British Indian Ocean Territory

Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton Excerpts

Tuesday 8th October 2024 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton]

To ask His Majesty’s Government what assessment they have made of the implications for the United Kingdom’s strategic relationship with the United States of America of the decision to cede sovereignty of the British Indian Ocean Territory to Mauritius.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (Baroness Chapman of Darlington) (Lab)]

My Lords, on 3 October, the UK and Mauritius reached an historic political agreement that will ensure the operational effectiveness of the joint US-UK military base on Diego Garcia well into the next century. Throughout the negotiations we have worked in lockstep with the US, and this agreement is strongly supported by the US. President Biden issued a statement applauding it within minutes of its announcement. Secretary Austin and Secretary Blinken have also voiced clear public support.

[Lord Lancaster of Kimbolton (Con)]

My Lords, I did not fully appreciate the strategic value of Diego Garcia until I visited it in 2019 in my capacity as Minister for the Armed Forces. Yesterday, the Foreign Secretary said that there would be “robust security arrangements” to prevent other nations occupying the outer islands. Of course, the best way to do this would be to maintain sovereignty. Short of this, are we simply relying on other nations to follow the international rules-based order? We need look only at what the Chinese have done on the disputed Spratly Islands to realise that this would be naive. I simply ask: what is the rush? My understanding is that we are in such a rush that no Minister has even had the opportunity to go to Diego Garcia. Can the Minister confirm that that is not the case?

[Baroness Chapman of Darlington (Lab)]

My Lords, the easiest way to put this is that there is no easy time to make this kind of decision. Noble Lords will be aware that the previous Government took part in 11 rounds of negotiation on this issue. The situation was getting to a point where legal rulings had made it clear that the sovereignty of the Chagos Islands belonged to Mauritius. I accept that those legal rulings, to which I can refer Members opposite should they need me to do so, were not legally binding; however, it is clear that they were going in that direction. We found that it would be much better to take this decision from a position of relative strength, rather than wait for a legal ruling that would be legally binding to go against us.