reduce those that were unnecessary, bringing in appropriate safeguards—a warrant or consent—where necessary. That is why we brought forward the provisions in this Bill in Clauses 39 to 46.

I make it clear to the House that those proposals were in respect of the existing stock of the 1,300 or so powers of entry that we had. On top of that, there is always the danger—because Governments do this—that new powers might creep in. That is why we brought in the new gateway approach in the Home Office, to be adopted by all other departments, to look at any new powers of entry that might come in and make sure that they were properly scrutinised and that Parliament looked at them appropriately as they came through in Acts of Parliament. I am grateful that my noble friend Lord Marlesford at least commended that gateway approach to the new powers, but we are largely talking about the existing powers and how we want to look at the existing stock and do what we can to reduce it.

My noble friend brought forward his amendment before. It went to the Commons, where they looked at it—and I have to say to the noble Lord, Lord Neill, that they did not look at it with a lack of respect. They gave it a very good hearing and debated it for some 45 minutes, and the fact that they did not divide on it was obviously a sign that they thought that there was sufficient agreement. It is not for the Government to decide whether matters are divided on. Certainly, considerable respect was shown to the amendment and it was debated in considerable detail in another place.

My noble friend in his amendment seeks to create a blanket approach to what should be dealt with and then accepts that that approach is wrong—and he admits it is wrong because he then brings in a blanket exemption, which surely contradicts the whole point of what he is trying to do. We are trying to conduct a review of the whole process, which will closely examine all the powers that we have and those that are necessary while adding further safeguards to others. That is the important thing. There might be some powers that we do not need—right, we will get rid of them. There might be some that we do need but which do not have the appropriate safeguards, and in that case we will look at them. We have made it clear that in conducting our review the default position will be that any powers that require entry to people’s homes must require their consent or be by warrant only. This amendment provides only a blanket rule across the board, which we do not think is the right approach.

I accept that there have been criticisms—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

Can the Minister confirm that we are not in a vacuum while the review is taking place in that, if there were unnecessary and disproportionate searches or seizures, the Human Rights Act would require our legislation to be read properly to prevent them from being classified as unlawful searches or seizures?

[Lord Henley]

My noble friend is a great expert on the Human Rights Act and the House always defers to him when we discuss such matters. If there was a case of the sort that he implies, I am sure the courts would look at it in a manner that he thinks appropriate.

I am trying to make clear that we want to conduct a review over two years. I accept that there has been criticism from a number of colleagues, including my noble friend Lady Hamwee, who asked whether we could do it more quickly. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and my noble friend Lord Lawson also implied that we should do it more quickly. We will try to do it as quickly as possible but, as my honourable friend said in another place, we will also update Parliament on a six-monthly basis about how we are getting on. We think that this approach is the better one—to go through all the powers one by one, from department to department. Obviously, some departments will have a bigger workload than others. I understand that my old department, Defra, has rather a lot of powers. No doubt we will encourage them to work harder, and I and my colleagues in the Home Office will encourage them to do that. I think that is the better approach, and my noble friend’s approach—to bring in a blanket approach, accept that it is wrong and then bring in blanket exemptions—is not the right way forward.