(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I certainly agree with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that there is a lot of imperviosity in the air today. He talks of feeding the flames. That is a phrase I and a number of colleagues have used many times over the last few years, certainly every time legislation affecting Scotland has come before the House. However, I make no apology for speaking very briefly in support of Amendment 1. Indeed, I support all the amendments in this group, with the possible exception of Amendment 3, proposed by my noble friend Lord Cormack. I sympathise with his sentiments but it is so palpably obvious that what he would like to achieve is outwith the terms of the Smith commission report, which is our sacred text, that it is highly unlikely it would make any progress.
In constitutional terms we should not forget that this is a shameful piece of legislation and has a shameful origin. The Constitution Committee was deeply critical of that fact. It was born out of panic and its contents decided by an arbitrary political cabal. Parliament’s role was blindly and blandly simply to pass it through into law. Clearly, my noble friends on the Front Bench have been given instructions not to yield an inch on any matter—not even a willingness to take things away and consider. “Get it through on all counts, unamended; don’t give anything away”. That is the sort of thing the Treasury says to other people, although in the last 24 hours we have noticed that it is sometimes a little bit inclined to breach its own rules—not always in the right way. Therefore, I think it is right to revisit this issue, however briefly, particularly because when we debated it very fully in Committee, I was pleasantly surprised to find that the noble and learned Lords, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, Lord Hope of Craighead, and Lord McCluskey, and other distinguished lawyers and constitutional experts, including my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, all came in behind the proposition that it was dangerous to legislate in a meaningless and declaratory way; indeed, that goes against the Government’s own guidelines on drafting legislation.
The point is that Clauses 1 and 2, which we are debating amendments to, change nothing in law. They are essentially meaningless. They are declaratory. But they could sow a seed and some Scottish judge at some time in the future could build a case over these now justiciable matters. The implications for Scotland, and indeed for parliamentary sovereignty, would be very considerable indeed.
My noble friend Lord Dunlop and my noble and learned friend Lord Keen of Elie are curiously reluctant even to consider what was said then. At one level, the clauses change nothing because they are declaratory. In a sense they are meaningless, but their very meaninglessness carries a meaning of sorts and carries implications and uncertainties. Indeed, I wonder why the Scottish Government were so keen to have the changes made to which our Government gave way so readily in another place. It is still not too late to think again, and I remain ever hopeful that the Front Bench will relent.
My Lords, for the removal of any doubt, I do not support any amendments in this group. But I am pleased to be given the chance to try again to pronounce the name of the noble Lord, Lord Louth of Norton—I have done it again—the noble Lord, Lord Norton of Louth, because he is a profound constitutional expert and he has my total admiration and respect, and I apologise for the mix-up.
The original draft of Clause 1 conveyed the permanency of the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government as institutions but our amendments put their permanency beyond any doubt and put the decision of whether they should be permanent in the hands of the Scottish people. We do not want any change to this aspect of the Bill. It is with some trepidation that I enter this debate, with so many constitutional experts, lawyers and esteemed legal people, but there we are; I might bring the perspective of an ordinary Scottish person without having all those grand titles—which are all deserved, I hasten to add.
I do not think we should spend too long on this aspect of the Bill. We support the Scottish people having the final say on any of these matters. Without going too much into the history of things, in 1707 Scotland entered the United Kingdom as a full country. It did not sacrifice totally its right to have its own say. We entered as an equal partner. I think we have played our part, pro rata, on an equal basis. I believe strongly that that should be the case. The sovereignty of the Scottish people should be recognised. It is not a coincidence that one of our monarchs in Scotland, Mary, Queen of Scots, was not known as the Queen of Scotland. Of course, her final legacy was that every monarch of Scotland and the United Kingdom since her death has been her direct descendant. That is totally in tune with the Scottish people. The Scottish people should have the say. I am sorry to say it but particularly the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, to take everything away from the Scottish people is just not acceptable or realistic. Realpolitik has been mentioned and that is absolutely right.
I do not want to feed the flames but I say to the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that he could have been a bit more careful with his words, bearing in mind the history of Northern Ireland. My party and I—and, I believe, the Government—are not feeding any flames. I believe in the merits of what we have here, not just as expediency or something passed down from on high. I believe firmly in it and if any of these amendments are pressed, we will be voting against them.
My Lords, I very much support the amendment introduced and moved so ably by my noble friend. It is over a dozen years ago now that the Constitution Committee of your Lordships’ House undertook an inquiry into devolution and inter-institutional relationships within the United Kingdom. We found exactly what the Calman commission found later—that what should be in place to encourage inter-institutional relationships was not there. Had the recommendations of the Constitution Committee report been implemented, we would be in a much stronger position now than we are.
There is a tremendous amount to support in this amendment, because it injects a useful discipline. It focuses the mind, because if consideration must be given to this each year it encourages reflection, as has been mentioned, addressing such things as best practice. That is wholly for the good; I see no real arguments against it, and I very much hope that my noble friend’s amendment will get a positive response from the Front Bench.
My Lords, I repeat briefly the support that I gave these proposals in Committee. The noble Earls, Lord Dundee and Lord Kinnoull, are to be congratulated on persevering on this issue. Like my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth, I, too, served on the Constitution Committee when, 14 years ago, we drew attention to the inadequacy of intergovernmental relations. They have got worse, not better, since then. We produced a report a year ago in the committee drawing attention to intergovernmental relations across the board, and we are still awaiting a response on it from the Government. I know that they are thinking about it, but they are thinking very slowly or, perhaps, very thoroughly.
I hope that this amendment will trigger further thought from them. I do not know whether the proposed new clause covers the whole comprehensive gamut, but it certainly looks like a very good effort to me. I reassure my noble friends that, if they do not prosper with this clause in this Bill, we have another report coming out from the Constitution Committee shortly, and I dare say that it is possible that we will return to the matter then.
My Lords, I, too, on behalf of the Labour Party, would like to record our support for the principles of the amendment moved by the noble Earl. This is a good, positive amendment and way ahead and a more positive discussion than some that we have had previously. We have to develop these links and prove that there is a better away ahead than just conflict, narking away at each other and coming to a conclusion. I am reasonably sure that the Government will resist the amendment, but I hope that its wording and, more importantly, the spirit behind it, form a template for further discussions and proposals coming from the UK and Scottish Governments.
(8 years, 6 months ago)
Lords ChamberI absolutely understand what the noble Lord is saying. That is why we have sought a deal that is fair to Scotland and to the rest of the UK.
My Lords, I compliment my noble friend on his modesty on leaving out of the Statement the one line in which the Secretary of State for Scotland in another place complimented him on his invaluable contribution to these matters. I welcome the fact that the conclusion of the negotiations has been reached, at least to the extent that it now enables the legislation to pass into law once it has finished its progress through this House and, at long last, bring the Scottish Government to a degree of accountability for their actions before the Scottish people. My noble friend referred to the review to take place in five years’ time. Can he confirm that when that review is produced by this independent body, it will be implemented without any further interruption or interference by either the Scottish Government or the UK Government?
Once the review is complete, it will be for the two Governments to reach an agreement. However, I need to say to my noble friend that this is a very significant act of devolution. In future, more than 50% of the Scottish budget will be financed from taxes that are raised in Scotland, and that is a major development.
(8 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, a number of points have been raised on this group of amendments. Amendment 43 refers to “may” and “must”. When I was a young, dynamic junior Minister in the Scottish Office, I once tried to change “may” to “must” in a Bill that we were bringing before Parliament. I was told by my officials that: “In effect, Minister, ‘may’ means ‘must’”. This was, of course, in the premiership of my late lamented friend Baroness Thatcher. I rather like the triangulation, offered by the noble Lord, Lord Gordon of Strathblane, that “shall” is probably better than either of them. No doubt the Minister will have an answer to that point.
I support the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on Amendments 45 and 47 and echo what has been said by my noble friends Lord Dundee and Lord Sanderson. This is an important issue because centralisation—to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, drew attention—is a very alarming trend that is taking place in Scotland. We see it threatening the universities. I had a hand in the universities when I was Secretary of State: I created their separate funding council in Scotland and took part in expanding university activities. To see anyone intervening in the independence of the universities worries me greatly.
One can see it in the police, too. Again, I made changes to the police force when I was Secretary of State but I resisted any suggestion of centralising, which I thought was a seriously wrong step. I would have liked to have privatised Scottish Water, but I was able to set up three separate corporations. Once they had created a record of performance, they would have been able to follow the English ones—already in the form of corporations—into private ownership. Sadly, I was no longer in power, and nor was my successor, my noble friend Lord Forsyth, when that point was reached.
There has been a trend, not just confined to the present Government but over time, for the devolved Parliament not to devolve further: not to decentralise but to centralise. That is why I feel strongly that we do need, as the noble Earl suggested, a separate Scottish Crown Estate commission. Indeed, I had rather assumed that that would be forthcoming. I regret to say that I do not have the Smith commission report with me now and I cannot quote the wording, but I was under the impression that the noble Lord, Lord Smith, anticipated some form of further decentralisation affecting this organisation. I do not believe that he thought that it should pass into the maw of the Scottish Government, for them to despoil or develop as they think fit. It has been immensely successful over the years and it deserves to be maintained, as my noble friend Lord Sanderson said. It should, of course, be accountable to the Scottish Parliament and its Ministers, just as happens in the United Kingdom with the Crown Estate.
On Fort Kinnaird, I echo what my noble friend Lord Sanderson said. This is a separate venture, not a wholly-owned part of the Crown Estate Commission. To intervene in a joint venture with an outside commercial body, which is maturing well and is part of a good, well-established relationship with that body, would jeopardise the interests of both the outside partner and the estate commission itself. Therefore it was and remains right not to interfere with the arrangement but to allow it to continue. To force some kind of disposal might jeopardise the venture itself and the Scottish Crown Estate commission to some extent. That cannot be in the interests of anyone involved in this debate. So I support what the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, said and I hope that the Minister will respond favourably.
Just as a footnote to the point that noble Lords have made about Fort Kinnaird, one can see from the Crown Estate commissioners website the structure of the venture that has been described. The Crown Estate commissioners themselves have,
“a 50 per cent interest in an English Limited Partnership which owns Fort Kinnaird Retail Park in Edinburgh”.
The venture is a partnership. The ownership and presumably the management of Fort Kinnaird are in the hands of the partnership and I take it that the commissioners draw a revenue out of that arrangement.
That takes one to the essence of the role of the commissioners, as described on their own website, which is one of management of the resources in order, as they put it,
“to deliver the best value over the long term”.
Of course, the interest for the UK Government at present is in the revenue. The commissioners make it clear that their function is to pay all the “annual revenue profit” to the Government. I would have thought it absolutely crucial to maintain that position, that in so far as the assets are concerned, they are managed in the broad interest of maintaining the assets for the best value. Of course, the revenue would then be transmitted to the Scottish Government, as would be consistent with the present position. That distinction between capital and revenue management and payment is absolutely crucial to the point that various other noble Lords have been making.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I, too, strongly support this amendment. If I have a quarrel with it, it is that I do not think it goes far enough. If I have read the amendment correctly, it focuses simply on the provisions of the Bill when it becomes an Act. The focus on the quality and quantity of co-operation that does or does not exist should go beyond just what this Bill is seeking to achieve; its scope should include all the provisions and measures that have led to the devolved constitution we now have.
For a similar reason I wonder why this amendment seeks just a single report on the level of co-operation that is being achieved. That co-operation is such an important continuing ingredient of a successful devolved constitution that it should not simply be subject to a single one-off review and report.
The perspective that I bring to this precedes the wisdom that the Smith commission added in this area and goes back to the Calman commission, of which I was a member. Noble Lords may remember that the longest chapter in the Calman commission report turned out to be chapter four. We came up with 25 recommendations under just that chapter, which concerned strengthening co-operation. The evidence that we took on the need for co-operation was compelling. The evidence from other countries with stable and successful devolved constitutions was especially compelling. It was quite clear from that evidence that the ability of different Governments and Parliaments to co-operate and work together in a constructive and structured manner is an absolutely fundamental ingredient of a resilient, flexible and successful devolved constitution. There was nothing ambiguous about the evidence that we took.
We also took evidence on the extent to which people in Scotland and interests in Scotland expected there to be constructive co-operation between the Governments and Parliaments of the United Kingdom and Scotland. They expected it to be a norm, not an exception. However, the depressing conclusion that we came to when we reported was that, apart from a few bright spots, good, constructive co-operation between the United Kingdom and Scotland was an exception, not a norm. Therefore, I very much support the direction of travel of this amendment. However, as I said, I would go very much further and widen its scope to include all the measures that comprise the devolved constitution, and I would make it a continuing or regular discipline rather than a one-off one.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Dundee on the very attractive sentiments that he expressed in moving his amendment. I also congratulate my noble friends Lord Kinnoull and Lord Lindsay on their contributions, both of which were extremely attractive. That shows how well the elected Members of this House are performing their duties.
I would like to broaden the subject slightly—as, indeed, did the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, and one or two others—to intergovernmental relations, as it is a very important area. The noble Lord, Lord Smith, was absolutely right to draw attention to it in one of his four points in his preface to the Smith commission report. During the Second Reading debate, I and others made reference to it.
Your Lordships might like to know that the Constitution Committee undertook a report on this subject in 2002. As it happened, my noble friend Lord Norton of Louth and I were both on the committee at that time. We then left the committee and, having rejoined it, we discovered that nothing at all had been done during the intervening 13 years. We have undertaken another report, which we published earlier this year and submitted to the Government.
We have not had a response to that report, and I make no complaint about that because I know that the Government are thinking very deeply about this subject and a lot of back-room work is going on. I hope very much that once the joint ministerial understanding work has been completed, they will feel able to produce the outcome of their deliberations and include with that a response to our report. This is a subject that your Lordships’ House will want to return to, I am quite certain.
I have only one qualification about my noble friend’s amendment, which is that this is probably not the right time or place to move it. On the other hand, if he thinks it will stand freely on its own, entirely separate from the broader subject of intergovernmental relations, he may wish to press it, and that is a matter for him.
(8 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberIn the light of the debate so far, I should like to add something to what I said before. I remind the House that the purpose of legislation is to effect a change in the law—to state the law. Subsection (1) is a statement:
“The Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are a permanent part”.
Whether or not that changes the law, I do not know. Given the arguments about sovereignty, it may state the law at present but it cannot change it a week next Tuesday because, as my friend Sir Gerald Gordon, an expert lawyer in Scotland, said, there is no written constitution in Scotland in the United Kingdom, but it can be written in one sentence, and that is: “There shall be a Parliament at Westminster, and it can do what it likes”. Another version is: “There shall be a House of Commons at Westminster, and it can do what it likes”. Apparently, the Government do not hold to that view because, as the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, has pointed out, it cannot do what it likes and must do what the Smith commission has decided it will have to do.
The point I want to make is the important one that subsection (1) makes a statement, although I do not know its legal effect at all. But when we look at subsection (2), where I want to add the word “only”, it states:
“The purpose”—
which probably means the only purpose—
“of this section is … to signify the commitment of the”,
UK Parliament et cetera to something or other. In other words, if you interpret subsection (1) by looking at subsection (2), which you have to do, of course, you find that its only purpose—or “the” purpose—is simply to make a statement of fact. I do not see how these things change the law.
The noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, made remarks about the parliamentary draftsmen. They have my deep sympathy because they were given an appalling job to do, given the terms of the report and the whole background to it, including matters discussed at Second Reading. If this is the best they can do, maybe we can try to do better, but we are writing on water here.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak on these amendments because I thought that I would prefer to speak on Clause 1 stand part. However, it might save time if I speak now, not least because the debate has already ranged very widely over a number of more general points.
I also wanted to speak at an early stage to thank those noble Lords—in particular my noble friends Lord Norton of Louth and Lord Forsyth, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead—who made polite reference to the report of the Constitution Committee. My noble friend Lord Forsyth’s excellent speech in particular, in which he managed, in that wonderful tone of slightly supressed indignation, to quote from the report, reminded me just how strongly the committee felt about it when it prepared that report. Committees tend to present reports in fairly moderated terms, but these are very serious issues. Indeed, we were in a pretty bad mood to start with because we had already produced a report on the draft clauses, which came out some time before this Bill appeared, in which we drew the attention of the Government to some seven major points of constitutional principle that we thought should be replied to. The reply we eventually received was just more than two lines long. We had to express pretty considerable indignation at that.
While I am on the same theme, it is also a matter of regret to us that the Government have not yet been able to reply to our latest report, which we particularly hoped to have had ahead of the start of this Committee. I hope that that response will appear very soon.
In our report, we criticised very strongly the progeny of the Bill and the fact that the Government had committed to accept the Smith commission’s terms. I will not dwell on that point any longer; it has been very well covered by other noble Lords. We also placed strong emphasis on the importance of the position of the United Kingdom and, with all this demand-led devolution that has been going on, of stabilising and securing the sovereignty of the United Kingdom for the future. I am glad to say that another instalment of our work is on its way to your Lordships in due course on the union and devolution, which will cover that theme and, I hope, carry it forward.
Reverting to this debate, the clause we are looking at and the amendments to it are about sovereignty, which is a clear, absolute and easy-to-identify concept. All the amendments are about protecting it from potential inroads that arise from all the changes made in the other place that depart from the simple request made by the Smith commission. It is a declaratory clause. As my noble friend Lord Norton pointed out at Second Reading, by making a declaratory clause the core of a new parliamentary Bill it has been drawn up in the face of the Government’s own guidance on drafting legislation, which deplores such treatment.
Not only is it unwise, but it also compromises the subject by adding specific changes that were not requested by Smith. They are changes that weaken the principle of sovereignty, in particular the requirement under subsection (3) that there should be no abolition of the Scottish Parliament without a referendum for the Scottish people. Smith did not request that. That is not declaratory; it has specific substance. How does it protect the sovereignty of the United Kingdom?
I also ask my noble friend the Minister: why do the Government think that the Scottish National Party wanted that amendment to the Bill? It does not believe in permanence; it wants impermanence. It wants to undermine sovereignty and provoke the United Kingdom Parliament. Ultimately, it wants to break up the United Kingdom. Every extra concession granted makes that more possible.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred to political reality. Yes, no one believes that the Scottish Parliament will be abolished and no one wants it to be abolished—you cannot put the smoke back in the bottle—but why compromise the position with qualifications of this kind in this important Bill? The Scottish National Party talks a lot about the sovereignty of the people—what one might call the “Braveheart philosophy”—but we have to wonder whether the clause makes the issue justiciable. Might some Scottish judge at some future date rule that the combination of permanence and a Scottish referendum in a statute overpowers the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament? I do not know the answer to that, but I know that at Second Reading a number of my noble and learned friends identified this area as one that needed close attention.
The noble Lord has talked much about the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, as have other noble Lords. In a very recent lecture the right honourable gentleman the former Attorney-General Mr Dominic Grieve said about that:
“Today, at least in theory, this means that any government with a parliamentary majority could pass a Bill requiring us to collectively worship the moon every other Tuesday. Provided the Queen were minded to give royal assent to it … then that would be the law of the land and we could be punished for not complying”.
Is he really happy that the sovereignty of Parliament, which he asserts so vigorously and to which he is so wedded, could lead to the kind of outcome that the right honourable gentleman Mr Dominic Grieve said could happen?
As I do not know the context and full detail of what my right honourable friend the former Attorney-General said, I can hardly answer the noble and learned Lord. But I hope that sovereignty can be reconciled with common sense and realism. Certainly that would be my objective.
There is a threat to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom which is potentially raised by the wording of these clauses, and the intrusion of new elements into them which cloud out the specific issues of principle. If a court in Scotland did overrule the power of the United Kingdom and managed to pass a judgment that said that the United Kingdom Parliament was overruled by the view of the Scottish Parliament, it would not be devolution but separation. We must not plant the seeds for such a development in this legislation.
Does the noble Lord not agree that there is now considerable case law in Scotland which has looked at the competences of the Scottish Parliament and the reach of legislation from this place? So under the existing arrangements, it is perfectly in order for UK legislation to be challenged on the extent of its interaction with devolved legislation. We currently have that practice and it does not seem to have undermined our constitution irrevocably.
That does not surprise me, because I have always taken the view that, ever since we embarked—for all kinds of reasons I will not go into in this debate—on an ill-conceived and unbalanced form of devolution, we were on the slippery slope and sliding towards separation and independence unless we were very careful. As I have said many times, this Bill carries us one step nearer to that.
In his wind-up speech at Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Dunlop said:
“The sovereignty of Parliament remains”.—[Official Report, 24/11/15; col. 667.]
That is a commendable, clear, concise statement. We also know, and have reminded ourselves today, that no Parliament can bind its successor. But my noble friend also said of this clause that it puts the permanence of the Scottish Parliament and Scottish Government, “beyond all doubt”. In conceding the referendum point on Report in the other place, the Secretary of State for Scotland said that it makes clear,
“beyond question that the Scottish Parliament and the Scottish Government are permanent institutions”.—[Official Report, Commons, 9/11/15; col. 57.]
By putting things beyond doubt, he raises doubts in all of us. The Government’s arguments are in deadlock: they hit each other head-on. That is why, at Second Reading and now, so many noble Lords have tabled amendments and why the House badly needs reassurance. I very much hope that the Minister will be able to give it to us when he winds up the debate.
My Lords, I am one of the few non-lawyers who are even putting their foot into this particular hole. I stand to be corrected by the Front Bench, but Clause 2, which has been referred to, makes perfect sense if the United Kingdom Parliament remains sovereign and can legally legislate on anything, including devolved matters. But that would contradict Clause 1 if the purpose of that clause is to entrench all provisions that are unalterable. I want our Front Bench to answer that question.
I am most grateful to the right reverend Prelate, but the vow is something that was dreamed up, as I said at Second Reading, by the editor of a tabloid newspaper, the Daily Record. The party leaders, some of whom are no longer with us as party leaders, who signed up to it were unaware that it would be presented on the front page of that newspaper as a vow. It is the old story. When you complain to an editor about a newspaper story, they always say, “I am terribly sorry. It was the subeditors who wrote the headlines and they did not really read the text”. In this case, that is the status of the vow. I hesitate to intrude on the right reverend Prelate’s territory, but I certainly would not confuse it with the marriage vows, which, in my own case, I took as being absolutely permanent and for life. My worry about the Bill is that this marriage of the United Kingdom is being turned into a system where we appear to be living apart from each other, in houses next door to each other with different regimes operating in those houses, but that is for another day. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise briefly to support my noble friend Lord Forsyth, who is absolutely right. The fact that the Government had the wording as per his amendment in the original Bill represents what must have been their best thought, after careful preparation, on what should be in the Bill. They have succumbed unnecessarily to pressure in another place and now we are faced, as in a number of other areas in the Bill, with what they must consider second best. I do not think that is good enough for an important Bill of this type, and I urge my noble and learned friend to accept the amendment.
My Lords, this is an interesting amendment. I wonder by whom the recognition is supposed to be given. “Recognised as” requires that someone does the recognising; who is it? This is a much better clause as it stands than it was originally. The process of improvement in Parliament has in fact worked in this case by missing out a nonsensical requirement and replacing it with one that is reasonably clear.
So far as I am concerned, the purpose of a clause of this kind is to declare the situation as it is and as it will be for this Parliament and for any subsequent Parliament that does not decide to repeal it. As we know, the Act of Union was supposed to be for ever, but we are all mortal, and Members of Parliament, in particular, are mortal. It may well be that a later Parliament has a different idea. The sovereignty of this Parliament is perfectly clear, but that does not mean that it binds a subsequent Parliament, and therefore there could be a change in a subsequent Parliament.
That brings me to a matter that was referred to about the referendum. The point that is made in the clause is that the Parliament is to be permanent, and therefore there is no question of a referendum until someone decides that there should be a question about that permanence. It is quite inappropriate to include detailed provisions about what would happen in the event of a decision that perhaps the Parliament was not permanent after all in the shape of a referendum. That is a matter which, at the very least, would have to be looked at in some detail, just as recently we have been looking in great detail at the referendum Bill about moving out of the European Union. If a Bill was required to alter the status of the Scottish Parliament, I feel certain that it would need some pretty careful consideration. That probably will not occur in my lifetime or, I suspect, in the lifetimes of most noble Lords who are present, except possibly the very young.
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. There are really two points. First, Clause 2 as worded uses “normally”; secondly, it does not set out in full the way that the convention is applied in practice. These points were made very effectively by the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, a moment ago in moving Amendment 11, which is read together with Amendments 15 and 16. There are two points which needed to be added to Clause 2, one being to alter the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament and the other being to alter the executive competence of the Scottish Government. These matters are in practice the subject of a consent resolution or a Sewel convention Motion and should be referred to expressly in the clause to cover the reach of the convention. That is the point which the committee of the noble Lord, Lord Lang, was talking about.
I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for his comments about the word “normally”. It is not a word that alarmed me particularly, as a non-lawyer, but the clause as a whole certainly alarmed and concerned the Constitution Committee. I shall say something about that in a moment but “normally” in its location there seemed to strike the balance between permitting the Scottish Parliament to legislate on devolved matters without intervention from the United Kingdom Government while, at the same time, giving the Government of the United Kingdom the clear right and entitlement in special circumstances to intervene. I will be interested to hear what my noble and learned friend at the Dispatch Box will have to say about it.
My own Amendment 13 simply seeks to strengthen new subsection (8) of Section 28 of the 1998 Act by reasserting the supremacy of the United Kingdom Parliament to reinforce the terms of subsection (7), which subsection (8) might otherwise seem to contradict. Having heard the treatment given by the Front Bench to my noble friend Lord Forsyth’s amendments, I suspect that I may not be on an ideal wicket. But I want to say a word or two about this clause because the Sewel convention is a dangerous situation in which to legislate.
The Sewel convention is as slippery as a fish. It has changed throughout the years since it came into being quite considerably and may yet change again. When I was first asked about it, I was told informally by my late lamented noble friend Lord MacKay of Ardbrecknish, who was at that time our Front-Bench spokesman on the Bill, that it was really just a courtesy to the Scottish Parliament for the United Kingdom Parliament to offer to legislate on its behalf, if it was an issue devolved to it on which it would plan to legislate. It would thus save time, expense and duplication. I do not think it was ever quite thus but that was the flavour of how I first understood it. It has now turned into something quite different and I see it as a weapon that seems to allow the Scottish Parliament to intrude into United Kingdom legislation to an unsafe extent, possibly even to the extent of a veto.
What is clear is that the Sewel convention is still so fluid and unsettled as not to deserve the name of convention. I do not think, in its present form, it is fit to be converted into law. It may be that those who have drafted the Bill have found, in the form of words they have used, a more stable and secure base for the long term, but the convention has changed a lot over the years and may again. Initially, the United Kingdom Government seemed to maintain that it applied only to powers already devolved or to restricting or diminishing such a power. That was certainly the original intention as I understood it, but in 2005, Devolution Guidance Note 10 was published, which suggested:
“The convention applies when legislation makes provisions specifically for a devolved purpose”.
I see that as something much broader.
Since then, the Scottish Parliament has claimed it applies to devolved areas rather than devolved matters, so that it also applies to legislation increasing devolved powers, which the UK Government seem at times to have accepted. The Scotland Act 2012 bore this out, as it was almost entirely an empowering measure and was taken to require legislative consent Motions. Astonishingly to me, the Labour Opposition supported an SNP amendment in the Commons and tried to enshrine devolved areas into the legislation. That could have given the Scottish Government a veto on UK legislation, which is what prompted my question to my noble friend on the Front Bench at Second Reading. This one-way degeneration of the original purpose of the convention is potentially damaging to the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament, and we have to exercise great care in handling this.
The Smith commission asked only that it be put on a statutory footing. Even if we can be confident of a clear, unambiguous wording, the potential troubles do not end there. My noble and learned friend Lord Hope indicated at Second Reading, as he will recall, that it could become challengeable in the courts. My noble friend Lord Norton had serious concerns also, pointing out:
“Clause 2 does not transpose the Sewel convention into statute. It simply states the convention”.—[Official Report, 24/11/15; col. 639.]
I am completely out of my depth in reacting to that and I look forward to his speech a little later in the debate.
My amendment echoes the concerns of others to counter the uncertainties generated by the present wording of the clause. We have all felt the need to reiterate, in every possible way, the need to reassert the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Parliament. My amendment is the simplest and shortest—it may not be the best but at least it has a different wording from that rejected by my noble friend on the Front Bench. We must have a wording that is clear and unambiguous and able to withstand challenge in the courts, where I suspect it will probably end up.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to the two amendments in my name, Amendments 14 and 18. I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, the noble Lord, Lord Stephen, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord McCluskey, for adding their names to Amendment 14.
I think we are all aiming for the same thing: clarity and the removal of ambiguity. The one thing that struck me when I was looking at the Bill for the first time was the use of the word “normally”. It is not a very good legal word; indeed it is a word that could, as those who know far more about the law than I do have said repeatedly, be challenged in the courts. In these two amendments, I have sought to remove that word entirely and to give, in Amendment 18, a specific exception. I do not suggest that this is the only answer or necessarily the best one. I listened carefully to what my noble friend Lord Lang said a moment or two ago, but I would delete “normally” and insert at the end,
“save in times of war or national emergency”.
It is accepted in the Bill that there could be occasions when the United Kingdom Parliament, which has absolute sovereignty, would need to override the Scottish Parliament. None of us wants that to happen—and certainly not often—but if we recognise that that can or could happen, we have to be a little clearer with our definitions. I believe that by removing “normally” and inserting a couple of specifics, we are moving in the right direction. It is in that spirit that I commend these amendments to your Lordships’ House.
(8 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a particular pleasure to follow the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, and to echo his tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Campbell of Pittenweem, who gave us a most interesting and elegant speech and whose presence in this House will enhance it considerably, not least because of his great distinction in the field of defence—knowledge of which will be quite welcome in the weeks and months ahead.
We must pass the Bill. That is not in doubt. Promises were made, agreement was reached between the parties, and approve it in due course we certainly must. But it must also be pointed out that, for the leaders of all the major parties in Westminster to agree in advance to pass into law whatever the Smith commission came up with—to do it in full and at once—is indeed, mercifully, a unique constitutional experience. No constitution committee could fail to protest at such an abandonment of due constitutional process, or to identify, as our report did, its dangers and possible shortcomings. Nor can the House fail in its duty as a revising Chamber to scrutinise the Bill thoroughly.
I make no criticism at all of the Smith commission or its chairman. Indeed, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Kelvin, on reaching an orderly conclusion. He presided with great skill. He showed perceptive and sensitive guidance that contributed much to the process. His comments in the foreword of the agreement are indeed valuable, in particular his reference to further devolution in Scotland and to improvement in intergovernmental relations—a subject on which the Constitution Committee has already reported, to which we await the Government’s response. I also pay tribute to the productive contribution to the Smith commission of my noble friend Lady Goldie, whom I am sure helped to contain some of the wilder aims of others.
Nor do I blame for the problems we now face my noble friend the Minister, who has the misfortune to be the last in line in the legislative process, with a difficult job to do and a lot of troubles piled up. But the bigger picture is not just about this Bill. We now have the third Scotland Bill in just 17 years—a box set of enduring settlements, each one seeking to regain lost ground. We all saw how the nationalists signed up to the agreement and then resiled from it the very next day, trying to use it as a stepping-stone. To them, it was simply ground gained.
The Bill has one really important aim: it will at last force the Scottish Government to face up to the responsibility for raising much of the revenue in Scotland and thus be held accountable to their electorate. That alone is a good reason for the Bill passing in due course, but that does not excuse it from scrutiny. I trust that your Lordships will indulge me for a little longer than the advisory speaking time so that I can draw attention to some of the most significant concerns our Constitution Committee has expressed. In the interests of time, I will leave to others the vital issue surrounding the fiscal framework. I will not endeavour to explain the double jeopardy point—what was it called?
The double detriment point. To do so would be to the detriment of my speech.
A similar problem attaches to the shared powers over welfare, whereby the House cannot assess how the vital intergovernmental relations will operate without the revised memorandum of understanding and joint ministerial committee structure now still being negotiated. Our report has therefore suggested that, as with the Economic Affairs Committee’s concern about the lack of a fiscal framework, a delay in the progress of the Bill may be necessary to allow for proper scrutiny of the welfare provisions.
I agree with my noble friend the Minister about the desirability of calming things down, but I hope that in his winding-up speech he can reassure me and the Constitution Committee on a number of points. Clause 1, on enshrining the permanence of the Scottish Parliament, seems simple, straightforward and declaratory, but it could have profound constitutional significance. The Government now appear to seek to compromise the United Kingdom Parliament’s competence with regard to the devolved institutions, first by stating their permanence in statute and secondly by creating conditions involving a referendum that have to be met before the UK Parliament could move to abolish them.
It is of course completely implausible to suggest that such a course would ever be contemplated, but the concept of parliamentary sovereignty is a fundamental principle of the United Kingdom’s constitution and it has long been understood that no Government can bind their successors. In seeking to limit Parliament’s powers in this manner, the Government are introducing confusion and uncertainty about the nature of parliamentary sovereignty where once there was none.
Clause 2 compounds this concern. By giving the Sewel convention a statutory basis, the Bill opens the door to judicial intervention on the right of Parliament to legislate. It risks creating a route through which the courts might be drawn—inappropriately but perhaps inescapably—into an area hitherto within the jurisdiction of Parliament alone: its competence to make law. That is serious enough, but it seems to me that the original meaning and purpose of that convention may have already mutated, with no debate or authority from Parliament, into something much more far-reaching, which could breach the whole principle of devolution: that power devolved is power retained. Even the word “normally” in the clause raises clouds of uncertainty and the prospect of judicial involvement.
Our committee believes that it is now vital that the Government clarify the purpose and reach of the Sewel convention as stated in Clause 2. Can my noble friend confirm that the guidance note GGN2, issued in 2005, to which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, referred, did not change the purpose of the convention in any material way? In addition, the combined impact of Clauses 1 and 2 could be dangerous and no thought seems to have been given to this. These two clauses might not be just declaratory and, taken together, could have far-reaching consequences. Will my noble friend also confirm that in the final analysis, no devolved Parliament or Assembly is entitled to veto legislation passed by the sovereign United Kingdom Parliament?
The noble Lord is raising an important point. Does he agree that, as we now have a system under Standing Orders whereby legislation passed by both Houses can be vetoed by a subset of the House of Commons—namely, English MPs—the Government have already sold the pass on the sovereignty of Parliament?
The noble and learned Lord identifies precisely the kind of confusion and obfuscation which endangers the sovereign nature of this United Kingdom Parliament. It is a very important area and I hope we are able to pursue it further.
The Bill also has significant implications for England. Considerably fewer issues will now be reserved, and the West Lothian question will consequently intensify. By increasing the scope of matters devolved to the Scottish Parliament, the number of issues to which the new English votes for English laws procedures will apply will increase. This will add to the complexity of establishing whether new legislation deals solely with devolved matters. I do not believe enough consideration has been given to that, and further confusion will flow from matters that are shared between the two Parliaments.
Our report commented on several other matters of concern, but the recurring theme was that no serious consideration seems to have been given to the implications of the Bill for the union as a whole. We need to articulate a coherent vision for the future shape and structure of the union if the ongoing process of reactive, ad hoc devolution, demand-led and indiscriminately granted, is to be stabilised. No major constitutional measure that does not take account of its implications for the United Kingdom as a whole can possibly claim the right to provide for an enduring settlement. It is that wider challenge of stabilising the union, and rationalising devolution within it, that your Lordships’ Constitution Committee is engaged with in our current inquiry.
(9 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberI am sure that noble Lords in this House and others outside it will come forward with proposals. The Government will engage with those proposals and will be happy to discuss them.
My Lords, if we are taking turns, it is actually the turn of the Conservative Benches, and the noble Lord, Lord Lang, is the chairman of the Constitution Committee.
My Lords, reflecting on the fact that the unbalanced form in which the Scottish Parliament was created was in fact the product of the deliberations of a constitutional convention, I welcome my noble friend’s caution on these matters. They may sound simple and easy to set up, but they may create many more difficulties along the line. However, I urge him to reflect on the importance of consultation: this should be carried out during a reflective period of calm when the House is not subject to a constant flow of devolutionary measures that have not been properly considered and have to be rushed through this House. A period of calm reflection is surely the best way forward.
I can only agree with my noble friend that consultation is a key element in any proposals that come forward. Since January, when we tabled the draft clauses for the Scotland Bill, we have been consulting and we will continue to do so.
(9 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the noble Lord may well be right that the SNP Government will seek to continue to blame the United Kingdom Government, but the people of Scotland would certainly blame the UK Government more if we landed them with a £10 billion funding gap, costing every family in Scotland £5,000 in higher taxes or spending cuts. That would be the price of full fiscal autonomy. The Government cannot support such a plan because we do not believe that it would be good for Scotland. We want a balanced settlement fair to all parts of the UK and our priority is to deliver the Scotland Bill, which will make Holyrood one of the most powerful and accountable devolved Parliaments in the world.
My Lords, I congratulate my noble friend on the way in which he managed to imply fairness to a block grant calculation system that bears no relation to, or has any connection with, any needs assessment relating to the other parts of the United Kingdom. Can he tell the House how he expects the no-detriment principle enshrined in the new Scotland Bill to apply in a way that does not inhibit the viability of individual parts of the United Kingdom from pursuing policies and expenditure that depart from the UK norm?
I thank my noble friend for that question. The simple overarching principle is that neither Scotland nor the rest of the United Kingdom should gain or lose financially as a direct consequence of implementing the Smith agreement. There are two aspects to this. First, at the point of devolution, the tax and spending block grant adjustments made to reflect the transfer of powers should of themselves leave funding for Scotland and the rest of the UK unchanged. Secondly, post devolution, both the UK Government and the Scottish Government should bear the risks and reap the rewards of their own policy choices. That will strengthen fiscal responsibility and accountability. How these principles work in practice must be discussed and agreed by the UK Government and the Scottish Government, but the fact that the principles are agreed by all five of Scotland’s political parties is a helpful starting point.