European Union (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness Kennedy of Shaws Excerpts

Report stage (Hansard - continued): House of Lords
Tuesday 7th March 2017 Lords Chamber

The reality is as follows. If Parliament as a whole resolves that as a matter of principle, the ultimate authority to determine the future of this country should rest with Parliament and not the Executive, skilled parliamentary counsel will be instructed to ensure—and ensure very rapidly—that the language of the Bill meets that objective. I ask your Lordships to rest on the long-contested principle that this country’s future should rest with Parliament and not with Ministers. It is in that spirit that I commend this new clause to your Lordships’ House.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it is the occasion for the Labour Benches. I remind the House that the Supreme Court gave us the benefit of its wisdom on constitutional matters in the case of Gina Miller, which we have heard about. In that case, the Supreme Court’s principal conclusion was that primary legislation is required to authorise the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union. I make it clear that this Bill is a notification Bill; it is not an authorisation Bill. It does not authorise withdrawal from the European Union. What it does is to notify other European Union members that we are in a process of negotiation. The withdrawal must come back before this Parliament.

I also remind the House what the Supreme Court judges said. They said that the reason why this was a matter for Parliament—both the notification and, finally, withdrawal—was because any fundamental change to our laws that inevitably amends or abrogates our individual rights requires the approval of Parliament. That is one of the essential constitutional principles under which our system operates: that anything involving our rights—whether they are to trade with, to live in or to travel to the European Union—we have introduced into domestic law. Because that therefore involves the rights of citizens, Parliament is the place that has to make the decision and approve any changes to that law.

The concern that I raised in Committee late at night, when most people were no longer here, was that I had heard repeatedly from Ministers that if there was not a deal, or if Parliament decided that the deal was not good enough, we would walk away and that there was therefore authorisation from the people, having taken part in the referendum, to walk away. That flies in the face of what was said by the constitutional court of this country—the Supreme Court, which deals with constitutional issues—because walking away and embarking on an engagement in trade worldwide under the WTO rules also involves an amendment or abrogation of some of the rights that citizens in this country have. It has implications. That is why it is a constitutional matter and why this House has a particular role to play.

[Lord Faulks (Con)]

Perhaps I can remind the noble Baroness of the limits of what the Supreme Court decided. In paragraph 3, it said:

“It is also worth emphasising that this case has nothing to do with issues such as the wisdom of the decision to withdraw from the European Union, the terms of withdrawal, the timetable or arrangements for withdrawal, or the details of any future relationship with the European Union”.


There is a distinct limit to what it decided. Does the noble Baroness agree?

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

In reaching that decision, the Supreme Court laid out the principle that the reason why it was engaging with the case at all was not because it had a view on Brexit but because of the constitutional principle. The principle is very straightforward. It is that when it comes to our rights, Parliament makes those decisions. That is why when the process comes to the end and there is a deal on the table it has to be voted upon by Parliament but, if there is no deal, that too becomes an issue. It is not good enough for Ministers of Government to say that we just walk away as though that has no consequences. Walking away also has consequences for the rights of citizens in this country. That is why it is a matter for Parliament. That is why this proposed new clause is so important.

[Viscount Ridley]

The noble Baroness said at the beginning of her remarks that this is a notification Bill, not an authorisation Bill. Will she therefore explain what an authorisation amendment is doing in a notification Bill?

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

At the end of the process, there is going to be a need to come back before Parliament. That has been acknowledged by the Prime Minister and other Ministers and I understand that an undertaking has been given. Like the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, I believe that having it in statutory form is the best way for us to know exactly what is on offer, but I have heard repeatedly from Ministers that the option of walking away involves no need to come back before Parliament. I asked the question directly of the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, and I have heard it said by other Ministers in Select Committee. All I am saying to this House is that that is why this amendment is so important, even if no negotiation deal comes back before Parliament because no deal means WTO and WTO has implications for citizens of this country with regard to their rights.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham—

[Lord Finkelstein]

Did the noble Baroness finish? I wanted to intervene on her.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

I think the noble Lord, Lord Finkelstein, wants to come in on the points that I was making. I had actually more or less completed my speech, but if he wants to raise an issue—

[Lord Finkelstein]

Was the court’s judgment not based on the idea that this was authorisation? The court would have not have ruled as it did if it had not assumed that this was not unilaterally revocable. Both sides in the court case, including the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said that it is not unilaterally revocable, and the court ruled specifically because of that that authorisation is delivered by triggering Article 50. If it had not done so, it would not have ruled as it did; therefore, it is crucial to the understanding that this is authorisation.

[Baroness Kennedy of The Shaws]

It is notification of withdrawal; it is not a withdrawal Bill.

[Lord Lawson of Blaby]

My Lords, as I was saying, as my noble friend Lord Hailsham, whose father I greatly respected as a colleague of mine in government, has reminded us, the reason we are debating this proposed new clause today is that the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, who moved this amendment, convinced first the High Court and subsequently a majority of the Supreme Court that a Bill is needed and that the Government’s intention to rely on the prerogative will not do. His argument was clear, and I think it will be helpful if I remind the House of it by quoting his words before the High Court:

“my case is very simple. My case is that notification is the pulling of the trigger and once you have pulled the trigger, the consequence follows. The bullet hits the target. It hits the target on the date specified in Article 50(3). The triggering leads to the consequence, inevitably leads to the consequence, as a matter of law, that the treaties cease to apply”.

In short, the very act of invoking Article 50 inexorably leads to Brexit two years later. This was the principal basis on which the courts decided that the Government were wrong to rely on the prerogative, yet the proposed new clause appears to say exactly the opposite. It says that there is no inevitability at all. Triggering Article 50 does not “inevitably”—in the own word of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick—lead to Brexit, for the explicit purpose of the proposed new clause is to ensure that even when Article 50 has been invoked, if Parliament disapproves of the outcome of the negotiations it can stop Brexit happening. Indeed, as a number of speakers have pointed out, on the strict interpretation of the proposed new clause, your Lordships’ House alone can prevent Brexit since the approval of both Houses is required. I do not want to go down that avenue because I have not time.

I have the greatest respect for the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, as an exceedingly clever lawyer who deploys his cleverness with considerable charm. However, is it possible for even him to have his cake and eat it? Might this not be too clever by half? The real mischief—