Defence Reform

Debate between Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton and Kevan Jones

Tuesday 26th June 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mr Jones]

Let me read what the NAO report says—for the third time:

“The size of the gap is highly sensitive to the budget growth assumptions used. If the Defence budget remained constant in real terms, and using the Department’s forecast for defence inflation of 2.7 per cent, the gap would now be £6 billion.”

The figure of £36 billion is reached only if flat cash over 10 years is included. Ministers said that the £38 billion figure is over 10 years—that is not the impression they have been giving to the media, the armed forces and the public. Instead, they have been suggesting that we somehow have to lay our hands instantly on £38 billion. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East said, the idea that that figure can be wiped out in two years is an accounting fantasy.

[Mark Lancaster (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

Listening to this debate, the one thing that is clear and that the hon. Gentleman accepts is that there is a gap, be it £6 billion or £38 billion. Given that there is a gap, why did the last Government not balance the budget?

[Mr Jones]

We were on line in that regard. One of the jobs that my right hon. Friend the Member for Coventry North East gave me when he was Secretary of State—it was something of a poisoned chalice—was to draw up some reductions. Just before the general election, I had already identified some £1.2 billion of savings, but some of that involved investing money in order to save it. The problem at the moment is that the Treasury want instant cash out of the budget, and the only way to do that is to slash personnel and equipment straight away. The more sensible approach that we were going to implement was a planned phase of three to five years, involving some investment and some reductions. That is in stark contrast to the Government’s approach. What is driving this process is not defence strategy but the desire of this Government and the Treasury to take 8% out of the budget in years one and two. That has led to the short-termism we are seeing now.

Armed Forces Bill

Debate between Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton and Kevan Jones

Monday 10th January 2011 Commons Chamber

[Mark Lancaster]

I would have to consider that matter in detail. I suggest to the hon. Gentleman that perhaps he should volunteer to sit on the Committee—I certainly will do so—and we can then explore the issue in greater detail. That is probably a sensible way forward, and it will be interesting to see whether he volunteers to do that.

Clause 2 deals with the military covenant and that matter has already been mentioned in the debate. The Royal British Legion—I am proud to be vice-president of the Olney branch—has raised concerns, and the Secretary of State has promised to consider them and, indeed, deal with them. It is perfectly reasonable to expect the role of the external reference group to continue in some form or another. That is something else I expect we can explore in Committee.

We have talked mainly about the three principal areas of health care, education and housing. In the previous Parliament, I was proud to serve on the Select Committee on Defence under the chairmanship of my right hon. Friend the Member for North East Hampshire (Mr Arbuthnot), when we looked at the issue of the education of service families. I am delighted that the Government have introduced some of our recommendations and we should continue to consider that matter. I am pleased that an annual report will be presented to Parliament. [Interruption.] When I referred to the Government, the former Veterans Minister, the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), said from a sedentary position that it was the previous Government. I am actually being apolitical and mean the government of the land.

There has been some concern that perhaps the Government’s commitment to the military covenant does not go far enough and that the relationship between the armed forces and the Government should be enshrined in black and white. My personal feeling is that it is not important what is in black and white for the lawyers to argue over; what is important is how the covenant has been interpreted by successive Governments. I shall give one example. After the introduction of joint personnel administration—the new payment computer system in the Army—there has been a problem with some junior ranks in the British Army being effectively overpaid for a number of months. That has amounted to a sizeable sum for some individuals. I do not think any fair-minded person would suggest that that money should not be paid back; it is an overpayment and we would all expect to pay it back. However, the true test of the covenant is how the money is paid back. It should not have to be paid back in a single lump sum in one pay cheque; those concerned should be allowed to pay the money back over time. That is just one example of how the application of the covenant, and not what appears in black and white, is important.

To be honest, soldiers are quite cynical about government. They feel that any covenant would always be interpreted in the Government’s favour. I hope that the Opposition will take that point in the spirit it is intended because it is simply an objective statement of fact.

[Mr Kevan Jones (North Durham) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman therefore agree that what is being put forward today is rather disappointing, especially in the light of the Green Paper that I produced in 2009, which set out not only what we had done in terms of the Command Paper, but how we could make what it referred to legally enforceable? Does he share my disappointment that the work and the response to that have not been brought forward in the Bill, so that the things put in place in the armed forces Command Paper would be legally enforceable?

[Mark Lancaster]

I do not, because the real test will be in the implementation. I have confidence that the Government will implement and uphold their end of the bargain, so I am afraid that I cannot agree with the hon. Gentleman. However, the proof of the pudding will be in the eating and only time will tell. Perhaps we can consider the matter again in one of our annual debates on the military covenant.

I was going to give one example of where soldiers are perhaps right to be slightly cynical. I fully supported the previous Government’s introduction of the operational allowance in October 2006. That was a good move, and it introduced a tax-free allowance of £2,240. However, it is worth remembering—I wish to make it clear that I think that this was more by cock-up than conspiracy—that at the same time the Government also cut the long-service separation allowance, meaning that a soldier on a six-month tour in Afghanistan lost £2,341. The Government gave with one hand and took away with the other, within the space of a month. When such moves happen, one can see why any soldier is entitled to be cynical of any Government. It is therefore very important that we see, over time, how the military covenant is improved.

As I said from the Opposition Benches shortly after I got back from my operational tour in Afghanistan, there has been a major improvement in personal kit over the past few years. I felt that when I was mobilised in 2006, the standard of personal kit that I was given then was far better than the kit I was given when I was mobilised in 1999 or 2001—so, once again, credit to the previous Government for that improvement, which I should like to continue under this Government in future years.

My other general point about the military covenant concerns rest and recuperation. I had personal experience of the problems of R and R on coming back from Afghanistan in 2006. Although I do not want to go into the details of the matter again—it was the subject of debate in this House for some time—I would like some reassurance from the Minister that the problems with the air bridge have been addressed. Clearly, we will always have trouble when we have to rely on airframes that are very old, but I have heard reports that unfortunately the problems experienced in 2006 are beginning to happen again. There have been calls for us to guarantee the two-week R and R period for soldiers in the middle of an operational tour. I do not support that for simple operational reasons. If a soldier were to lose a day at the beginning of his leave, a guarantee that he could come back from it a day later would make the whole manning plot for the commanding officer in theatre almost impossible. However, I would support a guarantee that if any R and R days are lost during an operational tour, they should be added to the post-tour leave. That is perfectly reasonable.

I was slightly disappointed that neither Front Bencher chose to mention the reserve forces. That is an oversight that I should like to correct, especially given that some 15% of soldiers mobilised on operations are from the reserve forces. Members of the reserve forces face some very specific problems when they are mobilised. Any mobilisation process starts at the reserves training and mobilisation centre in Chilwell. If I am lucky enough to be selected to serve on the Bill Committee, I would like to suggest that we visit that facility, which plays a very valuable role. Having been through it on three occasions, I must say that the standard of service that it provides in preparing reservists for mobilisation has improved significantly over recent years.

However, there can be major problems when a reservist returns home. Because, in general, they are mobilised as individual replacements, they lack the support that a regular soldier, sailor or airman has in coming back with a formed unit. I can give an example of a very unfortunate case from my own unit when a colour sergeant came back from mobilised service in Afghanistan. Because we are a specialist unit that does not meet for drill nights, there is no regular contact every Tuesday night where we can monitor colleagues who have recently returned, and we did not see much of him until one weekend when he was clearly not well. The effects of service in Afghanistan had clearly had a significant impact on him. I regret to say that that ended up with an incident in which he attempted to shoot a colleague with a weapon that he had brought back from Afghanistan, and he is now in prison. It was an awful incident. One wonders whether the same thing would have happened had that individual been serving with a regular unit and received the same levels of support that a regular soldier would have had.