European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Howarth of Newport

Report: 4th sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 30th April 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, is absolutely right to draw our attention to the constitutional dangers that lurk within the amendment. It goes too far to bind the Government.

I think it is time that we drew breath. We have had a very exciting couple of weeks but it is time to think about the respective roles of the Executive and Parliament and of the House of Commons and the House of Lords, as other noble Lords who have spoken have done. Parliament is not the Government and it should not try to usurp their role. Of course the Government emanate from Parliament and are accountable to it, the Government should be advised by Parliament and are invigilated and sustained by it, and if they lose the confidence of Parliament then they fall, but the Government are not the same as Parliament and Parliament is not the same as the Government. We have a separation of powers. The Government are the Executive, and Parliament neither can nor should act as the Executive.

It was improper and inept for the Government ever to suppose that they could bypass Parliament in dealing with Brexit. Of course there must be a meaningful vote, but it is for the Government to negotiate, listening all the time to Parliament—Parliament constantly proffers its advice—and then eventually to submit the deal that they have negotiated to Parliament for its approval or otherwise. You can call it a take-it-or-leave-it vote, but nobody could say that that is not a meaningful vote.

Dominic Grieve, someone for whom I have the greatest respect and the warmest regard, justified his amendment to Clause 9, requiring that the final terms of the deal should be approved by a statute, on the basis that it was essential to prevent the Government exercising the biggest Henry VIII power ever. That was an understandable and legitimate motive, but to require that the deal should be approved by the laborious process of statute seems to me to go too far in an inappropriate direction. Parliament cannot negotiate. Parliament certainly cannot negotiate by legislation or amendment. It cannot change the deal, it cannot bind the European Union. It can bind the Government in an excessively narrow straitjacket, and that would be an extraordinarily unhelpful thing to do in the national interest. The process of legislating such a statute would serve only to prolong the uncertainty about which everyone complains.

Amendment 49 would develop the Grieve amendment and take it further. It repeats the requirement for a statute already in Clause 9, but doubles up with the requirement for a resolution. It then goes further. Proposed new subsection (5) states that if the House of Commons does not approve the draft terms, the Government “must follow any direction” given by the House of Commons. That seems to me the most extraordinary provision. Of course, legislation routinely binds Governments for the future, but it does not tie their negotiating hand. It should not, specifically, tie this Government’s hands as they seek to perform this particular complex, sensitive, immensely difficult, crucial set of negotiations.

The resolution could say anything. It could say, “Go back to the negotiating table”. It could stipulate that the Government deliver what is undeliverable. It could rescind Article 50. It could call for a general election or another referendum. These are exceedingly important matters where the Government should listen to Parliament, but the Government should lead and Parliament should respond.

If we reflect on the relationship between your Lordships’ House and the House of Commons and our respective responsibilities, surely it is our responsibility to advise the House of Commons, to advise the Government. In the words of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, it is to suggest, to argue, to explain. It is no part of this House’s responsibility to seek to manipulate the House of Commons or the Government, to seek to choreograph future proceedings of the House of Commons, and certainly no part of our responsibility effectively to pull the rug from under the Government.

If we pass this amendment and some of the others on the Marshalled List today, I fear that we shall be getting too big for our constitutional boots, and many of our fellow countrymen feel the same.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Hailsham made an eloquent and powerful speech. If I had closed my eyes, I might have thought I was listening to his father. However, despite his eloquence, he did not go very deeply into the detail of his amendment. I wish to support what the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, and my noble friend Lord Howard said.

The first part of the amendment, proposed new subsections (1) to (3), it might be argued, roughly and broadly mirror what the Government themselves have outlined: a resolution in the House of Commons, the withdrawal Bill, primary legislation and trying to get a vote before the European Parliament has voted. But my noble friend Lord Hailsham then inserts a series of triggers with rigid dates. If the vote of approval has not taken place by 30 November, if the Act of Parliament has not received Royal Assent by 31 January, and if the withdrawal agreement has not been agreed by 28 February, a whole lot of things happen. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, highlighted, what happens is that the House of Commons or Parliament effectively takes over negotiations and can impose conditions. This is a most extraordinary thing. It has never been the case before that Parliament has dictated how a Government should negotiate a treaty, but this is what would happen under the provisions of the amendment. As the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, said, Parliament could dictate all sorts of things: it might dictate that the Article 50 notice be withdrawn or it might dictate, although it would perhaps be subject to dispute, that Article 50 was extendable. This would be for Parliament to assume extraordinary powers in a way that has never happened before. It would be a major constitutional innovation.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Howarth of Newport

Monday 20th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this because, as the noble Lord, Lord Williamson, said, it appeared on the face of it that this was not about thresholds precisely, but a different issue. But the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, has demonstrated the connection between the amendment moved by the noble Baroness and the issue of thresholds. Because I spoke last week, I certainly will not go over the arguments, but I want to comment on two points made by my noble friend Lord Strathclyde in reply to that debate. He argued that if you have a threshold relating to turnout, that just encourages people to abstain. He repeated the argument several times, saying that people will think that all they need to do is to abstain and the referendum will be rejected, but my noble friend Lord Lawson pointed out that that is not necessarily how it would go. It might well go in the other direction. He pointed out that, for example, there would be people who were against change but who believed that the threshold will be met and therefore will have an added inducement to vote. That is one category of people who would have an inducement to vote. Secondly, there could be a group of people who are in favour but know that if they do not vote, they may lose the issue. So it can work in several ways.

I made the point that in 1979, when we did have a threshold, the turnout then was 63 per cent—very high, even though there was a threshold—and that when the subsequent referendum was held without a threshold, the turnout was actually lower at 60 per cent. So in the particular case of the referendums in Scotland, when we did have thresholds, the turnout was higher. The noble Lord may say that that was an outcome threshold not a turnout threshold—and that is true—but I would argue that the effects of the threshold there are also ambiguous. If the noble Lord thinks that an outcome threshold that is something like the Cunningham amendment, with 40 per cent of the electorate required to vote yes, would encourage a high turnout, why do we not have that kind of threshold rather than a turnout threshold? The argument that a threshold encourages abstention is not very persuasive.

The second point made by the noble Lord in reply to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, was that the Labour Government had been elected by only 21.6 per cent in 2005. If that did for them and the noble and learned Lord was happy with that, why was he not happy with 21.5 per cent in a referendum?

A referendum is different from a general election. In a general election, Members of Parliament are up for election and may be up for re-election; a constitutional change is likely to be permanent and difficult to reverse. Secondly, even with 21.6 per cent in 2005, the turnout threshold put forward in the amendments would have been met anyway. There is obviously a difference between 21.6 per cent when at least three parties, and possibly four or five, are standing, and 21.6 per cent in relation to a yes/no proposition. Neither of the arguments the noble Lord puts forward against thresholds is persuasive.

I do not know whether or not we will have to vote on this but, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Elystan-Morgan, to the noble Lord, Lord Roberts, that we did not have thresholds in previous referenda, although we did have one in relation to the Scottish referendum, one cannot think of a country in Europe that does not have a qualified majority provision for changes in the constitution. I shall be interested in what my noble friend says in reply to these points.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, in tabling her amendment, my noble friend Lady Hayter has done two useful things. First, she has reminded us that in legislating, particularly on constitutional matters, we should be sensitive to sentiment in the different nations of the United Kingdom. We needed to be sensitive to that sentiment 10 years ago, which is why we brought in devolution; and, in the context of devolution, and after 10 years’ experience of it, it is all the more important that we should be so. However, the legislation proposed by the Government fails to be sensitive in that important regard. Under their model, a majority in the United Kingdom as a whole would trump a no vote within one of its constituent countries. In that way we risk alienating national opinion and national sentiment in whatever part of the country it was—it might be Wales or Scotland—that found its wishes thus crudely overruled.

The second important thing that my noble friend’s amendment does is to underline that whatever the result of the referendum and however the procedures might be amended in this legislation, if we then went on to have a referendum under whatever set of rules, the result is liable to be divisive. It would be divisive in the case of a particular country of the United Kingdom having its wishes on the electoral system overruled; and, equally, under my noble friend’s amendment, it would be divisive because what she proposes would mean that where there was a no vote in any individual part of the United Kingdom, that would trump the yes vote across the wider United Kingdom and invalidate yes votes in other parts of the United Kingdom. That cannot be a happy outcome either.

A third way in which it would be possible to go, although it is not proposed in the amendment, is for each of the constituent countries of the United Kingdom to determine its own electoral system. In those parts of the kingdom that voted for AV, general elections would in future be conducted on the basis of AV; in those parts which preferred first past the post, they would continue to elect their Members of Parliament on the basis of first past the post. The noble Lord, Lord Strathclyde, smiles at the evident fatuity of such a scheme, yet I do not know whether he entirely rules out the possibility of two classes of Member coming to this House of Parliament, some elected, some appointed, because he very wisely does not show his hand and delays doing so for as long as he can.

The only circumstance in which a referendum on the voting system would not be divisive and set parts of the United Kingdom at odds with each other would be the eventuality of every part of the United Kingdom voting the same way, either for AV or first past the post. It is reasonable to think that that is rather an unlikely outcome.