Trade Bill

Lord Lansley Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting: House of Lords
Wednesday 6th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Fairhead]

I understand the point that the noble Lord is making. As we have always said, we will seek to balance the protection of our consumers and downstream users from the possible price impact of no deal. The tariff regime will be subject to the approval of the House, and secondary legislation to give effect to the tariff will be laid in line with the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. The Government aim to secure a deal, so we hope that that announcement will not be required.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

Before my noble friend sits down, I draw the attention of the House to Amendment 10, in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which relates to tariffs. It permits a debate of the kind that I think the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, was hinting that he wanted. It seems to me that we do not start on 29 March without a schedule. We have notified a schedule to the WTO, and it is in line with the EU’s external tariff. On that basis, we should talk about it later rather than now. We know where we start from. The issue is to what extent we might vary—that is, apply a rate of duty lower than the EU’s external tariff at some point after 29 March were we to leave without a deal.

[Baroness Fairhead]

I thank my noble friend for his clarification. That is indeed true but I think he will also accept that, if we were aiming to have a deal, we would not need to publish. If we got to a stage where no deal looked likely, clearly we would have to provide the information that he and the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, mentioned.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Henig (Lab)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendments 3 and 4 and speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. We had a wide-ranging debate in Committee about standards and Members from across the House argued that we should not allow standards to fall in a whole range of important areas, as outlined in the amendment. The Government’s reply was to agree in principle. The Minister said at the time that the Government were committed to high standards and that they were the right policy for the country, but that they should not be written in the Bill. When asked why not, she was unable to give a convincing reply.

It is essential that we take this opportunity to ensure that existing standards in a number of areas cannot be lowered as a result of the Bill and that that is made explicit in the Bill. One reason for that comes down to the issue of trust. In 2017, the Trade Secretary promised that the United Kingdom would not lower the standards. He said:

“We have made very clear we are not going to see reductions in our standards as we move forward, partly because British consumers wouldn’t stand for it”.


But at the same time, the self-same Trade Secretary has prioritised a trade deal with the United States. It is no secret that the prime aim on the United States’ side will be to negotiate lower food standards with the United Kingdom to enable their food products to flood in to the UK. There is no secret that that is their ambition.

Asked about this last weekend, when asked about food standards, the Trade Secretary replied:

“The question is not about safety”.


This is a bigger issue than the safety or not of a way of preparing food, which is also subject to rules at the World Trade Organization: it is about the decisions we make between the EU and United States approach to regulation. It is about the barriers to trade that that may impose, the impact on our producers and, most of all, the level of trust over trade policy.

The absolute worst way to make significant changes would be through the power under the Bill, because that would cause huge resentment and distrust of United Kingdom trade policy, which would damage our long-term prospects of achieving consensus and wide support for trade deals in future. As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, points out, under the Bill, the Government could make any change they liked to any regulations as long as it was relevant to implementing a trade agreement and that tariff changes are handled by another piece of legislation. Let us take the much cited chlorinated chicken, which she mentioned, beloved of the United States.

[Lord Lansley]

My Lords, surely the point is that the Bill relates only to agreements in place before exit day. There is no agreement on chlorinated chicken or with the United States, so any such argument is irrelevant to the Bill.

[Baroness Henig]

The noble Lord is clearly prescient, because I am just about to cover the very point he raises. As I said, let us take the question of chlorinated chicken. There is nothing to stop Ministers making that change in implementing existing trade agreements. For example, perhaps Mexico would want us to declare that we will accept chlorinated chicken in return for continuing our trade agreement. There is nothing to stop a country with which we have an existing agreement asking for that in future as a part of the rollover, which is what I think he was asking about. Slightly more far-fetched, perhaps, there may be a change of Minister. Perhaps the current Secretary of State for Transport takes over at trade and makes the change by mistake. Who knows?

That is why it is so important to agree the amendment. Major changes in standards in all these important areas should not be covered under the Bill: they need to be fully discussed in terms of our future trade relationship with the United States and the EU in the light of the terms under which we depart from the European Union and with the involvement of a wide range of businesses, trade associations, producers, consumers and local communities. The Bill should not allow a departure from standards, and that is why I put my name to the amendments.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Purvis of Tweed]

My Lords, in Committee there were a number of amendments, including one in my name, which sought to make the case that some of the agreements that we are party to by virtue of our membership of the EU are significant for the economy as a whole and certain sectors of the economy. Some have a greater impact on some of the nations and regions of the UK and, therefore, to understand the impact of our trading policy it is necessary to have the report. So I welcome the Government’s position, as outlined by the Minister.

However, there are a couple of areas where I would wish to press for further information. One area relates to comments I made earlier about the status of the vast majority of the agreements to which we are party and have signed prior to exit day but which we are looking to replicate or agree after exit day. These will not necessarily be considered as continuity agreements—a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe.

The agreement with Japan is a good example. It has been in force since 1 February and, given all the powers under this Bill, is a candidate to be considered as a continuity agreement. The Japanese Government have said that they do not wish it to be a continuity agreement but a new trade agreement. Under the Government’s amendment, how would that be reported on? It would not come under its remit. That is one of many examples.

[Lord Lansley]

I declare an interest as the UK co-chair of the UK-Japan 21st Century Group. My understanding of the Japanese Government’s position is that they have made it clear that the procedures that are required by the Japanese Diet for a treaty would make it impossible for them to bring this forward as an agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan in the event of a no-deal exit. They would require it to be considered as a new treaty because we were no longer members of the European Union or covered by the withdrawal agreement. Were we, however, to sign the withdrawal agreement and to have a transition period, the Japanese Government, in their view, could consider it to be a rollover agreement during the transition period.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

9: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“Preferential trade schemes: parliamentary approval
(1) The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 is amended as follows.(2) In section 32 (regulations etc)—(a) after subsection (3)(a) insert—“(aa) the first regulations under section 10 (preferential rates given unilaterally),”,(b) in subsection (3)(b) omit “that section” and insert “section 8”.”

[Lord Lansley]

I am glad to have the opportunity to speak to Amendment 9 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. Amendment 9 follows our constructive discussions in Committee and outside the Chamber with the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and his colleagues on the question of the trade preference scheme, typically referred to as the generalised scheme of preferences in the European Union context.

A generalised scheme of preferences or the trade preference scheme established by this country would be one intended to give unilateral access to our markets for the products of some of the least and less-developed economies, assisting in their economic progress.

In so far as we have been discussing continuity, the intention is for the United Kingdom to maintain some continuity between the European Union preference scheme and a future preference scheme in the United Kingdom. However, I want to talk about where there may be scope for differences. If noble Lords want to look at the measure, it can be found in Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. That is why the amendment amends that Act, not to interfere with its revenue-raising functions but in relation to the scrutiny to be applied to regulations to establish a trade preference scheme.

Under that Act, when the Government bring in a trade preference scheme, the first such regulations will be subject to an affirmative procedure. As I understand it, the scheme may be established in line with the existing European Union preference scheme. However, it will be helpful for me to raise a number of issues with the Minister to give him a chance to put the Government’s intentions on record—as he helpfully did on the last group—about the character of the regulations and the extent of detail to be provided.

First, when we looked at Schedule 3 to the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, we found it very difficult to relate that directly to what is in the EU’s preference scheme. That is mostly because the EU’s preference scheme does not include those countries with which it has association agreements that effectively supersede and replace the unilateral preferences. They have entered into bilateral or multilateral arrangements.

Whereas “least-developed countries” corresponds directly and derives from a UN classification, the list of “other eligible developing countries” is referenced to a World Bank classification, “among other things”. It is not the same as the classification by the World Bank. In particular, it would be helpful if my noble friend would confirm whether it is the Government’s intention to follow the EU practice and to identify in that category a sub-category of “vulnerable developing countries”. I think the intention of the unilateral scheme of preferences is to support economic development in circumstances where they are not the poorest countries of the world but none the less have significant issues—often they are structural or governance issues—that require additional preferential support.

Secondly, can access to preferences be suspended or withdrawn, as Section 10 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act makes clear, in recognition of or in consequence of human rights abuses in those countries or in relation to United Nations sanctions? Will the regulations make that clear?

Thirdly, what is the situation where the availability of this unilateral system of preferences none the less gives rise to dumping? I remember way back in 1981 that I was responsible in the Department of Trade and Industry for the generalised scheme of preferences as it applied to chemical products. The dumping of petrochemicals produced in Middle Eastern countries illustrated this point: the fact that one is a developing country does not necessarily mean that one does not have the ability to have serious competitive issues with producers in this country.

Where preferences might lead to dumping, or to subsidy, or to an increase in imports that could give rise to injury to markets and producers in this country, will the Secretary of State under the regulations be required to ask the Trade Remedies Authority to investigate any such complaint? As is the case elsewhere in the Act, will the Secretary of State be required only to act and to implement remedies in so far as the Trade Remedies Authority itself determines that there is a need to act and in line with its recommended remedy? It is not clear in the 2018 Act that the Trade Remedies Authority is required to be used by the Secretary of State in relation to the preference scheme.

Will the first set of regulations make clear the overall structure of the preferences scheme? Will it also make clear the structure in relation to specific products from developing countries, which are not to have the unilateral nil duty of tariff but are to be treated as graduated products? This sometimes happens for reasons of relative competitiveness or due to the need to protect industries in this country—as might, for example, be the case with textile imports from India or Bangladesh. Will the availability of the preferences for those graduated products be specified in the regulations, so that the two Houses can look in detail at the way in which the preference scheme is to vary in relation to certain sectors and certain countries, which might give rise to differences between the EU scheme and our scheme? Clearly there are graduated products, particularly in the agricultural sphere, where the protection afforded is to southern European producers for certain agricultural products that have no relevance in the United Kingdom. This could be true for industrial products as well.

As was said in the previous group of amendments, that is my list. I hope the regulations will include—but not necessarily be limited to—those details. There may be other issues that noble Lords will want to make sure are set out by the first regulations. It will be helpful for us to have an idea because, depending on circumstances, it may not be long before the shape of the trade preference scheme becomes clear in detail, not just in its overall application, as was set out in the 2018 Act.

[Lord Stevenson of Balmacara]

I rise briefly to support the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, which I have signed up to. The meeting that he referred to was extremely helpful in drawing out some of the confusion that emerged during our first debate in Committee. The issues of how countries get on to the lists, how the lists get managed and shaped, and how the changes might come forward were all explored carefully; we now have a much better understanding. In these lists, there are bound to be curious decisions which do not seem to match up to one’s perspectives. I was in Tanzania on holiday recently and it certainly did not come across as one of the least-developed countries, although clearly there are issues around how it will progress and develop its own trading arrangements.

The point behind the amendment is to get on record some further points that have emerged. The noble Lord was kind enough to suggest that we might have further questions, but his all-encompassing knowledge and brilliant, incisive questions are quite enough for me.

--- Later in debate ---

There will be an opportunity to look at how we should respond to and reform the generalised scheme of preferences going forward, but this will be a matter for future negotiations. In the trade White Paper, we invited people to make representations, and a number of representations were received on areas in which the GSP could be improved and these included areas such as rules of origin, which could be considered. As I have said, we believe that there are opportunities to look at ways in which the scheme of preferences could work better for the world’s poorest countries going forward, but our first priority is to ensure that the preferences which exist already—helping approximately 70 developing countries to export to the UK—are maintained; that is the objective of this Bill.

[Lord Lansley]

I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister and indeed to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for their contributions to this short debate, and for the discussions that we had, which were not so short but were extremely helpful in clarifying many of the issues; they have enabled us to be brief today. I am grateful to my noble friend for his responses to my questions, which were very satisfactory.

I have two things to say. First, what he described as the role of the Trade Remedies Authority seems an appropriate one and mirrors what would be the case with other countries who are not part of the GSP scheme. I hope he implied that the Secretary of State would follow the TRA’s recommendations on the extent to which the preferential access is suspended or withdrawn; this can lead to a rate of duty that lies between nil and the standard rate—the most favoured nation rate. It is not necessarily in excess of the most favoured nation rate, as my noble friend said, but might fall somewhere between the nil rate and the MFN rate.

On the second point, I completely understand that noble Lords might expect us to start with a preference scheme that mirrors the European Union scheme and then consider the extent to which we can, or need to, change it in order to improve it—to address both the different circumstances of EU industries relative to those of developing countries and some characteristics of the scheme itself. Given that the legislation is structured so that the first regulations get affirmative processes and subsequent regulations do not, I hope that that will not inhibit Ministers from trying to consult proactively, as they have done through the White Paper and otherwise, on how the preference scheme could be improved if and when—there is definitely an “if” as well as a “when”—we come to establish a trade preference scheme that is the UK’s own scheme, rather than one which simply reflects the EU scheme. However, on the basis of the very helpful response from my noble friend, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Lord Lansley]

10: After Clause 5, insert the following new Clause—
“The customs tariff: parliamentary approval
(1) The Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018 is amended as follows.(2) In section 32(3)(b) (regulations etc)—(a) leave out “an increase in” and insert “to vary”, and(b) after “section)” insert “from that which is in the United Kingdom’s Schedule notified to the WTO”.”

[Lord Lansley]

Amendment 10 stands in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson. In Committee, we did not discuss what tariffs the United Kingdom would apply if we were to leave without a deal with the European Union. Since Committee, although Ministers have not published a proposal—notwithstanding some hints that they would—we are told something about it by virtue of reporting by Sky News. I do not know whether that is true or not; I tend not to rely on media reports for these purposes. As it happens, I tabled Amendment 10 before Sky News started reporting anything of this kind, because it seemed that noble Lords would want to talk about what such a tariff structure might look like.

This amendment relates to the implementation of import duty under Section 8 of the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act 2018. There are regulation-making provisions in Clause 32 of that Act, which specify that the first regulations under the Act require an affirmative procedure in this case, and that the affirmative procedure should also be used when there is an increase in duty in the standard case. For these purposes, “standard case” means when there is not a preferential rate or a tariff-rate quota, or when something is not subject to trade remedies. In that sense, it is what my noble friend referred to in the last group as an “MFN rate”. That is the standard case for these purposes.

The provision currently says it would be an affirmative procedure when there is “an increase in” that duty. The effect of Amendment 10 is to change that, so that it would be an affirmative procedure for any regulation that sought “to vary” the rate from the rate set in the schedule notified to the WTO. One of the points I hope to make is that this enables us to say something about the shape of how we might approach the situation if there is no deal. If we remain in the transition or implementation period, we will clearly abide by the EU external tariff. Depending on the nature of the future relationship with the EU, we may continue to be within a single customs territory and, by implication, within a single EU external tariff. That does not necessarily reflect the Government’s point of view, because they appear to want to be able to reduce tariffs below the EU rate, even though we remain in a single customs territory. This is a debatable proposition, which we will perhaps debate later but not on this group.

In this amendment, there is an expectation that, if we leave without a deal, we will start with our schedules to the WTO being those that we have notified—as I said right at the beginning of our proceedings today, in response to the noble Lord, Lord Kerr. They are essentially in line with the EU external tariff. My proposition is that there is no need for this; indeed, there would be significant detriment if we did not maintain those schedules. Under the WTO rules, we should have what is known as a bound rate, which is in line with the EU external tariff. The bound rate is the one that we are, in this sense, bound not to exceed. However, that does not mean that that is the rate that is applied. It is not widespread, but it is entirely normal practice under the WTO rules to have not only free trade agreements of the kind which are contemplated under Article XXIV, which lead to preferential arrangements, or the kind of preference scheme that we were just talking about for the less developed countries, but also to apply a rate of duty that is lower than the rate which one is bound to under the schedules for the WTO.

The proposition I put to your Lordships is that we should be thinking constructively about how to use the flexibility under the WTO rules to vary the applied rate of tariff from the bound rate, if we were in the unhappy circumstances of leaving without a deal. We would leave the bound rate, the WTO schedule and the EU external tariff where they are, in the expectation that, even if we leave without a deal, we may enter into a relationship with the European Union with a customs relationship which might require us not to vary from the EU’s external tariff—we would just leave that alone for the time being. In the short term, this would enable us to reduce tariffs on products from around the world which are presently subject to a higher tariff or to tariff-rate quotas. It would enable us to offset what is otherwise a significant risk of overall price increases for UK consumers.

The reasoning of course is that the EU will not change its external tariff. If we leave without a deal, we will be subject to the EU’s external tariff. Roughly half of our imports come from the European Union; a significant proportion of those—for example, cars—will have a 10% tariff applied. To turn it the other way round, UK producers would be in the unhappy position of being subject to increased costs when they try to sell. What we do not want to happen is that, simply by virtue of leaving, we impose high tariffs, leading to higher costs for UK consumers.

When people have speculated about what the tariff on a no-deal basis might look like, in some quarters they have tended to say, “We cannot lower our tariffs because the consequence of that is that we will have given something away unilaterally, which would prejudice our ability to enter into bilateral trade deals with other countries”. This is not the case. If we proceed by having an applied rate that is lower than the bound rate, first, it will become apparent to us and other countries to what extent liberalised, lower rates of duty stimulate imports from those countries, in some cases in competition with the EU at a level of duty which it has not been able to match in the past. It will begin to tell countries, and us, what the impact of lower rates of duty might be on trade between those countries.

Secondly, those countries would know that, if no bilateral deal was brought to a successful conclusion which then gave a preferential rate of duty to the United Kingdom under a free trade agreement, we could restore our applied rate back to the bound rate. They would then lose the benefit we had given them in the short run. In a nutshell, the short-run benefit of lowering tariffs not only potentially offsets what might otherwise be price increases but enables us to demonstrate to other countries what the benefits of a bilateral deal in the long-run might look like.

My expectation, and the expectation of most developed economies, is that the bound rate and the applied rate will converge in the long run. They are generally the same thing, but we are not required to have them as the same thing. It gives us an opportunity to vary rates and see what the future might look like. In the short run, it also gives us the opportunity to vary the rates of duty from those in the EU tariff to give specific benefits on things such as agricultural products or some industrial products where the protection that is required for European producers does not apply to UK producers. In that way, we can start to benefit from lower rates of duty where the European Union does not currently offer that option to us.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I thank my noble friend for moving the amendment. The noble Lord is right: my noble friend has raised, effectively, three issues that need to be examined. One is the level of tariffs. In that regard I will probably disappoint my noble friend by referring back to my noble friend Lady Fairhead’s response from the Ministers’ Bench to the invitation of the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, to set out a timetable for when those tariffs might become known. She made her points and they stand on the record; I probably do not need to repeat them. I also draw to the attention of the House The Implications for Business and Trade of a No Deal Exit on 29 March 2019, which was published on 26 February. On this occasion I draw my noble friend Lord Lansley’s attention to the section on tariffs, beginning at paragraph 31 and continuing into paragraph 32, which explores some aspects of the setting of tariffs.

Those are two aspects on the level of tariffs, but I now turn to some of the specifics to which my noble friend referred. He asked about the status of the common external tariff applied by the WTO. The noble Lord is correct that we have notified our bound tariff schedule to the WTO. Our bound schedule represents the upper limits of what tariffs the UK could apply on imports. If, for example, our bound schedule says 10% for product X, we could choose to apply 9%. The Government have yet to announce their applied tariffs for a no-deal scenario, but the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, is correct to say that on leaving the EU we will be free to set out tariffs within the parameters of the bound schedule that we lodged last year.

The EU’s common external tariff—as referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lansley—is the EU’s version of its applied tariff schedule. These are the tariffs that will apply to UK exports to the EU in a no-deal scenario. My noble friend also referenced the Taxation (Cross-border Trade) Act, which states that the first time a tariff is set, and whenever an import duty rate increases, the made affirmative procedure will apply; otherwise the negative procedure will apply.

These amendments would make the made affirmative procedure apply in different circumstances. In the case of Amendment 10, that would be any time the rate of import duty diverged from the bound commitment made by the UK to the WTO; in the case of Amendment 14 the made affirmative procedure would apply in all circumstances. However, under both amendments it is currently stipulated that the setting of the tariff would remain a matter for the other place. The Act ensures that the scrutiny procedures applied to the exercise of each power are appropriate and proportionate, taking into account the extremely detailed nature of the tariff and the frequency with which it may be changed. The tariff is long and complex; it currently contains 17,000 types of goods and is more than 1,000 pages long. The EU tariff is subject to regular, almost daily, amendment, so the current balance of the chosen procedure reflects that understanding.

Once again, I express the Government’s appreciation to my noble friend Lord Lansley for moving this amendment, giving us the opportunity to expand on our positions and put those additional remarks on the record. I hope that is helpful and reassuring to him, and that he feels able to withdraw his amendment at this stage.

[Lord Lansley]

I am grateful to my noble friend, and to the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara. This debate has been very helpful, and the takeaway from this—one I am grateful to my noble friend for confirming—is that the bound schedule has already been notified to the WTO. People need to be very clear about the fact that if we leave without a deal and the Government come forward and say, “These are the tariffs that we intend to apply”, they are not varying the WTO bound rate but saying that, on a most favoured nation basis, they will apply these rates. That provides a basis for negotiations on preferential schemes that could emerge over time. I read the document about the implications of no deal for tariffs, and it is correct: the Government must balance the desirability of supporting liberalised trade, with benefits for consumers through price and choice, with protection for producers in this country. That will be a delicate balance to strike. If people are aware that we can behave in this way with an applied rate that varies from the bound rate, it removes the argument that by applying a lower rate in the short run we have prejudiced our ability to conduct trade negotiations with other countries in the future—we have not done that. If we get rid of that argument, it helps to shift the balance in many cases in favour of lower rates in the short run, rather than higher rates. I am most grateful to my noble friend for his response. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 10 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Viscount Hailsham (Con)]

My Lords, I rise briefly simply to explain why I do not feel I can support the proposed new clause, although generally speaking I agree with the views that have been expressed in its support. I shall indicate what I could support with some changes to the new clause. I shall deal first with proposed new subsection (9), which makes the ratification of the agreement subject to approval by resolution of both Houses. This provision, in fact, goes much further, as the noble Lord will appreciate, than the procedure set out in the 2010 Act with regard to the approval of treaties, but I welcome the principle and I have no difficulty with it. However, I have a question which I hope the sponsors of the proposed new clause will address. I may have overlooked the answer—it may be staring me plain in the face. What happens if the Lords decline approval but the Commons approve the trade agreement?

There is no provision in the Bill to deal with that situation, and it would be profoundly unattractive if the House of Commons were to approve the trade agreement and the House of Lords were to refuse it, the result being that the trade agreement could not pass. This is actually dealt with specifically by Sections 20(7) and 20(8) of the CRaG Act of 2010, but there is no similar provision in the new clause. Because the procedures between the new clause and CRaG are fundamentally different, I do not think you could simply import the procedures in CRaG to the new clause. Perhaps I might seek guidance from the mover of the amendment on how to resolve a difference of opinion between the two Houses.

To move very quickly to proposed new subsections and (1) and (4), so far as the former is concerned it is very good idea that the negotiating mandate should be placed before an appropriate committee and discussed in both Houses of Parliament. It is a splendid idea, and I also agree with the supporting procedure set out in the proposed new clause. The one thing I do not agree with is that the negotiating mandate should be made subject to approval of the committee or the House. That is an undue restriction on the ability of the Executive to negotiate. I would say yes to consideration and discussion, but no to express approval.

The same point relates to proposed new subsection (4). I see no reason why the agreement of the appropriate committee should be obtained before the matter is put to a vote under subsection (9), because that subsection is already a parliamentary lock on the agreement. Why, therefore, should there be a pre-agreement by the appropriate committee before it goes to both Houses of Parliament? It seems to me that that restricts the ability of Parliament to do that which it thinks is right, and it is unnecessary because the parliamentary lock already exists.

To summarise, I cannot agree with this new clause, but I could agree with it if the principle of consideration and discussion were substituted for that of express approval in subsections (1) and (4).

[Lord Lansley]

I thoroughly agree with my noble friend Lord Hailsham in his argument. I will add one thing. The Commonwealth Parliamentary Association just a few weeks ago brought together people from across the Commonwealth to discuss a number of issues. The meeting I attended was a discussion on the ratification of treaties. It was clear that Australia and New Zealand—which of course have a long continuing history of negotiating their own trade agreements—still use the prerogative power as the basis on which the Executive enter into a trade agreement, but they do it in the context of continuing scrutiny, oversight and an approval process following implementation of legislation.

What I read in the White Paper last week went a long way towards replicating that in a very satisfactory way—that is, we would do those things in a similar way to Australia and New Zealand such as the outline approach being presented, reports on rounds and negotiations being reported back to Parliament and of course an approval process. It is perfectly reasonable to wait on the two Houses of Parliament to tell the Government what they think should be the committee processes by which these are considered. Australia, for example, has a joint standing committee on treaties, which looks at the way treaties are ratified. I do not think it is the case that mandates are being taken all over the world; some of the countries that have the greatest constitutional consistency with us do not have a mandate. The noble Lord, Lord Hannay, was right about scrutiny and oversight, but he elided them with the necessity for Parliament to issue a mandate. Under our constitutional processes we should not be issuing a mandate, and the proposed new clause falls on that count.

[Lord Bilimoria]

My Lords, at the heart of this is Parliament taking control. What has been a problem for the past two and two-third years is that the Executive have continually tried to bypass and bully Parliament, whether with Article 50 or the statutory instruments that are going through now. This is really frightening. I am sorry to say to the noble Lords, Lord Lansley and Lord Hannay, and the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, but there is a big difference between Australia and New Zealand, and, for example, the United States of America. Not only does that country undertake a meaningful public consultation before negotiating, but it releases all the negotiating text to a large representative panel and subjects the deals to an affirmative vote by Congress, which is also entitled to amend deals unless it waives its right. That is Parliament having a say. That is transparency. The European Union, with its mostly mixed agreements, needs ratification by member states. It is crucial that we accept these amendments, to make sure, in the words of the Brexiteers, that we take back control.