(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord on his excellent concluding question. I am a member of the International Agreements Committee and should start by paying tribute to our chairman, the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and her predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, for their work on this dossier, with the very considerable help of our former legal adviser, Alex Horne, and our clerk. The exercise of working practices, though I dreaded it, is being well done by the committee and I congratulate the chairman.
I also think that the noble Lord, Lord Oates, is a little hard on the chairman’s achievement in securing today’s exchange of letters with the noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, which settles the issue about which the right reverend Prelate was concerned. I agree that it does not go as far as we would have liked, but it is well worth having. It is good to see the relationship between the committee and the Department for International Trade placed on a more solid foundation, so I genuinely congratulate the chairman.
As the prisoner at the bar says, I need to confess to some previous convictions. I was a Sir Humphrey in my time—a Foreign Office Sir Humphrey—so I am now a poacher where once I was a gamekeeper. In the Foreign Office, I was responsible for a time for the operation of the Ponsonby rule. Ponsonby, 98 years ago, committed the Foreign Office to enable Parliament to exercise supervision of agreements, commitments and undertakings involving international obligations of a serious character, even if they were not given treaty form. In my time, which was a little less than 98 years ago, we were still honouring that rule. Occasionally, it led to disputes in-house as to whether we needed to put an agreement forward. Occasionally, it led to serious discussions about whether security considerations were involved. However, it was being honoured in my time in Whitehall and therefore, like the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, I was very surprised to hear it asserted at the Dispatch Box a few weeks back that the Ponsonby rule had been overtaken by the CRaG Act.
As we know, CRaG covers treaties, but Ponsonby also covers non-treaties. I am sure that while this House was considering the CRaG Bill it was never suggested that, if we passed it, we would, in doing so, kill off Ponsonby. That was not suggested at the time. I do not think we killed off Ponsonby. I do not think we should. The worrying thing is that the Government are now acting as if we did, and I am pretty sure they should not.
People have mentioned the sort of non-treaty agreements which ought to be drawn to the attention of Parliament. They gave examples such as the Rwanda agreement, which in my view represented a breach of the refugee convention. They mentioned the agreements with Sweden and Finland on defence. I do not know precisely what they say. I do not know what form they took, but it does not really matter; it seems our word has been pledged. That may be a good thing—I personally think it is—but Parliament ought to be aware, and these texts have not been laid before Parliament because they were not treaties and the Government’s interpretation is that if CRaG does not apply, then they do not need to do anything. I would also mention the defence agreement with Australia and the United States. I do not know what it says, but it sounds pretty binding and I would have thought it ought to be laid before Parliament. These examples are all considerably more significant than the many trade treaties which the Department for International Trade is laying before Parliament and which the International Agreements Committee is trying to scrutinise.
That is why the report suggested, at paragraphs 82 and 83, what we should do about non-treaties. That is why I was so surprised at the letter, which has been referred to today, received last week from the FCDO Minister of State, Amanda Milling. I am torn about this letter, because as a former Sir Humphrey, I think it is fabulous. It is a masterpiece of elegant, obscurantist obstructionism, with just the slightest dash of the otiose—marvellous. To quote her:
“The Government does not accept that there has ever been a constitutional convention in the UK whereby non-legally binding arrangements are routinely published or submitted to parliamentary scrutiny.”
Did noble Lords see what she did there? Did they spot the “routinely”? We never said that non-legally binding arrangements were “routinely published”. They never were; Ponsonby never said they would be.
There is a mass of documents exchanged between our Government, our ministries our embassies and other Governments, including exchanges of letters, memoranda of understanding and agreed minutes. That is the currency of daily diplomatic exchange. I recall as an ambassador status of forces agreements and their amendment for different exercises, and privileges and immunities for premises or people—all this stuff that takes some documentary form. But it would never be the committee’s intention that the Government should be required to submit such material for parliamentary scrutiny. Some of it was barely scrutinised by Ministers in my time. I was even allowed to sign off some of it myself because it was so trivial.
Paragraph 82 of our report says:
“We accept that it … would be disproportionate, to notify us of every Memorandum of Understanding that the Government enters into. However, there are some significant agreements which should be notified and sent to us for review”.
That is the essence of our proposal. The Sir Humphrey who drafted the Milling sentence that I read out was creating a straw man—a red herring. The sentence is perfectly correct, and it is totally misleading and irrelevant. That is the mark of the maestro.
The letter goes on to say:
“The Government has acknowledged that it may be appropriate to draw to Parliament’s attention non-legally binding arrangements which raise questions of public importance. Ministers consider this on a case-by-case basis.”
Ah, quite—and so they should. But hang on, what are the criteria they are using as they consider this case by case? That is why our report suggested a set of criteria:
“Notification and deposit should be required only if an agreement … is politically or economically important … imposes material obligations on UK citizens or residents … has human rights implications … is directly related to a treaty; or … would give rise to significant expenditure.”
If the Government do not like our principles, we will change them or have some more—but they have to reply. They have to tell us what their proposed criteria are. Then we can start a negotiation and engage on this. That is what this is all about. They cannot just say, “No, no—we’ll do it case by case.” That is a non-answer, although Sir Humphrey would have been extremely proud of it.
I think Sir Humphrey might also have been quite pleased with the following sentence, which is the last thing I will quote, I promise:
“The relevant factors in deciding whether and how to draw a non-legally binding arrangement to the attention of Parliament will vary according to the arrangement in question, and may include—but are not limited to—human rights considerations.”
I repeat: “may include, but are not limited to”—masterly. I am proud of my old department.
Being serious for a moment, I do not think this will quite do. I really do not. I think we are entitled to ask the Executive to engage. It is in all our interests to reach a sensible understanding here, as we have with the Department for International Trade. We did not get all we wanted with that department, but we now have a clear basis on which to go forward, whereas all we have from the Foreign Office is this refusal to meet us and the rejection of our criteria, rejection of the concept of criteria and refusal to start a discussion. I really do not think that will do. Parliament has powers in matters of this kind, but it would be infinitely preferable not to have to exercise them. We owe it to the Minister, just as we owe it to ourselves, to ask him to go back to the Foreign Office and ask it to have another look at this issue.
(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Queen’s Speech said that we
“will lead the way in championing security around the world.”
In “Yes Minister”, the Permanent Secretary would have said, “Very bold, Minister”. It is quite a bold assertion. We used to be good at understatement. Conservative Foreign Secretaries such as Alec Douglas-Home, Peter Carrington, Geoffrey Howe and Douglas Hurd tended to speak rather softly, although they still carried quite a big stick. They tended to get their way. The stick is now a little smaller, as the noble Baroness, Lady Davidson, convincingly reminded us, but we seem to be shouting rather loudly and not getting our way quite so often.
I want us to be trusted. Trust is quite a good thing to have. I want people to believe that, if they conclude a deal with us, that deal is likely to stick. This makes it easier to conclude a deal. I would like people to think it unthinkable that we would break a treaty commitment and start a trade war. I must say to the noble Lord, Lord Frost—I am sorry he is not here to hear it—that this House still champions the rule of law. I think we showed that during the passage of the then internal market Bill and, if we have to, we will show it again in connection with a Brexit Bill.
The Queen’s Speech does not say anything at all about development; the noble Lord, Lord Collins, was absolutely right to pick that up. The slick brochure published by the Foreign Office this week is unconvincing and alarming. It is alarming because it is clear that we are switching aid away from multilateral to bilateral, back to more tied aid. We will give less support to the international agencies fighting the causes of global insecurity, such as famine, disease, unrest and mass migration. Three out of every four cross-channel migrants and refugees come from a country fighting severe famine right now, but it seems from the Foreign Office publication that we plan to cut back on what we do to stem the flow at source—although, of course, the Queen’s Speech said that we will be hard on refugees. Apart from the moral imperative, is it not in our self-interest to do more, not less, through the multilateral agencies?
The noble Lord, Lord King, was absolutely right—as he usually is—in pointing to the imminence of the global famine. It is here already, but it is going to get much worse. Before Putin’s invasion, 80% of Egypt’s wheat came from the Black Sea; 75% of Sudan’s; 75% of Lebanon’s; 50% of Libya’s; and 50% of Tunisia’s. Global stocks were already at their lowest for seven years. The World Food Programme was already telling us that we were facing an unprecedented global hunger crisis before Putin’s invasion. As the noble Lord, Lord King, pointed out, protectionism in India and Indonesia —export bans—means that it is not just wheat that will be in very short supply in the Middle East. There are 9 million people in Tigray who are starving right now. The WFP says that there will be 20 million in Sudan within three months.
Should we not be urgently doing more, not less, for the WFP, the FAO, the UNDP, the UNHCR and the WHO? The WHO says that Covid has already killed 6 million and is still killing 1,000 a day. Those are probably underestimates, because the statistics are patchy. Some 75% of us are fully vaccinated, but only 23% are in Uganda, 19% in Ghana, 6% in Tanzania and 5% in Malawi. These disparities shame and threaten us. Do we not owe it to our Commonwealth friends and to ourselves to do more to help them do better?
It is not just them. In tragic, war-torn, blockaded Yemen, only 1% of the population has been vaccinated at all. Are we using our undoubted influence in Riyadh to persuade the Saudis that lives must be saved in the Yemen? I hope so, but I do not know.
The key global responder is the WHO. Some 80% of its finance comes from voluntary national contributions. Are we up there as global leaders showing the way? No, we are way down the pack. Up at the top are Germany and Japan; we are down with New Zealand. Global Australia contributes more than global Britain; the Gates Foundation contributes more than global Britain. Should we not put that right? It is a global pandemic and, if we aspire to be champions of global security and lead the way, should we not be doing something about global insecurity and its root causes?
My last point harkens back to my first. When working in Washington and Brussels, I was lucky enough to witness a virtuous circle: the more the White House trusted us, particularly because of our policies on Northern Ireland through John Major and Tony Blair, the more our perceived influence in Washington strengthened our hand in Brussels—and the more we were seen to deliver on common purposes with our friends in Europe, the more the White House listened to us. I worry about the very real risk of a vicious circle, which works the other way. Picking fights with the 27, particularly over Northern Ireland, is the best way of losing friends in Washington. The more we drift away from both Europe and America—
My Lords, it is a very long last point and I do urge the noble Lord to conclude.
It is a very important last point. The more we drift away from both sides of the Atlantic, the emptier our talk of leading the way. Effective foreign relations are built on trust, perceived honesty and reliability, so it is important that deals that are done stay done deals. No one ever doubted the word of Home, Carrington, Howe or Hurd: pacta sunt servanda.
My Lords, on the “Today” programme on Radio 4 on Friday the Irish Foreign Minister, Simon Coveney, asserted that “the EU cannot and will not renegotiate the Northern Ireland protocol”. In fact the EU can, should and must renegotiate it. It can renegotiate because any treaty can be renegotiated, and many are. It should renegotiate it because the sole justification of the protocol was to uphold the Belfast agreement, and the first article is that nothing in the protocol shall prejudice the Good Friday/Belfast agreement. As the former Solicitor-General, Sir Robert Buckland, said yesterday,
“that means … that the … agreement takes primacy over the protocol”,—[Official Report, Commons, 17/5/22; col. 554.]
so the British Government, as co-guarantor of the agreement, have a duty to renegotiate the elements of it which are undermining the Belfast agreement.
The main point I want to make in the five minutes that I have is that the EU must renegotiate the protocol. It must because, legally, the protocol is not a permanent arrangement: it must eventually be replaced or it will lapse. That is not my opinion or the Government’s opinion; it was the whole basis on which the EU negotiated the withdrawal agreement: that, under Article 50, it did not have the competence to negotiate a permanent trade and co-operation agreement with a member state. Article 50 allowed it only to negotiate the divorce terms and temporary or transitional arrangements to smooth the departure of a member state. It said that a permanent trade relationship could be agreed under Article 218 only with a non-member state. That is why the EU refused Mrs May’s request to negotiate the trade and co-operation agreement in parallel with the withdrawal agreement. The UK had first to leave the EU, agree to sign the withdrawal agreement and become a non-member state before negotiations on a permanent trade and co-operation agreement could even begin, so how come there was a trade and co-operation agreement covering Northern Ireland?
The Northern Ireland protocol could be agreed under Article 50 only because and so long as it was temporary; it was needed to smooth departure, not least because there was no certainty that a permanent trade and co-operation agreement between the UK and the EU would be in place by the time we left the EU. That should not be news to us because the former Attorney-General Geoffrey Cox explained to the House of Commons that,
“article 50 of the Treaty on European Union does not provide a legal basis in Union law for permanent future arrangements with non-member states”. —[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/18; col. 547.]
He went on to say that, if traders in future felt disadvantaged by the protocol, they should
“beat a path to the door of the Commission and the Court … to say, ‘Didn’t you say that article 50 is not a sound legal foundation for this arrangement?’ And I tell you frankly, Mr Speaker, they are likely to win.”—[Official Report, Commons, 3/12/18; col. 555.]
The original protocol itself spelled out that
“the Withdrawal Agreement, which is based on Article 50 TEU, does not aim at establishing a permanent future relationship between the Union and the United Kingdom”.
That is equally true of the protocol in the final withdrawal Act, since it, too, is based on Article 50. Paragraph 8 of Article 13 of the protocol itself specifically envisages the replacement of all or parts of the protocol by a subsequent agreement. Nor does the provision in the final protocol for approval or rejection by the Northern Ireland Assembly alter the issue; even if the Assembly were to endorse the arrangements set down under the protocol, which was an agreement between the EU and the whole UK, not just Northern Ireland itself, that would not change its transitional nature.
The temporary nature of the protocol is a matter of EU law. I am puzzled that its author never remembers that nowadays. He and all the other spokesmen of the European Union in this House suffer from a selective memory and treat this protocol as if it is to be permanent and cannot and should not be changed, even if undermines the Belfast agreement, which was the very purpose of that protocol. Of course, I give way to the noble Lord, my former good friend.
It is just possible that the noble Lord is confusing two versions of the protocol —the one negotiated by the previous Prime Minister and the one negotiated by the present Prime Minister. The previous Prime Minister’s protocol was, on the face of it, clear, straightforward and temporary. The present Prime Minister’s protocol is permanent.
The transitory nature of both protocols arises from Article 50, which the noble Lord himself wrote—and if he wishes to repudiate that and say that Article 50 does not mean what the European Union says that it means, that would be an interesting thing to do. If the European Union were now to change its view and say, “We were conning you and having you on when we said that we couldn’t negotiate a permanent arrangement under Article 50”, it would show that the original treaty was based on negotiations in bad faith, and that would give us a basis to seek renegotiation.
More positively, we should look to the EU to negotiate and renegotiate with the same spirit and the same objective that it did the original protocol: to uphold the Belfast/Good Friday agreement in all its parts. I welcome the fact that the British Government are moving forward on that basis.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Grand CommitteeWe are debating an excellent report, like all the reports produced by the Economic Affairs Committee under the dynamic and effective chairmanship of the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean. I find that very annoying, because I was a member of his committee and, after leaving, have detected no falling off at all in the quality of the reports it has produced. I have to tell the noble Lord, Lord Forsyth, that, knowing how dynamic and effective the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, is, I do not expect to see much falling off in the quality of the reports now, either.
The sad thing about this report is that it has not been overtaken, although it came out in July 2020. There is an extra dimension of sadness for me in that something is missing that could not be there, because it was written in July 2020, before the energy price spikes started. As the noble Lord, Lord Bridges, said, the energy price cap will go up by 54% next week. That is based on the increase in wholesale energy prices last autumn. We are now in the next reference period, which will determine the increase in October. At present, we are in for a rather larger increase. It looks as if the average household price, which is teetering at nearly £2,000 now, will go up to over £3,000, with another increase of 55% or 60% in the autumn.
We all know what a big component of household expenditure heating and lighting is for the less well off. Is it beyond the wit of man, or the wit of the department, to consider indexing universal credit, or an element of it, to the price of heating and lighting? Next winter could be an extraordinarily bad one for anybody on universal credit, for all the reasons that were set out in the report and discussed in the Chamber today, but with the additional reason, perhaps bigger than most of them, that the price of heating and lighting will be very much higher.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Grand CommitteeIt is never a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, because he shoots one’s foxes with such style. He has just shot four of my foxes so please see what I say as a series of footnotes to his very good speech.
I join the Committee’s unanimity in finding the delay in handling this excellent report absurd. However, the timing is fortuitously convenient because it enables us to ask the Minister to tell us about the weekend meetings in Norway, the Government’s response to Gordon Brown’s weekend appeal and the Government’s answer to what is clearly the number one priority issue: how to stop millions of people starving in Afghanistan this winter.
The report points out:
“Afghanistan is the most aid-dependent country in the world”—
it is talking about the 2020 numbers—with 60% of its budget funded from outside by the international community. Then,
“‘10.9 million people faced “crisis” … levels of hunger’”;
I quote the remarkable report of the noble Baroness, Lady Anelay. The world pledged $3.3 billion of aid for 2021; not all of it got through because of what happened in the summer of 2021. However, the need is much greater now. By December 2021, the UN was estimating that 23 million refugees—more than 50% of the population—faced acute malnutrition. We cannot let this happen. The West won the war, but we must not let our defeat trigger an Afghan apocalypse.
That means recognising reality. It means putting our pride in our pocket and working with the Taliban Government. But without outside budgetary support, they could not, as the report says, maintain basic state services. Yet, as I understand it, all our humanitarian aid now is going via UN agencies and NGOs, and none of it is going to or through the Government in Kabul. What does that mean for public health, education, power supply, transport and the distribution of the desperately needed food? When states fail, it is the poor who suffer. We must not fail the Afghans a second time. The Government in Kabul must be allowed access to the Afghan Government funds held abroad. I am afraid that we really must not let our well-founded concerns about the Taliban’s human rights performance mean that we end up denying the Afghans the most basic of human rights: the right to stay alive, the right to have something to eat.
I never understood why Foreign Secretary Hague derecognised the Assad Government in Syria 10 years ago. Recognition does not imply approval. Recognition provides a basis for doing business. Recognition makes it easier—much easier—and more efficient to do what we need to do now in Afghanistan. We were the first of the great powers to recognise the Bolshevik Government in Petrograd 98 years ago. We have an embassy in Pyongyang; I know, I opened it. We have to face facts, however unpalatable: the Taliban are in charge and we have to do business with them. If we are going to help Afghans, we have to recognise the authority of the Taliban Government now in Kabul.
I would like to make two more points. Unfortunately, they were both made much better than I am able to by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng, but I trade on the Committee’s patience. To ensure that our defeat does not also carry dishonour, we have to deliver on the promises we made to the Afghans—the ones who came here and those we said could come here. In August, as Kabul fell, the Prime Minister said:
“In addition to those Afghans with whom we have worked directly … we are committing to relocating another 5,000 Afghans this year”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/8/21; col. 1260.]
We also then said, separately, that we would take another 20,000 in “the coming years”—variously four or five years; it was not clear at the time.
But this month the Government have announced that the first tranche of the 20,000 are in fact those brought out in August. In December they revealed that the Prime Minister’s additional 5,000 similarly have been subsumed into the 20,000. In short, it rather looks as though we are now interpreting our commitment—the Prime Minister’s word—as restrictively as possible. It seems that few, if any, new refugees will be let in during this calendar year. I find that rather disappointing and I hope the Minister will comment on it.
In the first place, 20,000 over four or five years is not particularly generous. Canada is taking 35,000 this calendar year and, since 20 August, some 300,000 Afghans have crossed the mountains from Afghanistan into Pakistan to join the 3 million already shivering in the camps round Peshawar. Are we sure that our response to this massive tragedy matches its scale? I am not.
Nor, despite all the fine talk of Operation Warm Welcome, are we treating those who got here in August with conspicuous generosity; again, my fox here was shot by the noble Lord, Lord Boateng. These people are plainly refugees in any reasonable understanding of the word, but they are not being treated as such. They have not been allowed refugee status. Instead, they have been given leave to remain for six months and, five months on, many still have heard no more. Those whose position has been regularised have been given indefinite leave to remain. That does not carry the rights that come with refugee status, such as the right to family reunion. The majority, of course, are still living in temporary accommodation in hotels; as of today, the number is 84. They are unable to work. Their children are not in school. They are still in the dark about where in the United Kingdom they will eventually be settled. That does not come across as a particularly warm welcome. We could, and should, have done better; indeed, we still must. I hope that the Minister will be able to say something about that too.
However, the number one priority must be to make sure that as many of those left behind in Afghanistan as possible survive the Afghan winter. That means accelerated and enhanced international action urgently, as Gordon Brown said this weekend. It also means recognising reality and recognising the Taliban. The crisis unfolding right now is partly of our making because it springs from our policy failures and defeat. We must not just shrug our shoulders and walk away.
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am very glad that the noble Baroness, Lady Armstrong, said what she said about Frank Judd. I associate myself with it and add only that he was an excellent Minister for Defence and Development and in the Foreign Office, and always a genuinely good man.
Foreign friends are relieved that the Government’s puzzling new definition of sovereignty, which has obliged us at such considerable cost to sever economic, commercial and social ties with our European neighbours, apparently does not extend to NATO or United Nations obligations, or to the rules-based international order. The review shows that rules are okay provided they are not European, which is still a bit puzzling but good news. I welcome the linkage of domestic and international aspects of security and the new emphasis on a whole-of-society approach to resilience.
However, I find the hubris grating and mourn the death of British self-deprecation. I recall Lord Carrington’s reaction when Helmut Schmidt, his German Defence Secretary counterpart, told him that what made the UK crucial to European security was not so much 55,000 combat-ready troops forward-based in Germany, but German certainty that we could be trusted; if the balloon went up, the Brits would be there, and there was German certainty that Moscow knew that too. Back then, we did not shout about it. We carried a much bigger stick than we now do, but we spoke much more softly and carried more conviction.
Does President Putin, with his troops massing against the Donbass, pause to ponder how we might act on our 1994 commitment to the Ukraine’s security? I doubt it. Does President Xi, as he contemplates Taiwan, worry about our carrier deployment? I doubt it. A rather small gorilla beating its chest risks looking a little ludicrous. The Carringtons and Heaths, the Callaghans and Healeys—the generation who knew war and understood security—would not have been quite so hubristic. Of course, they would have agreed that it makes sense to subordinate national sovereignty to allied solidarity, and autarchy to mutually agreed rules, but they would have warned that what matters most is to retain a reputation for reliability. The noble Lord, Lord Purvis, is right that brutal 50% cuts to bilateral aid hurt us as well as the world’s poorest, and we surely shock the world by passing a law to break international law and tear up a newly minted treaty, gravely damaging global Britain.
One cannot rebuild a reputation by shouting about what one intends. Actions speak louder than words. We must see ourselves as others see us, remember Helmut Schmidt’s tribute, and seek to rebuild trust. The fine words of the review cannot do that for us. Only our actions can.
(3 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberThe Minister will recall that Sir John Major and Lord Hurd of Westwell were the west European signatories of the 1994 Budapest memorandum. Do the Government agree that this gives us a continuing responsibility for the security and territorial integrity of Ukraine? If so, how do the Government intend to discharge it? The United States has a similar responsibility as a signatory, and the Minister will have noted that President Biden believes that now is the time for dialogue with both President Zelensky and President Putin.
My Lords, we stand by our commitment to the convention that was signed and are fully supportive of the efforts in the defence of Ukraine and its sovereignty and integrity.
(4 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my noble friend raises an important point with which I totally agree—and I am sure that many other noble Lords would also agree—regarding the important role that our Armed Forces play in bringing about and sustaining peace and in ensuring humanitarian corridors. The increase in spending that we have seen in other areas—including in the MoD budget—testifies to the important role of the military when it comes to peacekeeping operations and sustaining humanitarian corridors. We can all be proud of the role that our military plays in delivering support to the most vulnerable communities around the world.
My Lords, a detected lie is the clock striking 13: it is wrong and it casts doubt on all past and future chimes. In June, the Prime Minister formally renewed the 0.7% commitment on the record in the other place. I was reassured, but it turns out that I was deceived. The aid community around the world was reassured, but it turns out that they were deceived. I suspect that the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, was deceived: she was an excellent Minister and will be much missed. The cut to our aid projects now is 30%; the cut to our credibility is much greater. I ask the Minister: why do we lie?
My Lords, as I said earlier, we are proud of our commitment to 0.7%; it was a Conservative-led Government who brought that into legislation. I can assure him that we made this decision after very careful consideration. We needed a temporary reduction in order to meet the unprecedented challenges that we face in terms of both health and the economy. I reassure him, however, that our intention is to return to 0.7%.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberIt is always a pleasure to follow the noble Lord. I was not planning to speak about Brexit at all today, on the grounds that my views on Brexit are very well known to the House, and I rather suspect that whatever I say today will not greatly affect the negotiation in Brussels—although I am sure they are following our debate intently.
The third reason I was against speaking about Brexit is because I am sure that we will have plenty of time. It is impossible that by 31 October there will be a completed treaty ready for ratification by the two Parliaments: this Parliament and the European Parliament. It is also, in my view, inconceivable that our Government will have acted illegally and against the Benn Act. It follows that will we have plenty of time.
I want to talk about foreign affairs. I am, however, tempted by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and invited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, so I will touch lightly on Brexit at the end. Your Lordships may leave before the end.
On foreign policy, I am struck by the tone and the content of the Speech. Of course, it says very little about foreign policy and of course that is wholly understandable because this is not a legislative programme or a programme for a Parliament; this is an election manifesto, and elections are not usually won on foreign policy, so of course there is not much there. What is there, however, is much less than is traditionally there.
I have been thinking about why, and I would like to go back into history a bit. In April 1991, John Major persuaded the European Council, meeting in Luxembourg, to declare a safe haven in Kurdistan. The Kurds were then under attack by Saddam Hussein and hundreds of thousands of them were fleeing into the mountains. It was a major humanitarian disaster. John Major persuaded the European Union that it should not stand idly by and that we would be prepared to send forces. The United States did not react. John Major spoke to the President of the United States. Three days later the United States came on board the initiative. US, British, Australian, French, Spanish and Italian forces went in, and the RAF flew in the skies, as did the US Air Force. Some 450,000 Kurds returned to their homes within three months. The operation was a remarkable success.
What is happening today? The General Affairs Council met in Luxembourg yesterday. Did the Foreign Secretary come up with an initiative? Well, actually, he did not go. He sent Dr Andrew Murrison, who is, I understand, a junior Minister in the Foreign Office. I have seen no reports of what he said. At the General Affairs Council, Foreign Ministers listened to the Foreign Minister of Ukraine talking about the continuing occupation and civil war in part of his country, fomented and funded by Moscow. I have seen no reports of what Dr Murrison said to him. Some in Ukraine remember the Budapest Memorandum of 1994, drafted by the British and agreed by John Major with his Russian, American and Ukrainian counterparts. In exchange for the Ukrainians giving up their nuclear weapons, we guaranteed the territorial integrity and political independence of Ukraine. Some in Ukraine remember that now. The negotiations, such as they are, over Ukraine’s future now take place in what is known as the Normandy format. We are not a party to it. The negotiations on our side are led by Chancellor Merkel, with President Macron. I find this rather shaming. We have excluded ourselves.
Then we read in the Speech that,
“my Government will ensure that it continues to play a leading role in global affairs, defending its interests and promoting its values … My Government will be at the forefront of efforts to solve the most complex international security issues. It will champion global free trade and work alongside international partners to solve the most pressing global challenges”.
I am not sure we are playing a leading role. I am not sure how we could ensure that we continued to do so unless we changed our views.
On Hong Kong, I very much agree with what the Foreign Secretary said in the other place on 26 September:
“Hong Kong’s high degree of autonomy is what guarantees its future prosperity and success”.—[Official Report, Commons, 26/9/19; col. 864.]
But in Hong Kong they are saying: what are the UK signatories of the 1984 joint declaration doing—as distinct from saying—to help preserve that autonomy? Are we playing a leading role? Hardly.
“Time hath, my lord, a wallet at his back,
Wherein he puts alms for oblivion …
Those scraps are good deeds past
… perseverance, dear my lord,
Keeps honour bright”.
How persevering are we now and how persevering can we be, despite the hubris of this Speech, as the twin pillars of our foreign policy crumble?
We say that we will champion free trade, but the greatest challenge to the global trading system is President Trump’s attack on the WTO and his belief that trade wars are good and easy to win. We say that we will be at the forefront of efforts to solve the most complex international security issues, but what are we doing to stop President Trump’s dismantling of the international arms control architecture which his predecessors—mainly his Republican Party predecessors—built? What are we doing to persuade him that alliances are not transactional but based on trust, and that NATO still matters to all of us, including America? Or that concerted action against global warming is not a conspiracy against America, but deserves American support? Or that help to Ukraine should not be held hostage to digging dirt on a political rival? Or that the Kurds should not be betrayed—or, come to that, that the Turks should not be totally destroyed and obliterated, according to the whim of his “great and unmatched wisdom”, to cite his weekend tweet? Of course, our apparent inability to influence a capricious White House may not be for want of trying—heroic efforts may be being made behind the scenes—but I wonder whether they are enough:
“perseverance, dear my lord,
Keeps honour bright”.
On 13 November 2016—just after the presidential election, President Trump’s victory—European Foreign Ministers met informally at an extra meeting to discuss the likely foreign policy consequences of the election. They thought them potentially serious. Our Foreign Secretary, Mr Johnson, chose not to go and denounced the meeting in public as a “collective whingearama”. Why? Perhaps he thought—wrongly, as it has turned out—that his colleagues’ worries were unnecessary, in which case, it should have been his duty to attend the meeting to persuade them of that. Perhaps he thought that deliberate distancing from continental Europe would bring future rewards in Washington. Perhaps it was the mirage of a generous free trade agreement with mercantilist Mr Trump. If so, it was a serious misjudgment. Whatever the reason, the fact is that we cut less ice in Washington today than at any time since Suez.
So too in Europe, where deliberate distancing from continental partners continues. We now have a senior adviser in No. 10 who feels licensed to tell the 27 that if they do not give us the Brexit terms we need we shall withdraw defence and security co-operation. That is an extraordinary statement. We boycotted the September General Affairs Council. We do not know what Mr Murrison said this week about the Kurds or Ukraine, but I do not think he put forward any initiatives. Are we really playing the leading role that the Speech tells us that we do?
Of course, a continuing aspiration towards a leading role in global affairs, even if we are not up for it, is perhaps a good thing, but ambition has to be matched by ability. We have chosen not to be centre stage in Brussels. If we leave the stage altogether we will have even less influence on policy decisions there. The twin pillars were mutually reinforcing: America listened because America believed that we could move Europe; Europe listened because we stuck by our friends and were thought to have America’s ear. I worry that the economic damage of Brexit will be accompanied by a further enforced retreat from a global leadership role into a truculent, transactional mercantilism in this country.
Perhaps the country is weary of well-doing. Perhaps perseverance is passive. Perhaps we do not care about keeping honour bright. I hope not, but what are the great global challenges that we should address if we are to live up to what the Speech says? I would say that the three biggest are: defending democracy and human rights in an age of authoritarianism; integrating China, the new economic superpower whose economy doubled in the previous decade, into the rules-based system; and maintaining our societies as open societies while climate change drives major population moves.
Clearly, we can do little against any of those three challenges on our own, so we need multipliers. We need to use the Commonwealth; curiously, it was not mentioned in the Speech, despite the Queen being the Head of the Commonwealth. We need to use what position we can still salvage in Europe and recreate that position in the United States. Then again, we might be able to make a contribution commensurate with our Security Council status, although I hope that we will talk about that less hubristically when it is real than we do now, in this Speech, while it is unreal.
I was almost invited to speak about Brexit by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay. His reading of Article 50 is, of course, absolutely correct. The divorce negotiators are to take account of the framework for the future relationship; by definition, that is a separate document and a separate issue. However, if they were to take account of it, it follows that it should have existed and come first in the sequencing. Like Sir Ivan Rogers and Mr David Davis, I spoke up for not triggering Article 50 until we had some agreement on the future relationship—at least on what we wanted it to be. That advice was not followed so we ended up with an unsatisfactory, non-binding political declaration and the phrase about taking account of the framework was ignored in practice. Both sides of the negotiation were wrong in that, but I must say this to the noble and learned Lord: I fear that we are where we are and we cannot expect the negotiators to down tools and go back.
Would it not be possible, if an agreement appears to emerge this week but cannot be put into legal form, to go ahead with the departure agreement, which leaves out that aspect, and thus satisfy the requirement to leave by 31 October? That seems to be the very valuable conclusion of the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay.
It would not be wise, on either side, or feasible to depart on the basis of an understanding that was being turned into a legal agreement but without that legal agreement existing. Legally, we would move into a very strange status. It is perfectly possible to envisage a deal that can be turned into a legal agreement during an extension period but it is impossible to do that by 31 October and it is unwise—I do not think that either side would want to do so—to go on the basis of a political understanding with no validity in law. I am afraid that I do not agree with the noble Lord.
On the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, the idea that a 2016 vote, three Prime Ministers ago, can be permanently determinate does not seem to be the will of the people today. You can ask, “Do you want to be consulted or do you want to leave it to Parliament?” If you assume that there is a deal and you ask, “Do you want to be consulted?”, they say by a margin of almost two to one, “Yes, we want to be consulted”. If you assume that there is no deal and ask, “Do you want to be consulted or should it be left to Parliament?”, they say, “Yes, we want to be consulted”, by a margin of more than two to one. Moreover, it is a fact that since September 2017, the opinion polls have consistently shown that the country is now of the view that it would prefer to remain. This year more than 70 polls have been taken of which one gave a victory for leaving. I do not think that a second referendum is just the least worst way out of this fix; it is now the will of the people.
If the noble Lord is justifying a second referendum on the basis that public opinion has changed, of course while it can change, I think his bona fides would be absolutely crystal clear to everyone if he said that three years after the second referendum, public opinion could change again and we should then have a further referendum. You cannot hold referendums every five minutes. Even general elections are now legislated for every five years. We had 41 years between what the noble Lord, Lord Jopling, rightly referred to as the first referendum and the second referendum. People were asking for a second referendum after the 2016 vote in 2016.
I entirely agree with the noble Lord. I think that a second referendum, if or, more likely, when it comes, should be mandatory. It should not be advisory.
Does the noble Lord agree that to have a robust foreign policy—I agree with everything he says on those issues—we need to have some hard power? Unfortunately, successive Governments have put us in a position where we are probably unable to put blood where our mouth is or to put in sufficient power as a permanent member of the Security Council. We need to have that if we are to fulfil our proper role.
(5 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberWherever the Kurdish community is, we have continued to campaign and advocate for its important inclusion in any future settlement, whether in Iraq or Syria, which have made, as we have seen, certain gains— although recent events in Iraq have caused concern. We continue to ensure that all minority communities, whatever country they are in, including the Kurdish community, continue to receive vital rights of representation and are fully engaged and involved in all processes. As for immediate support, as I have indicated, the SDF has been part of the global fight against Daesh and remains an important coalition partner.
I understand every word of the question, but I do not understand the answer. What is our policy towards the Kurds? Do we have no shame about betraying them now? Have we made any representations to the United States? Will we be making any representation to the Turks?
I challenge the noble Lord; I do not agree with him. It is not we who have made any declarations; it is the United States. It is entitled to make decisions of its own. The United Kingdom remains a committed partner to ensuring that we bring peace and stability to Syria. As I have said, we stand by the SDF and our Kurdish partners, in both in Syria and Iraq. That position is clear and I am not sure why the noble Lord is so confused.
(5 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, who speaks with great authority. It is also a great pleasure to join the chorus of congratulations to the noble Lord, Lord Howell, on this excellent report and his tenure as chairman of the committee. And it is a great pleasure to welcome back the noble Lord, Lord Bates, and to see that he has walked back into our debates in cracking form, no longer having to try to answer people like me. It is a pleasure to say how much I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Browne, on dialogue with Russia, the noble Lord, Lord Bates, on conflict prevention, and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, on how to handle Iran.
John Bolton, United States national security adviser, famously said that if the UN building in New York lost its top 10 storeys, it would not make a blind bit of difference. Bolton rejects the concept of international law and that of international organisations, which he sees as a threat to US national stability. He does not agree with me and the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, about Iran; he has advocated the pre-emptive bombing of Iran and wants regime change there, as well as in Syria, Libya, Venezuela, Cuba, Yemen and North Korea. His is a rather Hobbesian world where national sovereignty rules; he is a bit like the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, on speed.
I am sorry. If the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, was here, I would have said that, but since he is not in his place, I did not say it.
Bolton is his President’s man: the President’s views are very close to Bolton’s. The problem with the President is not the one discussed by two or three noble Lords in this debate—his unpredictability. He is all too predictable. Read the inaugural speech. The report from the noble Lord, Lord Howell, helpfully reminds us of the General Assembly speech last year, in which the President said:
“We reject the ideology of globalism … Around the world, responsible nations must defend against threats to sovereignty not just from global governance”,
but other threats as well. Global governance is a threat to the nation state. No wonder Orbán was warmly received in the White House last week. No wonder Bolsonaro is the poster boy. No wonder Mrs Merkel is so disliked. No wonder Trump’s America is out of the Paris accords, the Iran nuclear deal, the UN Human Rights Council, UNESCO and the Trans-Pacific Partnership. No wonder the President is seeking to destroy the WTO body, and is very close to succeeding. It is all too predictable; he told us what to expect from the start.
I used to think there were two pre-eminent threats to the rules-based system—the Bretton Woods system, or the UN system. The one that worried me most in my Foreign Office days was the reluctance of the transatlantic partners—our side of the Atlantic just as much as the Americans—to accept the need to take proper account of the rise of Asia and the Pacific and acknowledge that our weighting in these institutions must decline as our share of the world economy shrank. We were very reluctant to accept that and did so far too slowly. We have not yet really fully accepted it.
More recently, I worried more about whether the system might break down because the ethos of the institutions, rooted so firmly in our ideas about liberal democracy, might come to seem inimical and interfering in regions of the world such as Africa, which are possibly more attracted to a more authoritarian alternative model such as the Chinese model. That is a real risk today.
However, I missed the biggest threat. I did not spot that the greatest challenge to the rules-based system would come from its greatest beneficiary, America. President Trump does not want to reform the institutions. He does not like them; he does not like rules—not if they might bind America. With respect, the Government’s response to the Select Committee’s report seems to be in denial about this. The committee said, I thought uncontroversially:
“In the context of the … Administration’s hostility to multilateralism, the UK will need to work with like-minded nations to move ahead on some global issues without US participation or support”.
However, the Government are not so sure about that. Their reply says:
“The Government will always seek close cooperation with the US on a full range of issues”.
Of course, but the Foreign Secretary told the committee that,
“the way that … large multilateral organisations work at present does not work”,
for the US, and that it is,
“seeking to change that … But I firmly believe that if we can get the … reforms”,
to the institutions,
“we want … President Trump would be a big supporter of that system”.
Yes, like working with the Luftwaffe in 1941 to restructure London’s built environment. The President of the United States wants to bring down the system, not reform it. I wonder how well the Foreign Secretary knows Mr Bolton. It sounds to me as if he might be closer to Dr Pangloss.
I agree with the noble Lords, Lord Jopling and Lord Anderson, about the need to be courteous when the President comes to London, but I hope we will not pull our punches. I served in Washington and I understand the importance of the relationship, but like the noble Lord, Lord Lamont, I think that it has to be based on honesty. I watched Margaret Thatcher handle Ronald Reagan. He respected her because of her insistence on tackling the difficult issues and on plain speaking. If we believe in multilateralism and the rules-based system we must defend them even when the attack comes from our closest ally. We must tell him why and tell him straight. Fudging it, as in the Government’s reply to the committee’s report, would mean forfeiting America’s respect—not just America’s.
But it is not only on transatlantic relations that the Government’s response comes across as a little bland and Panglossian. I thought that the noble Lord, Lord Howell, was absolutely right to send a rather sharp reply to the response in his letter of 3 April. For me the clock struck 13 times when I got to page 20 of the response and read that post-Brexit global Britain will be,
“using soft power to project our values and demonstrating that the UK is open, outward facing and confident on the world stage. The UK will lead on issues that matter”—
presumably we will leave the unimportant ones to the Chinese and the Americans—
“be an innovative and inviting economy; and a normative power setting global standards that uphold our values”.
A trace of hubris? The tone rang a bell with me. It was in Pravda in 1968 when I was in Moscow. The Soviet Union was the world leader—the “normative power”—with the world communist movement applauding and the grateful Czechs cheering the Red Army’s tanks taking away Dubček. No one who read Pravda believed it; no one who wrote Pravda believed it.
Yes, soft power is a huge UK strength, but for its optimal exercise it is best not to be an international laughing stock. Do we honestly think that the Brexit process and paralysis makes us look,
“open, outward facing and confident”?
Do we honestly think that the world sees us as the next global leader on the issues that matter—the “normative power” setting global standards? Perhaps the world has not noticed the humiliations of the backstop, condemning us to follow standards set outside our frontiers while no longer having any say. Perhaps no one has spotted how our influence on global rules will shrink when we leave the Union, which is currently setting the pace in global regulatory standard setting. Is it not a little incongruous to preach the virtues of rules-based free trading systems while planning to leave the world’s largest? I feel sorry for my FCO successors who have to write such stuff. I was luckier.
Twenty years ago, the Commonwealth countries took us seriously because through the Lomé Convention process we were fighting their corner in Brussels and winning. The Americans took us seriously because more enlightened Administrations then supported the EU enlargement process, on which we were leading in Brussels and succeeding. Brussels took us seriously because it was believed that we could bring the Americans along, and sometimes we did. My successors must know that if one pillar of the mutually reinforcing tripod collapses, the others crack too. John Bolton cheers and the Kremlin smirks, but global Britain shrinks. It is not too late to stop the march of self-marginalisation and I hope that we will.
My Lords, I cannot help noticing that while the cat was away, time has slipped a bit. We are slipping back again and I respectfully remind all your Lordships of the advisory time limit of seven minutes. Some have been very good at observing that and, in fairness, perhaps your Lordships could all attempt to do the same.