Parliamentary Voting System and Constituencies Bill

Lord Lamont of Lerwick Excerpts

Wednesday 15th December 2010 Lords Chamber

[Lord Williamson of Horton]

My Lords, noble Lords cannot imagine how pleased I am to see the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town, moving this amendment. That is so for two reasons: first, because I am interested in the amendment and I support it; and, secondly, because I have sat through almost five days of discussion in the Committee and have heard a large number of extremely important interventions. Some of them did not interest me very much, I have to say, but I have been here and heard them all. I fully accept noble Lords’ right to raise points, but they have done so a large number of times.

Now we come to an amendment that I am interested in because I share the view that it is reasonable, in a situation where we continually tell ourselves that we are dealing with a constitutional issue, that we should have some threshold, as is the case in a good number of democracies in the world. It is true that there are some disadvantages. It is claimed that it could confuse the electorate, though I do not accept that argument myself. I think that the electorate will understand perfectly clearly that they were voting on a certain issue and that they had given their opinion only above a specific threshold. There is also the possibility that quite a lot of people who abstain would consider that they would have given a no vote. However, once again, I do not think that we should attribute to the electorate ideas that they might not have. They might feel quite confident that they will cast their vote and that it is perfectly reasonable that it should be laid down in the procedure that a reasonable percentage of the electorate should vote on an important issue.

Therefore, in principle, it is a good idea to have a threshold. We could have an argument about whether it should be 25 per cent—we have two more amendments here which have a different percentage—but I am very keen that the issue should be raised, as it has been by the noble Baroness. It would be a serious dereliction of duty if we went into a constitutional amendment and had not properly discussed whether or not there should be a threshold. It is an important point and we know that in a good number of other countries there is a threshold in constitutional issue referendums or votes, either in the procedure for initiating a referendum or in the threshold required to validate the vote, which is what we are talking about in this case. This is a subject that ought to be debated in this House. I support the procedure. I accept that 25 per cent is pretty low but we have to launch the debate and see what views are taken in relation to a threshold in the constitutional referendum.

[Lord Lamont of Lerwick]

My Lords, I raised the question of thresholds at Second Reading and the noble Lord, Lord McNally, replied by saying, “Bring it on! Put it down and we will vote it down”, so he can hardly be surprised that the amendment has arrived. I hope that he will be a bit more flexible than he indicated on that occasion. The amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, has put forward is—as has already been said—an extremely modest one. There are other amendments, with successively higher thresholds, which the House might or might not wish to examine and divide on. The principle of some sort of threshold is extremely strong.

There are two sorts of thresholds. There are thresholds that relate to the outcome of the referendum that demand that that there should be a minimum percentage of those voting yes as a hurdle. That is an outcome referendum as in the 1979 referendum on Scottish devolution. Then there are quite different thresholds—like all the amendments tonight—that are purely based on turnouts. Looking at other countries is very interesting. There, the logic of the argument is that constitutional change should occur only when there is a clearly expressed and significant majority for it.

In the United States, for example, in order to change the constitution, a two-thirds majority of both houses of Congress is required. Those changes then have to be ratified by three-quarters of the state legislatures. In Germany two-thirds of the members of the Bundestag and the Bundesrat have to vote for constitutional changes. In New Zealand and Austria it has to be a two-thirds majority of votes cast, in Norway two-thirds of members of the Storting, and in Belgium two-thirds of the votes in both houses of parliament. In Denmark there is a 40 per cent threshold for constitutional changes, and in Italy a 50 per cent threshold. I believe there are also thresholds in Spain and Switzerland. The principle is very clearly accepted in many countries and the logic of it is very powerful: that constitutional change can be extremely important and has to be endorsed by the electorate by a significant majority indicating that that is the will of the people.