European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Lord Lawson of Blaby Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

[Viscount Hailsham]

My Lords—

[Lord Lawson of Blaby (Con)]

My Lords—

[Lord Howell of Guildford (Con)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

At the end of the process, there is going to be a need to come back before Parliament. That has been acknowledged by the Prime Minister and other Ministers and I understand that an undertaking has been given. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I believe that having it in statutory form is the best way for us to know exactly what is on offer, but I have heard repeatedly from Ministers that the option of walking away involves no need to come back before Parliament. I asked the question directly of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and I have heard it said by other Ministers in Select Committee. All I am saying to this House is that that is why this amendment is so important, even if no negotiation deal comes back before Parliament because no deal means WTO and WTO has implications for citizens of this country with regard to their rights.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham—

[Lord Finkelstein]

Did the noble Baroness finish? I wanted to intervene on her.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

It is notification of withdrawal; it is not a withdrawal Bill.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, as I was saying, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham, whose father I greatly respected as a colleague of mine in government, has reminded us, the reason we are debating this proposed new clause today is that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who moved this amendment, convinced first the High Court and subsequently a majority of the Supreme Court that a Bill is needed and that the Government’s intention to rely on the prerogative will not do. His argument was clear, and I think it will be helpful if I remind the House of it by quoting his words before the High Court:

“my case is very simple. My case is that notification is the pulling of the trigger and once you have pulled the trigger, the consequence follows. The bullet hits the target. It hits the target on the date specified in Article 50(3). The triggering leads to the consequence, inevitably leads to the consequence, as a matter of law, that the treaties cease to apply”.

In short, the very act of invoking Article 50 inexorably leads to Brexit two years later. This was the principal basis on which the courts decided that the Government were wrong to rely on the prerogative, yet the proposed new clause appears to say exactly the opposite. It says that there is no inevitability at all. Triggering Article 50 does not “inevitably”—in the own word of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—lead to Brexit, for the explicit purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that even when Article 50 has been invoked, if Parliament disapproves of the outcome of the negotiations it can stop Brexit happening. Indeed, as a number of speakers have pointed out, on the strict interpretation of the proposed new clause, your Lordships’ House alone can prevent Brexit since the approval of both Houses is required. I do not want to go down that avenue because I have not time.

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as an exceedingly clever lawyer who deploys his cleverness with considerable charm. However, is it possible for even him to have his cake and eat it? Might this not be too clever by half? The real mischief—

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill (LD)]

My Lords—

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

I should like to develop my argument. The real mischief in this proposed new clause lies in subsection (4). As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, effectively conceded, without subsection 4 there is a possible reconciliation with his original thesis, since without subsection (4), Parliament would be faced simply with the decision of whether to approve the agreement that the Government had putatively reached with the European Union. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and one or two others, have already pointed out, the Government have pledged to put this before Parliament when the time comes.

The Government might, for example, have agreed to pay the Barnier ransom demand which our own European Union Committee has recently confirmed that we are under no legal obligation to pay. In that case, Parliament might have found that unacceptable. However, if, for whatever reason, Parliament refused to approve the agreement that the Government had reached with the EU, that would not prevent Brexit. It would mean simply that we would leave the European Union without an agreement—and, as I explained at Second Reading, that is nothing to be scared of. Far from jumping off a non-existent cliff into the unknown, trading under WTO rules is the very satisfactory basis of most of the trade that we do throughout the world today. I give way.

[Lord Lester of Herne Hill]

I am grateful. Does the noble Lord accept that at this stage the key question before the House is: who is to be master? Is it Ministers or Parliament?

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

If the noble Lord allows me to develop my argument he will see exactly what the problem with what he is saying is, because no agreement is by far the most likely outcome. As the Prime Minister made clear in her excellent Lancaster House speech and as the subsequent White Paper reiterated, no agreement would be better than a bad agreement. Sadly—and it is sad—a bad agreement is all that is likely to be on offer. However, the mischief of subsection (4) of this proposed new clause is that it would not merely give Parliament the power to reject a bad deal but enable it to prevent Brexit altogether by refusing to allow the UK to leave the European Union without an agreement. This not only is in diametric opposition to the Pannick thesis on which the Bill rests but, more importantly, would be an unconscionable rejection of the referendum result that would drive a far greater wedge between the political class and the British people than the dangerous gulf that already exists.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I am saying that I think it would then simply incorporate the Prime Minister’s and the Minister’s undertaking.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

But not proposed new subsection (4).

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

Of course, the bit at the end is a separate matter, and on the whole I do not feel very inclined to get into it. There is the problem that, as was said, Brexit, once initiated, may go out of hand and terminate without any voluntary agreement on the part of the Prime Minister. The amendment does not really deal with that—but I do not see too much harm in the amendment. I cannot foresee exactly what will happen, but I sincerely hope that it is the first two parts of the amendment that will come into play in the end and there will be an agreement that can be put before the Houses of Parliament. Nobody knows—I cannot tell—and we can only hope. But it would be very desirable for any amendment of this kind, going from this House, to recognise the supremacy of the House of Commons.