Scotland Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 24th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My Lords, I am not sure what, if anything, was said in the House of Commons about the lack of the fiscal framework when the Bill was being debated there—in fairness, I am sure that it was discussed—but what I have said is that the Government should be seeking to negotiate for the whole of the United Kingdom: there should be fairness all round with regard to this.

Crucially, we should make it very clear that Scotland should bear the full fiscal consequences of its own decisions. There has been some suggestion somewhere that there has been a bit of “cake and eat it”: that somehow or other, if things go wrong, Westminster will top it up. There are those of us who believe that the important rationale for more tax powers is accountability, but that goes out the window unless—for better or worse—the Scottish Parliament accepts responsibility and accountability for the consequences of its decisions.

In conclusion, the important thing that many of us want is to get on and use the powers. From next April, there will be the Scottish rate of income tax. We look forward, once this Bill is implemented, to more than £15 billion-worth of tax powers and £3 billion-worth of welfare.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I am most grateful to the noble and learned Lord for giving way and apologise for having hesitated for a moment; I was just reflecting on what he had said. I strongly agree with him about the Scottish Government accepting responsibility when they have the power to make individual decisions relating to rates of income tax. He said they must be accountable because they have the responsibility, but is that not utterly inconsistent with the idea of the second no-detriment principle which seeks to safeguard them and does it not make a nonsense of the responsibility that they have?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I look forward with interest to what the Government have to say on the second no-detriment principle. If I may say so, one of the shortcomings of the Smith commission report—I am sorry, this will have to take up a bit more time—is that it just gives a heading on page 26 that says:

“No detriment as a result of UK Government or Scottish Government policy decisions post-devolution”.

It then says:

“Where either the UK or the Scottish Governments makes policy decisions that affect the tax receipts or expenditure of the other, the decision-making government will either reimburse the other if there is an additional cost, or receive a transfer from the other if there is a saving. There should be a shared understanding”.

Scotland has powers over the threshold and rates of income tax. As I understood it—no doubt the noble Lord, Lord Smith of Kelvin, will be able to tell us—if for example, as was indicated, the United Kingdom Government were to change the definition of an income tax payer, that could have an impact on Scottish tax rates. I see that as the other detriment that would have to be addressed. It is certainly how I understood it—but more important is how the Government understand it. Thank goodness I do not have to answer for that any longer.

This should actually be an exciting time. The two most exciting elections I fought in Scotland were in 1999 and 2003, when we had got the constitutional settlement and were debating how we would use the powers we had. That made for real political debate. We should be able to use the powers imaginatively. Parties should be able to debate how we set out an agenda for an enterprising Scotland, a more socially just Scotland, a greener Scotland and a fairer Scotland, and how we can benefit all its communities—not just in the central belt but from the islands down to the Borders. This Bill is not an end in itself. It is a means to try and improve the governance of Scotland and the accountability of that governance, give the Scottish people an opportunity to take more decisions into their own hands and build the kind of Scotland we want to see. The Bill has our support.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Tuesday 29th March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

My noble friend Lord Lamont has also been trying to get in. If he wishes to ask a question, I shall deal with it and then press on.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

At Second Reading, my noble and learned friend said that the advantage and the public interest in having a fixed-term Parliament was predictability and continuity, as a Government could then complete their programme over a five-year period. I understand that argument. However, what public good is produced when a Government with a wafer-thin majority lose the confidence of the legislature and then artificially try to create a situation in which a new type of Government with new allies might be formed? Why is that in the public interest? Why have these two devices to try to create a new Government in place of the previous one? I do not see the public interest in completing five years with two different Governments.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

As has been pointed out, what happened in Wales was that, after Mr Alun Michael resigned—he did not actually face a vote of no confidence but there was one on the horizon—a new Government were formed who quite successfully saw out their term of office. The point that I am trying to make is that with fixed-term Parliaments there is that certainty.

Equally, it has been widely recognised that there must be some mechanism that allows an election to take place if it is no longer possible for a Parliament to continue. That is why I do not agree with my noble friend Lord Cormack that these are devices that somehow are to help the Executive; they are devices for where Parliament can no longer function. If these rules had been in place in 1979 and the then Prime Minister, Mr Callaghan, had decided that calling an election was the right thing to do, I rather think that the then leader of the Opposition, Mrs Thatcher, might well have agreed with him and there would have been a two-thirds majority for a dissolution. Alternatively, as happened in 1924, it was possible for one Government to resign and for another to come in and form an Administration.

Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 21st March 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I might be missing something somewhere. The coalition agreement referred to the 55 per cent that the noble and learned Lord has described. At the same time, he gave a plug to my right honourable friend’s book, for which I am sure he is very grateful. However, that is not in the Bill; I am describing what is in the Bill. Of course it is a product of the coalition. It is a coalition Bill that is before your Lordships’ House.

I recall sitting in this House during Questions and listening to many noble Lords on all sides of the House criticise that 55 per cent provision. The noble and learned Lord nods his head in agreement. It was a provision that received considerable criticism. There was a criticism that it meant a vote that could lead to a Dissolution. People asked about votes of no confidence. At the same time, there was the issue of whether there ought to be a higher majority to trigger a Dissolution automatically. The two mechanisms that provide the trigger in the Bill as it stands address the criticisms that were made. I make no apology for saying that the Government listened to the criticisms that were made, tried to take them on board and came forward with what is proposed here. It may be unique to the United Kingdom but it addresses some of the concerns.

We will come later to the issue of no-confidence votes but at present this House and—it is fair to say —other commentators and people in the other place said that there was an important point about the vote of no confidence on a simple majority having a consequence. The Government listened to that. Historically, there have been two possible outcomes. In 1924, when there was a vote of no confidence in Mr Baldwin’s Government, Mr Baldwin resigned and a new Government was formed under Ramsay MacDonald. In 1979, as has often been mentioned in our debates on this Bill, when Mr James Callaghan’s Government lost a vote of no confidence, he then proceeded to seek a Dissolution and an election was held.

When we come to the next part of this clause, that is what we will be discussing. We will no doubt debate what constitutes a no-confidence vote. We seek to reflect what has been the constitutional position of the outcome of a no-confidence vote on a simple majority. Equally, we took the view that there were circumstances in which it would be more appropriate, if there was a consensus that a Parliament should be brought to an end, to have a trigger mechanism that was more than a simple majority, such as a two-thirds majority.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

I apologise for not having been here earlier but I have heard everything since my noble friend Lord Norton spoke. The Minister referred to 1979. Would he describe for the benefit of the Committee how the provisions of this legislation would apply to the conditions of 1979? If there had been a vote of no confidence in Mr Callaghan’s Government under the provisions of this Bill, would he have been able to wait a fortnight, give jobs to the Irish nationalists and re-form his Government, thereby avoiding an election?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

Hypothetically, if he was able to do that, it could have happened. In a Parliament with less than six months to go, it is highly unlikely that that would have happened. There has to be a political reality. It was quite clear that that Government had run their course and there was a general view that an election was needed. Therefore, I think it highly unlikely that a new Government would have been formed, and no new Government having received a vote of confidence within 14 days there would have been a Dissolution. That is one set of circumstances. However, there ought not to be a vote of no confidence if that is not the reason behind the consensus that Parliament needs to come to an end and for there to be a general election. Rather than contrive a vote of no confidence, one should have it as a solution but with the threshold set at such a level that it cannot easily be obtained by a single party for political advantage.

In much of the noble and learned Lord’s speech at Second Reading, his main agony about this Bill was that it would be possible for a Government to abuse the procedure and seek a Dissolution, which would defeat the whole purpose of having fixed-term Parliaments. Therefore, we believe that it is appropriate that the Dissolution should be set at a level which has not been achieved by any governing party since the Second World War. I fully accept that we departed from the 55 per cent figure because that was clearly not going anywhere. It was roundly criticised in this House and, indeed, in other places. As I say, I make no apology for having listened to that criticism, reflected on it and come forward with a proposal which still maintains that there should be a vote which could trigger a Dissolution, but one where the percentage figure is much higher to the extent that it would not be achieved by one party alone. That is why that first trigger mechanism—the subject matter of this amendment—is there. The two-thirds majority that is proposed is the same majority required for a Dissolution vote in the devolved legislatures, as set out in the relevant legislation.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 7th February 2011 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

That is helpful. Originally it was linked and it seems to have been delinked. The amendment would change the obligation to implement the result of the AV referendum into a power to do so.

I thought that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, was suggesting that there had to be primary legislation, although I am not sure whether I heard him correctly. Amendment 10B deals with that, although I should say something about the difficulties there, because there is still a lack of clarity. In addressing these amendments, I never like to lean too heavily on the technical matters, but there are important technical issues here of which the House should be aware.

The new discretion in Amendment 10B, if it were to be carried, seems to apply whatever the circumstances and not just where the referendum is made non-binding by Amendment A1 because turnout is less than 40 per cent. We might, therefore, find ourselves in an odd situation if the turnout exceeded 40 per cent with the majority in favour of AV. One part of the Bill would suggest that the result was binding, but another would suggest that there was no obligation, because there would be a power rather than an obligation to bring forward the order. I am also unclear as to the effect of the amendment in the event that less than 40 per cent of the electorate voted in the poll and the result was against a change in the system. I strongly suspect that this is not the intention but, as it stands now, the provisions mandating the Minister to repeal the relevant clauses would still stand but the result itself would not be binding. I am sure that the noble Lord will have an opportunity to clarify that. There is a difficulty there at the moment.

In addition, the amendment offers no indication of what kind of process might be followed where less than 40 per cent of the electorate voted. Even if Amendment 10B were carried, there would be a heavy responsibility on the Minister and then on Parliament if there had been a yes vote. The Boundary Commission review would be complete but he or she may or may not bring the provisions into force. As we are all aware, the boundary review will not be completed until 2013 at the earliest. Is it really the case that we want to replace the current provisions in the Bill, which provide both clarity and certainty, with provisions that could leave us with no clear resolution for the two years following on from the referendum? I am not saying that that would be the case, but that is the possibility that we open ourselves up to with these amendments. I cannot believe that that lack of clarity would be healthy.

I assume that that is not the intention of the noble Lords who are making these proposals. Perhaps they envisage that the gap in their amendments would be filled by what the noble Lord, Lord Wills—I am not sure whether he is in his place—proposes in his Amendment 10C, which is that there would be a debate in Parliament. His proposal would introduce a statutory requirement for a debate in both Houses within 14 days of the referendum result, although as it stands it would not make the referendum indicative and so would have little practical effect.

Even if the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, provided for this or some other process, I would still find it necessary to oppose them. The Bill provides that the referendum result will be decided by a simple majority. We believe that that is right, because it is the simplest, clearest and fairest way of proceeding. When people make the effort to go to the polls on 5 May, they should know that, if they vote for the alternative vote, that is what they will get. To impose a threshold or to make a referendum indicative would be to offer some sort of consolation prize—people might get it at the very end.

Reference has been made in this debate and in the debates that we had in Committee to the 1978 situation, where, because of George Cunningham’s eloquence and, perhaps, the Opposition seeing an opportunity, a 40 per cent threshold was introduced. The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, said that there was a bitter taste. As one who campaigned in that referendum, I know that that bitter taste lingered for a very long time. To go out and campaign in a referendum and get a majority for the yes vote and then to be told that the majority did not count and did not matter was bitter. In terms of the cynicism of voters, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, there would be a real danger of cynicism if people went out and voted and there was a clear yes vote and somehow or other that yes vote had to be held in suspension or might not be translated into action.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

If that argument is correct, why does it not also apply to general elections and constituency votes, which some noble Lords wish to alter?

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton]

Is it not also right that it was an automatic no when the level was not reached in 1978, which is not what my noble friend Lord Rooker is proposing here?

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There is a difference because the 40 per cent related to something different. I am not entirely sure that I follow what my noble friend Lord Lamont said, because in general elections there is no threshold for what the turnout should be to make those elections valid and no one has ever suggested putting a turnout—

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

The noble Lord is in favour of moving to an electoral system in which a simple majority is not enough. At the same time, he is saying that this referendum ought to be determined by a simple majority.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

There are different types of voting system and there will be later amendments with regard to them. This is a referendum with a straight yes or no. If in a general election there were two candidates, it would be a simple, straight case of whether you were or were not elected. The difficulty arises under our electoral system where there are more than two candidates. That is why there is a difference between a straight yes or no in a referendum, where by definition one side is going to get more than 50 per cent of the votes cast and one side is going to get less than 50 per cent.

I am aware that concerns have been raised here and elsewhere about the turnout. It is clear that we all want to see high levels of turnout. I believe that this will be the case. The fact that the referendum will be combined with other elections on 5 May will help to increase turnout. The campaigns in the run-up to the referendum will increase public awareness. The work of the Electoral Commission in promoting public awareness about the referendum and the media coverage about the referendum will help. In previous referendums, the turnout has generally been above 50 per cent. It was 64 per cent in the 1975 referendum on the European Community, 60.2 per cent in the Scottish devolution referendum and 50.1 per cent in the Wales referendum in 1997.

My noble friend Lord Blackwell expressed some concern about setting a precedent if there are any future EU referendums. It is precisely because of the precedent that we should not start setting thresholds. A procedural barrier such as this can lead us into uncharted waters, because someone might come along with different thresholds for future referendums. Surely it is better to have a single, straightforward vote where people know where they stand and what the outcome will be when they cast their vote.

My noble friend raised the question of the United Kingdom. We sometimes have different votes in different parts of the United Kingdom at a general election. Sometimes that leads to some tensions, but I do not think that it is suggested that it has weakened the fabric of our union in any way.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Wallace of Tankerness

Monday 20th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

I am not quite sure how to take that. I start by reassuring the House that although I have an interest in electoral systems, I cannot recall ever going to bed thinking about them. I doubt I will even do so tonight.

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has put forward a system that would involve some fractional vote. As I read his amendment, at first I thought, as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours understood it, that the second preference got half of a vote, the third preference got a third of a vote, the fourth preference a quarter of a vote, and so on. However, in the light of the comments the noble Lord made on 8 December, his intention may instead be that where there is no winner in the first round of counting, and a further round of counting is necessary, the value of any votes reallocated from the eliminated candidates to the candidates who are still in the count would be determined by the position the eliminated candidate had in the first round of counting. In other words, if the eliminated candidate finished fifth, the value of the reallocated vote would be one-fifth and so on. The fact that there is that dubiety in the amendment—when I first read it, I took it to mean the same as the noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, obviously did—underlines the complexity that arises.

My noble friend Lord Lamont said that the important thing, in terms of simplicity for the voters, is that they are invited to number their candidates 1, 2, 3 and 4 and, if there is complexity, that is for the counters to work out. If we went down the road proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, there would be some complexity when we were being interviewed by Jeremy Paxman and we were trying to explain where the one-quarter vote and the one-fifth vote came into it. However, I also take the point that the noble Lords, Lord McAvoy and Lord Lipsey, and others made, that although at one level voters are invited to order their preferences as 1, 2, 3 and 4 so far as they wish, there nevertheless is a requirement that they have some understanding. They do not need to know all the complex details, but they need to have some understanding of how the system will work.

The purpose of the alternative vote with the system that we are proposing is that it gives equal weight to votes that are still in the count. That meets the clear, simple and practical tests that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, suggested that there should be. The amendment goes against that; it says that some votes should count for less. Where some would say that people “part company”, I would suggest instead that there is a misunderstanding of the position in failing to make the distinction between a preference and a vote, or in somehow suggesting that if, for the sake of argument, the BNP came last and were first to be eliminated, it would be the second preferences of the BNP’s vote that determined the outcome. In fact, it would be the voters’ second preferences that determined it.

It was said that everyone should have two votes and it is not right that, at the second count, someone has only one vote, whereas the person whose second preference has been transferred has two votes. In fact, at the second count, the person who expressed the first preference and who is still leading has a vote again. The vote still counts as a full vote in the second count.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

How can the Minister describe the situation where, let us say, the BNP voters’ second preferences just push the top person over 50 per cent, as “50 per cent of the votes”, when the other preferences of all the other candidates are ignored? That is not 50 per cent in any meaningful sense.

[Lord Wallace of Tankerness]

It is the preferences of the votes allocated to those who are still in the count, as it were. If someone has been eliminated from the count, it is not the party’s vote that is being transferred—it is the voter’s preference that is still being allowed to have a value.