Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Campbell-Savours

Monday 20th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

The noble Lord, Lord Rooker, has a powerful point, which I shall attempt to put into two sentences. The noble Lord, Lord McAvoy, is not right; this is not complicated. It may be complicated for the people who count the votes—a point which I expect the Minister to comment on—but it is not complicated for the voter. It is the same as it would have been under the system put forward by the Government—you just put your preferences.

The noble Lord said that when the votes are counted they will be given a weighting. This goes to the heart of what is wrong with AV. It is completely wrong that the winner of an election may be determined—and he used the quote from Churchill that I used—by the least worthwhile votes of the least worthwhile candidate. They may well be votes for the BNP or for an extremist party, but it is wrong that in some cases the outcome should be determined by the second preferences of the bottom candidate. The system put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, for addressing this by weighting the votes according to where they come on the list seems a logical answer. Whether it would be workable, I do not know—no doubt we will be told that it would be too complicated for the counting officer, and that may be so—but it illustrates what is so grotesque and ridiculous about the system that is put forward.

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My noble friend puts forward an interesting argument. This is an area on which I did some work in 1989 when we were designing the supplementary vote—we called it “weighting”—and a number of the scenarios that we ran through lengthy computer runs were based on a reduced value being given to subsequent votes under the supplementary vote.

I wish to ask my noble friend whether there might be a slight difference between what we were working on and what he was working on. When he moved the amendment, he referred to the value given to these additional preferences being based on the position on the ballot paper. I presume he meant that if a candidate was in seventh position and yet was the third preference of a particular elector, they would have only one-seventh of the value, whereas under the system on which we worked in 1989 they would have one-third of the value. Can my noble friend clarify the position? If he is working on the basis that there are seven candidates and the candidate at the bottom—candidate Peter—is the third preference of the voter but gets one-seventh of the vote for the third preference, I would not be altogether in favour of it. But if it is simply his intention that the first preferences of every voter should have 100 per cent of the value, that second preferences should have 50 per cent, that third preferences should have 33.3 per cent and fourth preferences 25 per cent, there is great value to the amendment.

I understand that a number of academics have also worked on AV and supplementary vote systems since 1989 to establish whether weighting votes in this way would work. The only problem that arises if one does that is that the minority candidates—in this case, the Liberal Democrats say that they would gain more seats under AV—would not gain as many seats. Although AV tends only marginally to be more proportional—it some circumstances, it can be considerably more so—the effect of weighting votes in the way being suggested will be to reduce the likelihood of outsider candidates winning seats.

My noble friend Lord McAvoy was worried about the anoraks. I apologise to him for being one of those rather pathetic creatures, but electoral systems is a particularly interesting subject. It is the sort of thing you go to bed at night thinking about. I welcome the amendment moved by my noble friend and look forward to the response of the Minister.

Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Debate between Lord Lamont of Lerwick and Lord Campbell-Savours

Monday 6th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Campbell-Savours]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 16A and 17, which are in this group. I wish to follow up on something to which the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, referred. He referred to “a proportional vote system”, which would be inserted under proposed subsection (3)(c) to be inserted into Clause 1 under Amendment 16. In other words, this referendum would not deal with only clear alternatives set out in the referendum question; it would pose the question, “Do you want a proportional vote system?”, which at this stage is not to be identified in the referendum question. By implication, there inevitably would have to be an inquiry arising out of a referendum which might choose new subsection (3)(c) as the option.

I am very interested in inquiries because last week we spent several hours arguing the case for an inquiry. What interested me about this amendment, and why I sought in my Amendment 17 to include the supplementary vote, is that that is precisely what I want to see. I want to see an alternative vote referendum based on the need for an inquiry in exactly the same way as is proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Owen, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Blackburn and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, in their amendment.

In private conversation, I asked the noble Lord, Lord Owen, whether he might be prepared to accept this amendment. There may well be conditions in which some of us would like to divide the House on this. It raises very important issues. He gave me the same explanation; namely, that it is too complicated. But the reality is that, of all the electoral systems that confront the British electorate at the moment, apart from first past the post, the supplementary vote is the simplest system. It is used nationally in the mayoral elections. It has been supported by many millions of voters. Next year, when the mayoral elections finally take place in the new mayoralties—I think that there was reference to 12—I presume that they will also be fought on the supplementary vote. I cannot quite understand why introducing the simplest possible system should be regarded as a complication of the question.

In winding up, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, might offer to take back to those who have their names to this amendment the suggestion that before Report they might be prepared to include, if they were to retable their amendment, reference to the supplementary vote.

The content of Amendment 16A is the substance of an amendment that I shall move later and, again, it is about the principle of an inquiry. The referendum question at the moment refers specifically to “the” alternative vote—a specific system that has been identified, which I and many of my colleagues reject for different reasons. My amendment, which I would have slotted in as paragraph (d) of subsection (3) as proposed under Amendment 16, would enable the public to vote on a question which asked whether they were in favour of “an” alternative vote system. That would then beg the question of an inquiry to take place and a decision to be taken by Parliament or whoever wanted to make representations. Finally, a decision to be taken by government could be put to the House. I ask the noble Lord to take this back to his noble friends, because I regard the amendment that he has moved as one of the most important to be considered on this Bill.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, as always, the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, has made an attractive speech which was full of interesting references, although I think that this is a somewhat curious amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Campbell-Savours, made a powerful point, but it leads me rather in the opposite direction to the noble Lord and to think that one could not support this amendment.

It will not surprise anyone that I speak as someone who has been over time a strong supporter of our existing system. In the 1970s, I even wrote a pamphlet defending our system, called Electoral Reform No Reform. At least I stand by the title because it has always seemed to me that the advantages and disadvantages of electoral systems are more evenly balanced than people acknowledge. The word “reform” is tendentious and “change” would be a better word. I have to confess on reading my pamphlet written 40 years ago that not all the arguments have stood the test of time brilliantly. I accept that there is more of a case than it appeared then for something like the German mixed system.

Some of the criticisms, however, that are made of our system, including one made by the noble Lord, Lord Skidelsky, are fallacious. The noble Lord referred to the first past the post system as one that depends on making the winner someone with a plurality rather than a majority of votes. The criticism is commonly made about our system producing over 50 per cent of the seats with people who have perhaps only 40 per cent of the votes and this is not a majority. The point is made that the Government do not reflect majority opinion under our electoral system. The fallacy in this argument is that there naturally exists in public opinion such a thing as a majority. It is true that if you take any single issue—like whether people are for or against the euro, whether they are for or against privatisation, whether they prefer public expenditure to lower taxes—you can get a majority for any single proposition. But elections are not fought on one proposition; they are fought on four or five issues. Opinion polls show that it is much more difficult to get a majority for four or five issues at once than it is for one issue. So it is a wrong argument to say that you have an electoral system that produces a majority when there is not in fact an underlying real majority.

What is the magic of a majority anyway? In a democracy, power, even by a majority, must be exercised with restraint and with respect towards one’s opponents. All electoral systems create a majority in an artificial way. The first past the post system does it by converting around 40 per cent of the votes into 50 per cent of the seats. The alternative vote system creates a majority artificially by taking the second preferences of the bottom candidate and allowing those to determine the outcome. But the second preferences of the second candidate do not count. The second preferences are given undue weight, which is why I was able to quote in Second Reading what Winston Churchill said about the system when he called it the least scientific in which the most worthless votes for the most worthless candidate determined the outcome. That is the artificiality of the AV system in creating a majority. With PR, equally, majorities are created rather artificially because people take two or three parties that may have fought the elections on completely different programmes, as we well know, and add them together and call it a majority, although nobody actually voted for the programme of the Government. So the artificiality of a majority is something that has to be recognised before one pours all this criticism on first past the post.