Courts and Tribunals Bill

Lord Lemos Excerpts

Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 29, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and I am delighted to endorse everything that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, have said about it. I am delighted to join the noble Baroness in her campaign against Henry VIII. I am bound to point out that he had six wives, so there is no reason why he should not have as many critics and more.

The amendment would leave out part 2 of new Schedule 3ZA and therefore remove the power to add or remove offences to the list by order of the Secretary of State. That amounts to a pernicious Henry VIII power to add any offence to the “judge alone” list. No one has read it out, but I remind the Committee that the “judge alone” list in the Bill as drafted is just financial crime: conspiracy to defraud and offences under the Fraud Act; tax and VAT evasion; false accounting; insider dealing; money laundering; terrorist funding; bribery; historic fraud offences under the Theft Acts, including deception and going equipped to cheat; and ancillary offences. Those are financial crime, and that is what we had all envisaged the judge-only provisions would be about. However, it is not what is now proposed when there is a power—fettered only by the need for a preparatory hearing, effectively—to add further offences of whatever sort, provided that they are not the offences, excluded by the primary legislation, of homicide and serious sexual offences.

The Delegated Powers Committee, on which I once served—I agree with the noble Baroness about the worth and value of the work that it does, if often unlauded—described those provisions in its report on the Bill as being concerned with

“offences of serious economic crime such as fraud, bribery and terrorist funding”.

The committee summed up the principle in the 2021-22 report Democracy Denied?, which the noble Baroness cited:

“The appropriate threshold between primary and secondary legislation should be founded on the overarching principle that the principal aspects of policy should be on the face of a bill and only its detailed implementation left to delegated legislation”.


That neatly and elegantly sums up one of the cardinal rules on which parliamentary democracy is based: that the Government are accountable to Parliament and Ministers introduce a programme of legislation, but it is for Parliament to pass or reject it as it determines.

Vesting a Minister with the power to enable trials without a jury of any offence triable on indictment other than excluded offences, provided only that a relevant preparatory hearing has been ordered, would be a radical departure from that principle of parliamentary sovereignty. We will oppose it and we will vote against it on Report. While we are prepared to give the Government time to consider their position between now and Report, Ministers should be in no doubt as to the seriousness with which we view this threatened abuse of constitutional principle.

On the merits of adding further offences to Clause 3, we see little reason, as I have explained, for judge-only trials as a matter of principle, unless applied for by a defendant. We see no reason whatever for them in other cases in the Crown Court, unless sought by the defendant, and will continue to oppose these provisions.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, Schedule 1 is an inherent element of “judge alone” trials for complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases, as it stipulates those offences that are in scope of the measure, and therefore should stand part of the Bill. I have heard concerns that Part 2 of Schedule 1 could be used over time to expand broadly the scope of Clause 3 —noble Lords have spoken very clearly and firmly about that. Let me be clear: it is already the case that amendments to the schedule can be made only through the affirmative procedure—and I note the comments that have been made about that—which requires a successful vote in both Houses. Offences cannot be added to the schedule without Parliament’s consent.

Amendments 30, 63 and 64, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would prevent the addition of further offences to the schedule. Amendment 29, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would go further by preventing any changes to the schedules at all, whether additions or deletions. As I have said, the purpose of this provision is to allow the system to respond flexibly as fraud and financial offending evolve over time. Technology continues to evolve rapidly, including developments in artificial intelligence. Cases involving any added offences will always have to comply with the other statutory safeguards for an order under Clause 3: a preparatory hearing, a public interest test, exclusions for homicide and indictable-only sex offences, and judicial decision- making.

I have noted the comments of the Delegated Powers Committee, and I understand that we will return to this on Report. With those comments, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, it occurs to me that the Minister may have missed his vocation: he is able to advance an unstatable case with at least a scintilla of conviction. We cannot accept the explanation advanced. I note the support across the Committee for removing Part 2 of Schedule 1. The suggestion that it might be required to introduce further new laws unknown at the present time was met eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who pointed out that such laws would almost certainly be introduced by way of primary legislation anyway. I make it clear that we will be returning to this on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 5 provides powers to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months should future circumstances require it. These powers provide important flexibility to respond to changing pressures across the justice system and to ensure that court resources are deployed proportionately. Drawing on the experience of the past few years, responding to changing pressures across the justice system, including in the prison system, is a very high priority for the efficient management of justice which commands public confidence.

The Crown Court continues to face significant pressures, and many cases sent there for sentence can be dealt with fairly and effectively in the magistrates’ courts, as I have said in earlier groups. Extending magistrates’ court sentencing powers will allow more cases to be appropriately retained in the magistrates’ courts, freeing Crown Court capacity for the most serious and complex cases.

Reducing delay is not simply a matter of efficiency. Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness and justice, and freeing Crown Court capacity is critical if victims are to receive justice within a reasonable timeframe. The backlog is one question, and noble Lords have cited various statistics about the backlog in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court, but the backlog in the magistrates’ court is dealt with much more quickly than the backlog in the Crown Court, for all the reasons that are obvious. The waiting times in the magistrates’ court are less than half the waiting times for the Crown Court. That matters to victims in particular.

Amendments 69, 71 and 72 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 34 from my noble friend Lady Goudie seek to make these reforms subject to the affirmative procedure and prevent them taking effect unless a prescribed number of magistrates is maintained. The Government do not consider this additional procedure necessary. Parliament is already being asked by this Bill to take the substantive policy decisions, including approving the full range of magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers that may be exercised in future. Once Parliament has established that framework, it is proportionate and consistent with existing practice for changes within those limits to be made by regulations. I know that is not what many noble Lords wanted to hear, but it is our view. The negative procedure is the established approach and has been used previously, both to reduce and to increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers in response to the changing pressures across the justice system, which have been vividly recounted in recent months.

Nor do we believe that the implementation or continuation of these reforms should be made contingent on a single workforce metric. The Government fully recognise the importance of magistrates’ courts’ capacity, which is why we are increasing sitting days and undertaking a national recruitment campaign with the aim of increasing the size of the magistracy to around 21,000, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, noted, by 2028-29. However, operational readiness cannot be reduced to a single numerical threshold. It depends on court capacity, workforce deployment, case volumes and wider pressures across the criminal justice system. Amendment 72 would make commencement and continued operation dependent on a prescribed number of magistrates being maintained, regardless of the wider operational position of the justice system. The Government’s view is that such decisions should be guided by evidence and operational need rather than a single workforce measure.

Amendments 36 and 68 were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater—I thank her for meeting me in such a constructive spirit, and we have provided her with more information since. I take seriously all the points that she made about the things that needed to be true, if I can put it like that, for these reforms to succeed. I pay tribute to her experience and collaborative spirit. The Government have already committed in Clause 20 to post-implementation monitoring and review of the reforms, and therefore we do not consider that a further statutory review requirement is necessary. Amendment 68 would delay commencement beyond two months after Royal Assent. We do not consider that necessary either. The Bill does not increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers. Magistrates will continue to operate at their current sentencing limits unless and until a future decision is taken to exercise the power. Any future decision to increase sentencing powers will be informed by operational data and engagement with key partners across the criminal justice system, including HMCTS, prisons and probation, the CPS and the judiciary.

Since sentencing powers were increased to 12 months in November 2024, fewer cases are being committed to the Crown Court for sentence, and magistrates are retaining more cases to hear. I reject entirely the comment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that the Government have provided no evidence. We have published a magistrates’ capacity plan; I have commissioned a fact sheet that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has seen, and we have published our modelling. There is a good deal of data out there already. I have spent a good deal of time, including this morning, going over progress on magistrates’ courts’ capacity, recruitment and retention, so I am afraid I simply do not accept that characterisation.

We are going to increase sittings days to 131,000 in 2028-29. A national recruitment campaign is under way to increase the number of magistrates and recruit additional legal advisers and district judges. We are committed to rebuilding the magistracy. We have already made 1,500 new appointments across England and Wales since April. In 2025-26, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, noted, 17% of new appointments were from an ethnic minority and more than a third of new recruits were under 50. Women account for 55% of the new appointments.

I heard the concerns from the noble Baroness about the capacity and funding of the Judicial College. We will monitor those carefully but, as I told her when we met, we have significantly increased the funding to the Judicial College. That is an important aspect of making a success of these things—as is the need for new magistrates to have the mentoring and support of more experienced magistrates, as we have discussed. We have a detailed implementation plan. I would be very grateful if the noble Baroness, given her experience, would continue to work with us on making sure that is a reality. We all have the same ambitions here. I have a good deal of confidence in our efforts to expand the capacity of the magistracy. I am happy to share that with the noble Baronesses, Lady Sater and Lady Hamwee, and others.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The Minister referred to Clause 20, which talks about a review of equalities issues and, regarding the appointment of reviewers,

“any other matter specified in the appointment that relates to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions”.

It would be helpful to know what other matters the Government have in mind. We have been talking about some quite specific issues. I would be glad of a reassurance that that is what the Government intend to look at in a specific and detailed way to report to Parliament.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

The review that is promised is specifically on the question of disproportionality as it affects Black and minority-ethnic people. The provisions that we have made for the appointment and so on of the reviewer relate to that. That said, we also intend to review and publish progress on magistrates’ capacity, because we see that as central. It is not the same review, but both of those things are in play.

Of course, the readiness of the magistrates’ courts would be assessed before any decision to increase sentencing powers is taken. The decision would be informed by operational data and engagement. A fixed statutory delay would, therefore, reduce our flexibility without providing realistic additional assurance on operational readiness. It would also delay commencement of the statutory independent review of the structural reforms—just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—and provisions for when the Crown Court sits in the City of London, despite there being no equivalent operational rationale for doing so.

Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, together with Amendment 35, and consequential Amendments 58 and 70 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would either restrict the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts to the current possible limits of six or 12 months, variable by regulations, or remove altogether those existing powers to vary their sentencing powers by regulations. The Government do not believe that would be the right approach. Parliament is being asked through this Bill to decide whether magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers may in future be increased to 18 or 24 months. Clause 5 does not itself increase those powers. Parliament is taking the substantive policy decision about those limits through this piece of primary legislation and setting the limits within which any future regulations may operate. The purpose of Clause 5 is to continue to enable flexibility and any future decision to exercise the power would be informed by that evidence.