NATO and the European Union

Lord Lee of Trafford Excerpts

Monday 7th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lee of Trafford (LD)]

My Lords, there were two crucial votes last week. There was the vote in the House of Commons to support air strikes against Daesh and there was the vote in the Bundestag to commit German forces in support. I was particularly pleased with the decision and position taken by my party, the Liberal Democrats, in the Commons. Had my party gone the other way, I would have had to very seriously consider my position.

I speak in this debate as a very committed European. Indeed, one of the prime reasons I left the Conservative Party was that in the 1990s that party became, very sadly, increasingly Eurosceptic. I think that going as far as having a European army is probably going too far, but I believe that we need much more multilateral integration of army units across Europe, as was referred to a little earlier. Similarly, there has to be a much greater rationalisation of procurement. We have far too many production facilities in Europe. Obviously, one is conscious of the sovereignty arguments. Until we have greater integration in military units and consolidation and rationalisation of defence companies, the problem of procurement excess will remain. It was very disappointing to me and to others when there was an immediate outcry when it was suggested, some years ago, that there might be a merger between EADS and BAE.

In my short time allocation this evening, I should like to focus on the UK-French relationship. I have to say that a failure to support France in Syria would have been a near disaster in relationship terms; indeed, in my view it would have been a national humiliation, so I repeat how pleased I was at the decision that was taken in the other House. The truth, of course—it was referred to by my noble friend a little earlier in his excellent opening contribution—is that co-operation between ourselves and France is far greater than is acknowledged and the public is aware of. We are conscious of what we did to help the French in Mali, in terms of heavy lift, and, more recently, the reciprocal help by France in maritime patrols, where we are currently sadly deficient.

I remember a very early briefing that the current Secretary of State gave to a number of us when he told us that the one thing that had really surprised him was the degree of co-operation that he found existed between our military and the French. He almost implied that he was speaking daily to his French opposite number, but there is a great reluctance by the Government to acknowledge just how much and how deep co-operation there really is, as my noble friend said.

I have a number of questions to put briefly to the noble Baroness arising from the SDSR. If she cannot answer the points tonight, perhaps she could write to me. Paragraph 450 says of the SDSR:

“We will … collaborate on complex weapons”.

Can she indicate what these complex weapons are?

Paragraphs 512 and 535 refer to the UK-France Combined Joint Expeditionary Force. Paragraph 535 says:

“Our Combined Joint Expeditionary Force, which will be operational in 2016, will provide a potent combined reaction force of up to 10,000 personnel”—

a crisis-responding force. We are nearly in 2016 now, so what is the latest situation with this force?

Finally, reference is made in paragraph 535 to “shared opportunities” when our new carriers enter service. In a number of briefings that I have been at over the years there have been very strong hints from the Navy that we will be looking to our allies—and, I suspect, particularly France—to provide escort support for our carriers, given the sadly inadequate number of escorts that we have. Can the noble Baroness give some indication of current thinking in this area?