Pension Schemes Bill

Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate Excerpts

Monday 23rd February 2026 Grand Committee

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

I hope noble Lords have had a restful recess. It is a pleasure to open the first debate on the final day in Committee on this Bill, and I look forward to hearing further and final contributions from noble Lords on this stage of the Bill.

Today, we continue to discuss important issues relating to pension schemes which of course ultimately matter greatly to the millions of individuals who are saving for, or who have saved for, their pensions, and who rely hugely if not wholly on these funds until the end of their lives. With that thought in mind, I turn first to Amendment 207, tabled in my name, which calls for a review of the impact of this legislation on retirement incomes.

When one reflects on the debates we have had in recent weeks, it is clear that they have been concerned not with procedure for its own sake but with the underlying architecture of the pensions system. The question before us has been whether the framework we are constructing will in practice enable schemes to deliver outcomes for their members. The provisions in this legislation are intended to change behaviour and outcomes: if they were not, there would be little purpose in legislating. The Government do not bring forward measures of this scale merely to rearrange, streamline or clarify administrative detail; they do so because they believe the system can and must function better.

So the objective, surely, should be clear: pension schemes should deliver stronger, more reliable outcomes for their members over the long term. Costs should be considered, but they must not become a proxy for value. The true measure of success is whether savers receive adequate and sustainable incomes—for example, the tax decisions by the Government of the time, or for inflation. Above all, schemes must operate with a single disciplined focus to act in the long-term interest of those whose savings they are entrusted to manage. If the Bill, on becoming an Act, succeeds in that ambition, it will deserve praise; if it falls short, as some noble Lords have cautioned it might, we must be able to say so clearly and respond accordingly. Amendment 207 would therefore simply ensure that we have the opportunity to assess whether the legislation has improved adequacy of income in retirement, and if not, to consider what further measures may be required.

I hope noble Lords will agree that this is a measured and sensible provision. It simply asks Ministers and departments to assess objectively what is working, to identify where improvement may be required, and to report their conclusions transparently to Parliament. In a policy area as long term, complex and consequential as pensions, that degree of accountability is essential.

I now turn to Amendment 211, which is more technical but no less important. It would require Ministers to undertake a full and transparent review of why employee and employer pension contributions are treated differently for the purposes of income tax and national insurance. If two forms of pension contributions are treated differently by the tax system, the Government should be able to explain why, clearly, publicly and with evidence. Tax design should be intentional, not simply the accumulated product of historical accident or, indeed, incremental drift.

The truth is that drift is not unique to any one Administration; it is often perceived as a feature or function of government itself. Complex systems evolve over decades; measures are introduced for sound reasons at the time, adjusted in response to fiscal pressure, amended again in the light of political compromise, and gradually layered one upon the other. In essence, “It seemed the right approach at the time” is a mantra, or even a cliché, which Governments in general find difficult to scrutinise as time marches on.

Reflection in government is not easy. Departments are occupied with immediate pressures, and many probably agree with me that those pressures have never been as great as they are at present. Chancellors face short-term fiscal constraints and Ministers must respond to events. In such circumstances, stepping back to ask first-principles questions can be difficult, yet it is precisely that discipline that Parliament should require.

In truth, we are all susceptible to accepting inherited structures without always interrogating whether the original rationale still holds. That is not a criticism; it is a recognition of institutional reality. But where differential tax treatment affects incentives, savings behaviour and long-term retirement outcomes, we have a responsibility to ask why the distinction exists and whether it remains justified. Amendment 211 offers a challenge to this Government: a transparent review would simply ensure that the current approach rests on deliberate policy choice.

At present, employer contributions receive more favourable treatment for national insurance purposes than employee contributions. That differential treatment shapes behaviour. It affects how remuneration is structured, how salary sacrifice operates and ultimately how pensions are accumulated. Pension saving is not a loophole; it is a public good. It reduces future dependency on the state, supports long-term investment and reflects the principle that income saved for retirement should not be taxed more heavily than income spent today. A structured review would require Ministers to demonstrate the behavioural impacts of the current system, its effect on savings rates and its interaction with automatic enrolment. It would ensure that we are not driven by short-term revenue considerations at the expense of long-term saving and fiscal sustainability.

This issue is especially relevant in light of the National Insurance Contributions (Employer Pensions Contributions) Bill, to which my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe, who is not in her place, and my noble friend Lord Altrincham have been responding on behalf of His Majesty’s Opposition. Many of the arguments advanced in that debate bear directly on the substance of this amendment. Recent decisions to increase the tax burden associated with pension saving, including the reduction in the availability and attractiveness of salary sacrifice arrangements, will have consequences across this space. These measures do not operate in isolation: they alter incentives, shape behaviour and affect the very architecture of workplace saving.

It is immediately apparent to pension providers, employers and practitioners that such changes do not, in practice, fall solely on the highest earners. They bear down on those in the middle of the income distribution and, in some cases, below it. Those impacted include young professionals in high-cost cities and mid-career workers seeking to close gaps in their retirement provision, typically earning between £30,000 and £60,000 a year. Given that the average salary in the United Kingdom is just over £37,000, it is difficult to describe individuals within that range as high earners. They are lower-income and middle-income earners, doing precisely what successive Governments have encouraged them to do: to save consistently and prudently for their retirement.

If we reduce the incentives for employer pension contributions through national insurance changes, we must, at the very least, understand the wider implications for pension accumulation, automatic enrolment participation and long-term adequacy of retirement incomes. We should not allow pension policy to become a vehicle for short-term fiscal expediency, nor should we undermine confidence in long-term saving through uncertainty or opacity. Stability and clarity are essential if individuals are to commit a meaningful share of their income to retirement provision over decades.

So Amendment 211 does not seek to dictate an outcome; it seeks an explanation. It asks the Government to set out clearly the rationale for differential treatment within the pensions framework and to consider whether that treatment remains justified in light of our shared objectives: retirement adequacy, fairness between different earners, and sustainable economic growth.

A natural extension of that argument is my Amendment 213, which calls for a review of employment rates and pension adequacy. With the Pensions Commission, under the chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Drake, reporting in 2027, we recognise that the Government have chosen then to opine and report on the structure of the pensions market before turning to questions of pensions adequacy as a stage two exercise. That is their sequencing decision. However, adequacy cannot remain a secondary consideration indefinitely. If the commission is to revisit the long-term sustainability of the system, it must also grapple with who the system is working for and who it is not. During previous discussions in Committee, the Minister pledged to write about the timeliness of stage two and adequacy. How is she getting on with that reply, and where are we on the timeline on adequacy?

Amendment 211 would specify that the review must consider the pension adequacy of workers who are in part-time or insecure work, the pension adequacy of those who take career breaks and parental leave, and the impact of regional labour market disparities on pension outcomes. If pension policy continues to assume linear, full-time, uninterrupted employment, it will systematically underserve large sections of the population.

In conclusion, adequacy matters. I will not rehearse the statistics relating to those who are not saving enough, but the figures are stark. I have spoken at length, as have others in this Committee, about the risks of drifting into a system that is technically sound in structure but insufficient in outcome. A pension system that does not deliver adequate retirement incomes will, in time, recreate the very pressures on the state that automatic enrolment was designed to reduce.

We believe that these amendments are modest. They ask for transparency, analysis and review, not prescription. They aim to ensure that fairness and adequacy sit alongside structural reform. For these reasons, I commend these amendments to the Committee and I beg to move.

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, I will intervene briefly in support of my noble friend’s amendment—not on the specifics but because, having read again the 42nd report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which refers directly to this legislation, it has become ever more obvious that this skeleton, which has taken up an enormous amount of time and is in itself highly complex, leaves an enormous number of question marks. It leaves an enormous number of doubts and concerns, most of which the Government are placing at their own disposal through secondary legislation, which is at this point equally uncertain.

Therefore, it seems absolutely essential that, when there are proposals such as those we have just heard from my noble friend—to review the commencement of the legislation, or to have reviews on a five-yearly basis, or indeed in any other ways, of some of the more complex areas—the Government should concede that that is appropriate in a Bill of this kind. I do not think I have ever read in my time here such a clear statement as that made by the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee about the nature of legislation. It would be serious enough if it were dealing with a Bill with very few clauses and of little import, but this is of such a substantial nature. The report we have read condemning the nature of the Bill for not having the flesh around those skeletal bones is notable and important. The Government should therefore be much more amenable to the sort of sensible proposals being made in the amendments of my noble friend.

I do not wish to speak further on this, but it seems terribly important that—whether it is dealt with now or at a later stage—there be an understanding that the Bill is entirely dependent upon future secondary legislation. Standing alone is, I am afraid, an unacceptable set of provisions.

[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

There can be no objection in principle to having a review; all public policies should be open to review. The objections are practical, such as whether it would be a waste of time for the people who would have to undertake the review, who might have better things to do. Undertaking reviews can lead to planning blights; measures that need to be carried forward are held back because of some form of review being undertaken that is not central to the measures currently in the Bill.